Millions of Russians had been killed, a large percentage of them 'peasants in uniform' - farmers who were untrained and unprepared for what awaited them. With so many farmers fighting or already dead, coupled with severe inflation due to lack of government control of the economy, huge food shortages swept across Russia. The people of Russia were strongly opposed to the war, so when the Provisional Government announced the formation of a new 'Coalition Government' on the 5th of May, in order to control the conduct of the war, criticism was piled on the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries who had taken control of this groups, and they immediately began losing support as the war continued to go badly.
In June 1917, the Provisional Government decided to launch the June Offensive, a major attack against Germany. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, Britain and France had requested that Russia attack on the Eastern front to take the pressure off their forces in the West, so they in effect the Provisional Government was responding to its treaty obligations to the Allies. Secondly, there was still a strong sense of patriotism and nationalism in Russian society that did not like to surrender to Germany and defeat would have meant loss of land and national humiliation. Thirdly, the Kadets and other conservative forces thought that a successful offensive might put the generals and officers back in control of the army, who were not operating under the Petrograd Soviet. Lastly, some socialists felt that a good offensive would put them in a better bargaining position with the Germans in peace negotiations.
But despite the huge propaganda campaign headed by the new Minister for War, Alexander Kerensky, and his success in increasing the morale of the people, the offensive fell apart after three days. According to O. Figes in A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (1997) 'By the time they were fit to resume fighting… enemy reinforcements had arrived and the Russians, suffering from heavy casualties, were forced to retreat.' The rate of desertion was extremely high, thousands of soldiers were killed, and even more territory was lost. The failure of the June Offensive caused an armed uprising in early July, known as the July days. Although the Provisional Government survived this, in the longer term the effect of their war policy was that the moderate socialist leaders in the government lost their credibility with the soldiers and workers. By autumn 1917, an estimated 2 million men had unofficially left the army
Had Russia negotiated a treaty with Germany sooner, they could have avoided further loss of lives and support. They would have lost territory and would have possibly been considered an enemy of Britain and France as a result of their 'desertion,' but at this point the Provisional Government should have been more concerned about the problems within the country, rather than international relations.
This leads onto the troubles within Russia itself, the main one being the redistribution of land. Again, the Provisional Government was guilty of procrastination. The socialist revolutionaries urged that the land problem be resolved by the Constituent Assembly, much to the disappointment of their supporters, the peasants. The liberals were not willing to simply hand over the land to the peasants, they too wanted it to be done within the framework of law set down by the Constituent Assembly and they wanted landowners to be compensated. They were also concerned that a free-for-all would lead to the disintegration of the army as peasant soldiers rushed back to claim their land. This seemed a reasonable position, except to the peasants, who began taking more and more land, livestock, tools and timber as the summer wore on.
In this case, the Provisional Government did have a difficult decision to make, and the one they chose proved to be worse for them in the long run. However, this decision would have worked out if they had not already lost so much support as a result of the continuance of the war, and the declining economy. They were right in waiting for the Constituent Assembly, so that the land distribution could be arranged legally, but were wrong in putting off the formation of such an assembly to deal with this problem among others.
According to Norman Lowe, Mastering Modern World History, 'the government lost support because it delayed elections, which it had promised, for a Constituent Assembly (parliament), arguing that these were not possible in the middle of a war when several million troops were away fighting.' This quote emphasises certain contradictions that were apparent. The provisional government were unwilling to make decisions until a Constituent Assembly had been called, yet they were unwilling to hold the elections for one until all the problems had been solved.
The third problem they faced was the demand of the national minorities. This issue emphasised the split in the Provisional Government as the liberals did not want the old empire to be broken up, maintaining the integrity of the state, while the Socialists wanted to accede to the national aspirations of non-Russian people, offering more self-government and local control; in particular, they wanted to grant self-government to the Ukraine. While other nationalities such as the Poles and the Finns called out for independence after the abdication of the Tsar, the biggest problem lay in the Ukraine, an area of immense value to the Russians, containing the most valuable farmland in the old empire and very near the Front. The Ukrainians demanded self-determination and the moderate socialists in the government made concessions to them, which out raged the liberals who saw it as the first step towards the break up of Russia. They believed that for Russia to remain a great power, it had to keep all the regions together as one centrally governed state.
The true problem here stems all the way back to time of the Tsar, when the practice of Russification was enforced. As a result of this oppression, where people of different nationalities were forced to live as Russians, speak Russian, and support the Russian Orthodox Church, and many were prosecuted (especially the Jews and Muslims) a great deal of resentment had built up among the different minorities. Possibly the best decision would have been to hold a plebiscite for each of the different regions, asking the people whether or not they wished to become independent, or remain part of the Russian empire. If they had chosen to become independent, they would be given a five-year trial to prove they could survive both economically and politically without Russia's influence. However, because of the fact that the Provisional Government was split over the issue, and different sides were making decisions without informing the others, it only succeeded in pulling the government further and further apart, and losing the confidence of the Russian people.
The last key issue the Provisional Government faced was the deteriorating economic situation. Shortages of fuel and raw materials led to factories cutting output or closing and laying off workers; 568 factories in Petrograd closed between February and July with the loss of 100,000 jobs. The scarcity of manufactured goods caused prices to rise rapidly. Food shortages were a major issue and, despite temporary respite after February, by the end of the summer the situation was critical again. In August the government increased the price it paid for grain by 100% but this did not persuade the peasants to bring the grain into the cities. They were unwilling to sell their grain because there were few goods to buy and those that were available were on sale at inflated prices. In Petrograd, grain prices doubled between February and June, and rose again in the autumn. It sent out punishment brigades into the countryside to requisition grain, but this served only to make the peasants more hostile.
As a result of the falling economy, strikes started up again and the running of some factories was taken over by workers' committees. Workers turned their antagonism on the government, demanding price controls, a halt to speculation and the arrest of profiteers. However, the liberals in the provisional government were under pressure from industrialists not to interfere or fix prices and would not act against them. The moderate socialist leaders in the government and the Soviet found themselves increasingly unable to meet the needs of their natural supporters, the workers.
This situation, once again, emphasised the split in the government. The different sides weren't able to agree on a solution and therefore the people took it into their own hands to improve their situation. Of course this only meant more trouble for the government which was already having trouble dealing with the war, the issue of land, the national minorities, and the slumping economy.
None of this was helped by the fact that the Provisional Government wasn't even really in control. The real authority was held by the Petrograd Soviet who had the support of the general public and control of the army. Their meetings took place in the Tauride Palace, the same place where the Duma members were meeting. It was formed on the 27th of February and it quickly became the focus for working-class aspirations. It soon became known as the 'Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' as it was made up of representatives from all factories and regiments of the army. The Petrograd soviet issued the famous order No. 1 which ordered all soldiers to obey the Soviet - this was widely obeyed and showed weakness of the Provisional Government.
A link existed between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd soviet in the form of Alexander Kerensky, the Minister for War, who became Prime Minister in July, after Prince Lvov resigned, fed up with both the liberals and socialists. Kerensky was seen as "the only man who could unite the country - since he was acceptable to workers, the middle classes, and the military - and stop the drift into civil war." However, there are varied opinions. Some believe that his great skills as an orator and talent for giving passionate speeches kept him favour of the Russian people. In the early months after February, he was referred to as 'the first love of the revolution', the 'poet of freedom' and the 'saviour of the fatherland.' He was the ideal man for February 1917, the link between the Provisional Government and the Soviet because he was generally liked in all circles and the workers trusted him. In the Daily Chronicle in 1917, Harold Williams wrote that "[Kerensky's] whole bearing was that of a man who could control the masses," and E. H. Wilcox praised Kerensky in his book, Russia's Ruin (1919) stating that "Kerensky became the personification of everything that was good and noble in Russia… [he was] the prophet of a new faith, the high priest of a new doctrine… he had in him true element of greatness."
Others, however, felt that Kerensky was temperamental and vain. He had pictures of himself working at his desk passed out all over the country in the form of flyers and postcard and newsreels made of his public appearances. According to a text book source, "He deliberately struck a Napoleonic pose, making tours of the Front in a smart military uniform with his arm in a sling." It is clear from this source, and another which talks of him moving into the Tsar's palace, keeping the servants, and having the red flag raised and lowered as he came and left just as the old flag had been for the Tsar, that Kerensky was rather power hungry, and worked more as a dictator, than a Prime Minister.
Had Kerensky been working for the good of the people, he would have been able to help the Provisional Government survive, especially as he as in constant contact with the Petrograd Soviet. However, it seemed he was too caught up in his own personal gain and this came across to the people and, despite the amount of propaganda he organised, he couldn't win everybody's support.
The Kornilov Affair was another factor that contributed to the downfall of the Provisional Government, embarrassing the government and increasing the popularity of the Bolsheviks. General Kornilov, the army commander-in-chief who viewed the Bolsheviks as traitors, decided it was time to move against the Soviet, and brought troops towards Petrograd in August. However, many of his soldiers mutinied and Kornilov was arrested. Army discipline seemed on the verge of collapse; public opinion swung against the war and in favour of the Bolsheviks, who were still the only party to talk openly about making a separate peace.
The Bolsheviks were the final factor in the collapse of the Provisional Government, notably, Lenin's role. He arrived at the beginning of April, with help from the Germans who hoped that he would be able to stir up trouble within Russia and hinder the Russian war effort. He announced his April Thesis the day after his arrival, calling for a worldwide socialist revolution, and immediate end to the war, an end to co-operation with the Provisional Government, the Soviet to take power, and land to be given to the peasants.
From the diary of N. N. Sukhanov, as recorded by J. Carmichael in A Short History of the Revolution, 1967, Sukhanov describes the impact of Lenin's speech at the Finland Station: "I shall never forget that thunderlike speech, which startled and amazed not only me, a heretic who accidentally dropped in, but all the true believers. I am certain that nobody expected anything of the sort." This quote tells us of the shock Lenin's speech proposing the April Thesis was received with, and it resulted in adamant opposition from the Mensheviks, and strong doubt from the Bolsheviks. By the end of the month however, the Bolsheviks were convinced and the April Thesis became the new party policy. Lenin swiftly gained support, taking away from the provisional government what little support and authority it had left.
The October Revolution highlighted the Provisional Government’s complete demise as the Bolsheviks were able to seize the city of Petrograd in the face of sparse opposition. The failure of the Government to rally effective military support in its hour of need was symptomatic of its much deeper political failure over the past eight months. Kerensky’s government could not generate any genuine enthusiasm – its support had evaporated. The Bolsheviks were pushing at ‘an already open door’.
It is clear from all the points listed above that the Provisional Government were not going to survive for long. However the question is whether or not it was doomed from the start. The Provisional Government started out on very shaky ground as a result of severe rifts within the government parties, and factions within the political groups themselves, as well as the fact that it came about at a time when there was much discontent among the Russian people for various reasons, and most of the peoples' support was going towards the Petrograd Soviet. Later events did make things worse but if the government had not been so guilty of procrastination, and had held the elections for a Constituent Assembly straight away, it would have made the decisions necessary to keep the people happy. This though, was obviously not achieved.
It must be remembered that the Provisional Government was never meant to last. As its very name implied, it was a temporary body, to be approved or removed at an early date by a Constituent Assembly which was to settle the country’s permanent form of government and constitution. At its formation the Government already suffered from two main weaknesses - that being the fact that it lacked legitimate authority and also that any authority it had was limited by its unofficial partnership with the Petrograd Soviet. This, therefore, is firm evidence for the fact that it was doomed from the outset and events further along the line certainly supported this.
