attention in his writing. In this hierarchy, God stands as “some more perfect being on which [humans] [depend]” (Descartes, 26). Humans are placed in the centre, because God grants us the ability to reason—the ability to distinguish what is true from what is false (Descartes, 22). Below us rest animals, having no reason. Truth in nature therefore, must not come from animals since they are lesser beings, but rather, it must be found within humans.
White finds appreciation for the external nature which Descartes considers to be “less certain” (Descartes, 28). While Descartes takes a rational approach, White takes a scientific, yet literary means toward nature. He observes nature ardently, noting animals’ modes of life—housing, reproduction, communications, transportation, and physical appearance. His ability to personify these animals creates “a meeting place for wild life and human feeling” (White, xvii). In his recordings for example, White observes the swallow’s mode of life. It builds its nest, “often within barns and out-houses against the rafters” (White, 156). “The swallow lays from four to six white eggs, dotted with red specks; and brings about her first brood about the last week in June, or the first week of July” (White, 157). “The swallow is a delicate songster, and in soft sunny weather sings both perching and flying; on trees in a kind of concert, and on chimney-tops; is also a bold flyer, ranging to distant downs and commons even in windy weather” (White, 158). White then creates a “meeting place for wild life and human feeling”: “All the summer long is the swallow a most instructive pattern if unwearied industry and affection; for, from morning to night, […] there is a family to be supported” (White, 158). White also observes other surroundings, for example, echoes. He uses inductive reasoning (the reasoning through experiments to find new knowledge) to find truths in nature: “By various experiments,” White concludes that “all echoes have some one place to which
they are returned stronger and more distinct to any other” (White, 204). White’s “originality lies in the way he wedded a celebration of these thoroughly irrational parochial loyalties to sharp and dispassionate observation. It is this blend which is the quintessence of what we know as ‘natural history’, and which makes it a different kind of knowledge from biology” (White, xvii).
Foundations, or principles, are recognized by both authors. Descartes states in a metaphor that “large bodies, when they are knocked down, are too difficult to rebuild and even, once shaken, are too difficult to support” (Descartes, 13), thus, it is important to have strong foundations, or morals by which a person can truly abide by in their life. White simply gives attention to a small, but important idea on foundations: “The most insignificant insects and reptiles are of much more consequence […] and are mighty in their effect” (White, 196). To White, bases are essential in the way nature functions. Descartes and White also value experience. Descartes realizes that “about experiences, that the more we advance in knowledge, the more necessary they become” (Descartes, 45). Throughout White’s journal, it is evident that he values experiences, as he records many encounters with animals and climate changes, in hopes of relating past ideas with new ones to generate accurate answers in nature.
Although Descartes explores nature internally through deductive reasoning and beliefs, and White externally through his observance, inductive reasoning, and scientific and literary combinations, their approaches originate from similar principles and beliefs.
Works Cited
Descartes, René. Discourse on Method and Related Writings. 10 Alcorn Avenue,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Penguin Books Canada Ltd, 1999.
White, Gilbert. The Natural History of Selborne. 10 Alcorn Avenue,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Penguin Books Canada Ltd, 1977.
