With the enactment of the Abortion Act 1967, an abortion is no longer an offence, subject to certain conditions.

Mr. Lim has not provided any reason as to why his girlfriend wants to terminate her pregnancy. If there were no valid reason, which falls within the conditions of the Abortion Act 1967, the intended abortion would not be legal. The burden of proof would lie upon Mr. Lim.

According to Section 1 of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 “Any person who with intent to destroy the life of a child capable to be born alive… shall be guilty of an offence of child destruction… unless the act was done in good faith for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother.” In spite of this, should Mr. Lim’s girlfriend obtain a certificate authorized by two medical practitioners, fulfilling the conditions of the Abortion Act 1967, then Mr. Lim would have to perhaps, rely on his personal interest as the father of the child, that an abortion would be a criminal threat to the child. However, this again, may not be effective, as in the case of C v. S.

The judgment in the Paton case has been subsequently applied in the case of C v. S [1988] QB 135. This case involved an unmarried couple, the mother wanting to terminate her pregnancy on the grounds that the pregnancy would cause more injury to her physical and mental health than if the pregnancy was terminated. Two medical practitioners, in accordance with s 1(1) (a) of the Abortion Act 1967 certified this. The father of the child applied for an injunction to prevent the abortion. He asserted that the child was capable of being born alive, as under s 1(1) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 it was an offence for any person, with intent to destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive (when feotus is between 28 or more weeks old, as per s 1 (2) of the Act). The father of the child, Mr. C, brought forth these proceedings because he feels that he has the locus standi based on his personal interest. He states that although his interests do not amount to a legal right, the abortion would be a crime concerning the life of his child. However, Heilbron J. still stands with the decision in Paton, where Baker P. said, “. . . there can be no doubt, in my view, that in England and Wales, the foetus has no right of action, no right at all, until birth… From conception the child may have succession rights by what has been called a ''fictional construction'' but the child must be subsequently born alive.” Heilbron J. also refers to the Abortion Regulations 1968, saying that “There is no provision requiring or referring to consultation with or obtaining the consent of a husband, if any, or father.  Neither is given any power of veto.” In this case, Heilbron J. attributes the dismissal of the application as a result of Mr. C’s counsel’s lack of sufficient basis for stating that the abortion is a threatened crime, “I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that counsel for Mr. C has not made out his case for an injunction.” With regards to this, it would be advisable for Mr. Lim to thoroughly prove that the abortion is indeed a threatened crime. To do this, he would have to corroborate that the child is capable of being born alive, he would also have to provide evidence that the pregnancy would not be a risk to his girlfriend’s physical and mental health and to verify, in one way or another, that the intended abortion is an illegal act.

Mr. Lim should also be advised of the status of the unborn child, that it has no legal right, as “the feotus, while unborn, cannot be a party to legal proceedings instituted for that purpose.”   In the case of Re F [1988], May LJ agrees with Sir George Baker in Paton and Heilbron J in C v. S, that a child only possesses a legal right at birth. In the American case of Roe v. Wade [1973], it was stated that 'In short, the unborn have never been recognised in the law as persons in the whole sense.' The case of Paton was subject of an application to the European Commission of Human Rights, which declared that the application was inadmissible.  In the report of their decision the Commission rejected the recognition of an absolute 'right to life' of the foetus.  At paragraph 19 they observed that this would involve a serious risk to the life of the pregnant woman: “This would mean that the "unborn life" of the foetus would be regarded as being of a higher value than the life of the pregnant woman.”

Mr. Lim should be strongly advised to validate that he has sufficient grounds upon which he can try to prevent his girlfriend from getting an abortion. With the fact that he has no legal right to stop her, in mind, he should rather consider all other alternatives, which will prove that an abortion would be unlawful. This would include providing evidence that the child is capable of being born alive without detriment to the mother’s mental and physical health. He can authenticate this by escorting his girlfriend for a medical examination, then subsequently obtaining a detailed report by two or more medical practitioners that the pregnancy will not affect his girlfriend’s mental or physical health. He has to also maintain perseverance in demonstrating the abortion as a criminal threat, by forming a firm and consistent basis of that crime. If Mr. Lim can attest that an abortion is unlawful, he can apply for an injunction to restrain the termination of his girlfriend’s pregnancy.

Biblography

Halsbury’s Laws of England