Moreover, the USSR was wary of the development of capitalism since it posed a direct threat to communism and the USSR. Thus, it is fair to say, fear bled throughout the USSR. Walter LaFeber, a renowned Post-Revisionist historian, argues that fear even caused an over estimation of the enemy’s threat to the USSR. This may have influence the Soviets to act in a more drastic manner.
On the other side, the United States was extremely vigilant regarding the expansion of communism in Europe and all over the world. This fear dragged the US to push through the Truman Doctrine on the 12th of March 1947, shifting the US foreign policy from isolation to intervention and containment. In addition, the Marshall Plan on the 5th of June 1947 developed alongside the Truman Doctrine, providing an economic aspect to the new policy. Fear drove developments to urgently push economic recovery in Europe and to fund anti-communist regimes. In fact, eventually the Marshall Plan would lead to the dissemination of over $17 billion in a four year period. This argument is bolstered by the Revisionist historians Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, who believed American policy was determined by fear of another world recession. In essence, fear fed the US’s pursuit for world security.
Yet, fear alone cannot justify all of the developments between 1945 and 1949. In addition to fear, the aggressive nature of both the USSR and US had tremendous influence on the development of the war. First of all, Orthodox historian Arthur M. Schlesinger argues the Soviets were inevitably expansionist in nature, as in accordance with their advocacy of the need to spread revolution. Through the Soviets’ aggressive nature, they disregarded both the Yalta and Potsdam agreements by occupying much of Eastern Europe and leaving 30,000 troops in Northern Iran after a settled date. The USSR was searching to expand, grow and gain power. In 1948, the Berlin Blockade set up to gain control of Berlin, a strategic capital, can be seen in many aspects as an aggressive action to capture the capital.
On the other side of the war, the US shared the same hostile nature through the supposed policy of containment. It can be argued the US imperialistically used ‘containment’ to justify expansionism and the need to intervene in governments around the world such as Nicaragua and Vietnam. Revisionist historian William Appleman Williams argues ‘dollar diplomacy’ and the need to bolster capitalism were the two main forces driving US policy. Even further, Revisionist Gar Alperovitz and P.M.S Blackett argue the action of dropping both ‘little boy’ and ‘fat man’ on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was driven not by necessity but by an underlying motive to intimidate the USSR. In addition, unquestionably aggression of both superpowers had significant impacts on the development of the war.
The elements of fear and aggression both had individual impacts on the development of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949, however, they cannot account for all such developments. In fact, as history shows and new evidence becomes attainable due to the opening of the USSR archives in 1991, new positions have been established on this issue. Firstly, the Post-Revisionist view as supported by Walter LaFeber, argues the development of the Cold War cannot be attributed to one single factor. In essence, the Cold War followed an action reaction course which resulted from internal developments, self-determination, economic needs and/or individual greed. As a matter of fact, post- Cold War historians such as John Lewis Gaddis argue individuals had a large impact on the development of the Cold War. Gaddis even pushes by stating if Stalin was eliminated from the war, the war would not even have occurred. These factors are necessary in justifying events in the Cold War which simply were not caused by fear or aggression alone such as the Molotov Plan and COMECON which were reactions to previous actions by the U.S.
Therefore, as seen, with a war as expansive and intricate as the Cold War, fought by proxies all over the world, fear alone cannot explain the developments of the war regardless of the time frame. However, to a limited extent, fear had a significant role to play within the crafting of the Cold War. Furthermore, aggression, by itself, does not provide entire justification for the developments of the Cold War. Yet, instead it was an amalgamation of a variety of individuals, policies and ideologies. The development of the Cold War would continue to be driven by microcosms, due to its expanse, until its demise in 1991.
