To what extent was ‘Inept Leadership’ responsible for the failure of Chartism?

Why did Chartism fail, if it did in fact fail at all? It was a widespread movement with mass support, which dominated late-1830s and 1840s politics. It even had a context of revolution in Europe and the (limited) success of the 1832 Reform act, yet no key goals were achieved within its lifetime. The search for a definitive explanation for this has led historians to cite reasons as diverse as the improvement of economic conditions; the strong, confident handling of the movement by the government; and the issue of the quality of leadership within the movement. Therefore we must look at all the separate viewpoints on the ‘failure’ and decide how much of a bearing the apparent ‘ineptitude’ of its leadership had.

The issue of whether Chartism was a complete failure is perhaps important in understanding why it did not achieve any of its aims in its own lifetime. A view that seems to ring most true is that what Chartism achieved was not in legislation, but rather in raising the mental, spiritual and emotional capacities of the working classes in early industrial Britain. Julius West concurs, saying that Chartism “achieved not the six points but a state of mind”. This perception of the movement’s ‘defeat’ suggests that outside forces were most influential, and that internal factors, such as the leadership issue, should be played down. While it is important to realise that Edward Royle may hold this view because of his belief in Chartism as a movement stirred by economic unrest and the stemming of its failure from the strength of the system it fought against, it seems to be the most reasonable explanation. Chartism was a short-term failure, but it gained hope and confidence among the downtrodden working classes. Perhaps this indicates that it had long-term successes that stemmed from these gains (many Chartists turned to Trade Unionism and other political movements in the wake of economic recovery, showing greater political knowledge and awareness). For these reasons I feel that the responsibility of ‘inept leadership’ in bringing the failure of Chartism is probably minimal at best. It was the figurehead of the “literate and sophisticated working class”, which continued to develop until all but one of the important points of the Charter were realised. With this in mind, other external issues must have held greater importance, such as the changing social and economic climate and the handling of Chartists by the government. However, this is not to say that there were no weaknesses within the leadership. It is evident that the interrelationship of these factors with the strength of the government, thanks to stability provided by the great Reform Act 1832, is of great importance.

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The responsibility of the handling of Chartism by the government in the movement’s downfall cannot be underestimated. While governments fell in Europe in 1884, the governing class of Britain was confident and tightly-knit enough to control the Chartists, with the same few families holding leading positions in the government, the church and the army. This fact meant that the strength and organisation of troops prevented any real revolt from taking place, and allowed the government opportunities to demoralize Chartists with the use of propaganda. This allowed the government to play down, or even laugh off large-scale events such as the great Chartist demonstration on Kennington Common (10th April 1848) with great conviction, even if it seemed anything but a failure at the time. With the government pouring ridicule onto the Chartists, it is no wonder that support ebbed away from the movement. Coupled with the facts that the government held fast against the points of the Charter and the army remained loyal, it is testament to the leadership qualities of Feargus O’Connor (his organisation and speaking especially) that meetings of this standing could take place at all. However, the government capitalised fully on Chartism’s failure to achieve any of its main points and this must be seen as a hugely responsible factor in the movement’s downfall.

Another way, in which the government’s strength was highly influential in the failure of Chartism, was its continual use of specialised ‘reforms’, such as The Factory Acts (1844 and 1847) and the repealed Corn Law (1846). While the Chartists wanted to force ‘drastic’ (in the eyes of this parliament) actions through, such as Universal Suffrage, people saw other, less radical measures allowed through. This was to undermine the Chartist message that no reform could come before political reform, and is a mark of the intelligence, or perhaps deviousness, of the government. The way they did this enticed people (especially the middle classes, who saw that gains could be made from the 1832 Reform Act) into concentrating upon smaller grievances and therefore steadily took away support for what appeared to be hopeless goals. These short-term measures employed by the government helped to appease many people, forcing back progress made by the Chartists. This effect can be linked with a weakness of leadership, as it was perhaps an indication that Chartist demands were ‘ahead of their time’. It does seem harsh, however in blaming the leaders for failure, due to their sticking to their ideologies, and so the government capitalisation on these principles is surely of greater necessity in the defeat of the movement. The drastic principles of the Chartists merely gave the government sufficient room to manoeuvre a way of undermining them.

The failure of Chartism to gain any parliamentary support, or in other key areas, was another reason for its failure, as it would have been perceived as going nowhere. This factor can be more attributed to failings in leadership as O’Connor’s attempt to become MP for Oldham ended in defeat, while the presentation of a petition with over 3 million fake signatures in 1848, would have done little to increase political integrity for Chartism, even though Chartists would have seen the day as successful, having passed without violence. Of course, this error of judgement on O’Connor’s part led to severe mocking of the movement and increased tension with William Lovett. The government amplified this failing, and so ridicule was placed upon the movement. Again a slight failing was sufficient for the strong government to undermine the movement and its aims.

While it is of great importance to emphasise the assured strength of the government, it is also impossible to talk about the failure of Chartism without referring to the economic and social changes that gave the movement its context. It is rather simplistic (and in my opinion wrong) to say that the support of the movement depended entirely upon a few empty stomachs. This would imply that the mass-support generated was “an unthinking group responding to very basic stimuli” and would miss the point that they were protesting for political aims. The fact that protest built up and faded away as recession and improvement came and went is more due to the realisation that the economic problems of the working classes were due to the corrupt political system that excluded those who were building (literally) society. This factor became less apparent as the economy recovered and so there were fewer supporters. The Chartists lost political protestors to union activities in better economic circumstances, so the socio-economic conditions contributed this towards its failure. Other improvements, such as railways helped the government gain contentment in working class engineers, while also allowing greater control over protestors for a mobilised policing of Britain. The strength of the government is also highlighted within this issue, as its improved handling of the economy and introduction of various political reforms (mentioned previously) aided the improved conditions, which undermined Chartism.

So what of the ‘inept leadership’ that supposedly existed to force Chartism into failure? The question must always be asked whether the movement would have had greater impact, had its leaders acted, thought, or perhaps just been different. The split between O’Connor and William Lovett (not to mention anyone who could have challenged his leadership!) is famous. In the view of Gammage (a minor Chartist) O’Connor “transformed Chartism into the victim of his own megalomania”. However, as Edward Royle correctly points out, “O’Connor has been…the victim of a history written by other leaders” where impartiality is impossible. His leadership of the movement led to its unity of the people, due to the confidence he inspired in the working classes. It is doubtful that Lovett, with his policy of ‘improvement’, or any of the other leaders, could have generated these feelings that were vital in creating the success of the “state of mind” that was Chartism’s prime achievement. It is therefore more likely that O’Connor saved the movement and turned “a pressure group into a national movement”. However there were some ways in which the leadership contributed in the ultimate failure of the movement.

The perception of O’Connor as a “physical force” Chartist and Lovett as a “moral force” Chartist cannot have aided the movement. Although the gap between them was not great – ‘Moral Force’ Chartists often used violent language as a tactic, ‘Physical Force’ Chartists staged many peaceful protests – the perceived difference led to alienation of the middle classes who could have provided more ‘respectable’ support for the movement. However, these middle classes could have proven to be treacherous towards the working classes after the various Acts in the early 1840s. A contribution to failure here is more due to the perception of the well-supported ‘physical force’ Chartism as being a sign that the working classes were somehow ‘unready’ for the vote. This perhaps tells us that Lovett was, to some degree ‘inept’ as he failed to gain popular support. It is easy to see, however, that with a weaker government, O’Connor may have succeeded in ‘forcing’ the Charter’s aims into place. Despite obstacles, such as the three failures to pass the petition, the geographical separation of many supporters, a personality clash that exposed the disparity of ideologies within the movement and the isolated nature of many Chartist protests, O’Connor and his “Northern Star” newspaper acted as a backbone to the movement. Ultimately there must not be too much blame attached to Chartism’s leaders to explain its failure, as there was organisation and popular support (300,000 people at peaceful 1838 protests), coupled with the belief and superb platform speaking skills of O’Connor to instil the belief in audiences. Lack of cohesion within the movement was a problem only exposed by a powerful and confidant government. The ability of the government to control Chartism’s strengths by constantly undermining them and bringing to the fore its weaknesses within the context of economic recovery (itself a symptom of a strong government), shows the most important interaction of factors explaining the failure of Chartism.

In my opinion the major reason for the failure of Chartism is the strength and assurance of the government, who acted calmly to clip Chartism’s growth with propaganda and strong physical force. Of course there were weaknesses amongst the leadership, but there is every indication that the movement could have succeeded, such was the nature and quantity of support. This was inspired by O’Connor and his ”Northern Star”, therefore making him both essential and burdensome (due to his splits with other Chartist leaders) to the movement. Likewise, the context both aided and hindered Chartism. The greatest achievement of the leaders was to bring political ideas filled with hope to the working classes, which was in my opinion a success for a movement that was perhaps ‘ahead of its time’.