How might a moral relativist respond to the claim that people should always tell the truth?

factual statement, the truth of which can be proved by evidence. An ethical naturalist would claim that the second statement is verifiable. We can find out whether Saddam Hussein is evil either by finding out if, in his personal behaviour, he is cruel, deceitful or cowardly; or by finding out if his action have ever had evil consequences. If we find he was like this, or that his action did have these results, then I have confirmed the statement that “Saddam Hussein is a very evil man”. If the evidence points in the other direction, then the statement is false.      Another form of ethical naturalism reduces all ethical statements to expressions of approval or disapproval, whether personal or general. So if I say ‘Mother Theresa was good’, I am not saying anything about the person herself but I am saying that ‘I approved of Mother Theresa’.      An important weakness of ethical naturalism is that there are so many objections to it. The most famous objection to ethical naturalism comes from G E Moore (1873-1958). In his book Principal Ethics, Moore argues that all forms of ethical naturalism, by seeking to define moral words like ‘good’,’ bad’ and so on in non-moral terms, commit to what he calls ‘the naturalistic fallacy’. His argument is based on a technique he created for testing if definitions were correct or incorrect. He called this ‘the open question technique’. For example, he used the word ‘yellow’, which has one of the definitions ‘the colour of a banana’. This definition makes the question, ‘I know a banana is a fruit, but is it yellow?’ pointless because the first part of the sentence has already supplied the answer to the question. It is what G E Moore calls a ‘closed question’. Moore concludes that that a definition is correct when the question asked is closed and incorrect when the question is open. Asking an open question, in other words, means that the two expressions being used do not mean the same thing. Therefore, G E Moore is teaching ethical non-naturalism / intuitionism.      Ethical non-naturalism is G E Moore’s own moral theory. If ethical language can ever be reduced to factual statements, then it can never be regarded as true or false on the basis of observable evidence. Does this mean that ethical statements can never be considered true or false? Moore denies this. We do process another method of verification, in which we decide whether an ethical proposition is true or false through a process of moral intuition. Here it becomes self-evident to us that something is good or not. For example, if we say ‘telling the truth is good’, this statement is not verifiable by observation and experience. Yet nevertheless we say that the statement is true – and rightly say that it is – because we can immediately see that a property of moral goodness does belong to telling the truth.      Ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism are both cognitive theories of meta-ethics; they both maintain that ethical propositions communicate a type of knowledge. Ethical naturalism argues that this knowledge can be scientifically verified or falsified. Ethical non-naturalism denies this and claims instead that ethical propositions ascribe a certain indefinable quality to objects and actions and that these propositions will be deemed true or false by the process of intuitionism. Ethical non-cognitivism rejects both these positions. Naturalism is denied because, as Moore demonstrated, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; and Moore’s own teaching is rejected because there exists no simple quality called ‘good’ disclosed by intuition; because indeed ethical propositions are non-cognitive, communicating no knowledge whatsoever and containing nothing therefore that can be rendered true or false. A Moral relativist would respond to the claim that people should always tell the truth as follows: I live in a world populated by politicians where the word “truth” is not recognised, but if telling the truth helps my exert power then I should tell it but it would help me if my opponents did not. I live in a world of saints where the word “truth” is seen as a concept of honesty and purity, so telling the truth is a given. Our interpretation of truth in any situation may be different, but because our intentions are honourable, any difference of interpretation is forgiven and an understanding of our differences is sought. I live in a world of children where “truth” is what we recall instinctively. So, if I am being threatened I say what I think I need to say to remove the threat. If I am asked if I believe in Father Christmas – I do, because I know no different from what my parents told me. So, I think I always tell the truth. Last year I asked my Dad if Mum was dying, he said no. But she did. Last year I asked my Dad if my Mum was dying, he said yes. And she did.         In summary, a Moral relativist would answer in the context of his or her own culture and experience. I think that there is more to life than just truth and a Moral relativist would have to think about the context of the question as much as the definition of truth. So, I think the answer would be “it depends”.Strengths – there is a lot of support for a point of view from the society because judgements reflect the values of the community. Weaknesses, a corrupt society could lead to corrupt values, which may ultimately not be sustainable in the wider world.