Fundamentalism places piety at the heart of politics. In terms of religion, it demands that any religion should abide by the fundamental doctrine out of which it has grown, and a complete rejection of any attempt to accommodate that religion with social, moral or historical changes; consequently, a fundamentalist Christian would be opposed to such things as the marriage of divorcees or homosexuals, the baptism of illegitimate children or giving alms to the 'undeserving poor.' Politically, however, fundamentalism has become the basis of entire politico-religious movements which demand that piety should be the core basis of political and social life.
Religious fundamentalism is very much seen as the creation of the modern world. Although typical fundamentalists reject technology, the ideology can be said to be ‘evolving’ as it has incorporated it as with the Taliban and . Religious fundamentalism has seemed to arisen in societies suffering from a deep sense of crisis, particularly identity.
The question is whether religious fundamentalism is destined to survive throughout the twenty-first century, or ultimately be viewed as a temporary phenomenon, linked to the conjunction of particular historical circumstances. The question of the future of fundamentalism raises two starkly different scenarios. The first questions the long-term viability of any religiously-based political creed in the modern world, and highlights the particular limitations of fundamentalism as a political project. According to this view, fundamentalist religion is essentially a symptom of the difficult adjustments that modernization brings about, but it is ultimately doomed because it is out of step with the principal thrust of the modernization process. Modernization as westernization is destined to prevail because it is supported by the trend towards economic globalization and the spread of liberal democracy. Religion will therefore be restored to its 'proper' private domain, and public affairs will once again be contested by secular political creeds.
This analysis suggests that the theo-political project that lies at the heart of fundamentalism will gradually fade, with religious groups becoming mere components of broader nationalist movements. The emergence of a western-dominated global system may allow for the survival of civic nationalism, orientated around the goal of self-determination, but it suggests that there is little future for militant ethnic nationalisms, especially when they are based upon religious distinctiveness. The limitations of fundamentalism will thus become particularly apparent if fundamentalists succeed in winning power and are confronted with the complex tasks of government. Lacking a clear political programme or a coherent economic philosophy, fundamentalism as an ideology of protest will survive, if it survives at all, only as rhetoric or as the 'founding myth' of a regime.
The rival view holds that religious fundamentalism offers a glimpse of the 'postmodern' future. From this perspective, it is secularism and liberal culture that are in crisis. Their weakness, dramatically exposed by fundamentalism, is their failure to address deeper human needs and their inability to establish authoritative values that give social order a moral foundation. Far from the emerging global system fostering uniformity modeled on western liberal democracy, this view suggests that a more likely scenario is that the twentieth-century battle between capitalism and communism will give way to some form of clash of civilizations. Competing transnational power blocs will emerge, and religion is likely to provide them with a distinctive politico-cultural identity. Fundamentalism, in this version, is seen to have strengths rather than weaknesses. Religious fundamentalists have already demonstrated their adaptability by embracing the weapons and spirit of the modern world, and the very fact that they are not encumbered by tradition but travel 'fast and light' enables them to reinvent their creeds in response to the challenges of post modernity.
