But how reliable must the method be? If we mean “totally reliable”, then no method can be tested infinitely, and hence we can never assert it as consistent. For this reason it seems best to consider a method as being “generally reliable.” By this we mean there is a high statistical probability that a belief will be justified as knowledge using the relevant methodology. We may even assert numerical values to the reliability, in that a method with the probability of yielding a true belief half the time will have the reliability 0.5.
Goldman is one of the most famous proponents of a brand of Reliabilism known as process Reliabilism. His definition is recursive, containing a clause providing a condition for basic justification, a clause containing a condition for non-basic justification, and a clause that states all justification meets one or other of the first two conditions. He describes these clauses as a set of mentally stored epistemic virtues and vices. These will be recalled when trying to establish the truth of a belief. The evaluator will consider the method by which the belief was formulated. If it was obtained by a sequence of virtuous cognitive processes it will be justified. However if it is acquired through psychological processes including vices, it is unjustified. By this theory reliability is introduced when determining the virtuous processes from the vices. The virtuous processes are those that produce a high ratio of true beliefs such as, vision, hearing, memory, and good reasoning (Goldman 1979, 311). Confused reasoning, wishful thinking, reliance on emotional attachments, hunches, guesswork, hasty generalization are all deemed as vices (Goldman 1979, 311).Therefore when it comes to the actual evaluation of a belief we merely have to check against these mentally stored cognitive processes.
Although Reliabilism is a strong theory it has meet a lot of criticism. A serious issue for both simple and process Reliabilism is the Generality Problem. This questions the exact cognitive process required to justify a belief. How can one specify what a reliable method is? Since for any justified belief or instance of knowledge, one is able to classify numerous different, simultaneously operating processes from which the belief results. For example I form the belief that my computer is in front of me. But in order to justify the process by which I arrived at this belief I could provide a number of descriptions. Firstly I could state that the method of forming this belief was based on looking. Secondly I could say the method of forming the belief about the computer was based on me looking at it in the light. Thirdly I could explain I looked at the computer in the light with my glasses on. Such justification could carry on to the point where the case becomes specific to this instance. By narrowing the method to a single occasion, the process will only be a function of the truth or falsity of the belief. This amounts to nothing more than equating justification with truth and lack of justification with falsity. But if one is too general equally damaging presumptions could be made. For example I form the belief that I see my computer in front of me on the basis of looking, but what if the room was dark and the object that looked like a computer was 20 feet away from me? Maybe I could have mistaken another object to look like a computer. Hence it is necessary that Reliabilism provides a non-arbitrary method for the determination of the relevant process, otherwise the notion will be vague sometimes to the extent of incoherence. Yet in defence of Reliabilism surely one may consider an innately true quality of the process. For example if were to make a cake I would require the ingredients flour, egg etc. If I chose to make it a chocolate cake I would then add coco powder or for a carrot cake, the carrot shreds. But what is essential is the fact that it is still a cake. Alston responds to this objection with the claim that there is a psychological truth about which process we are actually engaged in at any one time; Conee and Feldman respond by saying that even psychology doesn’t pick out a unique process.
Another problem presented to the Reliabilist is known as the problem of sufficiency, first proposed by BonJour. This gets us to consider the case where Samantha is a reliable clairvoyant, but has no evidence for her powers. She has confirmation that the president is in Washington, but her clairvoyancey tells her he is in fact in New York City. Intuitively, we assume her belief as unjustified, even if her powers are reliable and the President is in New York City. Simple Reliabilism implies that the belief that the president is in New York is justified, a counterintuitive result. But Goldman’s view escapes this problem since in the account of epistemic virtues and vices gives, the clairvoyant is ignoring the epistemic vice of contrary evidence.
The problem of necessity, I believe is one of the weaker arguments used against Reliabilism. It demands that we imagine a world whose inhabitants are the same as us in every relevant cognitive sense except for the fact that a demon (or demons) manipulate their perceptions of the external world. Hence all the reliable doxastic practices of this world are unreliable in the new Cartiseian evil-demon world. For example, whereas we believe the grass is green because we see green grass in front of us and in fact there is green grass in front of us, the demon’s victims believe there is green grass in front of them when in fact they are looking at sand. Since the victims of this evil demon world are unaware they are being deceived they are still justified in their beliefs, as they use seemingly reliable processes. Furthermore, how can we be assured that we aren’t in this demon world? How can we really define processes as reliable if we can’t answer such a question? But in defence of Reliabilism, it rationally justifies to the extent of our possible knowledge. Stewart Cohen notes that, in the demon world,
“We would have every reason for holding our beliefs that we have in the actual world. Moreover since we actually have reason to believe that our cognitive processes are reliable, it follows that in the demon world we would have every reason to believe that our cognitive processes were in fact reliable ... It strikes me as clearly false to deny that under these circumstances our beliefs could be justified” (Cohen, 281).
But then this becomes an internalist justification rather than being based on reliability. Goldman however anticipates this objection and proposes a world where wishful thinking produces true justified belief and is therefore a reliable belief forming method. He refers to this world as W. Instinctively we do not view wishful thinking as a reliable process, hence Goldman concludes a belief in this possible world is only justified if it is formed by a reliable cognitive process of the actual world.
“Since wishful thinking is not among those processes, a belief formed in a possible world W by wishful thinking would not be deemed justified, even if wishful thinking is reliable in W” (Goldman 1979, 316).
Goldman proposes that all we need to consider is a normal world. It is by the standards of this normal world that we acquire our belief forming processes of the actual world. Hence even if it transposed that we lived in the demon-world, the cognitive processes used would be unreliable but our beliefs may still be justified because “the cognitive processes we use may still be reliable in normal worlds” (Goldman 1986, 108).
In my opinion, both the clairvoyance and demon-world examples are based upon supernatural and far fetched elements that need not even be considered. In BonJours clairvoyance example, simple Reliabilism may imply the beliefs are justified. However surely this is counterintuitive since this world doesn’t view the powers of clairvoyance as a reliable belief formation method. This is why our intuition leads us to deny Samantha’s belief that the president is in New York. It is true to say that if we did inhabit a world where clairvoyance was reliable Samantha’s case would be trivial and obvious. Furthermore it would not pose a threat on Reliabilism.
Similarly in the case of the Cartesian demon-world, simple Reliabilism indicates that a person being deceived by an evil demon would be unjustified in their beliefs, although instinct tells us the contrary. This is because reasoning in our world includes methods such as sense perception which are generally reliable for acquiring beliefs. Therefore we need not even consider this evil demon world for Reliabilism wasn’t designed to work in this hypothetical. Furthermore it is unreasonable to ask an epistemic evaluator to consider this hypothetical evil demon world. For if we require this, surely in order to be thorough we should also consider every possible world we can dream up which is clearly ridiculous. Therefore we should only take into account aspects of the actual world.
In conclusion the Reliabilist theory is justified in arriving at its conclusions to the extent that one can claim reliability. For as I mention early on, one cannot find a method that is completely reliable in this world. But the intuitive proposal satisfies our request for generally reliable knowledge.
References
- Stewart Cohen, (1984) “Justification and Truth,” Philosophical Studies 46: 279-295.
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Alvin I. Goldman (1979), “Reliabilism: What Is Justified Belief?” in Louis P. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999), 306-319
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Williams, (2001) Problems of Knowledge a critical introduction to epistemology, Oxford
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Dancy, J.: (1985) Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Oxford
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Everitt, N., Fisher, A.: (1995) Modern Epistemology, New York
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Goldman, A., (1986) Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., Chapters 2–5.
