The official Canon Law of the Church states:
“A person who actually procures an abortion incurs automatic excommunication”. This means that the person who decides to have an abortion has to think that her particular abortion, taking into account all the circumstances of her life and pregnancy, is a sin against God, and yet still decide to go ahead. If she does not believe it is a sin against God, because of her circumstances, it does not need to be confessed and is not a sin.
The Roman Catholic Church strongly believes that as life is a gift from God, it cannot be taken away from anyone but God himself. Human life is precious “for in the image of God man was made” (Gen.9: 5-6) therefore we are sacred to God. The Church also believes that abortion lessens human dignity and doctors are supposed to preserve life not destroy it. Sometimes a pregnant woman may need surgery which will result in her having a miscarriage (e.g. cancer of the uterus) this would not be an abortion as the ending of the foetus was not intended. The doctors have a duty to try to sustain the pregnancy as long as possible. In other words, this could be seen as the principle of “double effect” (DDE).
The DDE is a principle where the primary intention to do good is accompanied by an unintended bad side effect. The good intention legitimises the action In the case of abortion; Bernard Häring and Franz Boeckle have attempted to move away from the rigid interpretation of the rigid DDE theory involving the Catholic Church. With regard to situations in which the life of the mother and foetus are equally at risk it is proposed that there are circumstances in which abortion is justified to preserve the life of the mother or for some other important value proportionate to life even though the action itself aims at abortion as a means to an end. In physical life threatening situations the sole choice is to let either die or save the life of the mother. In such a position, the life of the mother is saved, and her potential for bearing future children is also preserved. An example of where this could be uses is during an ectopic pregnancy. In the 16th century, Thomas Sanchez argued that an embryo could be aborted in an ectopic pregnancy. He used as the basis for his argument Augustine’s just war argument, where reasonable force might be used to defend oneself against a life-threatening aggressor. The argument in a secular form argues for the mother’s right to use force against physical threats to protect her own interests. An ectopic pregnancy occurs when the fertilised ovum becomes attached to the wall of the fallopian tube. The continuation of the pregnancy would lead to the death of both the mother and the child. In these circumstances, the uterus is removed and the embryo dies. The doctors intended to save the mother rather than killing the foetus, so the action is morally permissible. However, Peter Vardy and Paul Grosch (20th century philosophers who wrote The Puzzle of Ethics) have identified a problem with the application of the DDE thinking in this example. New laser technology will enable women to have a safer operation, which involves the foetus being ‘lasered’ rather than the fallopian tube removed. The result for the mother is much better, but it’s difficult to suggest that the death of the foetus in this case is a secondary feature. All that is really different is the intention of the doctor.
The criticism, as always with the DDE, is a question of true intentions. It is impossible to gauge these and critics of the DDE argue that any good doctor will know the likely effects of treatment, so I would argue that the DDE is a piece of “sophistry” (clever argument) to keep the Sanctity of life intact. The DDE does not adequately settle the value of the mother and baby and if both lives are deemed to be equally valuable according to the Sanctity of life, might we not choose to treat the baby and not the mother? However, it has to be remembered that the rights of the mother do exceed the rights of the foetus.
In conclusion, the Roman Catholic Church has laws in which there is no room moral anarchy (except maybe the DDE). The rules are absolutes that cannot be bent nor changed and I would argue that in a changing world and society, the Church needs to change its ideals on abortion. Rather than condemn those who have had abortions, the Church could show compassion for those who have been through traumas concerning the abortion and for those who may need emotional support. The Church should not forget that as Christians, we also have to duty to look after our fellow men in their times of need and we should strive to help those regardless of whether they have committed a sin or not. I would suggest that the Roman Catholic Church may need to reassess the situation concerning abortion because in a modern world, there can no longer be absolute laws. The world we live in is different to the God-fearing world that it was before and I would claim that as many people continue to lose faith because of such things as war and death, the Church should help those in their situation rather than try to educate and condemn them which I believe that they are doing by maintaining these morally, absolute laws.
The position of the Church of England(C of E) is often compared to that of the Roman Catholic Church. Both churches acknowledge that the foetus is a potential life and has significance that must not be overlooked, minimised or denied. However, the churches' ideals of abortion differ because unlike the Roman Catholic Church, the C of E believes that in certain circumstances, abortion can be justified. In a report and resolution of the General Synod, it states:
“The Church of England combines strong opposition to abortion with a recognition that there can be – strictly limited – conditions under which it may be morally preferable to and available alternative.”
I strongly support this ideal that the C of E hold. In some circumstances, abortion can be justified. I find it reassuring that the C of E are willing to look beyond the actual sin of abortion and look at the other side of the situation. I maintain that abortion is an evil because I believe that we may be ending the fulfilling life of a potential human being. Yet, I would strongly argue that need to look beyond the sin itself and strive to do what we believe is most compassionate thing to do.
However, members of the C of e are divided on the question of abortion. Some members point out the sanctity of human life, others say that there has always been abortion e.g. 3,500 Irish women travel to England each year to have abortions.
Much of the debate within the Church has centred on weighing the claims of the mother against the claims of the foetus. Most agreed that the 1967 Act was too wide and too much like abortion on demand and the Church has expressed serious concerns about the large number of abortions carried out under the current legislation. Some members of the church would limit abortions only to life-threatening situations while others would permit them for emotional and socio-economic reasons. Many members of the C of E supported David Altons 1987 private members Bill. Altons was a Roman catholic MP who sought to reduce the number of weeks at which an abortion could be performed from 28 weeks to 18 weeks) The Bill failed, although in 1990 the weeks were reduced to 24. I would argue that the number of weeks permitting an abortion is too long into the pregnancy. At 24 weeks, half the pregnancy has passed and the foetus is more than 12 inches long. If the mother were to give birth at this stage, it could survive. (However, it must be noted that this can only occur with some medical support and intervention.)
To me, this seems more like killing not a foetus, but a child. If the foetus has to be aborted for extreme circumstances such as the health of the mother, then I can understand how the abortion may be justified, as I would argue that the rights of the mother are beyond the rights of the foetus. However, for cases such as a late decision or having a slightly disabled child, I do not believe that having the late abortion can be justified. Who is to say that a disabled child will not live a fulfilling life? The C of E is still trying to bring down the number of weeks and hopefully one day the law will be brought down from 24 weeks though realistically I do not think this will happen as abortion has become too much like a product on demand.
The C of E has had many debates on abortion since the 1967 Abortion Act in order to try and provide a law that prevents abortion becoming on demand as it is now. These debates have happened in February 1974, July 1975, November 1979, and July 1983.
Plus the Church has published documents such as Abortion: An Ethical Discussion (1965) and Abortion: The Church – what are the issues? (1993). These documents provide a theological background to the 1967 Abortion Act. By having these debates, the Church is constantly trying to find out an acceptable resolution to the dilemmas of abortion. The Church also believes that abortion should not just be condemned, but instead the situations which make abortion a viable option.
In general, the C of E position believe that life is to be preserved rather than destroyed and those who cannot assert their own rights to life are especially to be protected. This may be taken from Proverbs 31:8 – 9 which states:
“Speak up for those who cannot speak for themselves, for the rights of all who are destitute. Speak up and judge fairly…”
Abortion can be justified in certain situations when ‘medical indications’ make therapeutic abortion morally viable, if the pregnancy has occurred as the result of a sexual crime or if the social and emotional conditions do not appear to be beneficial for the well being of the mother and child. Successive resolutions in the Church have urged the need for compassion for the mother (1966) and have emphasised that she has interests, which need to be taken into account (1974).
A statement was made by the Church of England’s Board of Social Responsibility a response to the Roman Catholic Archbishops of Great Britain in 1980. The C of E has no moral absolutist position, but the statement represents its current thinking on abortion. The C of E “…see abortion, the termination of that life by the act of man, as a great moral evil.” However, the Church believes that “circumstances exist where the character or location of the pregnancy renders the foetus a serious threat to the life of health of the mother. However, the C of E also believes that withholding compassion is an evil, and in circumstances of extreme distress or need, it is a great evil. The C of E know that it is difficult to decide which is the lesser of the two as it can mean genuine dilemma and pain which should not be minimised. However, Christians need to face frankly the fact that in an imperfect world, the “right” choice is sometimes the “acceptance of the lesser of two evils.”
I would maintain this same ideal as the C of E. Sometimes, Christians have to make a choice out of two that could be regarded as sinful. Yet, although the situation is regarded as an evil (as indeed life is a sacred gift from God), we are not perfect and cannot necessarily make the right choice. We can however make the most loving (agape) choice and in some cases, abortion can be the “right” choice to make. We have a duty to do right, but we also have a duty to be compassionate.
When dealing with hard cases such as rape and disability, there are several views on whether abortion can be permissible or not. Both the pro-choice and the pro-life groups have as their premise that “every child is a wanted child”. Both agree that there is nothing worse than bringing a child into the world that is unwanted, unloved or rejected. However, after this initial agreement, the viewpoints are in complete contrast. The vitalist (pro-life) “a priori” (before the experience) argues that all life is wanted so no direct abortion is possible whereas the extreme pro-choice “a priori” leaves all decisions with the woman as the owner of her womb.
It was the rape by British soldiers of a young girl in 1938 that justified Dr Aleck Bourne carrying out an illegal abortion in order to safeguard her mental health. The Quality of Life (QOL) which employs a broadly utlilitarian/consequentialist basis has to determine whether an unwanted pregnancy of this kind will not only continue the trauma for the mother but also for her existing family. Furthermore, it might be argued that any child of rape might also suffer the trauma of learning of their violent origins.
The C of E sees rape as a justifiable reason for an abortion to occur. Their report Abortion: an Ethical Discussion, (1965) speaks of rape needing to be considered strongly as it is not a trivial issue. It also condemns those that insist that the woman must have a child as it falls outside the primary Christian context of love. I agree with this notion. Sometimes, we need to accept “the lesser of the two evils” in order to do the “right” thing and showing compassion for those is even more important in a situation like rape. Bringing a child into the world that was a result of a violent action is not fair on the mother or the child itself.
Some others, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson, argue that a woman should be justified in having an abortion because of the ownership of her body. In Thomson’s argument A Defence of Abortion, she outlines justifications in which a woman should be permitted to have an abortion in the case of rape. These justifications are such as:
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Ownership: the body belongs to the woman. In the same way that we may say it is her house or her life, she has a prior claim to her body and so she can remove the foetus whenever she wants to;
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Priority of rights: the possible rights for the foetus are acknowledged, but seen always to be less than the woman’s because it is using her; the right is only possible if she chooses to acknowledge it as a right. She may, on the other hand, choose to ignore it.
Thomson’s views are also supported by a fellow feminist, Mary Anne Warren, who put forward a case for granting women the right to abort unwanted pregnancies, because if the state was to prohibit abortion undesirable consequences would follow. Warren argues that in most cases killing is wrong, but to prohibit abortion on demand would deny a woman’s basic human rights. If the foetus is given equal rights then, in principle, a court could force a woman to go through with a dangerous birth rather than abort, because her life would be considered to be no more valuable than that of the foetus.
However, there are objections to these justifications. The Roman Catholic Church believes that a child should not have to suffer the death penalty because of the violent actions of another man. Other objections include the “slippery slope” leading to abortion on demand. Some would also argue that abortion in the form of self-defence implies that the foetus has evil intentions. It has to be remembered that it is not the foetus that has malevolent intentions but the rapist. Those against abortion acknowledge that the foetus cannot have the same rights as a fully-grown and responsible adult. However, her rights do not include killing an innocent child. She may have to carry the child for some time but it can then be passed on for adoption at birth or earlier through extraction.
Some of the objections put forward against a woman being permitted to have an abortion seem to me to be unreasonable. I strongly hold the view that a woman should be allowed to have an abortion in the case of rape. I cannot understand how some would argue that she must have the child. It is not kind-hearted and the woman could suffer considerable mental damage if she had to give birth to the child. I still maintain the view that abortion is wrong yet in this circumstance, it is “the lesser of the two evils”. Some of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s ideals and justifications for abortion also seemed unreasonable and I did not agree with them, such as calling a woman’s body “property” as this depersonalises it and also referring to an abortion as “self defence” because I see it more as a last resort. An abortion should only occur having tried other ways to solve the problem and a foetus is not evil and should never be considered to be evil even if it the result of a man’s misconduct.
Another difficult situation involving abortion is whether the mother has a right to abort the child if it is disabled. In 1996,out of 177,225 abortions performed in England and Wales, 1943 were recorded as having been due to a “substantial risk of serious disability as a child.”
In 1982, the USA case of Baby Doe, the Down’s syndrome baby, the parents allowed him to die after listening to the advice given by the hospital obstetrician, Dr Owen. This case caused huge interests and a series of “Baby Doe rules” appeared which attempted to prohibit withdrawing treatment from handicapped babies. Dr C Everett Koop, the US Surgeon General and ardent upholder of the Sanctity of Life (SOL) who, as one who had done a considerable amount of work with handicapped children, was chosen by the Reagan administration to champion the pro-life argument, judged that Down’s Syndrome babies should always be treated, yet he was prepared to allow the babies to die in extreme cases (e.g. the child having no brain or intestine). In these cases, I would argue that his judgements are justified by judging them on the basis of ‘ordinary’ not ‘extraordinary’ means. In other words, if the treatment of a severely handicapped child should fail, to improve their conditions then doctors would be justified in giving them the only medical treatment that a healthy child would receive. However, Peter Singer (Rethinking Life and Death, (1995)) is unimpressed. The case of abortion illustrates the enormous problem of deciding what constitutes ‘handicap’ and whether a life is worth living. Dr Owen, who had advised the parents of Baby Doe, said he was, “proud to have stood up for what I and a large percentage of people feel is right.”His advice, in utilitarian terms, had minimised the suffering of the maximum number of people (the parents) enabling them to have another healthy baby that would not have been possible had they been occupied by looking after Baby Doe.
Yet Singer argues that the gap between infanticide and abortion on the grounds of handicap is narrowing. The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990), permits abortion at any stage on the grounds of foetal abnormality. In other words, there is already an accepted implicit view that some human beings are if less ‘value’ than others:
“When we do that however, we will not be able to avoid noticing that, if we set the standard anywhere above the bare possession of life itself, some human beings will fail to meet it” (Rethinking Life and Death (1995))
The Roman Catholic Church and the C. of E have different viewpoints on the case of disability. The C of E agrees that abortion may be permitted if the foetus was to become a disabled child that could further cause pressures to family and especially the mother. According to the Church, an abortion can also be carried out after 24 weeks in the case of “serious foetal handicap” where survival is possible only for a short period of time. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, disagrees with this. The Church argues that because a child is disabled, it does not mean it will have an unfulfilling life. I agree with this view. To a certain extent, I would hold the argument that the abortion may be justifiable if the foetus will only live for a short period of time. I would argue that this is justifiable as it prevents further anguish and misery for the family and the mother. However, in other cases, such as Down’s Syndrome, I would argue that only unless the disability is extremely severe then abortion would be justifiable. We cannot judge those who have not experienced life. It is neither right nor fair. There need not be any direct correlation between intelligence and happiness. People with Down’s Syndrome manage IQs of 30-70, sufficient to live a life (in Dworkin’s terms, life as “bios”) with a history and in their own terms to respond socially given sufficient love and care. Gregory Pence concludes:
“To put it another way, they will have a narrative history…most of them would not be better of not existing…” (Classic Cases in Medical Ethics (1995), p.191)
Finally, there is the broad principle that supports the SOL, which is that all human life should be treated with care and love. It is the basis for medicine, the Hippocratic Oath, not wilfully to kill. Christian Ethics looks to the example of Christ whose life and teaching particularly singled out the weak, the ill, and the marginalised as examples of those whom the Kingdom of God welcomed. Compassion as a Christian teaching means to “suffer with” and it warns against treating others as things or objects. Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) secular version puts it simply: never to treat people as a means to an end but as an end in themselves. Thus the care for the handicapped is not a question of preference but one that accepts life, in whatever form, as part of the human condition.
Since the 1960s, many Christian theologians have argued that Jesus’ teaching was not to legislate but to give people their own freedom to act responsibly based on the principle of generous love or agape which wills our neighbour’s good. Joseph Fletcher’s influential book Situation Ethics (1966) coined the term “situationism” and set out a Christian calculus that decides each case on its own merits. Fletcher outlines a case in 1962 where an unmarried, schizophrenic girl was raped by an inmate of the mental hospital where they both lived. However, her father’s request for an abortion was denied because the only moral and legal grounds for abortion would have been if her life was in grave danger. Like Fletcher, I find it shocking that this kind of rigid legalism could deny compassionate treatment through the claim that maintaining the moral laws of the Church allows God to bring about the best outcome. Surely the mental unstableness of the mother is permissible for her to have an abortion? I would argue that it is. A child is in need of support from its family and I do not think this can be gained from a child whose mother is in need of support herself.
For situationists such as Fletcher who believes there are no absolute laws apart from love, the mental health of the woman is paramount and furthermore Fletcher states that:
“No wanted and unintended baby should ever be born.” Situationism is criticised for the same kind of shortcomings that utilitarianism suffers from and Fletcher is far from clear about why and to what extent the embryo or foetus should be included in the calculus. Situationists would in all likelihood favour abortion for the sake of the patient’s physical and mental health, not only if it were needed to save her life. It is even likely they would favour abortion for the sake of the victim’s self-respect or reputation or happiness simply on the ground that “no wanted and unintended baby should ever be born.”
Situationists would reason that it is not killing because there is no person or human life in an embryo at an early stage of pregnancy (this is the opinion of Thomas Aquinas as shown earlier who believed that the embryo gained a soul at 40 days for a boy and 90 for a girl), or even if it were killing, it would not be murder because it is self-defence against an aggressor. If it were the case of rape, there would be two aggressors. First there is the rapist and then there is the “innocent” embryo that is continuing the ravisher’s original aggression. The embryo is not more innocent, no less an aggressor or unwelcome invader. The situationist would ask: “Is not the most loving thing possible in this case a responsible decision to terminate the pregnancy?”
Although Fletcher presents this argument in a direct form, I would argue that it is not fair to call the embryo “an aggressor” for it has done nothing wrong. Although I agree with Fletcher in saying that rape is a justifiable case for abortion, I object to him giving the reasons that is should be permissible on the grounds that the embryo is “an unwelcome invader”. I would propose that the abortion is permissible on the grounds that it is the most loving thing to do for the mother who has rights over the unborn child. However, it must also be remembered that as situationism is a pragmatic and flexible theory, there is a lack of clear guidance leading to the “slippery slope”. This is seen in our society when discussing abortion. Despite the 1967 Abortion Act, which seeks to allow abortion only in limited specific circumstances, in practice there is now abortion on demand. Situationism allows individual freedom yet this freedom could be abused. The theologian William Barclay (20th century) argued that Situationism gives us “ a terrifying amount of freedom.” It may easily be seen to be the most loving thing to do to have the abortion, because it would not be fair on the “unwanted child”; but in reality the true motive may well be that it would be extremely inconvenient for the woman to have the child that disrupted her education or career. In other words, Situation Ethics is very individualistic and can lead to self-interest being dominant. However, I am only pointing out how situationism could be both for and against abortion. I still maintain that in any situation, we should strive to do the most loving thing possible.
For utilitarians, the answer to abortion lies in the question: “Does it provide the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number?” John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism (1861)) stated, “ the utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable as an end.” Utilitarian need to know which people have interests that must be considered in calculations of moral utility and then calculate what action produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number. The action can be considered to be instrumentally good in bringing about consequences that are instrinsically good (in and of itself good). If the answer were to have the abortion, then it would be permissible. Yet, if the answer were not to have the abortion, again it would be permissible.
It is often claimed that greater unhappiness will result to a pregnant young woman by having a child than if she terminates the pregnancy. Using the “Hedonic Calculus” devised by Jeremy Bentham, utilitarians have justified this by saying that the woman would be intensely unhappy if she had the pregnancy, and this is certain. The happiness would also extend to the family and as the unborn foetus has no concept of happiness of unhappiness unlike its potential mother, it is not a remote possibility.
However, I would argue that the guilt and potential medical problems that accompany abortion like its lack of purity may mean that the abortion will not result in the greatest happiness in the longer term. Having said this, I would also argue that the unhappiness of the woman being pregnant may not endure because when she has the baby she may find that it makes her happy, and that it is only the prospect of having the child that makes her unhappy.
Assessing consequences such as abortion is fraught with difficulties. This is why some philosophers reject consequentialist theories of ethics. It is not easy to predict the consequences of any action, as indeed it is not easy to decide which consequences count. This is why I would suggest that taking a utilitarian view on abortion is difficult because although it may initial be uncomplicated, the consequences of the decision made may come out different to what was expected.
A consequentialist, like a situationist and utilitarian, could argue both for and against abortion. A consequentialist must weigh out the consequences and decide which action would bring out the most positive consequences. Mary Anne Warren (a feminist) believes that:
“If actions are to be made morally evaluated by their consequences, then a strong case can be made that the prohibition of abortion is wrong.” Warren argues that access to abortion is essential for the health of not just individual women and families, but also that of the larger social and biological systems that all our lives depend such as the prevention of population growth.
However, Albert Schweitzer argued for an ethic of reverence for all living things. He argued that all organisms, from microbes to human beings, have a “will to live”. However, Schweitzer was aware that not all killing could be avoided. His view was that one should never kill without good reason, and certainly not for sport of amusement. Thus, it does not follow from an ethic of reverence for all life that abortion is morally wrong. Many abortions may be defended as killing “under the compulsion of necessity.”
Although I claim that abortion is justifiable in certain circumstances, I disagree with Warren and Schweitzer although they are against each other in their views. I disagree with Warren because she makes an excuse for abortion that she sees as a prevention of population growth. Abortion is a grave experience for both women and their families and I would argue that Warren makes it sound like abortion is a way of saving the earth. I strongly hold the statement that abortion is wrong. It is a sin yet because we are living in an already sinful world, I believe that it could be the “lesser of the two evils.” It is not a way of saving mankind from starvation.
I disagree with Schweitzer because he refers to abortion as killing. I would argue that that term is too strong. It is complicated to call an abortion a “killing” because this makes it sound cold and bloodthirsty. I would like to believe that all the circumstances of abortion have occurred because it is a last result not a purposeful killing.
Having researched this topic in some detail, I am now in a position to give my conclusions.
As shown in this coursework, abortion is not a simple issue. Although the law permits abortion to occur until 28 weeks, I strongly disagree. I would argue that this is too late in the pregnancy and I would call the abortion of a foetus of 28 weeks a killing as I maintain that it is no longer a foetus at this stage but a baby. I am also aware that abortion is becoming too much on demand rather than is specific circumstances. I believe that this could destroy our society if something is not done about it.
Like the Church of England, however, I agree that abortion can be acceptable in certain circumstances. A girl of a young age will not be able to look after a baby and if the living conditions will not be suitable for the child to live in (such as low living standards and difficulty if employment for the parents) then again, abortion is justified.
I believe that regardless of religion, we should all strive to do the most compassionate thing for those who need help and during the while writing this coursework, I have come to the conclusion that I am a situationist. I would argue that in some circumstances, abortion is “the lesser of the two evils” and rather than condemn those in the situation (such as the Roman Catholic Church), I would maintain that we comfort and support them with the self-less, self –giving love of Agape. Although abortion may be evil, not showing compassion for others is also an evil.
During this coursework, I have learnt that there are always two sides to the argument. It is difficult to know what to do in these situations and living in a modern society, the old fashioned ideals of abortion (Natural Law and the Roman Catholic Church) make abortion more difficult to bear with rather than supportive. We must always be sympathetic to those in the situation for we have never experienced the emotions of deciding whether to have a child or not.
We can only do what we think is best and I hope that those questioning abortion will have the guide and support of the law, the church and the people. We all need to remember that at the end of the day, we are not perfect.
Joe Jenkins, Ethics and Religion, p.87, Heinemann Publishers, 2002
2 John Ankerberg & John Weldon, The facts on abortion, p.39, Harvest House Publishers, 1995
John Ankerberg & John Weldon, The facts on abortion, p.40, Harvest House Publishers, 1995
Robert A Bowie, Ethical Studies, p.178, Nelson Thornes Ltd, 2001
Robert A Bowie, Ethical Studies, p.178, Nelson Thornes Ltd, 2001
Joe Jenkins, Ethics and Religion, p.91, Heinemann Publishers, 2002
Craig Donnellan, The Abortion Issue, p.5, Independence, 2000
Michael Wilcockson, Issues of Life and Death, p.33, Hodder and Stroughton, 1999
Robert A Bowie, Ethical Studies, p.180, Nelson Thornes Ltd, 2001
Michael Wilcockson, Issues of Life and Death, p.47, Hodder and Stoughton, 1999
Medical Ethics and Issues of Life and Death, http://www.cofe.anglican.org/view/medical.html
Medical Ethics and Issues of Life and Death, http://www.cofe.anglican.org/view/medical.html
Medical Ethics and Issues of Life and Death, http://www.cofe.anglican.org/view/medical.html
Michael Wilcockson, Issues of Life and Death, p.52, Hodder and Stoughton, 1999
Michael Wilcockson, Issues of Life and Death, p.41, Hodder and Stoughton, 1999
Michael Wilcockson, Issues of Life and Death, p.42, Hodder and Stoughton, 1999
Michael Wilcockson, Issues of Life and Death, p.45, Hodder and Stroughton, 1999
Michael Wilcockson, Issues of Life and Death, p.44, Hodder and Stoughton, 1999
A term laid down by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
Michael Wilcockson, Issues of Life and Death, p.45, Hodder and Stoughton, 1999
Michael Wilcockson, Issues of Life and Death, p.53, Hodder and Stoughton, 1999
Mary Anne Warren; A Companion to Ethics: Edited by P.Singer; p.303; Blackwells; 1999
Mary Anne Warren; A Companion to Ethics: Edited by P.Singer; p.307; Blackwells; 1999