Critically Discuss D.Z. Phillips Conception of Immortality.

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Mike Brookes: 201794. Philosophy of Religion 2.

Critically Discuss D.Z. Phillips Conception of Immortality

In his book ‘Death and Immortality’, D Z Phillips starts by asking the question: does belief in immortality rest on a mistake? The first two chapters are negative in the sense that they examine traditional philosophical, as well as common sense, conceptions of what immortality means.  Phillips argues that philosophical analyses centred on the notion of immortality have generally been constructed around certain essential presuppositions: presuppositions that assume some form of continuation of personal identity after death. One cannot logically deny that, by definition, death entails the end of bodily existence, so one, it seems, is logically drawn to the notion that survival after death entails the survival of some kind of non-bodily identity - the soul. In the last two chapters Phillips disputes this presupposition, claiming that a perfectly valid conception of immortality can be maintained without resorting to any form of dualism. Phillips gives an alternative account of immortality based, not on any realm of existence beyond this life, but on certain moral and religious modes of living within this life.

Unlike some of writers, e.g. R. Swinburn, D Z Phillips does not support the notion that belief in continuous personal existence is logically defendable. Indeed, he provides an extremely robust argument to the contrary, claiming that such claims are open to fatal logical objections.  After briefly contradicting any notions of survival of a non-material body (the possibility of some form of bodily resurrection in this world or the next), Phillips goes on to attack the more commonly held view that what survives death is some form of disembodied self - the soul. This notion of survival after death is dependent on the idea that the self is numerically distinct from the body. I e, I can continue to exist without my body if I am not the same thing as my body. Following on from Wittgenstein's attack on the notion of logical privacy, Phillips thinks that this idea of the soul is "fundamentally confused". Phillips argues that it is impossible to divorce private experience from public life and as such any conception of the soul as a separate substance is entirely fallacious.

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Taken that any continuation of personal identity after death seems to be dependent on some form body/soul dualism, and given the logical objections to such notions, one may be drawn into thinking that immortality is always going to be seen as rationally implausible. However, Phillips argues that a rejection of dualism does not necessitate a rejection of immortality. Phillips draws attention of to the fact that a perfectly meaningful conception of the soul can, and does, exist in the absence of any reference to some mysterious incorporeal substance. In everyday language we use expressions such as "he was a ...

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