Giap's "new model" of Guerrilla Warfare incorporated three phases1 consisted of:
1) Stage on Contention (predominantly organization and guerrilla warfare).
2) Period of Equilibrium (complex mix of guerrilla and mobile warfare).
3) Stage of Counteroffensive (mobile warfare with conventional forces including some positional warfare in late stages).
First, the movement must establish strong bases in country where the enemy cannot easily attack them. Here they can train their soldiers, and build political strength amongst the surrounding villages. It also gives the military a supply base and headquarters, and somewhere to fall back on in difficult times. The movement was always strongest in the north, and the "homeland" of the VM was the Viet Bac area of mountainous jungle around Bac Can. The VM gradually developed similar base areas (Chien Khu) in the region north-east of Lang Son, the mountain region of Yen Bai, Thai N'Guyen (the "traditional" stronghold of the PCI), Quang N'Gai, Pac Bo, Ninh Binh and Dong Trieu. These areas were all extremely difficult terrain, and the French maintained only scattered posts through them. The VM began to set up their bases. With these Chien Khu established, and peasant support increasing, the VM moved onto Phase Two.
The guerrillas will make pinprick attacks in the enemy rear, forcing him to disperse his forces and making his troops' morale drop. When the enemy becomes frustrated and makes reprisals, then the movement gains political strength from this. The less control which the enemy is seen to have over the country, the more that the people will look to the VM for support and guidance. If the enemy presses hard on the guerrilla forces, they should avoid contact and only fight when they have a clear advantage. The country was eminently suitable for such warfare, and the people had a long tradition to draw on. With the mixture of rugged mountains, dense jungles, deltas and swamps crisscrossed with rivers, communications across the colony were always difficult, and tended to be restricted to a limited number of routes. The French had, in fact, spent considerable time and effort in improving the road and railway network through Indochina during the late nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries - which actually worked against them in the Indochina War. Sabotage, Traps, Terrorism, Camouflage and Ambushes were used to damage French troops.
When the French is weakened and the people are behind the VM, it is time to engage in open warfare. Again, every victory by the VM brings political capital. VM failures should be ruthlessly abandoned, so that the enemy can take little advantage from them. Eventually French will be forced to retire from the country. The VM military gained experience, equipment and confidence. They rarely attacked strongly-held positions, and avoided high-intensity combat. Once Giap felt that the VM had enough power, they began to campaign against the French in open, mobile warfare. The heavy equipment seriously reduced French effectiveness, but the VM troops were lightly equipped, and thus able to move rapidly across rough terrain. Their fieldcraft was excellent, and in particular they were good at hiding artillery and AA guns in caves or other camouflaged positions. Often French aircraft received flak from unknown positions, and CEFEO units came under artillery fire for which they had little counter. With superb intelligence from agents or observation, the VM planned attacks meticulously. Weak points and important positions were identified.
In November 1953, the French, weary of jungle warfare, occupied Dien Bien Phu, a small mountain outpost on the Vietnamese border near Laos. Although the Vietnamese rapidly cut off all roads to the fort, the French were confident that they could be supplied by air. The fort was also out in the open, and the French believed that their superior artillery would keep the position safe. In 1954, the Viet Minh army, under General Vo Nguyen Giap, moved against Dien Bien Phu and in March encircled it with 40,000 Communist troops and heavy artillery. At Dien Bien Phu, the French commander, Navarre, hoped to draw out Giap’s forces for a mass battle based on traditional battle plans. Giap outmanoeuvred Navarre and surrounded the French forces at Dien Bien Phu. Giap had 70,000 men at his disposal – five times the number of French troops there. He also had 105mm artillery and anti-aircraft guns from the Chinese and he used these to ensure that the French could not use airdrops to supply the men at Dien Bien Phu. When he was satisfied that the French were sufficiently weakened, Giap ordered a full-scale attack (March 13th 1954). The Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu signaled the end of French colonial influence in Indochina and cleared the way for the division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel at the conference of Geneva. It was also a major victory for Giap and sealed his fame as a military commander.
‘Army cadres concern themselves solely with military affairs,
Government cadres with administrative jobs,
Party cadres with Party business.
They are like men standing on one leg. It is wrong for a cadre
to be acquainted only with one field. He will no be truly
proficient because army, mass, government and party work
forms a whole which would not be strong and complete should
one of its components come to miss.’
-Ho Chi Minh- July 1952 (Ho's Selected Writings, p. 146)
- O'Neill, Robert J. (1969). General Giap: Politician and Strategist. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers. P.62