Can there be a coherent Relativism?

Authors Avatar
Can there be a coherent Relativism?

Characterised generally relativism, within the context of ethics, is the view that all moral standards are relative to an individual or culture. Under a relativist conception of ethics there are no moral 'facts', and the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of an action is dependent on the views, beliefs and values of groups, societies or cultures in which the actions are performed. Relativism is neatly summed up by the ancient Greek sophist Protagoras (480-411BC) in his statement that "Man is the measure of all things". And that there may in fact be more than just one true morality. Moreover what is morally right for one group or culture may not be right for every group or culture. This was a typical view among the sophists at the time of Protagoras and was grounded in a prevailing belief in 'Nomos' or social convention over 'Physis' or nature. However, when Protagoras uttered this statement he meant it to encompass all aspects of human life and not just morality. This strongest form of relativism, that all truths are relative not just moral ones, has led to its own unique set of problems but within the scope of this study we are concerned only to look at relativism within the context of ethics and morality in general. Can relativism form the bedrock for a coherent conception of morality? And if not what are the problems with the thesis that may render it incoherent?

Through the history of ethics, relativism has remained a controversial thesis that has been in stark contrast to more conventional systems of ethics, such as that of Immanuel Kant, that have advocated an ideal standard of absolute morality. And unlike ethical systems such as utilitarianism or duty based theses, relativism is meta-ethical. It says nothing about particular actions of themselves but rather asks about ethics itself, in this sense relativism is a second order thesis. It is an interesting point to note at this stage that since relativism as an ethical system has no classical formulation or notable exponents it has at times been developed more by its critics than those who overtly defend the position.

The question of relativism raises a number of issues that must be dealt with before we attempt to assess the coherency of the thesis as a whole. The first of these, which I feel it necessary to address, is that of authority. This is specifically the question of whether any one is more qualified than any other to judge the moral worth or 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of an action than anyone else. Benn1wanted to draw a distinction here between 'authority in' and 'authority on'. It seems to Benn that the former is of a lower status than the latter as the former is an appointed position where as the latter is an earned authority. So if there is to be an authority with regard to morality and ethics it must be someone who is an 'authority on' the matter who has earned their title by proven expertise with regard to that matter. So is it possible that a moral authority is able to teach that which he has expertise on? Or when it comes to matters such as morality would this simply be indoctrination? Plato certainly thought, as we see in Meno and Protagoras, that morality or virtue can be taught. If we assume that morality is teachable and that there are authorities on it, we may infer the existence of moral truths external to individual opinion or belief, since if an authority is able to tell you the best course of action in any situation, it assumes that there exists a best course of action at all that is not simply the opinion of the person giving this advice. The best course of action exists independently but it is through the authority that we are made aware of it. However the fact that we all make moral deliberations assumes we are competent to make them. So is it really the case that this competency is unequally distributed? Or are we all as able to make moral choices as well as each other through our intuitive capacity? Meta-ethical relativism is the view that in moral matters there are no universal truths; instead morality is relative to one's society or culture2.
Join now!


A fundamental question of meta-ethics has been whether or not 'moral facts' really exist. Stronger forms of relativism claim there is no such thing as detached objective morality and it is these formulations of the thesis that have come under the heaviest attack. Such strong relativistic claims have prompted calls of in-coherency and even that they are self-refuting. For example if we claim that everything is relative then relativism itself is here surely to be held to the same claim as everything else, namely that relativism is itself relative. If relativism is true is it absolutely true or ...

This is a preview of the whole essay