Have Social Democratic governments had to limit their ambitions to being mere managers of capitalism?

Have Social Democratic governments had to limit

their ambitions to being mere managers of capitalism?

Before any political party could come to power as a ‘social democratic’ government the idea of social democracy had to be developed first. The unfolding of social democratic thought and doctrine that had to happen before the idea could be brought into government is an important pointer toward how these budding ‘workers’ parties’ would act in any future position of rule. I will argue that the policies and practices of social democratic governments can be foreseen from their electoral tactics that were modified from their original purpose into one which would enable the party to be elected. I will also argue that once the history of social democracy in power began, it’s various guises throughout western Europe could only hope to be mere interventionist, reformist managers of the capitalist world that they inherited.

Firstly, what does social democracy mean? What policies did social democratic parties pursue? What electoral measures did they take to attempt to win the majority vote that would allow them to enter government? And what signs could we see at this stage that would give us an idea of the nature and role of any future social democratic ruling party?

Briefly, social democracy developed due to a split in the socialist parties and their following. In late 19th and early 20th century western Europe, the idea that socialism could be achieved by a violent, revolutionary seizing of power by the proletariat began to be questioned. A break away from this Marxist viewpoint saw the emergence of a group, committed to socialist ideals, but seeking government through the ballot box rather than a bourgeois led worker uprising. This group came to be known as Social Democrats. Seeking a social revolution for the working-class through fair, representative electoral means.

This change in the view of how to gain power obviously meant new and different paths would have to be tread on the way to achieving socialism. Now, rather than appealing to the proletariat to follow insurrectionary tactics, they would now concentrate on ensuring that the workers went and voted. This entailed that to now gain power, the majority of the people that voted in elections needed to be supporters of the social democrats. As they were still solely concerned in promoting the rights and interests of the working-class, this is where the majority would have to come from. Social democratic parties envisaged the working-class only ever growing more populous in proportion to the rest of the electorate and so, by the sheer weight of numbers, it would only be a matter of time before a social democratic government would be born. “Since most people suffer from poverty and oppression inherent in the capitalist organisation of society, and since elections are decided by numbers, socialism would become the electoral expression of an immense majority.” (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986, p 1).

Unfortunately for the social democrats this majority working-class vote was never realised. Despite some polls of around the 30% mark, a worker led electoral victory was elusive. The worker vote was the only one that mattered because it was only the furthering of the workers’ interests that was on the social democratic agenda. This alienated the rest of society and appealed only to the proletariat.

‘This had to change’ was the new, emerging voice of the social democratic parties. To be able to achieve power they would have to extend their appeal to a wider section ...

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‘This had to change’ was the new, emerging voice of the social democratic parties. To be able to achieve power they would have to extend their appeal to a wider section of society than just the working-class. “To be effective they must organise the masses.” (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986,p 55). Their extended electoral targets were now known as the ‘people’, or ‘the superclass’. They would now try to dilute their commitment to the abolition of capitalism to get on board the majority of the electorate they needed. They became parties of reform rather than revolution. A more inclusive appeal, propagating the improvement for all, rather than just the proletariat was the new leading tactic in their electoral struggles. They realised that if they pursued strictly socialist doctrines they would never gain power.

This did increase their electoral standing, and by the end of the First World War and during the inter-war years, social democrat governments could now be seen in power, notably in Scandinavia. At this starting point of social democracy in power we have a number of factors that may point to the nature, effect and success (or not) of future social democratic governments. Firstly, the increase in electoral appeal from one of the working-class to one of a more inclusive, superclass nature. Secondly, and intrinsically linked to the first factor, the change of social democratic policies from ones of a revolutionary aspect to ones of reform and intervention. Thirdly, the acceptance and almost embracement of capitalist institutions such as the electoral process and the apparatus of the state. Lastly, but equally as important as the former points, was the fact that at the time of social democratic parties coming to power they were doing so in a western Europe that already was rooted and embedded in a capitalist structure of society. “ Socialists had to govern in an essentially capitalist world.” (Schumpeter 2000, p 364).

All four of these factors point toward how social democratic rulers would rule. They all demonstrate a weakening of socialist ideals in the face of capitalism, through it’s institutions, it’s supporters, and the very fact that it was already cemented into the machinations of the economy, trade, markets and the social institutions and communities of western Europe. The means of pursuing power would be reflected in the ends of power. A reformist, interventionist party in opposition would be a reformist, interventionist party in government.

The first time we can see this is in the coalition governments of Sweden and Norway of the 1930s. To be able to have a say in the governance of their respective countries, the social democratic parties had to deal and barter with their opponents in order to gain at least some footing in the ruling coalitions. Although this is not an example of outright, majority social democratic government, it reinforces the four pre-emptive factors of the nature this type of government would take.

After the Second World War, social democratic governments would still be heavily affected and influenced by the prevailing economic structure of western Europe. All western European governments were involved in the post-war reconstruction of the international economic order led by the United States.

Two social democratic governments, namely Britain and Norway, were not exceptions to this rule. They both took the reformist route. The US funded European Recovery Programme bound these governments to a compromise between their interventionist approach and market liberalism. Britain and Norway’s participation in the Marshall Plan meant “in effect a trade-off of socialism in return for economic growth.” (Hodne 1983, p 162).

French and Italian governments of this time also took the interventionist route, typical of social democratic parties. They “ took the form of partnership between the government and the private economic sector.” (Padgett & Paterson 1991, p 134).

The post-war history of social democracy in power can be seen as an extension of the four pre-governance factors mentioned above and the coalitions of pre-war Scandinavia. The British Labour Party’s 1945-51 period of office also reflected this. “Undoubtedly, political and social change was confined within the limits of a society which continued to be governed by market capitalism.” (Padgett & Paterson 1991, p 140).

This trend extended into the 60s until the electoral demise of social democracy from the mid-70s. Social democratic governments, especially the British and Swedish, did bring in some important welfare reforms, the flagship of the Labour party’s being the National Health Service. But the fundamental aspect of equality of wealth, a prerequisite of which was steady economic growth, still eluded the social democrats. “Even the most well-disposed observers, however, were unable to argue that Labour made any positive impact on the distribution of income and wealth”. (Padgett & Paterson 1991, p 152).

After the electoral setbacks of the 70s the Swedish government still achieved great success at home in terms of introducing welfare programmes and obtaining high levels of employment. Again, the fundamental background to this though was the fact that it was still a government elected by workers and the more capitalist prone middle-class, a government that operated through the institutions of capitalism and could not avoid the external affect of capitalism. “Even here, social democracy was on the defensive, hemmed in by the constraints of the national and international environment.” (Padgett & Paterson 1991, p 163).

To conclude, it must be said that from social democracy’s nascent period right up until the present day social democratic governments of western Europe, social democrats have never operated within anything other than a capitalist structure of society. This, in turn, meant that for social democrats to gain power, they must pander to a wider section of the electorate, including capitalists. Their doctrines became ones of reform, on the one hand promoting the social interests of the workers, whilst on the other hand leaving capitalism intact as it ever was. There was, and is, no longer any principle of achieving a change in the distribution of wealth, merely a principle of making capitalism better for all, rather than removing it completely. “The fundamental premise of social democracy is that nationalisation of the means of production is not necessary to overcome the irrationality of capitalism.” (Przeworski 1992, p 132).

Social democracy’s apotheosis in the late 60s and early 70s still made no decisive change to the organisation of wealth and capital. For a political party to gain power through the ballot box it must win a majority of the vote. To do this, the majority of the electorate must be catered for in the policies of a party. In a society that is already predominately made up of capitalists, especially the more entrepreneurial middle-class, a victorious party will only be a reflection of this society. Thus, we see the eternal dilemma of social democracy – capitalism must be paid lip service to gain power in an already capitalist society. By doing this, the ends of social democracy change to ones of capitalist management, reform and intervention.

In today’s increasingly globalised economy social democratic governments can be seen as having to shift their policies and their practices even further toward a capitalist approach. As the seemingly only eternal principle of governments is to remain in power, all other principles become secondary. Throughout the history of social democracy capitalism has, at best, merely been diluted. From origins of socialism by revolution, through socialism by democracy, to reformist and interventionist governments, the future of social democracy can be predicted as one that finds itself forced to try and limit how far capitalism manages social democratic governments rather then the other way round.