Ontological Argument for the existence of God

It was not surprising the argument met oppositions; the first one to criticize would have been the monk Guanilo, who criticized Anselm in his ‘In behalf of the Fool’. First, Guanilo says that God’s nature is essentially mysterious we do not have an idea of him. We may think we do, but we have only the verbal symbol, for when we hear the word “God”, what are we to think or imagine? The proof fails, them, for the term “God” does not denote any conceivable thing. Second, he says that if the argument were sound, we could prove the existence f other things. By way of example he invites us to think of an island which is perfect; if it is to be perfect then it must also intrinsically hold the value of existence and must therefore exists.

Because, this was written during Anselm’s period, it was possible for Anselm top reply to the refutations, he replied to the first objection by saying that the proof does not require a complete understanding of God, but only that we understand this much: that whatever else he may be, God is such that no greater being that can be conceived. In reply to Guanilo’s second objection, Anselm says that God, unlike a perfect island is not thought of simply as the greatest thing of a certain type, or even the greatest thing of all, but as the being which nothing greater can be conceived. This latter concept can refer to only one thing; and that thing quite obviously is not the perfect island.

However, there is an obvious flaw with the classical Ontological proof for the existence of God. For the fact that I am thinking of a being, thinking of it as existing necessarily, does not provide the slightest evidence that there actually is such a being, for the thought of a necessarily existing being is one thing and a necessarily being is another.

In the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, the word ‘God’ which I shall henceforth pronounce ‘umlaut’ is defined as a being greater than which cannot be imagined. At present, an umlaut is a hypothetical object, as we have yet to determine whether or not there is a being greater than which cannot be imagined. The trick comes in when the definition of ‘greater’ is misplaced. Does it mean taller? Heavier? More intelligent? Or a combination of many attributes some type of weighted average? In light of a specific meaning for ‘greater’, the first sentence might read, “An umlaut is a being taller than which cannot be imagined.”

 Is it taller to exist in reality and the mind than in the mind alone? If an umlaut exists in reality, it has some specific height, and we can imagine something taller. This violates the definition of an umlaut; therefore it must not exist in reality. The same line of reasoning can be repeated with any (and every) attribute one can name. So the umlaut remains a hypothetical object, a Platonic ideal akin to infinity, the highest imaginable number. Perhaps it is taller to exist in reality. Perhaps a thought in my mind is not tall at all, because it does not really exist. In this case, the proof boils down to:

An umlaut is the tallest being.

It must exist in reality.

Therefore, an umlaut is the tallest being that exists in reality.

Obviously, an umlaut is some type of giraffe. The original argument uses ‘greater’ in the hypothetical sense in the first sentence, and in the giraffe sense in the second sentence, and then tries to draw a conclusion in the third without adhering to either definition. The ‘proof’ is an attempted shotgun marriage between two contradictory ideas, and the meager dowry is the fact both ideas are named ‘greater.’

Immanuel Kant also argued against the Ontological argument, he claimed that the word ‘existence’ cannot be used as a predicate. The error with Ontological proof is that god is *defined* to exist -- you start with defining god as the greatest ‘idea’ ("the greatest thing that can be conceived"), and then define that idea to have corresponding extant. Existence, however, is a quantifier, not a predicate, and you cannot simply define a non-existence entity to exist.

We must know that logic and pure reason is not all there is to provide enough evidence for existence, in order to ‘prove’ we must also need empirical evidence. Logic alone is not always ‘real’ for a logical statement can contain two false premises and still come up with a true conclusion e.g.

1. A triangle is a 4 sided closed shape
2. This object is a 4 sided closed shape
3. Therefore it is a triangle

Logic concludes that triangles are 4 sided closed shapes, and according to logic alone, it must therefore be true. However, we know with certainty that this is not the case; a triangle is a 3-sided closed shape whereas a 4-sided closed shape is known as a square. In fact, the most fundamental postulates of logic such as A=A does not necessarily hold much value in reality. If A=A is to be held true in reality then the world must be static, but, things are always changing and animals always evolving. Electrons hold dual properties as waves and particles and A=A cannot possibly hold true. To a lesser extent, A is often recognized as its pure form and concepts are often added to it. Thus we can conclude that (concept of) A = A is not necessarily true. Hence, the Ontological argument, with its irrefutable logical argument does not verify with reality.