Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement

International Baccalaureate History

History IA:

Research Question: Was Chamberlain's appeasement a policy of peace at any price?

Word Count: 1939

IB History: Internal Assessment

Candidate: Rasmus Puggaard Hansen

Class: 3u

School: Birkerød Gymnasium

May 2009

Table of Contents

A: Plan of Investigation 3

B: Summary of Evidence 3

C: Evaluation of Sources 4

D: Analysis 5

E: Conclusion 7

F: List of Sources 8

A: Plan of Investigation

This historical investigation will focus on Neville Chamberlain, “the man who was to become the world's most celebrated and notorious appeaser,” and his policy of appeasement, especially from March 1936 to September 1939.

In order to successfully go into depth with this assignment, I ordered books on the topic, and the main body of this investigation will outline how Chamberlain's appeasement allowed Hitler's many territorial and political gains in the years leading up to the war. Using various books of different origins and ideas, I will in particular use two books that are of great importance and relevance to my research question, and these are A. J. P. Taylor's The Origins of the Second World War, and Robert J. Caputi's Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement. I will also evaluate these sources for their usefulness and the potential limitations that there may be.

By using the books obtained and my own knowledge, I will seek to answer the question: Was Chamberlain's appeasement a policy of peace at any price?

B: Summary of Evidence

Following the First World War, which had been extremely bloody and expensive, the winning nations and especially Britain realized that never again would they fight such a devastating war. Therefore, the policy of appeasement were taken into account, which is a foreign policy of pacifying an aggrieved nation through “giving way to their demands provided these were not too unreasonable” However, Hitler realized there potential benefits to be made by abusing this foreign policy.

The years leading up to WWII proved very worthwhile for Hitler.

Having noticed the weakness of The League of Nations which failed to react to Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia in 1931, Hitler felt encouraged to expand his territory.

On the 7th of March, 1936, Germans troops entered and re-militarized the Rhineland in Western Germany. “Germany had literally no forces for war” however, but this were not halt them from this aggressive move. Hitler promised that he would withdraw his troops immediately if French action were taken, even though he was confident that the French would remain passive. Hitler's excuse for his actions were the ratification of one month earlier, of the French and Russian pact of mutual assistance that he perceived as a regarded directly towards Germany. The fact that Hitler breached the Versailles and Locarno Treaties by this illegal act was seen by Churchill as “a decisive turning point,” due to the Anglo-French failure to react.

Then, on the 13th of March 1938, Hitler annexed Austria through an internal coup by the Austrian Nazis. Hitler demanded this “Anschluss” as it would open the doors to Czechoslovakia and southeastern Europe for future territorial gains, and Hitler wanted more “Lebensraum”. Chamberlain provided Hitler with the opportunity of the Anschluss of Austria, as his respect for Chamberlain had diminished greatly by his nature of drifting along. Chamberlain, who were obviously in distress, were still convinced that good relations with Hitler would prove rewarding: “It was the general belief, though less sustained by experience, that nations became contented and pacific, once ...

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The Sudetenland, the western area of Czechoslovakia, also proved to be of great interest to Hitler. Knowing that the area contained a majority of Germans, three million to be precise, and that the Czech defenses were concentrated in the region, it proved very valuable to Germany, and Hitler therefore appealed to Chamberlain. The result was the Munich Agreement in which the major powers of Europe participated, with the exception of Czechoslovakia itself, to discuss the matter. The outcome of the agreement was that the Sudetenland would be handed over to Germany, in exchange for the agreement that all future struggles would be solved through peaceful negotiations, which was signed by Hitler.

C: Evaluation of Sources

A. J. P. Taylor, born in 1906, was one of the most influential historians of the 20th century. Studying modern history at Oxford, Taylor had a great interest in world history and international relations. The Origins of the Second World War, published in1961, is a highly controversial document as it challenged the accepted view on Hitler by identifying him as a mere opportunist. Taylor also said about Chamberlain: "He was a meticulous housemaid, great at tidying up." Taylor's

It's very valuable considering Taylor's huge experience in the field of history, with over 46 published books, and the fact that he lived at the time. Taylor is of the impression that WWI was largely responsible for the causes of WWII, and this is one of his purposes for the book.

Limitations may include the fact that it was published in 1961. More information are available now than when it was first published, and also the fact that Taylor is very biased limits its value to historians. However this can prove to of value to others, as it can give insight to other ways of thinking.

Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement was published in 2000 and is written by Robert J Caputi. It is the first extended historiography of Chamberlain's diplomacy in the years leading up to WWII. It begins by explaining the initial support and criticism that appeasement had in Britain in the prewar period, whereas it moves on to describing why Chamberlain's status and reputation suffered, and still suffers, in the years today. Caputi debates that Chamberlain's failure was largely due to the tense and complicated international situation in the years up to the war. Caputi remains very neutral and avoids taking sides, which is of great value to historians studying this topic, as the information therefore won't be biased.

D: Analysis

The policy of appeasement originated from the 1920's, as the British already at this time tried to conciliate the Germans with the Dawes and Young plans. However, when Chamberlain became British Prime Minister in May 1937, he altered the policy to suit the current international situation in Europe. “He (Chamberlain) believed in taking the initiative: he would find out what Hitler wanted and show him that reasonable claims could be met by negotiation rather than by force.”

Was Neville Chamberlain an ego maniacal fool, a naive domestic politician utterly out of his depth with Adolf Hitler, though? Or were his policies the only ones possible at the time, policies which demonstrated to all that Hitler was a liar, and led a unified rearmed British nation to declare war? One thing is certain, Chamberlain felt his policy was the right one for his nation, and following the Munich Agreement, he was of the impression that he had achieved permanent peace with Hitler. Chamberlain thus returned to England with the signature of Hitler, believing to have achieved 'peace in his time'. The criticism that appeasement had suffered from seemed to have been forgotten: “...the crucial question is, just where were these stout legions of anti appeasers on 30 September 1938 when Neville Chamberlain basked in the afterglow of his triumph, hailed as the peacemaker of the world?”

“The integrity and independence of a lesser power was sacrificed to avoid the catastrophe of war,” which was met with negative public opinion in Britain, as well as the rest of Western Europe. It became a proof of betrayal, caused by appeasement, and Britain became distrusted by many Europeans. One newspaper after Munich attempted to give an accurate indication of the feeling of the county: Yorkshire Post: “By repeatedly surrendering to force, he has repeatedly encouraged aggression... It is because we believe that Mr. Chamberlain's policy is even now threatening the safety of the realm, and is likely in the near future to threaten it with danger still graver, that we are stating in detail our case against it.”

Ironically, merely a year after Munich, German troops invaded and occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia.

Following the Versailles Treaty signed in 1919 which concluded WW1, the British shared sympathy towards the Germans who could be said to have been treated unfairly, as they had to pay huge reparation bills. This also influenced Britain, as the German and British were linked together in the sense that a quick German economic recovery would improve the British economy as well. However, Chamberlain did not use appeasement to be kind towards the Germans: “They wanted peace in the continent, so that they could concentrate on their real problems, and achieve it without having to bond themselves to any guarantee to France.” Chamberlain were aware of the fact that the Germans felt cheated and bitter after Versailles, and he therefore believed that by pleasing them, he could improve international relations and prevent a future war. The public in Britain supported this viewpoint on appeasement in the beginning, as the memories of WW1 still haunted the lives the many, and none were really interested in another bloody and tragic war.

The main reason for Chamberlain wanting to prevent another future war, was the fact that Britain were too weak: “Britain ought not to take any military action in case it led to a full-scale war which Britain was totally unprepared for.” The Great Depression had severely impacted the economy and hence the military as well: “...army cut down to 200,000 in 1935 from 3.5 million in 1919...” The military threat from Germany as well as Japan and Italy were simply too vast and risky, leaving Chamberlain without a choice but to be defensive and diplomatic. Interestingly enough, though, is that documents show that British and French forces were superior to the Germans at the time, but Chamberlain completely overestimated Hitler: “They failed to allow for the fact that Hitler was a gambler who would play for high stakes with inadequate resources.”

If Chamberlain had acted with force at an early stage, the threat of Hitler most likely could have been averted.

After giving way to Hitler through the series of events in the 1930's, Chamberlain finally declared war on Germany on the 3rd of September, 1939, when Hitler invaded Poland. Clearly, it had now become obvious to Chamberlain that Hitler had never intended peace: “...his foreign policy aimed at conquest, not at equal justice for Germany.”

Chamberlain abandoned his policy in March 1939, when he had realized that Hitler had unlimited ambitions, as a result of Hitler's breach of the agreement he had with Chamberlain by the full invasion of Czechoslovakia.

E: Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be stated that Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was not a policy of peace at any price. Chamberlain sought to prevent another world war, and so he tried to improve international relations with Hitler in order to secure 'peace in our time'. When he realized that Hitler could no longer be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations, the policy was finally abolished and war broke out. Appeasement had thus failed, due to the fact that Hitler, fueled by Chamberlain's weak character, tried to gain more and more territory while still in peacetime.

Unfortunately, the realization of Hitler's trustworthiness was too late, and Hitler succeeded in annexing Austria, re militarizing the Rhineland and winning the Sudetenland.

Had this firmly been his aim, then, logically, after Munich he would have made no further territorial demands and Appeasement would have succeeded. However, we know today, of course, that Hitler was literally insatiable and wished to conquer and subjugate all of Europe, but this was not known at the time of appeasement.

Bibliography:

Caputi, Robert J. 2000. Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement.
Churchill, Winston S. 1991. Erindringer om Den Anden Verdenskrig (Memoirs of the Second World War.
Churchill, Winston S. 1938. While England Slept – A survey of world affairs.
Lowe, Norman. 1982. Mastering Modern World History
Neville, Peter. 2006. Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War.
Parker, R. A. C. 1993. Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War.
Taylor, A. J. P. 1961. The Origins of the Second World War.
Trommer, Aage. 1976. Hitlers udenrigspolitik: Realiteter contra visioner (Hitler's foreign policy: Realities versus visions)