After the 1948 War, which concluded based on armistice negotiations between February and July of 1949, a number of new stressors exacerbated the Arab-Israeli conflict. First, due to the weakness shown by the Arabs leaders during the war, a period of instability followed in states such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. While changes in leadership preceded cries for revitalized efforts in the liberation of Palestine, the refugee question also burdened Arab nations. Though both sides blamed the other for the displacement of over 700,000 Palestinian refugees, and some refugees resettled in Europe and parts of the Persian Gulf, many integrated themselves into Arab cities such as Beirut, Amman, Damascus, and Cairo. In this way, the Arab side was forced to bear the brunt of an increased population, posing a strain on their economy. This conflict left a sour aftertaste for the Arab nations. Shown in the expulsion of several Arab leaders, the Arab people called for a greater push to reclaim Palestinian lands. As Israeli historian Benny Morris said, "even before the ink on the armistice agreements was dry, there arose in the Arab capitals a clamour for an avenging second round." The animosity on both sides of the conflict, but particularly on the side of the angered Arabs, all but promised a future engagement.
The conflict proceeding the 1948 War, the 1956 Suez-Sinai Campaign, signified the increasing involvement of the Western powers in the affairs of the Middle East. The British-French-Israeli triumvirate against Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt garnered a military victory, but Nasser's formidable challenge to long-standing Western colonial influences earned Egypt the respect of the Arab world. The military superiority of Israel's side seemed to deter further conflict following the 1956 Suez-Sinai Campaign, but the eye of the Western world was blind to the mounting tensions between the Israelis and Arabs through the 1960s. After the powers of Britain and France united with Israel to sustain a military rout of the Egyptian forces, the European leaders, though unsuccessful in their attempt to expel Nasser, succeeded in enhancing Israel's military prowess and providing Israel the opportunity to continue erecting its fundamental infrastructure with an established military front. It was then that the Western powers relieved themselves of their ties to Israel, assuming a measured strength of Israeli forces and infrastructure to defend themselves against Arab intrusions. However, the nationalization of the Suez Canal and Nasser's ability to challenge the Western imperialist powers was an early glimpse of the potential of the Arab side. Even in disarray, one nation could withstand the forces of two European sides. Following the military loss of Egypt to the Israeli side, the Arabs recognized the need to liberate Palestine with greater force. This would require far greater cooperation that had been demonstrated in the past. Rather than focusing on furthering domestic interests, the Arabs realized that the common of liberating Palestine must remain at the forefront, and this would not be possible without a unified Arab side. This realization also led to the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
The 1960s, after the 1956 Suez-Sinai Campaign, was a period of great tension. Sanctioned violence had ceased between Israel and the Arab states, but acts of violence continued between Israelis and Arabs. In February 1966, a liberal, militant political party known as "Ba'thists" began to assume power in Syria. This worsened the existing relationship between Israel and Syria. A raid in November 1966 by the Israeli Defence Force in West Bank was a retaliation to many small-scale terrorist acts directed at Israel. While the action was unnecessary to advance Israel's position or strategic holding, it was merely an automatic reaction to violence from the Arabs. At this point, the conflict had become a bitter, emotional struggle between the two warring sides. A buildup of hostile rhetoric rendered the conflict increasingly more bloodthirsty. Neither was willing to risk their respect and dignity when threatened even mildly. The evolution of the Arab-Israeli struggle over 15 years had moved towards a rivalry grounded not in religious or territorial disagreements, but simply a raw bitterness and hatred towards the opposite side. As the Arab-Israeli conflict became more caustically violent, it became engrained in the minds of the Arab and Israeli people. In this manner, conflict became inevitable, creating a sense of continuous forward potential for future conflict as well. This period of tension set up the onset of the 1967 Six Day War, and the inevitability of the war was clear to both the Arabs and Israelis. At the same time, however, the Western powers were more concerned with domestic issues than the affairs of the Middle East. In 1961, the construction of the Berlin Wall was at the forefront of European affairs. The United States was also involved with the Vietnam War and the rapidly evolving social scene regarding women and suburban life during the early 1960s. This is shown in the involvement of the United States in Israel's goals and the abstinence of Britain and France, who had previously aided Israel, during the Six day War.
In conclusion, the Six Day War surprised only the world outside of the Middle Eastern region. The increasing tensions between the Arabs and Israelis, as well as the time for nation-building and infrastructural development after the 1956 Suez-Sinai Campaign, allowed both sides to prepare for a violent engagement. After the 1956 Campaign, the British and French believed that their efforts in aiding the Israelis would allow them to defend their front without great duress on the side of the Arabs. While this was not the case, Israel's triumph in the Six Day War was a shock to the world, as the Six Day War was the first time that the Arab side had fought on a united front. The unstable conclusions to the 1948 War, 1956 Suez-Sinai Campaign, and the building of tensions resulted in an obvious circumstance for conflict. However, the world outside of the Middle East could not sense these subtleties.
Literature Cited
Schulze, Kirsten E. The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education Limited, 2008.
Morris, Benny. Israel's Border Wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Schulze, Kirsten E., The Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education Limited, 2008), 3.
Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 33.
Morris, Benny, Israel's Border Wars, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 9.
Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 26-27.
Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 33.
Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 37.