In order to be able to assess the reasons as to why it was that the Bolsheviks successfully seized power, it is necessary to evaluate the political and economic condition of Russia before and during her entry in the war. Three years of total war seemed too greater strain for the Russian economy to cope with. Russia’s national budget multiplied almost eight times between 1914 and 1918, taxes were increased, and the government began to circulate more notes after having abandoned the ‘gold standard’. The result of these actions was severe inflation, and the prices of food and fuel almost quadrupled. To the problem of inflation and growing prices were the added difficulties of food production. Due to the full-scale mobilisation during the war of men from the countryside, it became difficult to maintain agricultural supplies. During the first two years of war, grain supplies were at a steady level. It was not until 1916 that peasants ceased to market produce and began to hoard supplies. Food shortages almost amounted to famine across Russia. This affected the army, who by 1916 in contrast to the high morale of 1914, became pessimistic and displayed defeatist attitudes and soon began to desert in increasing numbers. Overall the impression of an incompetent tsar emerged, and opposition to him rapidly came into existence from various political groups. All these factors contributed to the growing discontent amongst the Russian people and therefore made it easier for other political groups to gain support.
Once the Tsar had abdicated, the provisional Government soon became into effect. It was significant that this new government was not an elected body and therefore lacked legitimate authority. The provisional government had no constitutional claim upon the loyalty of the Russian people and this contributed to its unpopularity amongst the Russians. The governments second major weakness was that its authority was somewhat limited by its unofficial partnership with the Petrograd Soviet. There was a considerable amount of liaison between the two bodies, some individuals such as Alexander Kerensky were members of both. For a period he was
Chairman of the Soviet as well as minister in the Provisional Government. From the very offset the Petrograd had the ability to restrict the Provisional Governments authority. And the ‘Soviet order Number 1’ in effect declared that the orders of the government with regard to military affairs were binding only if approved by the Petrograd Soviet. This drastically undermined the Government as any government which cannot directly control its army, cannot wield real power.
After the fall of the Tsar there was an initial feeling of post revolutionary euphoria in Petrograd. However as the years wore on and the problems mounted, The provisional Government moved increasingly to the right and the Petrograd Soviet increasingly to the left, and soon the partnership of the Dual authority began to decay.
