The weak government slowed more by the division between the socialists and the liberals whose differences made way for little progress in decision-making. The Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries had great political power, starting from the Petrograd Soviet and reaching out to control in the soviets established in the other Russian cities.
The Great War also made a large problem for the Provisional Government, especially after it mistakenly decided that it would be best to continue fighting in the war. While at first succeeding in a campaign against Austria, continued failures afterwards led soldiers and sailors to mutiny. The failed campaigns demoralized the nation and unwittingly increased support for the anti-war Bolsheviks. By attempting to send some units of the Petrograd garrison to the front, the government made situations worse, eventually escalating to chaotic desertions of army garrisons. Paradoxically, the Provisional Government had rallied the offensive in the war in order to create a sense of ‘civic patriotism’ that hopefully would end the conflict and bring peace to Russia.
The Provisional Government failed to solve much of the issues that racked the nation, especially the ever-present problem of lack of food and the redistribution of the land that the peasants wanted. In this way the Bolshevik party appealed to the masses, using attractive slogans such as ‘Peace, Bread and Land!’ and ‘All Power to the Soviets!’ Whether or not they would fulfil their promises meant little as long as there was a hope that things would improve.
Kerensky proved to be no better at handling the decisive decisions that were required of his leadership. He had been called as the national hero who would be able to bring together the country and stop the drift towards civil war, but his vanity and alter ego as Napoleon Bonaparte hardly fit his description of himself as the ‘hostage of democracy’ that he was sometimes called. Kerensky’s ill-judged appointment of Kornilov as Supreme Commander of the Russian army really reduced what little support the Government had from its people. The consequences pf his actions could be argued to be far worse: it could be said that the whole failing of the Provisional Government was sealed from the day of Kornilov’s appointment. The officers of the army felt that Kerensky had betrayed Kornilov and therefore they were unwilling to follow Kerensky’s commands when it came to confronting the Bolsheviks. It was true that the people did not want to have anything to do with the Bolsheviks; this was the result of the belief that the Bolshevik rule would not last long and their downfall would then shame all the socialists.
Kerensky himself plainly thought that he could easily crush the Bolsheviks by sending troops to the Northern front to rid the city of its ‘unruly soldiers’. It was a bad mistake. When their transfer was made public, the soldiers of the Petrograd guard mutinied and switched their allegiance to the Military Revolutionary Committee, which from this point onward gained control over the military, leaving the Provisional Government completely defenceless.
The Provisional Government made no real attempt to control the power of the Soviets, although it could be argued that by the time they realized the stuff that was going on, they no longer had any means to control such an example of civil disobedience. The Provisional Government was almost another reminder of the Tsar in the way that it was so incapable of solving the problems that Russia faced that so desperately needed attention. It would not be false to say the popularity of the Bolshevik party largely depended on what the Provisional Government did. The Provisional Government’s weaknesses and failures increased appeal for the Bolsheviks, especially since the other socialist parties became identified with the Provisional Government.
However, it cannot be right to argue that it was only the mistakes of the Provisional Government that brought the October Revolution (and the government’s demise) about. The Bolsheviks had strengths and favourable factors that allowed it to maximize its advantage over the other socialist parties and over the Provisional Government. The role of Lenin in the party was crucial—his leadership proved very important amongst the unruly days of the Bolshevik rising.
