The Provisional Government was still losing the power of popular opinion, however, to the Soviets, in particular, the Bolsheviks. The Provisional Government ignored the voice of the people who begged for an end to the war. They believed that participating in the war was a necessity to keep their allies, Great Britain and France. These allies could also be used, so thought the bourgeoisie, to restrain the revolutionaries after the war with Germany was over. The war was also a way of keeping some order in the country. The government stayed with its own class attitude on this point. “[The grande bourgeoisie] must restore the order destroyed by the incapacity and the criminal inactivity of the deposed order.” In the chaos of the war, some social structures, such as the Church and estates of the nobility and kulaks (richer peasants) remained intact. The Provisional Government was supported for a brief while by the soldiers, who still agreed to fight in the war because the Soviet supported the war; the Soviet was comprised of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries who thought the time was not ripe enough for a “proletarian dictatorship.” However, the Bolsheviks ruined the cooperative attitude of the soldiers’ by propaganda after Lenin’s return on April 4, 1917.
The Provisional Government also aggravated the peasantry by procrastinating on the land question. Peasants in Russia had wanted land, since all land in Russia was owned by nobility, and thought “without land there could be no freedom.” The Provisional Government had formed a Committee to look at the land problem in some detail. “The most important question for our country –the land question- can be properly and finally resolved only by the Constituent Assembly, elected by universal…suffrage. [In order to resolve upon this issue] the Provisional Government is forming a Central Land Committee.” This did not satisfy the peasants, however, who soon took over tracts of land without the consent of the Provisional Government or local authorities. The Soviet supported the peasants in their actions, which revealed an ideology closer to that of the Bolsheviks than the moderate viewpoint of the Social Revolutionaries, who were the peasants’ representatives in the Soviet. By following the ideas of the Bolsheviks, the peasants caused further trouble for the Provisional Government.
These revolutionary ideas exploded in the Soviet after Lenin’s return from exile to Russia, ignited by the April Theses, presented by Lenin, the death knoll of the Provisional Government. The theses won for him and his Bolshevik party the popular opinion of the Russian peoples, and the fear of the Provisional Government. His two main points:
1) In our attitude towards the , which under the new [provisional] government of and Co. unquestionably remains on Russia's part a predatory imperialist war owing to the capitalist nature of that government, not the slightest concession to "revolutionary defencism" is permissible.
2) The weight of emphasis in the agrarian programme to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies. Confiscation of all landed estates. Nationalisation of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organisation of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 , according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies and for the public account
The simple statements as “End war and land for all” transferred to the Bolsheviks the support of the peasants who had previously given their support to the Social Revolutionaries and presented the Bolsheviks with the endorsement of the soldiers who were tired of the war. The cause for the Provisional Government’s nervousness lay in Lenin’s thesis on how to deal with the government:
3) No support for the ; the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear, particularly of those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Exposure in place of the impermissible, illusion-breeding "demand" that this government, a government of capitalists, should cease to be an imperialist government.
Seeing the immense enthusiasm the theses generated when they were presented to the Russian people gave the Bolsheviks a clear view of what they had to do: take over the government. This vision became apparent when a non-Bolshevik leader of the Soviet declared “the government is secure, as there is no political party in Russia which at the present time would say: ‘Give us power.’ Lenin replied: ‘Yes, there is.’” This announcement shocked the Provisional Government who could clearly see that popular opinion was shifting towards the Bolsheviks. This caused another boost of support for the Bolsheviks, while wearing away at the power of the government.
Another major problem was the non-Russian nationalists who were breaking free of the Russian empire in favour of autonomy. The Ukraine had set up its own government, the Rada, which refused to recognize the Provisional Government, and set up their national military. “The Ukrainian Military congress deems it necessary to … create a national army on the national and territorial principle ... for the practical realization of the resolutions adopted, the Ukrainian Military Committee in connection with the Central Ukrainian Rada, which will have charge of Ukrainian military affairs.” Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all wanted self-determination and independence from Russia. In protest against the weakness of the Provisioanl Government and its inability to keep the empire intact, many of the government officials quit their positions, causing dissension in the government. The Soviets had supported the nationality cause of the countries.
…revolutionary Russia must enter immediately on the path of decentralization, opening up broad areas for the initiative of the democracy, and developing all the popular forces of the nationalities. In order to guarantee the rights of the nationalities of free Russia, the revolutionary democracy will strive in the Constituent Assembly to obtain broad political autonomy for regions that differ by virtue of their ethnographic or socio-economic characteristics, guaranteeing them national rights…the Congress asks the Provisional Government to proceed immediately to the realization of [a publication] of the recognition of the right to self determination of all peoples.
The Soviets, increasingly dominated by the Bolsheviks, supported the non-Russian nationalists and their aspirations of self-determination. This caused the Provisional Government even more difficulties, as there was turmoil and heated discussions amongst government officials who wanted to preserve the territories of the Russian empire. the Soviets succeeded in disrupting the government and gained even more support, this time from the subject peoples of the Russian empire.
While the Provisional Government was struggling with internal difficulties, the Bolsheviks took another step forward by using an election in the Soviet to take power. The Bolsheviks had a leader in Lenin, who having had the brainwave to overthrow the government, continued to exploit opportunity to realize that dream. After the Bolsheviks had taken over the Soviet completely on the 25th of October 1917 (they had only influenced matters in the Soviet so far, and had not had the power to enforce policies), they immediately adopted Lenin’s programme. “Having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies of [Petrograd and Moscow], the Bolsheviks can and must take power into their hands.” They organized propaganda through speakers who encouraged the masses for the revolt against the Provisional Government. This plot was orchestrated by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in order to seize power quickly.
The Provisional Government recognized the threat of the Bolsheviks and realized that they had caused many of the problems that the government had to deal with during the course of its short lifespan.
One can no longer close one’s eyes to the fact that the Bolshevik Party has brought about a deep split in our democratic organization. Since this party obtained a majority in the Petrograd Soviet, it has converted it into a party organization of its own and, leaning on its [support], launched a party struggle to seize [control] of all the Soviet organizations throughout Russia. They have consistently opposed the slogan of national defence…the Bolsheviks are in favor of seizure of power by the Soviet…a split never brings strength, it only weakens, and it can only benefit the enemies of democracy.
The Provisional Government was unsupported by the masses as it did not deal with the issues important to those who relied on it, such as the peasants and the lower classes. The Bolsheviks fed upon this impediment, and used the government’s weakness to support their own policies, started by Lenin. The Provisional Government was a refreshing spring of democracy to Russia, but the Bolsheviks came as an early frost, chilling Russia back into winter. Governments of nations that were repressed by many years often find it difficult to work in a democratic setting, as Russia in 1917 clearly shows. A government needs a firm stand on issues and cooperation of the people in order to continue functioning.
From the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies (“Izvesiia” Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 7, March 3, 1917, page 1) quoted by Kerensky The Russian Provisional Government (Stanford University Press, California 1961) Vol 1 pg.136
Novoe Vrembya quoted by Marc Ferro The Russian Revolution of 1917 (Prentice Hall Inc, 1972) p. 85
Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti No 65 March 22, 1917 p.3 quoted by Kerensky, The Russian Provisional Government Vol 2 p.526
Appeal to the Provisional Government concerning the Land Question (VVP, No 38, April 23, 1917, p.1) ibidem
marx.org 1997 HTTP: www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/04.htm
Curtis, John Shelton The Russian Revolution of 1917 (Florida 1982) p.41
From the Resolutions of the First Ukrainian Military Congress May 5-8 1917, On the Ukrainian Army quoted by Kerensky The Russian Revolution Vol 1 p.374
Soviet Resolution on the National Question quoted by Kerensky The Russian Revolution of 1917 Vol 1 p.318
‘Lenin’s Letters of August 30 and September 12-14 and 13-14 to the Bolshevik Central Committee on the Unexpected Aid given to Bolshevism by the Kornilov Affair and Urging a Seizure of Power’ quoted by Kerensky The Russian Revolution of 1917 Vol 3 p.1695
‘Izvestiia on the Bolshevik Use of and Activities in the Soviets’ quoted by Kerensky The Russian Revolution of 1917 Vol 3 pp1765-1766