Sovereignty of the state:
When Dayton was signed the international bodies soon came to realisation that they wouldn’t be leaving Bosnia any time soon. The excessive external power brought questions about sovereignty of Bosnia under the Dayton. In order to make the consolidation of democracy whereby the Bosnian institutions have democratic legitimacy and policy-making is accountable to the Bosnian people through the mechanism of electoral competition the sovereignty had to be put on hold. The international democratisation experiment grew even bigger and more powers were awarded to the international bodies rather than trying to hand over democracy to the people of Bosnia (Chandler 37). The international body defended itself through the voice of the High Representative who stated in December of 1997, “Gradual disengagement as improving circumstances allow. The faster the progress the sooner we will be able to leave maters in the hands of the people of Bosnia and those they elect in free and fair elections, to lead and represent them (8th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.).
The objective of the international bodies to bring democracy to Bosnia has downgraded the importance of sovereignty of the Bosnian state. With so many international mechanisms to regulate and make sure that everything is democratically run the Bosnian state bodies have had very little influence on the policy making and implementation. Dayton has brought rule to Bosnia from outside rather than from the inside. Major external powers like the NATO, UN, and OSCE are the leading policy making organs. While the state of Bosnia is left with its representatives to discuss the policy proposals under the guidance of the High Representative and other international bodies such as IMF and the World Bank. This political structure of Bosnia is such that Bosnia is the only internationally recognized country that lacks political sovereignty and all that the local institutions can do is slow down the implementation of prepared packages that come from outside (Chandler 64).
The practice of forcing international body’s opinions onto the local governing was the debate amongst the Bosnian government officials however it was opposed by the High representative as unnecessary and rejected, “Democratization has a long way to go before one can safely say it has taken root in a country with no political experience of its benefits” (Chronology/Monthly Tracker, January 1997). The Bosnian officials saw the new political structure imposed by Dayton composing of the tripartite Presidency and the parliamentary Assembly as an obstacle to vital policy implementation. However with the ethnic reconciliation still missing and country still very much divided (8th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.) the Office of High representative was given a further power at the Bonn PIC summit that gave the High Representative the power to impose legislative control which gave the international body the executive and legislative power over the formally independent state (Chandler 65). In December 1997, the High Representative, Carlos Westerndrop explained this, “You do not have the power handed to you on a platter. You seize it. If you use this no one will contest it.”(Article about Carlos Westendorp, High Representative:"Our Man in Sarajevo).
The success is very questionable and relative. However the international bodies seem to think that the only way for their withdrawal from Bosnia can be achieved through their pressure that puts the sovereignty and self-government into a denial when they are de-facto ones who are ruling the state of Bosnia. On top of it all, if we take into consideration that the international bodies have a strategy that aims to bring democracy to the Bosnia while making a multi-ethnic government that will protect the human rights and promote political pluralism together with promoting a better life for civil society than there is huge space to analyse whether the strategies of the international bodies has been able to make possible the development of a self-governing state of Bosnia or whether they have made the whole situation even more difficult with no plans on how to withdraw from Bosnia while completing their objectives (Chandler 65).
Multi-Ethnic Policies:
Since the war characterized by aggressive nationalism was now over in Bosnia, the international body saw multi-ethnic government as the key in bringing the process of democratization. America in particular was very keen and they promised to assist the construction of multi-ethnic administration. “If there is to be a post-Cold War peace in Europe – and not a cold peace, but a real one – it must be based on the principle of multi-ethnic democracy...The United States are one of the greatest examples of the principle. Hence it is in our interest that multi-ethnic democracy prevails” (95/11/09 Strobe Talbott on the Balkan Challenge).
The idea in Bosnia was to make the multi-ethnic policy through decentralizing the state. This was to be done to make sure that a single ethnicity wouldn’t be able to take control of political power since all of the major ethnic groups were a potential minority as well. Bosniaks that are the largest group could have been over ruled if Serbs and Croats joined together. The Serbs could be over ruled if Bosniaks and Croats joined together. Decentralization seemed to be a great way to provide security to all ethnic groups of Bosnia (Chandler 66). Warren Christopher who was the US secretary of state at the time saw this as the best for all three peoples of Bosnia, “The central structures created by Dayton were designed to insure that each ethnic group would see that its interests can and will be protected within a unified Bosnia” (96/09/18 Statement on Bosnia Elections).
With Dayton the power of majorities would be controlled and if possible power had to be shared with the other ethnic groups. The idea was that this practice would provide more self-government at the local level. The two entities that Dayton introduced would provide more mechanisms and institutions that would accommodate all three ethnic groups hence create a multi-ethnic political structure. “The two entities will probably be the most decentralised state in the world; (96/09/18 Statement on Bosnia Elections); “it will be a very loose and decentralised state with weak central power for its common institutions – and thus unlike any other state in existence” (96/09/18 Statement on Bosnia Elections).
This idea that all three ethnic groups are included in the policy making was also constructed by the Dayton. The institutions were to be made on the basis of ‘ethnic key’ which organised the institutions with representatives from all three sides to ensure that vital interests of everyone were satisfied (Chandler 67). The Dayton Agreement followed the ‘ethnic key’ with the Presidency, Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Ministers (Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement).
The Presidency was to be composed of three members. Each member representing one ethnic group; the Croat and Bosniak from Federation and Serb from Republika Srpska entity. During the election the voter is allowed to choose only one of the three options. This allowed for the Croat voter to choose their desired candidate and for the Bosniak and Serb voters to do the same. All of the decisions were to be made by the consensus and when it couldn’t be reached any member of the presidency could declare that the decision is unhelpful to his ethnic or the interest of the entity. The president’s decision would then be reviewed by the Assembly of Republika Srpska or the Assembly of Federation depending on which entity the president belonged to. Through the voting process needing a two-thirds majority it would be established if the decision of presidency will not take effect (Chandler 68).
The Council of Ministers is an even more complicated structure with several processes to ensure that multi-ethnic structure is met. After the presidency nominates a Chair of the Council of ministers and the deputy ministers their approval has to pass by the High Representative who decided on the two co-chairmen and co-deputy ministers for both Chair of the Council of ministers and the deputy ministers. The chair and each deputy minister would have the two men from the other two ethnic groups than his (Chandler 68). Consensus was the key once again with any indecision problems that were to be reported to the full Council (3rd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.").
The state parliament was made up of two chambers; The House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The house of people was composed of 15 members, with 5 from each ethnic group while the House of Representatives had 42 members that were split up the same way with each ethnic group getting one third of the members (Chandler 69) This provided the safety and security needed for each ethnic group however it made all policy making and enforcement very inefficient. On top of having so many members both The House of Peoples and the House of Representatives had three chairs with one from each ethnic group that would rotate. Every decision again was to be accomplished through consensus and if any difficulties to the consensus occurred it would be taken to the Constitutional Court for ratification.
On paper Dayton managed to accomplish the multi-ethnic goal that was the vital need for bringing democracy to Bosnia. At the all levels from state to the municipal level all ethnic groups were to be accompanied in decision making process. However after the first elections it was clear that the multi-ethnic practice will only remain on the paper and not really in practice. After the first state elections since the war stopped the same nationalistic parties that were also the main warring sides won 86% of the vote. The Bosniak SDA (party of democratic action) 45.2%, The Serb SDS (Serb democratic party) 21.4%, the Croat HDZ (Croat democratic union) 19% (Chandler 119). This brought to disagreements at all levels which made any political progress virtually impossible. As the international bodies quickly realized that it would take more than the willingness of the local policy makers to make progress the High Representative was very often used as the final judge on making changes as the actions of the local politicians had very little strength on changing the decision made by the High Representative. The high Representative at the time, Carlos Westendrop described the nationalistic representatives “like animals who cling to their Turf” (Ali 122).
The practice of the international bodies to have the High Representative as the final word was very unpopular one amongst the local leaders. They saw this as breaking the Dayton Peace agreement’s clause that guaranteed them ethnic autonomy in regards to policy making (Chandler 71). The criticism came from all sides. The Croatian Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia stated to the BBC “International hostility disagrees with the Dayton’s guarantee of three constituent nations” (Chandler 71). The Bosniak President Alija Izetbegovic sent an open letter to the office of the High Representative where he stated “Dayton did not establish a protectorate and you aren’t the protector” (Chandler 71). While the Republika Srpska’s President Biljana Plavsic criticized the international bodies of legitimizing the reinterpretation of the agreement (Plavsic).
It turns out then that the multi-ethnic goal proposed by the international bodies in the Dayton didn’t come with much success. The huge political administrations that require a tripartite consensus at all times from three different ethnic groups with three completely different vital interests meant that the international bodies had to step in and settle the issues that the local policy makers weren’t able to do themselves.
Human Rights in Bosnia:
When the war ended Bosnia had 2.2 million of people who were either refugees or internally displaced people (IDP) (The State of Annex VII). During the creation of Dayton international bodies believed that securing human rights is the key to bring security to the people of Bosnia which over a period of time will encourage the return of refugees and IDP’s back home (Chandler 90).
The International body and especially the United States regarded the implementation of human rights as a fundamental pillar in the creation of Dayton, “Human rights is the key to most aspects of political and civil implementation of the agreement. It is only when human rights are fully respected that the political life in the country can free itself of fear that is now so obvious. Only when the human rights are satisfied the refugees and IDP’s will start to return in greater number” (2nd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations) [See Appendix I].
With the years after the war there were very little human rights violations. However it can be argued whether the implementation of the human rights laws is successful since Bosnian ethnic groups have generally separated and don’t live together like they did before the war. This is the reason there is almost no human rights violations in the post war years. The real picture is that there have been very little refugees that have returned and the barriers are still many. If the refugees return home they will be living in towns and villages where they are the minority now. The worry of amnesty international is that human rights violations would restart once again if the refuges return (Chandler 99).
If it is then the status quo that is holding the human rights violations on a low then amnesty international reason for concern is a real one since after the war nearly all the elected leaders in all levels in Bosnia have been suspected of war crimes and human rights violations. The fact that they were elected with such high majority is a very worrying factor and shows the picture and mentality of the Bosnian people. In other words if the refugees and IDP’s start returning to their place of origin the human rights violations could increase significantly. Leading US academic Bogdan Denitch stated, “Ideally for real civic life to be possible again in post-war Bosnia, there will have to be both war-crime trials and something resembling de-Nazification in Germany and Italy after the Second World War” (Denitch 8).
However there have been improvements that aren’t misleading. Crossing of the entity boundaries doesn’t seem to be a problem anymore. The numbers of people crossing the boundary daily exceeds thousands. In fact in an informal survey that was conducted in May of 1996 in a 48 hour period 28000 people crossed the entity boundary according to the IFOR count (Chandler 105).
However the miscalculation of importance of human rights from the international body can be examined even further through the lack of desire from the Bosnian refugees to return. By spring of 1997, 300000 Bosnian refugees had been given a new citizenship or a permanent status in the countries where they live abroad. By the end of 1997 this number had risen to a significant 540000 (Chandler 105). On top of all that with human rights violations or not no refugee can’t return back home if there is no chance of finding work. The ones that had returned 90% of them couldn’t find a job and with time on their hands they turned to illegal activities and became a problem to the community rather than help and their return has had an impact on the growing crime rate (RRTF: Report July 1997) [See Appendix II].
The heavy emphasis by the international bodies was focused on the improvement of human rights that were seen as the key to refugee return. However it seems that some miscalculation was done as the problem of no return is more linked with socio-economic barriers rather than fear of being abused by your neighbour who is of a different ethnic group.
Impacts on civil society:
For the Dayton to follow through the international community in Bosnia decided that the extensive development of civil society is essential for democratization. Between 1995 – 1998 it has been dealt through several NGO projects where the objective is to give ordinary citizens encouragement to support civil society. The OSCE sought to help the Bosnians to “overcome the challenges and to help their country move into a tolerant and democratic state” (Chandler 151).
The Dayton aimed to break the mental barriers that people have amongst each other. The European Union hoped that their project Dialogue Development will be the primary locus in creating ideology for building of consensus while legitimizing power (Chandler 151). This means creating and maintaining cultural and social harmony while giving in to the dominant power thorough the practice of acceptance and not through force.
Bosnia since the war has become a truly NGO based civil society building experiment. Many NGO’s such as Heliski Comitee and OSCE have suggested that for a functioning democracy the people of Bosnia have to get over the national association with their leaders (Chandler 152)
The conclusion is that international community should try and improve the lives of the ordinary citizen because at the core it is the ordinary citizen that chooses the political leader. The people of Bosnia were traumatised and in fear and with this mind when going out to vote they can only vote according to the ‘nationalistic key’ due to their fears and insecurities. As the time progressed and the people from different ethnic groups started to interact with one another and creating new social groups amongst themselves that aimed at improving their lives the democratization has seen progress. With high unemployment in the years after the war and many unhealed wounds it was hard to see progress in civil sector.
Conclusion:
At the end it can be said that Dayton Peace Agreement was an excellent effort by the international community. Firstly it managed to end the fighting in Bosnia. It was the only document that the warring sides managed to find a consensus on. Secondly it was a document that allowed for a creation of a sovereign state, which is internationally recognized and accepted. Managed to create government that although inefficient still a government that follows law and tries to be democratic. Dayton didn’t manage to boost the economy which has had an impact on the civil society in making a dialogue between the ethnic groups. This had also been a cause in slowing down the return of the refugees in Bosnia. However in my opinion it was a truly spectacular piece of work that came to Bosnia from outside. It managed to stop the killings and atrocities that people of Bosnia were experiencing on a daily basis for over 3 and a half years. Although the document wasn’t great and followed many amendments in the years after it was a starting point for Bosnia which has moved a long way since then and has ambitions to become a member of NATO and the EU.
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Works Cited
Primary:
"95/11/09 Strobe Talbott on the Balkan Challenge." Dosfan Electronic Research Collection Archive Home Page. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/eur/releases/951109TalbottBalkans.html>.
Annotation:
Strobe Talbott is an American foreign policy analyst associated with Yale University and the Brookings Institution. He was a journalist for Time magazine. Also served as the Deputy Secretary of State from 1994 to 2001. The purpose of this source is to show America’s interest in bringing Multi-ethnic governance to Bosnia. The source can be useful to a historian studying this topic as it shows the America’s political involvement in Bosnia. Its limitation is that it shows Talbott’s opinion only and not the opinion of the whole America.
"96/09/18 Statement on Bosnia Elections." Dosfan Electronic Research Collection Archive Home Page. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1996/9609/960918dossec.html>.
Annotation:
This source is a statesman by Christopher Warren the Secretary of state at the time (USA). The purpose of the source is to inform about the outcome of the first elections in Bosnia after the Dayton agreement was signed. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is that it lets him/her understand Christopher’s feelings towards the outcome of the election. The limitation is that it only shows Warren’s view towards the outcome.
"Article about Carlos Westendorp, High Representative:"Our Man in Sarajevo"" Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressa/default.asp?content_id=3176>.
Annotation:
This source is an article by Jesús Rodriguez, author, photographer, and Berkeley Professor. The purpose of the source is to explain Carlos Westendrop the High Representative of Bosnia at the time. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is that it lets him/her understand what Carlos Westendorp was like and what his actions were like. The limitation of the source is that it is Rodriguez’s opinion and it may not be what Westendorp was actually like.
"Chronology/Monthly Tracker, January 2002." Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/chronology/default.asp?content_id=6957>.
"8th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations." Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3671>.
Plavsic, Biljana. "Our people will see the benefits of out policy." Interview by James HIll. James Hill's Weekly 3 Apr. 1998: 25-27. Print.
Annotation:
This source is an interview conducted by James Hill. The purpose of the source is to show Biljana Plavsic’s feelings towards the restriction on her political decisions that were imposed by the High Representative. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is that shows Plavsic’s feelings towards the implementations of this new policy. The limitation of the source is that it only shows Plavsic’s perspective and her restrictions to use political power may be justified.
.
"RRTF: Report July 1997." Office of the High Representative. 30 July 1997. Web. 31 Jan. 2010.
"2nd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations." Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3664>.
"3rd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations." Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3666>.
Secondary:
Ali, Tariq. Masters of the universe? NATO's Balkan crusade. London: Verso, 2000. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by Tariq Ali, a British-Pakistani historian. The purpose of the source is to explain what happened in the Balkans in the 1990’s. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is that it provides more understanding. The limitation of the source is that it is by a single author whose opinions and claims could be bias.
Chandler, David. Bosnia - Second Edition Faking Democracy After Dayton. New York: Pluto, 2000. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by David Chandler, Professor of International Relations at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster. The purpose of the source is to explain the Bosnia’s democratization process after the Dayton Agreement was signed. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is that it provides a deep analysis of the topic and allows for a good understanding. The limitation of the source is that the interpretations and analysis could be opinionated by Chandler.
Cohen, Lenard J. Broken bonds Yugoslavia's disintegration and Balkan politics in transition. Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1995. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by Lenard Cohen. The purpose of the source is to show the timeline that Yugoslavia went through from its foundation after WWI to its break up in the 1990’s. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is that it provides some thoughtful analysis of the subject. The limitation of the source is that it was written by a relatively unknown author and his interpretations could be wrong not to mention opinionated.
Denitch, Bogdan Denis. Ethnic nationalism the tragic death of Yugoslavia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1996. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by Bogdan Denitch, an American sociologist of Yugoslav origin who is an emeritus professor at the City University of New York. The purpose of the source is to explain the break up of Yugoslavia and the rise of nationalism in the region. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is that it provides very vigilant observations of the people from the region of Yugoslavia which allows the historian to make better conclusions on the topic analysed. The limitation of the source is that it is possible very opinionated since Denitch is of Yugoslav origin.
Dyker, David A., and Ivan Vejvoda. Yugoslavia and after a study in fragmentation, despair and rebirth. New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, 1997. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by David Dyker, a specialist in political science and an economist; and Ivan Vejvoda, a philosopher and executive director of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a project of the German Marshall Fund dedicated to strengthening democracy in the region. The purpose of the source is to show the differences in government and its structure in Yugoslavia and after its break up. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is that it provides more understanding of how peoples of Yugoslavia perceive politics. The limitation of the source is that it is biased more on claims rather than facts which mean that it can be very opinionated.
Holbrooke, Richard C. To end a war. New York: Modern Library, 1999. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by Richard Holbrooke, a special envoy to the Balkans at the time and today a Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan under the Obama administration. The purpose of the source is to show the struggles that Holbrooke went through and all the attempts he tried in order to make sure that Dayton satisfied all three warring sides in Bosnia. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is to explain the extent of the international involvement and effort to make peace in Bosnia work. The limitation of the source is that it is from Holbrooke’s point of view and is very opinionated by him.
Little, Allan, and Laura Silber. The Death of Yugoslavia (BBC). New York: Penguin Ltd, 1996. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by Allan Little, a British a reporter for BBC News at the time and today a BBC correspondent; and by Laura Silber director of Public Affairs at the Open Society Institute. The purpose of the source is to explain the break up of Yugoslavia and the tragedies that couldn’t be stopped due to the conflicted sides that couldn’t come to a solution to implement peace. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is to understand how the interest of the politicians in the region prevented for peace enforcement. The limitation of the source is that it is an opinionated analysis and some interpretations could be wrong or misleading.
Mark, Thompson,. Paper house the ending of Yugoslavia. New York: Pantheon, 1992. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by Thompson Mark, a British author and chief executive of Channel 4 at the time. Today he is Director-General of the BBC. He was also marked the 65th most influential man by the Forbes magazine in 2009. The purpose of the source is to explain the Yugoslavia’s break up due to its ethnic differences that didn’t allow for the country to function and longer. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is to show the social relationships between the different ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. The limitation of the source is that it is an opinionated analysis by Mr. Mark.
"State of Annex VII." United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://www.unhcr.ba/press/state%20of%20annex7.htm>.
Annotation:
This source is a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the implementation of Annex VII which is responsible for refugee return. The purpose of the source is to summarize show how many refugee’s have returned. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is to provide the information of the improvements in human rights that allow for the return of refugees in theory. The limitation of the source is that since it doesn’t take into account other reasons for low figures of return such as lack of job and bad living conditions.
"Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement." PBS. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/dayton_peace.html>.
Annotation:
This source is a summary of Dayton Peace Agreement. The purpose of the source is to summarize the Dayton Peace Agreement. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is to provide the frameworks of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The limitation of the source is that since it is a summary some important information might be lacking in it.
Szasz, Paul. "Protecting Human and Minority Rights in Bosnia: A Documentary Survey of International Proposals." California Western International LAw Journal 25.2 (1995): 234-310. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by Paul Szasz, a Hungarian expert on international law. The purpose of the source is to explain the abuses of Human Rights in Bosnia and the importance of Dayton’s strong enforcement of their protection in the post war period. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is to explain and provide better understanding of what happened in Bosnia between 1992-1995. The limitation of the source is that it shows what Paul Szasz thinks about Human Rights abuse in Bosnia and it’s his interpretation which means that the source has to be examined with care.
Woodward, Susan L. Balkan tragedy chaos and dissolution after the Cold War. Washington, D.C: Brookings Discussion Papers, 1995. Print.
Annotation:
This source is a book by Susan Woodward, an expert scholar and political adviser on Balkan, East European, and post-Soviet affairs. The purpose of the source is to show the link between the break up of Yugoslavia and the links it has to the Cold War. The use of this source to an historian studying this topic is to understand that there is a link as Yugoslavia was officially in Non-aligned Movement on paper but in reality she played a significant involvement in the Cold war. The limitation of the source is that it is an opinionated analysis which doesn’t provide many counterarguments.
Appendix 1:
Such a heavy emphasis on the human rights is a direct consequence of the war in Bosnia during which an infinite number of human rights were broken hence the human rights are a very important segment in reconstructing the state. With the Dayton agreement the citizens of Bosnia enjoy the highest level of human rights intentionally recognised and parts of Dayton, Annex 4 and Annex 6 incorporated 16 human rights agreements into Bosnian law. This provided more human rights protection to the Bosnian citizens than to the any other person in the world.
Appendix 2
The figures do show improvements and the economic growth in the Federation for the period of 1996 was estimated at 50%, however the average wage still remains very low at 290 DM (150€) (Chandler 105). While in Republika Srpska the average wage is 67 DM (35€) (RRTF: Report July 1997). The poor living conditions amongst the locals is another discouraging factor for the refugees to return as most of them live in countries abroad where they can achieve better standards of living than in Bosnia and therefore even if they return they would be under frustrations from relative poverty (Chandler 107) On top of all that it’s been estimated that between 50-65 % of the housing in Bosnia has been destroyed by the war (Little 8). The process of reconstruction is slow and the refugees therefore have nowhere to return.
