The Labour party nationalised many industries, including fuel, power, and transport during 1945-1951 and forced a mixed economy. Most of these industries already had a history of government involvement and required huge resources for investment and modernisation. Many private owners did not have the finance necessary for the improvements and were offered generous compensation payments, which allowed the nationalisation programme to be implemented without too much controversy. Stiff opposition from the Conservative Party did not start until 1947, when the legislation was concerned with road haulage and iron and steel. Although the Conservative Party were against the nationalisation programme, it was committed to continuing state regulation in key industries that were already state managed, including fuel and transport, and were planning to introduce a programme to restructure and reduce the number of existing companies. On the whole the Conservative Party accepted the nationalisation programme, although they would not have implemented this policy themselves, and did little to change the balance of the mixed economy, with the exception of iron and steel, until after 1980.
Full employment was a priority, not only of the Labour government of 1945 but of all subsequent governments right up until 1976. Both parties adopted the Keynesian demand management techniques. J M Keynes thought that it was possible to control unemployment through government borrowing and spending. When unemployment was high and investment was low, if the government borrowed money and increased public spending it increased the demand for goods, stimulated production, and created additional employment, giving the possibility of full employment and economic growth. For this policy to work it was necessary for wage increases to be kept in line with price increases so that any inflationary tendencies could be restrained. From 1947, demand management influenced economic policies and budgets were deliberately unbalanced to control inflation but by the 1960s governments were forced to use direct intervention to try and control spiraling wage rises that were causing high inflation, affecting the whole economy. The economic policies of Hugh Gaitskill, Labour chancellor 1950-1951, and R. A. Butler, Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer 1951-1955, were so similar that they were given the name ‘Butskellism’, and this confirms that there was a strong consensus on economic policy during this period. Both parties continued with similar economic policies during the late 1960s and early 1970s despite mounting problems with inflation, a growing deficit in the balance of payments, and a sterling crisis. In the election manifestos of the two parties in 1964 David Robertson said they ‘were closer together…than at any time in the previous forty years’. By the end of the Wilson Government in 1970 it was evident that the economy was experiencing low growth, rising inflation and rising unemployment at the same time and the Keynesian approach was not producing the desired result.
Many foreign and defense policies, put in place by Attlee’s Labour government of 1945, remained consistent throughout this period. The ‘special’ relationship that existed between Britain and the United States of America was built upon, with Britain proving to be a loyal ally in the Korean War of 1950-1953. In 1949 Britain became a founder member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO, which formally committed the United States to defending Western Europe. Churchill continued with these policies, when he was elected back to power in 1951, he strongly believed that the United States offered the best protection for Britain. By the mid 1950s Britain became increasingly dependant on this relationship, as their world role began to collapse and by the late 1970s had significantly disappeared. Every government’s foreign policies, with the exception of Heath’s, were pro-American and without European allies were of paramount importance for the protection and safety of this country.
Britain also began a programme of decolonisation, with India being granted independence in 1947 and eventually the British Empire was transformed into a multiracial Commonwealth with a series of naval and military bases maintained for the protection of Britain’s global interests. Churchill continued Labour’s policy of gradual retreat by withdrawing the military presence in Egypt and by the late 1970s the empire had been completely dismantled and the Commonwealth had little influence on Britain’s world standing or future.
Bevin the Foreign Secretary in the 1945-51 Labour government thought that maintaining a large conventional military force and building atomic bombs were essential to maintaining the perception that Britain was still a great power. Defense expenditure remained at a high level throughout Attlee’s government and per capita was greater than the United States. The Conservative government followed Labour’s lead and Britain’s nuclear capacity was increased with the development of the hydrogen bomb after 1954. By 1960 Britain had cancelled their order for the surface-to-surface missile and no longer maintained independent nuclear power and from 1962 became totally dependent on the United States for its nuclear weapons.
European integration was ignored because of the stability gained from Britain’s relationship with the United States, and the immense trade from the British Empire, enabled them to remain aloof. In 1950 the Schuman Plan proposed that the coal and steel industries in Western Europe were pooled together but the British government did not join. This attitude continued during the next three Conservative governments, the 1951-55 and 1955-59 governments refused to take part in negotiations for the European Defence Community, and in 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed, moving the countries of Western Europe towards a Common Market, Britain were voluntarily excluded. By 1961 it had become necessary for Britain to rethink its foreign policy. Britains Trade with the Commonwealth had declined and trade with Europe increased. The six EEC countries experienced economic growth far higher than Britain and the United States were encouraging Britain to join so that it could act as a counterpoise to France and Germany. Both the Conservative Party in 1962 and the Labour Party in 1967 applied to join the EEC but were rejected by General de Gaulle. In 1973 when the Conservative government did manage to secure entry the terms were disadvantageous and Labour negotiated new terms after a referendum in 1975. This clearly shows that there was consensus politics. In the 1940s and 1950s both parties rejected the European Union because Britain were in a strong world position, but they both became aware of the necessity to become part of that union once the British Empire had started to collapse in the 1960s.
The two political parties disagreed on many policies, sometimes it was just a matter of emphasis, but on others the differences were more significant. Conservatives favoured private sector enterprise and the Labour Party favoured the public sector, with high levels of state intervention and provision. Each party interpreted their social and economic policies according to these ideological ideas and therefore they always had differences in their policies. On nationalisation the Labour Party wanted to extend government control to other industries but the Conservative Party wanted to denationalise specific industries. With the exception of the iron and steel industry, which was nationalised by Labour in 1949, denationalised by the Conservatives in 1953, than renationalise by Labour in 1967, there was little change in state owned industries during this period.
Both parties were committed to improving welfare provisions during this period but their approaches were different. On housing both parties had a significant number of new houses built, Labour completed over one million in six and a half years and the Conservatives average for each year was just under 300,000. The houses built by the Labour Party were mainly local authority houses that could be let out for ‘fair rents’ but those built under the Conservative governments were mainly private houses built for owner occupation, helping to create a ‘property-owning democracy’. Between 1945 and 1975 the number of owner occupied houses had increased from 28 per cent to 55 per cent, public rented houses from 16 per cent to 30 per cent while the number of private rented houses fell substantially from 56 per cent to 15 per cent.
At the beginning of this period there was little difference between the education policies of the Labour and Conservative Parties. The Labour Party Debates on changing to a comprehensive system did not emerge strongly until the late 1950s, and although they wanted to integrate public schools into the state system, and the Conservatives were in favour of keeping them, Labour failed to achieve this. In 1965 Labour successfully launched comprehensive schools to replace existing grammar and secondary modern schools. The Conservative Party continued with this programme, even though they would never have introduced it, but they did retain many of the grammar schools.
Taxation increased for both the low and middle- income groups under both parties during this period. But for higher earners, (those whose average earnings were twice the national average or above), tax fell during the 1951-1964, and 1970-74 Conservative governments fell, but increased in 1864-70 and 1974 when Labour were in power.
When deciding whether a consensus did exist during the period, 1945-1970, there are many considerations that need to be taken into account. The period covers twenty-five years and during that time there were seven different Prime Ministers and the Labour and Conservative Parties changed office four times. If we were to look solely at the end of the war in 1945 and compare the Manifestos of the two parties it is without a doubt that there was a consensus. The two parties would have pursued an almost identical course regardless of who had been elected. By 1951, when the next election was held, the two parties had both moved towards middle ground politics and had leaders who were placed in the political centre. They both tried to appeal to the same interests and emotions of the voters, resulting in their manifestos being very similar. The Conservative Party had been forced to reassess their thinking and had incorporated some of Labour’s ideas and policies into their programme, including accepting the Welfare State and a mixed economy, in order to appeal to the electorate. The Conservatives were elected to government and remained there for thirteen years.
Britain’s economic decline in the 1960s was largely responsible for the demise of any existing consensus. Kenynesianism failed to rectify the ‘stagflation’, unemployment Increased, an aging population put pressure on the Welfare System, and union demands for wage increases and industrial unrest added to the Government’s problems. Political ideas began to shift towards the right of the Conservative Party and the left of the Labour Party. With Labour wanting additional nationalisation and state control of industries and the Conservatives wanting tax cuts and a Welfare Service only for the neediest, huge differences in policies and opinions began to emerge.
The two main parties, Labour and Conservative, would not agree that there was a general consensus because the opposition party were only elected if they could convince the electorate that they were offering better policies. But they did have a lot of common ground, including maintaining high levels of employment, the provision of a welfare state and a mixed economy with both public and private enterprise. Some of the continuity was inevitable as middle ground politicians led both parties, and because when a new government were elected they inherited any debts and problems that the previous government had had and this restricted and constrained their own policies. New policies could only be implemented if the political, diplomatic, economic, social and even world conditions were favourable. Sometimes it was necessary to postpone or abandon policies because of a prevailing climate, for example lack of finance. Policy details and the aims of the parties always differed profoundly, and the extremists within both parties were irreconcilable. This consensus was not complete or absolute but the fundamental continuity that the two alternating powers provided and the undisputed continuation of many policies makes me believe that there was an underlying consensus.
Bibliography
British Politics Since The War
Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins
MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998
British Politics Since 1945
(The Rise and Fall Of Consensus)
David Dutton
British Politics Continuities and Change (Forth Edition)
Dennis Kavanagh
Oxford University Press, 2000
Post War Britain A Political History
Alan Sked and Chris Cook
Penguin Books, 1993
Contemporary Britain
Longman Advanced History
Robert Pearce
Longman Press, 2000
British Politics Today (Sixth Edition)
Bill Jones and Dennis Kavanagh
Manchester University Press, 1998
