Attempts at Peacemaking
1948-1978
- UN secured a truce in Jan 1949
- By July 1949 neighbouring Arab states had signed separate armistice agreements with Israel
- After the Suez Crisis of 1954, Washington sponsored a UN resolution creating the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the territories vacated by the Israeli forces.
- Following the 1967 (Six day) War UN issues Resolution 242 — 'peace in return for territory'; Israel called upon to return 'disputed territories' Effectively a step towards recognition (implicit) of Israel by Egypt and Jordan. Became key document in all later peace attempts.Explicit recognition and negotiations were supposed to come from Palestinians before Israel left OTs, but this did not occur and so Israel remained.
- During the 1973 war, the Organisation of Arab Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) adopted the Yamani Plan — Arab oil producers would not send oil to pro-Israeli countries
- 22 October — UN Security Council passed Resolution 338 calling on the parties to negotiate directly on the basis of Resolution 242. Outcome — a peace conference co-chaired by the US and USSR in Geneva on 1 December 1973. Israel, Egypt and Jordan attended. Syria boycotted the conference.
- May 1974, Kissinger achieved a disengagement accord between Israel and Syria regarding the Golan heights.
- Over the next two years, Kissinger continued to facilitate negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Some gains were achieved: The Suez Canal was re-opened in June 1975 , Israeli troops partially withdrew and UN buffer zones were set up.
Camp David Accords
- Carter invited Sadat and Begin to meet at Camp David, and after two weeks of meetings signed two accords on Sept 17 1978.
- Formally signed on Mar 26 1979.
- First accord "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" formed basis of all subsequent negotiations, calling for negotiations between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians to settle WB and Gaza. Self-governing Arab authority would be set up to replace Israeli military in OTs for 5 years while talks held on final status.
- Second accord "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel" draft of peace agreement to be negotiated and signed within 3 months — Intended to get free passage for Israeli ships through Egypt
- Israel yielded the vast expanse of the Sinai and also gave up oil fields in Sinai.
- The Camp David Accords contained provisions that have formed the basis of all subsequent peace negotiations.
Following the Intifada
- At the Algiers Conference of November 1988, the PNC proclaimed the independent state of Palestine comprising Gaza and the WB by votes of 253 to 46 with 10 abstentions. The declaration gained immediate worldwide attention and within 3 days 27 nations had extended recognition. The US and Israel dismissed the declaration, but by the mid 1990s more states had recognised Palestine than they had Israel.
- In December 1988, Arafat and the Swedish Foreign Minister issued a joint statement recognising Israel and condemning all terrorism in the Middle East, including state terrorism (AKA Israel’s)
- Arafat then addressed the UN assembly in Geneva and outlined his peace plan, proposing an international conference held under UN auspices, followed by Israeli withdrawal fro the WB and GS with forces replaced temporarily with UN ones.
- Shamir then proposed his own four point plan, under US pressure. The plan was very similar to the one proposed for Palestinian autonomy at Camp David.
Madrid and Oslo
- October 30, 1991- Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians held a peace conference jointly sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union at Madrid. Very little came of it.
- Israel entered into direct negotiations with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians — began series of secret meetings in Norway between Israeli and Palestinian representatives which led to launching of the Oslo peace process.
- The "Declaration of Principles," entailing mutual recognition, was signed at a Washington ceremony hosted by U.S.
- President Bill Clmton on September 13, 1993 It detailed a series of interim steps leading to a long-term ‘Final Settlement'
- Following the signing of another agreement in May 1994 in Cairo Arafat returned to Gaza to take control of a new Palestinian Authority which would govern the Palestinian towns evacuated by Israel
- The 1994 Israeli peace treaty with Jordan was a much easier negotiation than with Egypt or the Palestinians. Israel made border adjustments and water-sharing arrangements called for by Amman.
Finishing Oslo
- September 28 1995 at another White House ceremony Israelis and Palestmians signed the Oslo II Peace Accord 400-page pact which allowed for a second stage of autonomy for the Palestinians, giving them self-rule in the majority of Palestinian towns.
- On November 4th, 1995 Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by Jewish extremist Yigal Amir — Terrible loss for peace process.
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The ‘final status’ talks Started in Taba on the 5th May 1996.
- Binyamin Netanyahu was then voted in as the new Israeli Prime Minister, he was much less conciliatory than Rabin had been.
- In August 1996 Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met for the first time since the Israeli elections. Both sides immediately accused each other of violating the accords.
- After weeks of futile negotiations, a breakthrough was secured by King Hussein, who extracted concessions from both sides in Jan 1997. Arafat existsed a mid-1998 target rate of withdrawal instead of the existing September 1997 one, and Netanyahu agreed to the timetable for withdrawal.
- Agreement signed Jan 15 1997, ratified by PLO, the Israeli cabinet and Knesset.
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Dershowitz argues: "No matter what steps Israel takes towards peace and the two-state solution, there will always be some for whom nothing short of Israel's destruction will suffice. For that reason, Israel's best defense must remain its determination to survive and its ability to defend its citizens against those zealots - some armed with bombs, others with bigotry who cannot abide the reality of a strong independent and democratic Jewish State”
International Involvement in the Conflict
Objectives
Strategic
- The Middle East was important to the superpowers for a number of reasons: An extension of the cold war theatre, oil and its strategic position on the map.
- Primarily the US's objective in its involvement in the conflict was to contain the influence of the USSR in the Middle East, a critical region. This opposition to the spread of Soviet influence was first expressed in the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Following the Suez Crisis and the departure of English and French colonial influence, the US began to establish a sphere of influence in the Middle East with the original aim of surrounding the USSR with a number of states diplomatically aligned to the US.
- Although the US say that their interest in the region stems purely from an ideological pledge to promote and protect democracy, this has been proven to be untrue as they have often been happy to assist anti-democratic regimes if such actions furthered their interests.
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Noam Chomsky: "at the rhetorical level, the threat from which the ME must be 'defended' is generally pictured to be the USSR"
- On the other hand, the USSR could be said to have hoped to foster the spread of communism through the spread of its influence; however, as the Soviet historians Dawisha and Dawisha state, the primary goal was to secure the USSR's southern borders and act in the national interest before aiding 'national liberation movements'.
Economic
- Oil has always been a significant reason for the continued interest of international powers in the region, and after the policy of détente, this became primary. It is estimated that the US's GNP would be cut by 13% without Middle Eastern oil; eg. In 1973 the Yamani plan cost the US $10-20 billion and 500 000 jobs through the refusal to sell Israeli-aligned nations oil.
Political
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Influence of Zionist lobby in America politics. Hinchcliffe: “it would be a bold or rash administration that took any action that might arouse its ire.”
- UN wanted the resolution of international disputes without protagonists resorting to war. To push the PLO and Israel to accept resolutions 242 and 338.
Role and Impact
Escalators/Initiators
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British involvement through mandate and UN partition 141, leads to Al Nakba. 1956 war initiated by France and Britain in response to nationalisation of Suez Canal(July), leading to Sevres protocol, aimed at protecting the last European colonial interests in the region. Mohamed Heikal: "A clash of arms btw the British... and the forces of Arab nationalism [Nasser]... can be seen to be inevitable." US and USSR both threaten Israel and Britain to stop war, threaten "every kind of modem destructive weapon" (USSR); US threaten withdrawal of a $1 billion IMF loan to Britain.
- 1967 wax, supply of arms to ME, Israeli air force entirely supplied by US. Led to arms race increasing tensions. Egypt, Syria and Jordan signing defence pacts. USSR, seeing US on the run in Vietnam, gave false intelligence to Syria hoping Arabs would invade and provoke another confrontation. Brinkmanship policy led to US deploying its navy to the region, forcing the USSR to concede.
- Israel has received more US assistance per capita than any other nation in the world amounting to billions of dollars in arms and funds. For example, in the 1967 War, the Israeli air force that proved so effective against the Egyptian army was entirely supplied by the US. Immediately after the war the US became the guarantor of Israel's survival. Their assistance over the next three years allowed the Israeli military to double in size.
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Stephen Green: "US tactical reconnaissance assistance was not only important it was critical." <1967 War.
- The superpowers played a direct role in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, or Ramadan War. The Soviets played a pivotal role in rearming their Arab ‘clients’, forcing the US to step up its supply transfers to Israel to maintain the regional balance of power. On 14 November, the US began a massive airlift, worth around $3.5 billion, to rearm Israel. Washington’s effective response during the Yom Kippur War helped ensure Israeli victory. The US saw Israel as stronger than ever, and as a result of American military assistance, Israel’s military power doubled over the next three years.
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According to Hinchcliffe, in pursuing client-state diplomacy the superpowers "exploited new fissures and tensions, severely exacerbating pre-existing ones such as the Arab-Israeli conflict."
Mediators and Peacemakers
- After the 1973 War the ceasefire was brokered by the two powers, with Henry Kissinger organising a Geneva conference and finally a disengagement accord between Israel and Syria. The peace talks after this war lead to the US President Carter opening the Camp David talks in 1978 (signed March 26 1979)
- The Reagan Plan, proposed in September 1982, called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza to make way for a Palestinian homeland on the West Bank under the rule of Jordan’s King Hussein. The plan was rejected by both sides. However, the implications of 1982 were that the US came to play a more objective role in the Middle East crisis, which set the stage for more successful peace negotiations.
- Following the Intifada US President Bush attempts to open further talks, resulting in the Madrid Conference in October 1991, but this was a near-total failure.
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George Bush (Madrid Address): "Peace can not be imposed from the outside by the US or by anyone else.”
1. Origins of tension
The War of Independence (Israeli) or The Catastrophe (Palestinian) 1948
Background:
- The UN. Special Commission on Palestine decided on a partition and voted for the plans in Nov. 1947. As partition became increasingly likely, the Jews tried to move more people into Palestine.
- Over the next 5 months, Jews and Arabs prepared for war. Terrorism and violence escalated.
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Avi Schlaim on Ben-Gurion, the key player on the Israeli side: “although he valued international support, especially that of the US and SU, for the idea of a Jewish state, he did not expect statehood to be delivered on a silver platter. Realising that ultimately the Jews would have to fight for their state, he wanted a clear-cut Jewish military victory.”
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Ze’ev Jabotinsky: (founder of Revisionist Zionism) “The only way a Zionist project could be realised was unilaterally and by military force”.
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Plan D, implemented in April and May 1948 was part of a wider offensive strategy aimed at quelling the increasing Arab violence against Jews. Aim was to secure all the areas allocated to the Jewish settlements under the UN resolution as well as the Jewish settlements outside these areas – so it involved destruction of Arab villages for the first time. Schlaim: “it’s objective was to clear the interior of the country of hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements, and in this sense it provided a warrant for expelling civilians.” – so gave birth to the Palestinian refugee problem
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Israel made an agreement with King Abdullah that he would annex the Arab part of Palestine adjacent to his Kingdom, the Jews would set up their own state, and then the two parties would made peace. Schlaim: “to both sides Palestinian nationalism posed a threat, and they therefore had a common interest in repressing it.”
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On 14th May 1948, Britain’s last High Commissioner, Sir Allan Cunningham, left Haifa. Ben Gurion then proclaimed the state of Israel. US and SU recognised Israel almost immediately.
The War of 1948:
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Following Israel’s declaration of statehood in 1948, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan attacked the Jewish borders.. Schlaim: “Israel was thus born in the midst of war. The first aim of its foreign policy was survival.”
- By 28 May 1948, the Jordanian Arab Legion had occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank.
- After initial setbacks, however, the Israelis successful drove the Arab armies out of the north, regained the Negev from the Egyptians and secured a corridor between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. They were, however, unable to gain control of East Jerusalem.
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Both sides accepted the Security Council’s call for a cease-fire on 7th Jan 1949 and agreed to begin armistice negotiations. This was followed by agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria by July that year – yet this armistices never came to a conclusive peace agreement.
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The relationship between King Abdullah and the Zionists had reasserted itself during the war. This is often left out in Zionist historiography because it challenges the view that Israel stood alone against the entire Arab world. Schlaim, “had this special relationship not existed, Israel would have been unlikely to achieve such a comprehensive and decisive victory in the first Arab Israeli War.” As a result of this, King Abdullah expected Israel to help him mobilise international support for incorporating the remains of Palestine into his Kingdom. These talks began in Dec 1948 and resulted in a major victory for Israeli diplomacy (although they had also used military force) - Israel got a large amount of the territory originally assigned to Palestine under UN partition plan, the rest went to Jordan.
How did Israel win the war?
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Arabs fought with 55 000 men; the Jewish with 95 000. Schlaim: “In this war, as in most wars, the stronger side ultimately prevailed.” In addition, although the Israelis had few heavy weapons and no artillery or planes, they received a large shipment of weapons from Czechoslovakia at a crucial stage in the war. While the Arab states possessed armoured vehicles, they did not use them effectively.
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One Zionist answer is the spirit and youthful determination of the Jews. According to Zionist historian A. L. Sachar, the Arabs “were almost listless by comparison, for they seemed to have little personal stake in the outcome of the war”. Sachar says the Israeli’s fought with a “desperate last-ditch spirit…the Arab’s never fully understood how much this counted” and that this is why Israel won the war.
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Schlaim feels that “The Arab forces… mobilized to do battle against the emergent Jewish state were nowhere as powerful or united as they appeared to be in Arab and Jewish propaganda.” The Arabs were divided and succumbed to interstate rivalries; their command was not united, Schlaim: “Each of the other Arab states was also moved by dynastic or national interests, which were hidden behind the fig leaf of securing Palestine for the Palestinians.”
Consequences of the war for Israel and the Palestinians to 1967
Political and social issues in Arab-Israeli relations in 1967
Ive put these two together because I found them a bit hard to differentiate between – what do you guys think? The divide I thought we could possibly make would be between the impact of the war on the various groups, and then the issues that arose as a result – eg refugees, the rise of pan arab nationalism etc. What do you think?
Israel created and Palestine ceased to exist:
- Israeli casualties were very high but the Israeli that now existed was far larger than that proposed in the UN Partition Plan (from 55% of Palestine to 79%)
- The UN secured a truce in January 1949, and by July, Israel and the neighbouring Arab states had signed separate armistices agreements. Yet, these left many issues unresolved:
- Israel refused to return to the borders laid out in the UN partition resolution, occupying 20% more of Palestine than the UN had agreed on.
- The Arab states and Palestinians refused diplomatic recognition to Israel and would not acknowledge the Jewish state’s right to exist.
- Jerusalem remained divided though Israel still called the west part of the city its capital. UN Resolution 303 passed in December 1949 called for the internationalisation of Jerusalem
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Schlaim: “Israel emerged from the war economically exhausted but with superior organisation and morale, a tremendous sense of achievement, and a confident outlook on the future that formed a solid foundation for the development of parliamentary democracy.”
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American Zionist leader Nahum Goldmann: “It seemed to show the advantages of direct action over negotiation and diplomacy… it seemed to indicate the only direction that could possibly be taken from then on.”
- No Palestinian Arab state had emerged after 1949.
- Palestinian historians assert this was because Israel, supported by Western powers, prevented it. They claim that the British destroyed local Arab leadership through hostility and duplicity to the Arabs and complicity with the Zionists, therefore enabling the Zionists to expel the Palestinians from their own country.
- Israeli historians argue that an Arab state did emerge in the area allocated by the UN General Assembly. It was, they say, an expanded Jordan: ‘Jordan is Palestine’. This argument harks back to the borders of the British mandate before 1922 when Transjordan was separated from the original Palestine mandate as an area in which Jewish land sales and settlement were prohibited
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Walbank and Hinge: “there is little question that the Palestinian people have a legitimate grievance and that their plight has been largely ignored by a world community… as well as by their Arab brethren.”
Refugees:
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David Gilmour sums over 1948 civil war "not only did it solve none of the basic issues of the Palestinian question; it created new and grave ones."
- Resolution 194 called for reparation of Palestinian Refugees, but Israel refused the return of thousands of Arabs to their homes. For many Jews, this was justified on the account that Arabs had not accepted the UN partition, and thus shouldn't need to cater for their return. Many also simply claimed it was a hindrance to the new state.
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Moshe Sherok: "reintegration of the returning Arabs into normal life, and even there mere sustenance, would present an insuperable problem."
- 150 000 Palestinians remained resident in Israel with the promise of equal freedoms and rights but 725 000 became refugees. The bulk of the refugees ended up in the WB and GS and in neighbouring Arab countries, especially Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon
- Intellectual Palestinians went to the big cities, but the majority of them 80% (fellaheen) were unskilled and went to appalling UN refugee camps in neighbouring Arab cities. Those in camps had limited access to employment and were heavily reliant on charity, many became extremely ill due to poverty and poor living conditions. There was little sanitation, no sewerage and only basic medical facilities. Electricity and communal running water were only supplied in the 1950s. The camps were places of desperation, degradation and insecurity, and remain so until this very day
- Arab hosts did little to integrate them into their places of refuge, as they believed it was Israel’s problem because they had created the issue.
- Israel would not accept Palestinian refugees back, emphasising the small size of Israel, arguing that as Arabs, the displaced Palestinians could easily find homes in neighbouring states, and that the returnees, due to their hostility towards the Jewish state, would constitute a subversive fifth column, dedicated to the destruction of the state. Israel pointed out that a large number of Jews had been expelled from Arab countries in the Middle East and northern Africa and migrated to Israel, so the Arab states had an obligation to take the refugees back.
- It would only accept refugees back in return for peace treaties, something which the Arab states refused to do, as this would mean recognising Israel. Recently, however, historians have suggested that it was in fact Israel that refused to sign peace treaties with its neighbours (such as Avi Shlaim).
- Palestinians in Jordan were allowed to become citizens, and many joined the army and civil service; others entered business and the professions. Lebanon was the country where Palestinians fared best, enjoying freedom of speech and many becoming successful in business and banking in Beirut. Some Palestinians also moved to the Persian Gulf countries and the United Arab Emirates
- The Palestinians were not forced out of Israel but there is a large amount of debate surrounding why they left:
- Any Palestinian historians assert that it was because of a categorical attempt by the Israelis to get rid of Palestinians.
- Post-Zionist historians such as Morris say that Israel had no categorical, master plan to expel the Arabs, it just sort of happened.
- Some think that Arabs encouraged the Palestinians to flee, so that they could easily get through the cities in war.
- Widely acknowledged that many Palestinian’s fled in fear of their lives or property
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Walbank and Hinge: “For many the identity of being a refugee also put them in a status level similar to that of a ‘gypsy’ or ‘bastard’ – a personal deserving of no respect.”
The effect for Jewish communities in Arab countries:
- Jews from outside Europe flooded towards Israel; more than 500 000 by 1952. Before 1948, almost 90% of Jews had arrived from Europe, and by 1961 they represented only 55% of the population. This coming together in Israel of the Ashkenazim, or European, Jews (who had played such a central role in building up the national home) and the non-European Jews (who were so different in language and culture) created great problems for Israel.
- In Africa and the Middle East, Jews were expelled or left Muslim countries:
- The traditional Zionist view sees the exodus as a response to a long history of Arab persecution. Zionists portray the lot of Oriental Jews in Arab countries as one of misery, fear and anti-Semitism.
- The anti-Zionist view highlights the positives of Arab-Jewish history, and their exodus is attributed not to anti-Semitism, but rather to a malicious Zionist conspiracy including instances of bomb-throwing aimed at achieving mass Jewish immigration to Israel. Anti-Zionists believe that the wave of bombings which took place between April 1950 and June 1951 were perpetrated by Zionist agents in order to cause fear among the Jews and promote their exodus to Israel. Many Iraqi Jewish immigrants shared this belief, but there is no solid evidence, and the motivations of the bombings remain a contentious issue.
- These perspectives are overly simplistic, it is widely agreed that for many Jews, the reason to move was economic and for others, the chance to live in a Jewish state, a place of refuge, was greatly attractive. It is true that anti-Jewish feeling had certainly been heightened by the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, encouraging many Jews to leave Arab states. The Jewish exodus was also influenced by the Zionist underground movement, which convinced many Jews that emigration offered the best solution to their problems.
Impact for the Arabs of Israel:
- 150 000 Palestinians remained resident in Israel and in 1949 made up about 18% of the Israeli population.
- More than 385 Palestinian towns were absorbed by Israel, and a quarter of all buildings in Israel were Arab
- The new Israeli state put in place a series of laws aimed at institutionalising Jewish control and ownership at the expense of Palestinian Arabs
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In March 1950, the Knesset (Israeli parliament) passed the Absentee Property Law. This stated that any person, who on 29th November 1947 was an Arab citizen or resident in an Arab country, was classified as an absentee. The Development Authority appointed by the Knesset then had the right to see the land of these absentees. In Palestinian eyes, this law authorised the theft of a million Arabs’ property. Palestinians were encouraged to attempt to reclaim their possessions in Israel; 5000 unarmed Palestinians were killed by Israel between 1949 and 1956 for doing so
- In July 1950, the Knesset passed the Law of Return which stated that any Jew, anywhere in the world, had the right to full Israeli citizenship
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In August 1952, the Law of Nationality affirmed the Law of Return and also stated that non-Jews could only be citizens by being naturalised or proving by residence that they were Palestinian. Most Palestinians had no papers and thus became foreigners in their own country
- The Israelis project the image that the Arabs were treated with humility and kindness, emphasising the National Law of 1951, allowing them many freedoms
- The Arabs say they were mistreated, governed by military rule and denied basic rights and opportunities; they could also have their land expropriated for no reason
- The Israeli populace viewed the Arabs with suspicion (seen as a fifth column); because Israel was at war with their countries
- In any case the two populations inside Israel lived very separate lives, and the Arabs faced significant disadvantage in terms of living standards, education, health and employment opportunities
Impact on neighbouring Arab States:
- Israel now held all of the Negev Desert in the south. In the north Nazareth, Acre and the land to the Lebanese border had been gained while much of the land west of the river Jordan, originally stipulated as Arab territory, became Israeli
- The Arabs regained the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Israel decided not to attempt to capture the WB for fear of bringing Britain into the war, angering King Abdullah and incorporating unnecessary amounts of Palestinians into their territory.
- The Arab states perpetuated the belief in Israel that they were totally dedicated to its destruction
- Arab countries were actually in upheaval; they could not muster unity for military strikes, so they had to resort to economic sanctions against Israel, closing the Suez Canal in 1951
- In 1950, the West Bank and the Kingdom of Jordan were united while the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control
- In the early 1950s, the Arabs remained united in their objective of destroying Israel and by the mid 50s, Israel had become the target of frequent Fedayeen attacks. The Fedayeen were Arab guerrilla fighters who attacked Israeli border areas. By 1956, these attacked numbered 11,000
- Israeli reprisals were swift and brutal. In October 1953, Israeli forces led by Ariel Sharon attacked Qiba in the West Bank killing more than 50 people
- In March 1954, Israeli forced attacked the West Bank village of Nahalin
- Palestinians were also gradually organising. In September 1951, Yasser Arafat organised a Palestinian Students’ Union in Cairo. In February, Egypt’s President Nasser created the first Palestinian Fedayeen group in Egypt
- In 1958 Arafat created Fatah, which increased guerrilla raids against Israel.
- Palestinians in Jordan began to turn against King Abdullah (who was assassinated) and later King Hussein
The development of Pan-Arab Nationalism:
Nasser and his influence:
- Arguably the most influential Arab leader of the century
- Attended secondary school in Cairo and in 1938 graduated from the Royal Military Academy
- Served as an army lieutenant in Egypt and Sudan
- In 1948, he fought against the Israelis in the Negev Desert
- It was during the first Arab-Israeli war that Nasser held the first meeting of the ‘Free Officers’ whose aim was to remove the last elements of colonialism in Egypt and transform the political system
- Nasser was a key player in the overthrow of Farouk
- Nasser’s early measures included extensive land reforms. Holdings were limited to 80 hectares and the excess redistributed to the peasants
- Nasser persuaded Britain to remove its troops from the Suez Canal Zone and showed and independent line in foreign policy when he refused to join the Western-back Bagdad Pact
- His aims were to: end the British presence in Egypt, avoid siding with either of the superpowers (did not want to be dragged into Cold War) and wanted above all, to forge Arab unity and dreamed of a pan-Arab nationalist grouping with himself at its head
- In July 1958, pro-Nasser army officers overthrew the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq and set up a republic under General Abdel Karim Kassem
- Syria and Egypt allied in 1958, however they split up by 1961, due to revolutionary activity in Syria
- Syria was then taken over by radical Shiite Muslim sects, and became openly hostile to Israel, provoking it along the Golan Heights, and eventually beginning the antagonising which would lead to the 1967 Six Day War
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Efraim Karsh: “The actual policies of the Arab states show they have been less motivated by concern for pan-Arabism, let alone for the protection of the Palestinians, than by their own interests. Indeed, nothing has done more to expose the hollowness of pan-Arabism than this, its most celebrated cause”.
Suez War:
- Nasser pursued policies deliberately aimed at hurting Israel’s position:
- Nasser refuses to allow Israeli or Israeli-bound ships to use the Suez Canal
- Closed the straits of Tiran thus cutting off the Israeli port of Eilat
- Israeli ships were attacked from Sharm el Sheikh
- Nasser began to be viewed in the West, particularly Britain, in a negative light:
- Nasser’s move towards Communists, including an arms deal with the Czechs
- Nasser’s refusal to join the Bagdad Pact = the British PM, Eden saw Nasser as another Hitler and was determined to remove him from power
- Jordan’s dismissal of Sir John Glubb, the British officer who ran King Hussein’s army: this was seen as Nasser’s work
- The anti-British propaganda by Nasser proliferated into Kenya
- Nasser wanted to build a giant dam at Aswan. To get the best deal, he began to play off West against East. These actions, as well as Nasser’s communist links, persuaded the US Secretary of State, Dulles, to cancel the Aswan Dam deal. Nasser was humiliated, and responded by nationalising the Suez Canal
- The retaliation, known as the Anglo-French-Israeli conspiracy was that Israel would be ‘invited’ to attack Egypt across the Sinai as Israel had certainly being provoked by Nasser in recent years. Once Israel had reached the Canal, Britain and France would order Israel and Egypt to withdraw from the Canal Zone and occupy it themselves. Israel would comply with the demand and it was assumed that Egypt would not. British planes would then attack Nasser’s air force on the ground. If Nasser accepted his ultimatum, he would be humiliated and forced from power. If he refused, he would be defeated and the same result would be achieved
- The British, French and Israeli forces quickly had control of the Sinai by November 1956, but a USSR ultimatum prompted cease fire. USA also opposed the action
Results of the War:
- Israel now held the Gaza Strip, with the loss of 231 soldiers
- Israel withdrew without commotion however, and the fedayeen was stopped (only to be replaced by the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO])
- Nasser emerged from the war as a great Arab hero and leader of Arab nationalism.
- Israel gained no land and lost face conspiring with Western imperialists but its military skill was admired and in the years immediately after the Suez, its border areas were quieter
- Britain and France were humiliated for the international world to see. Eden’s career was finished and he soon resigned, claiming ill health
- The SU made inroads in the region as a third world friend
- However, the Suez left the fundamental Middle East situation the same: Israel still existed, Ps were still live in refugee camps and the Arabs still worked for Israeli destruction. The region was quieter for a while but peace was not achieved
- War and Peace
Causes, course and consequences of the 1967 (Six Day) War
Background:
- During 1966-67, military tension was high as the number of Fatah attacks increased and Israeli retaliation was quick and ruthless. Nasser was coming under increasing pressure to do something about Israel
- The war was ultimately begun after the Soviets gave a false intelligence report to Egypt that Israeli troops were massing against Syria as they wanted to weaken America’s influence in the Middle East, and believed this was the time as America was otherwise occupied with Vietnam. Egypt then massed troops along the Israeli border during May, mainly because Nasser was concerned with his image in the Arab world and wanted to put on a show of strength by going on the offensive.
- Both the US and SU made it clear to their respective clients that they did not want them to attack first.
- By May 30 Israel faced a possible war on 3 fronts, from Jordan, Syria and Egypt. They decided to launch a pre-emptive attack rather than wait for the Arabs to make the first move, especially because they were told that the US were not planning to take any action.
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The Zionist Perspective: The ‘Pre-Emptive Strike’ - Israel was threatened with superior numbers and warlike rhetoric; their only action was to attack first
- The Palestinian and Arabic Perspective: The ‘Pre-Meditated Attack’ - That the Arab rhetoric was empty, and Israel knew this. Israel only started the war to gain more land
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Shlaim: “The Six Day War was a defensive war. It was launched by Israel to safeguard its territory, not to expand its territory”.
The Six-Day War:
- Israel attacks on June 5 by sending 180 aircraft to Egypt, leaving only 8 to defend Israel.
- They approached Egypt from an unexpected direction, and warnings from Syria barely got through as the codes had changed the previous day so Egypt had trouble understanding the message.
- Israel started by destroying runways to precent the Egyptian planes from getting off the ground, and those that did manage to fly were no match for the Israeli airforce.
- The Egyptians faced a series of mishaps, including codes that had been changed that no one knew about, the fact that Marshall who gave orders to the army was off on a tour, and despite the fact that they had 3 times as many tanks as Israel without air cover they were in big trouble.
- Jordan then responded by shelling Jerusalem, which although the Israeli’s claim it was not their original intention to fight with Jordan, resulted in a determination to wipe out the Jordanians.
- Israel then took the Old City and West Bank.
- The following day they captured Gaza and the Sinai
- They then decide to attack the Golan Heights (part of Syria) which brings the SU into the war. They decide to disguise their planes and attack in stealth.
- The US tells the Kremlin that they are doing everything they can to stop the war, which is a lie, they never actually contact Israel directly. They then move their fleet closer which lets the Soviet’s know that they’re willing to get involved.
- A cease fire is then declared after 6 days.
Consequences of the Six Day War:
- The 1967 war settled nothing: it exacerbated the refugee situation, created the OT problem and increased Arab resentment
Israelis:
- Massive success, Arabs lost 15,000 men, the Israelis lost 777. 70,000 sq km of land had been gained, land quadrupled
- Paradoxically their position worsened in the long run
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The Occupied Territories (Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights) introduced new problem. Schlaim: “The question was what to do with these territories, and to this question there was no simple answer.”
- Lots of internal debate about whether to keep OTs, From a strategic POV, by holding onto the WB, Israel could better defend its borders and major populated cities. The extra labour also created an economic boom. On the other hand, some believed that if land were trading for peace with Arab neighbours, then giving up the WB would be worth it.
- The territories were also important for the Sephardic Jews who migrated from Arab states because it gave them more status/importance.
- For years, Israel would be hounded by the UN Resolution 242 which called for a return to pre-1967 borders
- Israel says that in exchange for peace it is willing to give back the Golan Heights to Syria and the Sinai to Egypt, but they wanted to hold on to the Old City and West Bank because they are part of Eretz Israel.
- Egypt rejected this proposal as it indirectly implied Israel’s right to exist.
- SU and several Eastern bloc countries severed ties with Israel in the aftermath of war.
- US became even more the guarantor of Israel’s survival.
- In the late 1980s Israel would have to cope with the Intifada
Palestinians:
- Increased Palestinian nationalism, as it was clear that the other Arab states could not be relied on to guarantee Palestinian self-determination. After the 1967 war, 40% of Palestinians lived under Israeli control (about 1.3 million)
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Walker and Gowers: “After the Six-Day War, it was obvious that the PLO was discredited in the eyes of the masses as the Arab regimes that and supported its foundation in 1964.”
- PLO therefore took an increasingly radical stance and violence in the region escalated.
- Palestinians in the OTs had very few rights – for example they could not meet in public places.
Arabs:
- Arab hostility was further increased towards Israel, but it also marked the end of the Pan-Arab dream
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Arab leaders met in Khartoum in September 1967 and passed the ‘three noes resolution’: no negotiation with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no peace with Israel
- Arab defeat allowed the SU to entrench itself in the region by quickly offering to re-equip Egypt. The SU did not encourage negotiation as this would decrease their influence in the region
- Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Algeria and Yemen severed diplomatic ties with the USA.
The UN Resolution 242
- A masterpiece of diplomatic ambiguity, calling for peace in return for territory, return of occupied territories, recognition of state sovereignty.
- The two sides interpreted the document very differently.
- All the Arab states bar Syria accepted it – this was implicit acknowledgement of Israel’s existence
- The most significant issue is the lack of direct referral to Palestinian people, except a provision that there should be a solution to the ‘refugee problem’
- The PLO completely ignored it until 1988, when they began to acknowledge it as a peace basis
- It has been argued that UN Resolution 242 did not specify ‘the’ when referring to ‘returning occupied territories’ to allow Israel to acquire more defensible territory
- Israel ignore it anyway, and it ends up just becoming a complicating factor both in the peace process and in relation to America’s relations
Creation, aims, methods and effectiveness of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 1964-1974
Creation:
- In June 1964, the PLO was formed at an Arab Summit in Cairo.
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Nasser: “The Palestinian Entity must be preserved because the extermination of the entity would mean the elimination of the Palestinian problem forever”.
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Walker and Gowers: “Powerless to do more than expostulate, the summit covered its own confusion by agreeing on Nasser’s long-nurtured plan for the creation of an institution to represent the Palestinians”.
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The PLO was an army of refugees whose aim was ‘organising the Palestinian people to enable them to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and determining their destiny’
- It was to be financed by contributions from Arab states and taxes levied from the Palestinians themselves.
- Official objectives as outlined by their covenant were to: remove Zionism from Palestine, commit itself to an armed struggle and reject the historical events from 1918 to 1964
- According to the covenant, those Arabs who until 1947 normally resided in Palestine, anyone born after 1947 with a Palestinian father and those Jews who arrived in Palestine before the Zionist invasion were all to be considered Palestinians.
- Walker and Gowers: “It seemed to many Palestinians to herald a new start in the battle to return to Palestine”.
- The many different factions within the PLO would cause problems to the Arab-Israeli peace process as they all represented different groups and had different interests.
Arafat Takes Control of the PLO
- In 1969, Arafat won a power struggle within the PLO and emerged as the Chairman. Arafat’s aims were to remove the influence of the Arab states from the PLO and unite the various Palestinian factions.
- The PLO now controls the Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
- Arafat stresses armed struggle (terrorism) over standing armies
- He also places great emphasis on Palestinian nationalism over the holistic term Arab
- Israel began reprisal attacks against Jordan after PLO steps up violence against Jews
The armed struggle:
Do you think we need more on the specific terrorist groups/factions?
- Between 1969 and 1974 the PLO engaged in an armed struggle:
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‘Lisa Beyer: “The impossibility of a victory with Israel had Arafat led the PLO in the 1970s on a bloodthirsty campaign of terrorism.”
- PLO attacks were targeted on Israeli border areas. These terrorist attacks were retaliated harshly by Israel who arrested and deported suspected terrorists and demolished the houses of suspected supporters of terrorists, as well as conducted large scale attacks on PLO bases.
- 21 March 1968: In retaliation for a Fatah raid, Israel struck back in Karameh. In a major battle, Arafat, backed by Jordanian armoured battalion, held his ground against the superior Israeli force. Palestinian casualties were heavy and whilst 100 Palestinians died, only 28 Israelis were killed. Karameh was successful in making Arafat an instant hero in the victory-starved Arab world
- As a result of Karmeh, thousands of young men volunteered to be Fatah fighters and Arab states made financial contributions. By the end of the year, Arafat featured on the cover of ‘Time’ magazine
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An El Al plane was attacked at Athens in December 1968. Two days later, Israeli commandos destroyed 14 Arab aircrafts at Beirut airport
- In August 1970, five aircrafts were hijacked to Jordan, with the terrorists demanding the release of Palestinian prisoners in Jordan. The planes were blown up after the hostages were released. This action led to the Jordan-Palestinian war, which saw the PLO expelled to Lebanon
- King Hussein opposed the PLO, who would restrict his authority on his rule over the Palestinians, and whose actions could have provoked a war with Israel, as the PLO operated out of Jordan
- In September 1970 Jordan declares war on the PLO, and the Syrians move in to support the PLO. The SU then supports Syria, and the US support Jordan.
- Palestinians, who made up 60% of Jordan’s population, hated King Hussein
- Black September 1970 PLO thrown out of Jordan because of threat to King Hussein - becoming too powerful and large in number, challenged Jordan army
- Hussein crushed Palestinians -> massacre of Palestinian refugee camps killing more than 3000, massacre perpetrated by brother Arabs became known as Black September
- In early March 1972, the ‘Black September’ group hijacked a plane and landed it at Lydda airport in Israel. An Israel army group rushed the plane and rescued the passengers
- In September 1972, the BS group killed 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics
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In March 1973, Israel shot down a Libyan Boeing 727 after being warned it was on a suicide mission. After it failed to answer radio calls, it was shot down over the Sinai
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Walbank and Hinge: “Whatever the reasons, as a weapon terrorism has had mixed results… it may be successful in keeping the Palestinian cause before the world community… it has tended to put a cloud of illegitimacy and contempt over the various groups within the PLO.”
Change to Diplomacy:
- In 1974 the PLO adopted the ‘Stages Plan’ stating that a state should be achieved in any area that might be evacuated by Israel in exchange for a peace settlement – it made the aims of the PLO broader and therefore more achievable.
- Methods moved more to politics than terrorism recognising Israel’s right to exist and renouncing terrorism It was also recognised this year as the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.’
- October 1974: Arab League Summit recognised the PLO and thus Arafat himself as the Palestinian’s ‘sole legitimate representative’
- Arafat invited to speak to UN on behalf of PLO in November 1974- angered Israel Arafat: “I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand”
- It was not until 1988 that Arafat officially renounced terrorism, after the declaration of the establishment on an independent Palestinian state.
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Danny Rubinstein: “Through complex and torturous political manoeuvring, Arafat succeeded in altering the stance of the Palestinian national movement”.
Ongoing issues of terrorism”
- Despite the fact that the PLO officially renounces terrorism, many groups continued to engage in the armed struggle as a result of their frustration with the slow diplomatic process, or their belief that moderation was not the way.
- Intifada led to the creation of the extremist fundamentalist group Hamas, so as the PLO was becoming more moderate, Hamas merely took up the flag. Arab and Palestinian terrorist groups, such as the Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and the PFLP, committed large strings of smaller terrorist acts, embedding the 'siege mentality' of the Israelis and their life of fear and unrest.
- The extensive used of suicide bombers during the 90's had a large mental affect on both Israeli and Palestinian communities, It presented a situation in which no-one could truly be safe if people were willing to kill the themselves to commit acts of terrorism This created an atmosphere of unsettlement, especially amongst Israelis, as this tactic was more commonly use by Arab groups
Causes, course and consequences of the 1973 (Yom Kippur) War, including the Camp David Treaty
Developments after 1967:
- Between 1967-70, Israel and Egypt fought a drawn-out ‘war of attrition’ along the Suez Canal
- Egypt launched attacked against Israeli positions along the canal. Their position was being helped greatly by renewed Soviet military supplies
- Israel responded wit raids deep into Egypt, on one occasion Israeli troops were only 40km from Cairo
- By March 1969, the Israelis had constructed a line of fortifications along the canal called the Bar Lev Line, which enabled them to withstand heavy Egyptian artillery attacks
- The ‘war of attrition’ finally ended in August 1970, following the intervention of US Secretary of State Rogers
- The Israelis had lost 500 men and suffered 2000 wounded
- Once the ‘war’ was over, the Bar Lev Line was strengthened and General Arik Sharon also had a second line of fortifications built a few kilometres behind the Bar Lev Line
- The ‘war of attrition’ period allowed the SU to entrench itself ever more deeply into Egypt:
- The soviets supplied the Egyptians with MIG 21 fighters, T55 and T54 tanks and hundreds of advisors were soon involved in many aspects of Egypt’s defence work
- Israeli air action in early 1970 brought the obvious fact of their air superiority. In January 1970, Nasser flew to Moscow to seek more aid. The Soviets soon had 15,000 advisors in Egypt and they did much to beef up Egyptian air defences. Even the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972 by Nasser’s successor, Sadat did not end Soviet influence as by the end of that year, some advisors were back manning canal air defences
- By 1973, Egypt has a ‘wall’ of SAM 2,3 and 6 missiles providing an umbrella of defence in the canal area as well as SCUD surface-to-surface missiles
- In April 1972, Iraq and the SU signed a Treaty of Friendship
- Soviet ties with Syria also increased. By 1973 Syria had 3,000 Soviet advisors and Soviet ships were calling at Syrian ports. A submarine base was being built at Ras Sharma
Background to war
- Egyptian President Sadat was facing domestic problems at home and he needed to consolidate his position as he lacked the support Nasser enjoyed. However, his aim was not to drive the Jews to the sea and destroy the state of Israel (as was the case previously). He had a limited objective: to break the ‘log-jam’ in negotiations
- Sadat was highly successful in keeping Arab preparations quiet and fooling the Israelis into believing nothing unusual was under way in the lead-up to the war
- Egyptian and Syrian troops were ignored and Moshe Dayan said at the time that war was not imminent
- Sadat launched a ‘misinformation campaign’ such as showing journalists the poor state of Egyptian forced
- Even on the day war broke out, many Egyptians officers thought they would only be involved in exercises
The 1973/Yom Kippur War
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6th October: Egyptian and Syrian armies attack Israel simultaneously at 2pm on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year. Israel is taken completely by surprise
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7th October: Egypt crosses the Suez Canal. For a short time Israel is outnumbered and ill-prepared
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8th October: Israel counterattacks
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10th October: Syria is pushed back behind its 1967 lines
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13-14th October: Egypt’s 4th and 21st armoured divisions attack Israel but are defeated in a massive tank battle
- 23 October: Israel cuts the main Cairo-Ismailia road and encircles the Egyptian Third Army. Sadat asks US President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev to send troops to oversee a cease-fire. Brezhnev indicates that Russia will do this, which leads Nixon to order a worldwide state of alert of US forces
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24th October: The US alert is dropped following agreement between Moscow and Washington. Israel is forced to allow supplies to reach the Third Army and to allow UN troops in. The USA is keen to lower tension in the area and thus forces Israel to compromise.
Effects of the Yom Kippur War:
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Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, spent a fortnight flying between Middle Eastern capitals. As a result of his ‘shuttle diplomacy’, an Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement was signed on the 11th November, supplies were allowed in and prisoners exchanged
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The Yom Kippur War demonstrated the loss of Arab cooperation, as the Egyptians followed their own plan that did not support the Syrian advance, and Hussein warned Israel of the possible attack.
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Arab states decided to make use of the ‘oil weapon’. On 17th October, 11 Arab oil-producing states decided to reduce production. Prices went up; the Iraqi oil price was increased 70%. The aim was clear: blackmail. The effectiveness of the oil weapon would vary, depending on the importing country’s needs but the fundamental effect was obvious: there would be Western pressure on Israel to compromise
- The shock of near-defeat led to recriminations inside Israel. The Agranat Commission of 1974 cleared PM Meir and Defence Minister Dayan but the chiefs of staff and heads of military intelligence were forced to resign\
- Though militarily defeated, Sadat was politically victorious in the same way Nasser had been after the Suez War. His domestic position was now strong and the myth of the Israeli invincibility had been demolished
- The ‘log-jam’ in negotiations were cleared
- After 1973, the issue of the Palestinians and the role of the PLO became more prominent. Israel sought to treat the Palestinians as ‘mere refugees’ and labelled the PLO as a terrorist organisation
- In February 1974, the Palestine National Council called for the establishment of a Palestinian state in any part of the occupied areas excavated by Israel
- Even King Hussein, who had been killing PLO members in 1970, announced at the Arab Conference in Rabat in October 1874 that the PLO represented Palestine
- In 1974, Arafat was received at the UN as the head of state. He made his famous address to the General Assembly with a revolver on his hip, saying he carried a gun and an olive branch and asking members not to let him drop the olive branch, that is, be forced to resort to violence
- UN General Assembly Resolution 3210 recognised the PLO as the representative of the P. people
- The PLO was largely uninvolved
- The USA and the USSR played an important role rearming their client states
- Israel had been the very obvious victor, once again
- The Israeli Labour government was replaced by the Likud coalition government
- Israel were shocked back into reality
- The US closened their ties with Israel
- Arab states lost the war militarily, but won it diplomatically
- The Arab states realised the importance of their weapon: oil
- Arab nations formulated a plan, through OAPEC (Organisation of Arab Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries), to strop selling oil to pro-Israeli countries, and increase the price by 400%
- The effect was significant and immediate: EU urged Israel to abandon the 1967 occupied territories, and the US lost $20b
- The Arab League recognised Palestine as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian cause
- Israel was forced to deal with Arafat, rather than Hussein; this meant they could no longer claim that ‘Jordan is Palestine’
The Camp David Treaty:
- Sadat now realised that the best way to put pressure on Israel was through the USA and so Egypt began to move out of the Soviet Camp and into the arms of the Americans
- Yom Kippur made Camp David possible
- As US-Egyptian relations warmed, simultaneously US-Israeli relations cooled, as pressure was put on Israel to compromise
- Sadat met Presidents Nixon and Ford. He was feted worldwide and remained a far more popular figure outside Egypt than inside
- In June 1975, Sadat reopened the Suez Canal
- In September 1975, US Secretary of State Kissinger achieved a Second Disengagement Agreement between Israeli and Egyptian forces:
- Egypt recovered the Abu Rudeis oil fields in western Sinai
- Israel left the Giddi and Mitla passes
- US electronic experts were sent to monitor truce violations
- Non-military Israeli cargoes were allowed through the Suez Canal
- Apart from his philosophical leanings, Sadat needed peace because of the disastrous state of the Egyptian economy
- Israeli politics did not augur well for peace. In May 1977, the Labour Party was defeated in elections and the former terrorist, Menachim Begin became PM. Begin was the leader of the right wing Gahal Party and head of the Likud Bloc. Begin appointed Dayan as Foreign Minister and a hardline Israeli approach to events was expected. Dayan immediately called for more Israeli settlements in the occupied WB.
- Despite Israeli political developments and Israeli attacks on P. positions in Lebanon, Sadat announced that he would even travel to Israel to achieve peace
- In November 1977, Sadat made his historic visit to Israel, addressing Knesset and called for peace. Sadat’s presence effectively recognised Israel and also Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. In December, Israeli PM Begin visited Egypt.
- Throughout 1978, thanks to US President Carter, the two sides moved closer together
- In September 1978, at Carter’s retreat Camp David, Carter, Begin and Sadat worked non-stop to achieve an agreement. The result of the diplomatic effort was the Camp David Accords
- A formal peace treaty was signed in March 1979
Camp David produced two agreements:
1. Framework for peace in the Middle East
- Dealt with the WB and Gaza
- Provided a 5 year period of autonomy with Palestinian and Jordanian representatives to negotiate the terms
- The autonomy period would be followed by talks on the final status of the territories
- Palestinians did not become involved in peace talks for more than a decade
2. Framework for the conclusion of peace treaty between Egypt and Israel
- This provided for the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
- It aimed for the presence of an international observer force in Sinai
- It sought the normalisation of relations between Egypt and Israel
- All these things had been achieved by 1982
Impact of the Camp David Treaty
- Sadat effectively signed his own death warrant: The Arab world was furious with anger at what they saw as Sadat’s ‘treachery’, in 1981, Sadat was assassinated by members of the extremist Muslim Brotherhood
- Hosni Mubarak succeeded Sadat. Mubarak wanted to complete the gains of Camp David (which he achieved when all Egyptian territory was handed over by 1982), however, he also mend friendships with his Arab brother
- By effectively neutralising Egypt, the changes of another Arab-Israeli war became much less likely:
- Egypt was still the strongest of the Arab states economically, militarily and demographically
- Egypt was of crucial strategic importance in any way
- Victory over Israel without Egypt was almost impossible
- There was no other natural leader for the Arab states. Syria was bogged down in Lebanon and Iraq was fighting Iran between 1980 and 1988
- Through the 1980s, the key issue in the Middle East centred less on Arab-Israeli relations and much more on the Palestinian issue, especially after the Intifada
- It could be argued that having neutralised Egypt, Israel gained more self-confidence and became less concerned about Arab reaction to its policies:
- The 1981 air attack on Iraq’s atomic plant at Osirek
- The 1982 invasion of Lebanon
- With the Arab states almost certain not to fight Israel as in 1973, the Palestinians found it necessary to pursue a different approach to achieve their goals:
- Capitalising on the Intifada
- Taking a more moderate line and negotiating directly with Israel which would eventually lead to an Israeli-PLO accord in 1993
Role and objectives of the superpowers in relation to events in the Middle East
Objectives
- The Middle East was important to the superpowers for a number of reasons: An extension of the cold war theatre, oil and its strategic position on the map.
- The Arab-Israeli conflict became part of the Cold War as both the US and the USSR tried to increase their influence at the expense of the other. Israeli and Arabs became proxies used by the superpowers in their wider struggle. Neither were prepared to engage in direct conflict.
- The US wanted to stop the spread of communism, keep Jewish population of US happy by promoting the security and prosperity of Israel, keep Suez Canal open (major trade route- oil supplies) post 1990 leader of the new world order. There developed increasing pro-Israel sentiment in the US (successful Zionist Lobby)
- Although the US say that their interest in the region stems purely from an ideological pledge to promote and protect democracy, this has been proven to be untrue as they have often been happy to assist anti-democratic regimes if such actions furthered their interests.
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Noam Chomsky: "at the rhetorical level, the threat from which the ME must be 'defended' is generally pictured to be the USSR"
- USSR wanted to please the Muslim population, win allies among Islamic nations around world, use influence to control oil supplies to USA, test US resolve in ME by maintaining pressure on Israel. Soviet historians Dawisha and Dawisha state that the primary goal was to secure the USSR's southern borders and act in the national interest before aiding 'national liberation movements'.
Role up to Suez War
- The role of the superpowers in the 1948 war was limited. Both the US and USSR refused to supply arms, and both sides brokered for a “fair” peace. The Arab-Israeli conflict remained, at this point, a localised dispute.
- The Suez War of 1956 marked the beginning of the internationalisation of the conflict.
- Israel, Britain and France had launched an attack on Egypt on 24 October, and the UN, crippled with vetoes, had virtually stopped functioning. It was the US and USSR who ultimately tipped the scales and attained a cease-fire.
- The USSR threatened to use ‘every kind of modern destructive weapon’ to stop the violence, while US President Eisenhower threatened to withdraw support for a $1 billion loan to the British from the International Monetary Fund.
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The US also threatened Israel with discontinued American assistance, UN sanctions and expulsion from the UN if it did not withdraw from the Sinai. Israel thus learnt an important lesson: without US approval they would be forced to return hard-won territory. Aburish: the Suez War “was the beginning of the American era in the Middle East”.
- The USSR was determined to play a more active role in an area it regarded as strategically important in protecting its southern borders, while the US aimed to prevent the USSR from increasing its influence in the region.
- Nasser turned to the USSR for support, while the US became Israel’s major backer.
The 1967 War and its aftermath
- Beginning in the early 1960s, Israel and the Arab states entered into an arms race, purchasing their missiles, planes and tanks from the US and USSR respectively. However, neither power was prepared to intervene directly or risk engaging the other militarily. This changed with the Six Day War of June 1967.
- The extent of the role played by the US and USSR prior to the outbreak of the 1967 war remains a source of extensive historical debate.
- Some historians argue that the Israeli government was involved in secret negotiations with the US prior to 5 June. This view is supported by the fact that American administration and the Israeli government were aware that, at the end of May at least, Nasser did not intend to attack Israel.
- Most historians have accepted that, in May 1967, the USSR informed Syria and Egypt that Israel was planning to invade Syria.
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The US secretly supplied Israel with arms and aerial reconnaissance assistance, which proved to be a key factor in Israel’s victory. As Stephen Green writes, “the US tactical reconnaissance assistance was not only important it was critical”
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The Soviet Union responded to the shameful Arab defeat in two ways. Firstly, on 10 June, Moscow severed diplomatic relations with Israel, a move followed by nearly all Eastern bloc countries. Secondly, Soviet influence in Arab nations escalated: its arms supplies to Egypt and Syria were boosted and it became heavily involved in the training of the PLO. As Israeli historian Itamar Rabinovich notes: “The Soviet Union may not have had a colonial past in the Arab world, but it was fast acquiring a colonial present”. As a result of Soviet involvement, the Arabs had largely regained power by 1969.
- While many Arab states severed ties with the US following 1967, blaming America for their humiliating defeat, the Six Day War forged a symbiotic relationship between the US and Israel that has lasted to this day.
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For the first time, the US viewed Israel as a geo-strategic asset rather than a liability: according to Benny Morris, Israel had proved itself “a desirable ally among a bevy of fickle, weak Arab states”.
- Israel, in turn, became dependent on the US for economic and military assistance. This was highlighted in Black September of 1970 (15-30 September), during which President Nixon sent heavy military backing to ‘encourage’ the Soviets to stay out of the crisis, leading to the PLO’s expulsion from Jordan. Military backing sent to Israel included two aircraft carrier task forces with 14 destroyers, a cruiser, 140 aircraft and 1200 marines.
Role in the Yom Kippur War and Camp David
- In the 1970s, Soviet president Brezhnev and US President Nixon began a process of détente to lessen Cold War rivalry. This meant that the role of the USSR in the conflict declined, as they supplied fewer arms to the Arab states than previously.
- The role of the USSR further shrunk in March 1972: although Egyptian president Anwar Sadat had signed a defence pact with the Soviets in 1971, he believed Egyptian reliance on them was becoming a liability, and expelled around 15,000 Soviet advisors from Egypt. Nonetheless, he continued to purchase Soviet weapons. In contrast, however, the role of the US escalated, as military support for Israel increased.
- The superpowers played a direct role in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, or Ramadan War. The Soviets played a pivotal role in rearming their Arab ‘clients’, forcing the US to step up its supply transfers to Israel to maintain the regional balance of power. On 14 November, the US began a massive airlift, worth around $3.5 billion, to rearm Israel.
- Washington’s effective response during the Yom Kippur War helped ensure Israeli victory. The US saw Israel as stronger than ever, and as a result of American military assistance, Israel’s military power doubled over the next three years.
- With the gradual fading of Russian involvement in the conflict, the US began to see itself as a ‘peace broker’ in the Middle East and moved towards formulating a lasting peace in the region. However, America’s history of support for Israel led to Arab and Palestinian fears that the US would continue to forge a pro-Israel policy even though it was no longer needed in the fight against the USSR.
- The US has consistently opposed any UN Resolutions defying Israeli interests, even when Israel is found guilty of Human Rights violations. The US has vetoed 32 UN Resolutions against Israel since 1972, including the resolution condemning Israel for massacring over 100 Lebanese civilians at the UN compound in Qana: as Chomsky argues, all record of Israeli terrorism has effectively been ignored in the US. This unconditional US support of Israel has been a key factor in the failure of the peace process.
- In December 1973, following the 1973 war, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger facilitated a meeting of the two parties. America’s motives were by no means honourable: OAPEC had found ‘the oil weapon’, and refused to sell oil to pro-Israeli countries (which cost the US between $10-$20 billion), and US feared any further damage to its economy. After five months, Kissinger achieved a disengagement accord between Israel and Syria regarding the Golan Heights. Over the next two years, Kissinger continued to facilitate negotiations between Israel and Egypt. The Suez Canal was reopened in June 1975 and Israeli troops partially withdrew from occupied territories, setting the stage for progress in Israel-Egypt negotiations.
- The US also played a pivotal role in the formation of the Camp David Accords, signed on 17 September 1978. Both Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin recognized the importance of future relations with the US. It was concern for this relationship that led Sadat to announce his willingness to discuss peace and led Begin to reluctantly agree to the concessions that produced the peace settlement. Both sides received massive American economic and military aid as part of separate agreements accompanying the Accords, Israel receiving $3 billion and Egypt receiving $2 billion. However, while the Accords were hailed as a watershed by the West, they were denounced by most Arab states and the Palestinians, and it soon became evident that no comprehensive solution to the conflict had emerged.
Role in Lebanon
- During the 1980s, US support for Israel continued. Israel was given increased access to US military technology, and American aid was increased and converted to outright grants. The US tried to weaken the Soviet-backed regimes in Syria and Iraq and what it saw as the Soviet-dominated PLO.
- The USSR, did not play a significant role in the Arab-Israel conflict during most of the 1980s, as it was preoccupied with internal economic problems and the invasion of Afghanistan, which ended in chaos. It was humiliated by Syria’s inability (using Russian arms) to contain Israel in Lebanon, and frustrated by the failure to protect the Palestinians in Lebanon.
- The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was significant because it marked a shift in US-Israeli relations.
- The brutal massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila generated an upsurge of sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause, while Israel was the focus of heated international criticism, even from America.
- Far from reducing international pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, the war triggered a shift in American policy from acceptance of autonomy for the Palestinians in accordance with the Camp David Accords to the Reagan plan.
- The Reagan Plan, proposed in September 1982, called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza to make way for a Palestinian homeland on the West Bank under the rule of Jordan’s King Hussein. The plan was rejected by both sides. However, the implications of 1982 were that the US came to play a more objective role in the Middle East crisis, which set the stage for more successful peace negotiations.
Role in the 1990s peace process
- The end of the cold war with the collapse of the SU removed the Cold War element from the Middle East which had so bedevilled peace efforts
- Israel was no longer viewed as a solitary, Western outpost in a region dominated by pro-Soviet client states. Israel’s indispensability was thus lessening and so it could not rely on unquestioning American support as it once had
- The Arab states could equally no longer rely on Soviet economic and military aid. Gone were the days when Moscow would, or could make good any Arab military losses as had so often happened since the 1950s. This fact made seriously hardline, very pro-Soviet states like Syria become much more willing to talk and consider further compromise
- Economic factors such as globalisation also contributed.
- There is now only one global power with significant interest in the Middle East, and they are therefore in a unique position to pursue peace.
- The Gulf War, in which the UN permitted the US led coalition to use ‘all necessary means’ to crush Saddam Hussein, had a significant impact on the peace process (see below)
- Following the Gulf War the US initiated the Madrid Conference – however very little came of it.
- The US would play a pivotal role in the peace process from this point on,
3. The Occupied Territories and Lebanon
Attitudes and policies of the Israeli Labour and Likud parties towards the Occupied Territories
Likud:
- For hardline Israelis (who form the Likud party) the WB is inextricably linked to the concept of Eretz Israel.
- The Likud party is also known for its extreme pursuit and acceleration of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, and issue which further complicated an already difficult peace process.
- Begin opposed trading land for peace because he did not trust the Palestinians, giving a new ideological impetus to the settler movement. By 1981 Begin had brought the number of Jewish settlers in the OTs to around 110,000.
- Begin argued that 242 did not apply to the WB because it did not state that Israel should return ‘the’ or ‘all’ the territories. He said that the WB had never been ‘acquired’ because it has always been a part of Israel. He wanted to annex the WB.
- Shamir’s government also stated that it would not trade land for peace. It would not give up its control of the territories that Israel had captured after the 1967 war.
- In July 1984, Israel indicated a loss of confidence in the Likud party in the election, and as a result Labour and Likud were forced to create a national unity government.
- Following another unclear election in 1988 another National Unity Government was formed. The country was clearly divided abot what to do about the Intifada and the settlements. Labour was prepared to trade land for peace and security, and Likud wanted either the annexation of the territories or at least a massive settlement drive. It’s ‘Iron First’ policy during the Intifada reflected a general attitude of the party that only brunt force would bring an end to the conflict once and for all. It made it clear that it would not attend a peace conference as long as the Intifada continued.
- After the Labour-Likud coalition broke up and Shamir formed a government which now relied on minor religious parties to stay in power. These parties were totally opposed to giving up land, conversing with the PLO and they pushed for more settlements in the WB.
- Netanyahu’s election in 1996 resulted in further setbacks for the peace process.
Labour:
- Rabin was elected Prime Minister after the resignation of Meir in 1974. At this stage, the situation in the occupied territories was becoming increasingly more problematic for Israel. At this time, the idea of a Palestinian entity alongside Israel was not seriously considered. The options apparently opened to the party was to annex the territories and expel the Arab population or to return the areas to their former –Jordanian and Eqyptian- status, an option unacceptable to many groups in Israel.
- The establishment of Jewish settlements was initially pursued by Rabin’s labour party, and approximately 85 settlements had been established by 1977.
- In 1984, after the creation of the national unity govt, Peres remained committed to his earlier policy of reaching an agreement with King Hussein concerning the West Bank, thereby excluding the PLO. The Peres solution involved giving up some territory to Jordan in return for peace and recognition. Likud’s Sharon (minister of commerce and industry) wanted Israeli annexation of the OTs and this ongoing rivalry blocked any concensus within Israeli politics about the future of the West Bank.
- In 1992 Rabin defeated Shamir
- Rabin had already been PM previously and was known as a no-nonsense, Israel-first military man. This ‘hardline’ reputation actually made it easier for him to sell the later peace deal with the Palestinians as the Israeli people felt Rabin would be the last Israeli leader to threaten their security
- Rabin’s government took steps to facilitate the peace process. New settlements in the WB were frozen
- Israeli Arabs were appointed as deputy ministers
- Contacts between Israeli citizens and PLO members were made easier
Rise and significance of the Israeli settler movement in the Occupied Territories
Rise
- The settler movement was initially established by the labour part of Rabin. By 1977 there were approximately 85 settlements.
- Begin opposed trading land for peace because he did not trust the Palestinians, giving a new ideological impetus to the settler movement. By 1981 Begin had brought the number of Jewish settlers in the OTs to around 110,000.
- If an area was considered ‘too Arab’ in character it would often be settled, and therefore the settlements were often established in heavily populated Arab areas.
- Ariel Sharon, as minister for agriculture in Begin’s govt, played a significant role in expanding Jewish settlements, exerting great effort to expand them in the WB and GS. He even proposed to create dummy settlements in the Sinai to bargain with Sadat.
- Sharon also had close ties with Gush Emunim (a right wing religious organisation which was dedicated to the creation of Jewish settlements in the OTs) and backed their efforts to settle in areas adjacent to large Arab centres.
- Following the accession to power in the SU of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, an increased number of Soviet Jews were allowed to leave the SU and emigrate to Israel. Many of these Jews were extremely devout and believed that they had a divine purpose to re-establish Jewish control over the biblical lands in Israel
- During the 1980s and 1990s, it became increasingly difficult for Israeli governments to maintain a majority in the Knesset. As a result, coalitions had to be formed which included some of the smaller, extremist religious parties. These parties had a strong attachment to the OTs and often made it a condition of continued support that no settlements in these areas be given up in any peace agreement
Significance
- Violence between Palestinian’s and the Jews increased dramatically, as popular Israeli pressure pushed for more settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; by 1988 more than half the West Bank and a third of the Gaza Strip were Jewish controlled.
- PLO attacks increased in the areas, but Jewish settlement just increased in size.
- As a result of this violence, security tightened in the areas surrounding the settlements – further increasing hostilities.
- The settlers were one of the main factors contributing to the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987.
- The settler movement significantly complicated the situation in the OTs, as well as the peace process.
- It also caused a great deal of division within Israel, both on a civilian level and a political one.
- The intention of the settlements was to ensure an Israeli foothold in the Occupied Territories – this was achieved in some senses however at a great cost.
- Even after the results of the settler movement had become apparent, govt’s such as Netanyahu’s continued their expansion.
Reasons for the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982
Background
- Lebanese society was divided into loosely-knit family clans, and characterised by a diverse range of religious beliefs, primarily Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shiite Muslims and Druze
- The Christians made up the majority of the population til the 1960s; after this, 60% are now Muslim
- A system had evolved to deal with this division between Maronites and Muslims: the President was always to be a Christian, the Premier a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite Muslim
- The Christians feared being overrun by the Muslims whilst the Muslims claimed that due to demographic change, they should have the bigger say in the government
- Lebanon’s politics, religions and ethnic differences were further complicated by the fact that both the Christians and the Muslims were divided amongst themselves into sects, each headed by bosses who used patronage to build iron loyalty and militias. These divisions were further complicated by terrain and political groupings sometimes had a geographical character
- Lebanon was home to more than 300 000 Palestinians by 1970, who upset the power balance between Christians and the Muslims (Palestinian’s were Sunni Muslims) – many Lebanese saw the Palestinians as a disruptive force – they had become a state within a state
- The Fatah and PLO used Lebanon as their headquarters, prompting Israeli retaliation on Lebanon
- Soon, the PLO was in direct conflict with the Phalange, Christian militia sick of the Palestinian’s causing trouble
- By mid-1975, the ‘high-wire act’ that was Lebanon slipped into full-scale civil war. Syria entered the situation and soon had thousands of troops in the country attempting to bring peace though more likely trying to impose Syrian influence
- Two interpretations can be placed on the significance of the Lebanese civil war on the overall Middle East position:
- It had the potential to spill over into an all out Middle East War
- On the other hand, it may have acted as a ‘safety valve’ taking pressure off the wider conflict
1978
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The PLO invaded Israel on the 11th March, 1978, killing 34 Israelis: the Jewish response was Operation Litani, where they entered southern Lebanon to destroy the PLO: in the process they killed 1000 people and made 200 000 people homeless. They then set up a Christian army in the south, to halt the PLO’s activities
1982
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Operation Peace for Galilee, 6th June 1982, to stop PLO rocket attacks on Galilee
- By 1982, the Palestinians were firmly entrenched in southern Lebanon, so much so that region was known as ‘Fatahland’
- It was from here that terrorist attacks were often launched against Israel
- There were also 30,000 Syrian troops based in Beirut or the Bekaa valley with Soviet-supplied SAM 6 missiles directed at Israel
- Using the assassination of their London Ambassador as a pretext, Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 with 100,000 troops. Their objective was to drive the PLO out of the country
- In June 1982 after the Israeli Ambassador to GB is assassinated in London, Israel attacked Lebanon again, to drive the PLO further north and install an Israeli friendly Christian government in Lebanon
- Israel’s invasion proved very successful and they soon reached Beirut. By July, with the help of its Christian Lebanese allies, Israel had forced the evacuation of Palestinian fighters by sea
- Lebanese President Gemayal was assassinated in September and his brother, Amin, succeeded him. Israel then attacked west Beirut. In September there were two major massacres by Lebanese militias in Palestinian refugee camps at Chatila and Sabra. This may have been revenge for Gemayal’s death
- The harder the PLO fought back the more that the Lebanese suffered –it got to the point where even the Muslims asked them to leave.
- Israeli forces were blamed for not acting to prevent these actions
- In July 1983, Israeli forced drew back to the Awali River and by 1984, back to their security zone in the south, which they still controlled. Israel’s withdrawal was complete by 1985
- Arafat escaped alive, with around 14 000 PLO fighters, and set up base in Tunis
The significance of the war for Israel and the Palestinians
Implications of Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon
- It is unclear why Israel invaded Lebanon; they achieved very little, and the Maronites proved unreliable allies
- The Arabs simply considered this as another attempt by Israel to implement expansionist policies
- The Palestinians had shown great tenacity and fighting spirit during the Israeli invasion, which raised nationalistic Palestinian hopes and moral everywhere: increased determination to resist Israeli rule
- Worldwide sentiment shifted away from Israel after the atrocities and towards the Palestinian causes
- 40,000 would die on both sides and Beirut was completely destroyed
- There were two peace negotiations which were proposed and failed: The Reagan Plan and the Fez Plan
Significance of the war for Israel and the Palestinians
- 19 000 Palestinian’s died, 368 Israeli’s
- About 8,000 Palestinian fighters were dispersed across the Arab world helped by an International Peacekeeping force. Half of them went to Syria and Syria’s President Assad sought an alternative leadership to Arafat but to no avail
- In June 1983, Syria declared Arafat ‘persona non grata’ and he was ordered to leave the country, whereby he fled to Tunis
- Syria’s position in Lebanon at first seemed precarious. However, international and domestic criticism encouraged the Israelis to leave; the Lebanese army were impotent and the multinational force soon pulled out. In October 1983 229 US troops were killed in a massive car bomb explosion
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By the end of 1984, all US forces were out of the country and the Syrians were left as the dominant force in the country
- Assad’s position in early 1982 was further weakened by risings at home against his rule but the massacring of 10,000-20,000 of his domestic enemies consolidated his position
- Israel was politically and morally weakened following the Lebanon adventure
- The greatest cost Israel suffered was losing the unconditional support that the US governments had given it over the years. Formed in the wake of the Holocaust, Israel received great sympathy from the USA however; its actions in Lebanon seriously threatened its support. As Israel continued to establish settlements in the OTs, even former firm supporters such as ex-presidents Ford and Carter came out denouncing Israeli settlement policies as a ‘major obstacle to peace’
- Labour and Likud formed a National Unity government in July 1984, headed alternately by Labour’s Shimon Peres and Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir
- There were ideological differences between the two parties: Labour wanted to give concessions to Jordan, Likud wanted to annex the OC’s. This prevented any political cooperation in Israel
The situation in Lebanon by the early 1990s
- Peace had at last arrived after 16 years of civil war and in 1992, the country held its first elections for 20 years which led to Rafiq al-Hariri becoming PM. There was now a degree of optimism about the country’s economic future
- Syria remained the dominant force in the country
- The Palestinian forces gradually returned
- Israel and its Christian Lebanese allies controlled the southern part of the country in what Israel termed a ‘security zone’
- Terrorist attacks on northern Israel continued, as did quick and firm Israeli retaliation
- By the early 1990s, the main source of instability in the country was coming from Hezbollah, a guerrilla, fundamentalist, Muslim groups that totally opposed any accommodation with Israeli. The group was financed by the radical Islamic regime in Iran. It was an enemy of the PLO
- The peace process
The Intifada 1987-1994: Palestinian resistance and Israeli response
- Started spontaneously in December 1987, in response to four Palestinians being killed by an Israeli truck
- Young rock throwing Palestinians hurled rocks, in what came to be known as the intifada, lasted for five years
- Within a year of the intifada beginning, more than 150 Palestinians under the age of 15 had been killed
- By 1990, over 800 had died; only 56 Israelis had died, but it had cost them $500 million dollars
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“Only the blind it seems could see in the Gaza Strip anything but a hell-hole made for terrorism”-Jerusalem Post
Aims of the Intifada
- The long term goals of the Intifada were articulated as:
- a desire to bring an end to the Israeli occupation of the WB and GS
- A desire to establish a Palestinian state. In the OTs, a large proportion of the population lived in refugee camps, there was unbearable overcrowding and the Israeli military rule was very harsh. The Jewish settlements were established in 30% of the WB to prevent its return to the Palestinians.
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The short term goals were to achieve a greater level of Palestinian self-reliance and unity of purpose. Schlaim: “The aims of the intifada were not stated at the outset; they emerged in the course of the struggle. The ultimate aim was self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.”
Israeli response
- The Israeli response to the continuing Intifada protests was uncompromising both under the Likud government of Shamir and the Labour government of Rabin.
- Initially they were not sure how to oppose the massive civil disobedience – they had amazing weaponry etc but couldn’t exactly legitimately use them against women and children throwing rocks. Soldiers were trained to fight against other soldiers – not regular people and the army felt very uncomfortable about this.
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On 17th January 1988 Israel adopted the ‘iron fist’ policy with Rabin announcing ‘the first priority is to use might, power and beatings to restore order.’ This did not work and attracted much condemnation.
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‘Shamir Plan’ was the next step and was a diplomatic response. Involved 20 points re Palestinian autonomy in the OTs and was approved by the Knesset on 16th May 1989. The longer the uprising continued, the more severe Israel’s measures became.
- Israel’s retaliating actions included: curfews, demolition of rioter’s houses, sealing off the OTs and denying P. workers access to their jobs in Israel
- Israel deported suspected rioters and Intifada leaders as a means of dealing with the ongoing protest. In December 1992, Israel deported 400 P. members of Hamas to southern Lebanon, which caused wide condemnation and derailed peace talks
- Throughout the Intifada period, Israel continued to build settlements in the occupied areas for many Russian Jew, whose numbers in Israel had greatly increased with the collapse of the SU.
- By 1988 the number of settlements on the WB and GS had grown to 120, with 55% of the WB confiscated and 30% of Gaza confiscated.
Impact of the Intifada
Israelis
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The Intifada shook the Israeli’s who did not know exactly how to react, and it attracted a lot of support, even internationally. Schlaim: “a powerful army was being unleashed against a civilian population that was fighting for its basic human rights and for the right to political self-determination.”
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It challenged the status quo in the occupied territories and for the first time, both at home and abroad, Jews began to question the occupation. Humphrey is “reminded the Israeli electorate that their state was established on land the Palestinians regarded as rightfully theirs.”
- It also exposed as a failure the process of gradual incorporation of the Territories into Israel through the settler movement.
- Did serious damage to US-Israeli relations by sparking sympathy for the Palestinians in all levels of American society. Even some leaders of the American Jewry began to question Israel’s policies and the morality of its methods. The US govt worried that too close a link with Israel would have negative repercussions for US middle east interests. Result was first major US effort since the Reagan plan on 1982 for peace – the Shultz Plan.
- It emphasised divisions in Israeli society between the left who were willing to negotiate with the PLO and the right who believed brute force would bring an end to troubles
- It also emphasised divisions within the national unity govt – Peres resurrected the idea of Gaza first (should be demilitarised but remain under Israeli supervision and 13 settlements dismantled). Shamir stated that Peres and party were to blame for the unrest. He saw the Intifada as a threat to Israel’s existence, not as a territorial dispute.
- It damaged Israel’s international reputation. They were condemned again for ‘violation of human rights’.
Palestinians
- It demonstrated to the Palestinians that neither terrorism nor street violence would solve their problem
- Initially the PLO played a very small role, they in fact learned about it from the news. They could provide very little guidance in exile.
- Local Palestinian leaders threw all their weight behind a moderating mainstream, urging PLO to recognise Israel, accept a two state solution, declare a Palestinian state and establish a govt in exhile.
- Hamas, the military arm of the Muslim brotherhood, began activities in 1988 as a result of the Intifada and quickly became the dominant religious and political force. Initially, Hamas received Israeli support as they hoped to open a divide between fundamentalists and the PLO. However as the intifada continued, Hamas was radicalised and terrorist attacks against Israel increased. Hamas were completely against Western Influences and Israel. By 1994 Hamas had commenced suicide raids in Israel.
Arabs
- One of the causes of the Intifada was the seeming indifference of Arab states to the Palestinian cause.
- June 1988 meeting of the league reaffirmed the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and pledged economic and political support.
- 31 July Hussein announced he was cutting legal and administrational ties with the WB, forced Israel to negotiate directly with the PLO and cutting of the ‘Jordanian option.’
Successes and setbacks in the peace process 1987-1996
Hinchcliffe: “The white dove with its olive branch had finally shown up in the region where conflict had become a way of life for citizens and of politics between states.”
The Proclamation of the State of Palestine:
- In July 1988, Jordan’s King Hussein dropped claims of sovereignty over the WB. The WB had been Jordanian territory from 1948 to the Six Day war of 1967
- Arafat, under US and Israel pressure, once again modified his position in October 1988 saying that the PLO would accept a federation with Jordan
- In November 1988, by a vote of 30 to 2, the UN condemned Israeli oppression in the OTs and the violations of Palestinian human rights
- At the Algiers Conference of November 1988, the PNC proclaimed the independent state of Palestine comprising Gaza and the WB by votes of 253 to 46 with 10 abstentions. The declaration gained immediate worldwide attention and within 3 days 27 nations had extended recognition. The US and Israel dismissed the declaration, but by the mid 1990s more states had recognised Palestine than they had Israel.
- Arafat was named President in April 1989
- The decisions of the Algiers Conference and King Hussein had great significance:
- The PLO invoked UN Resolution 181 on the partition of Palestine, the legal basis for a two-state solution of the Palestinian problem. This reference to resolution 181 was used as evidence that the PLO implicitly recognised Israel.
- Pro-Israeli arguments centre on the ambiguity of the declaration in relation to actual area of land that the Palestinian state would occupy, and whether it was actual acceptance of UN 242 and UN 338. They also argued that there is no authorised English translation.
The Stockholm Declaration
- In December 1988, Arafat and the Swedish Foreign Minister issued a joint statement recognising Israel and condemning all terrorism in the Middle East, including state terrorism (AKA Israel’s)
- Arafat then addressed the UN assembly in Geneva and outlined his peace plan, proposing an international conference held under UN auspices, followed by Israeli withdrawal fro the WB and GS with forces replaced temporarily with UN ones.
- Shamir accused Arafat of deception and the following day Arafat was more explicit, repeating his acceptance on 242 and 338 and fully renouncing, not just condemning, terrorism.
- The US Secretary of State, Shultz, announced that the US would open a dialogue with the PLO
- Shamir then proposed his own four point plan, under US pressure. The plan was very similar to the one proposed for Palestinian autonomy at Camp David.
- Reconfirmation of the Camp David Accords
- An end to Arab hostility towards Israel
- A solution to the refuge problem that is an international effort. Says the issues much be viewed as a humanitarian problem not a political one.
- Free elections held in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to set up a representative of the Palestinian people, rejecting the involvement of the PLO.
- The plan was rejected by the Palestinians because it did not give them the right to choose their own destiny or representatives – the plan rejected the notion of direct PLO-Israeli negotiations. The Palestinians and PLO believed that the plan was totally out of touch with the new realities created by the Intifada and the 1974 Rabat Decision (the Arab League recognising the PLO as sole representative of the Palestinian people)
- George Bush Snr and King Hussein supported the proposal.
- Shamir was under pressure from the PLO and the USA for more concessions, but the sentiment within Likud was that he had already gone too far.
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On the 9th of May 1989 Arafat declared that the provisions in the PLO charter calling for the destruction of Israel were ‘null and void’.
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On the 22nd May American Secretary Baker called on Israel to lay aside the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel and accept the Palestinians as neighbours who deserve political rights, the Israeli’s rejected it. He called on the Palestinians to amend the covenant and translate the violence of the Intifada into politics and diplomacy.
The Gulf War
- The Iran-Iraq War (180-1988) significantly weakened the Iraqi economy. Saddam Hussein believed Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were partly responsibly by flooding the oil market. Hussein also accused Kuwait of stealing oil from a field on the common border.
- Iraq wanted compensation and cancellation of their war debts as well as territory from Kuwait – who refused to meet any of these demands.
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Aug 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein declared it Iraq’s 19th province. Within days this invasion turned into a conflict involving many nations.
- The UN condemned the invasion and imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Surprisingly the Arab League also condemned it.
- The US then offered the Saudi govt military support.
- A few days later Iraq agreed to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel agreed to withdraw from the OTs and Syria from Lebanon.
- Nov 29 the UN passed resolution 678 authorising the multinational coalition to ‘use all necessary means’ unless Iraq withdrew by Jan 15. Iraq refused to do so.
- Jan 17 the coalition forces launched ‘Operation Desert Storm’ (an air offensive)
- Jan 18 Iraq began to fire Scud missiles on to Israel and Saudi Arabia. Hussein wanted to provoke retaliation from Israel, which would threaten the coalition against Iraq as the Arabs would not be willing to fight on the same side as Israel.
- Feb 24 the coalition launched the ground offensive, ‘Operation Desert Sabre’
- It took the UN force, led by General Schwarzkopf, 43 days to defeat Iraq.
- Feb 28 a ceasefire was announced, but before withdrawing Iraq set fire to most of Kuwait’s operating oil wells, blew up buildings and destroyed power plants for electricity.
- ‘Desert Storm’ destroyed up to 80% of Iraq’s oil generating capacity, as well as many of their power plants, transport and infrastructure systems.
- Hussein was allowed to stay in power and Bush was later criticised for this, especially after Hussein’s brutal treatment of Iraq’s Kurdish and Shi’ite populations
Impact of the Gulf War on the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Israelis:
- Saddam Hussein claimed that the operation of the US and Allies against it was a direct attack on the Arab world, and further evidence of Israel’s attempts to destroy Arabic influence in the region
- Saddam Hussein claimed that the UN had made resolution 678, calling on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Why would they not do the same to Israel, calling on them to leave the OT?
- Saddam Hussein tried to involve Israel so that he could accuse them further of belligerence, yet Israel did not retaliate (the first time ever) This is because they did not want to assist Hussein in his effort to link the Palestinian problem with his war. This decision was made easier by the support of the US and Western European nations.
- The Israelis gained a lot of international support for their neutral stance during the war.
- The reasons for the US’s continuing support of Israel diminished with the increased cooperation of the Arab states. The US therefore applied pressure on Israel to make concessions in any future peace process.
- The US’s role as Israel’s loan guarantor gave them further leverage.
Palestinians:
- Arafat and the PLO support Hussein, and his attempt to link Kuwait with the OTs gained much Palestinian support.
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Arafat congratulated Hussein on conquest and supported him throughout Jan and Feb. This is considered one of the largest mistakes in Arafat’s career, and resulted in a damaged and weakened PLO position. Walker and Gowers: “Thanks to his alliance with Saddam Hussein, Arafat’s leadership was being called into question.”
- Not just their reputation was damaged – some Arab states withdrew economic and political support for the PLO as a result, imposing economic sanctions on the Palestinians in the OTs. 250,000 Palestinian workers were expelled from the Gulf States.
- Palestinians felt betrayed and hated by the West and by Israel: militancy would once again replace diplomacy
- Palestinians found themselves in a weaker negotiating position as a result of their support of Iraq
Arabs:
- Arab unity was shattered by the Iraqi invasion which also led to a new found respect for the US
- The Arab States realised how destructive any future wars could be.
- For the first time Syria indicated it was willing to negotiate peace with Israel. The Declaration of Damascus proposed an international conference to resolve the conflict.
The conflict as a whole:
- Divisions between the Israeli’s and Palestinians widened again, particularly in relation to the Israelis on the left who had previously worked hard in an attempt to find a solution to the problem. It was hard to fight for this cause as Palestinians had cheered in support of the scud missiles heading to Israeli cities.
- The Israelis and Palestinians felt that only permanent separation of their people could be peaceful – the Israelis overwhelming wanted to achieve this by deporting the Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians wanted their own state.
- The war vastly altered the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours.
- By the end of 1991 there was a strong move towards regional security and peace in the region.
- The Gulf War and the effective end of Soviet influence encouraged the USA to seek a peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbours and with the Palestinians. The US had talked directly with the Palestinians for the first time in 1989:
- Israel was already at peace with Egypt
- It has not fought Jordan for decades though the two were still officially at war
- Peace with Syria would be more difficult as Syria would always demand the return of the Golan Heights which Israel wanted to keep for security reasons
- Peace with the Palestinians was even more difficult. Israel was prepared to make minor concessions to the Palestinians to keep the Americans satisfied but it would not even discuss the possibility of a Palestinian state.
- The USA endeavoured to organised a peace conference for 1991. It attempted to get Arab states on side by opposing the continuation of Israeli settlements in the WB and by accepting the idea of giving land for peace. It tried to push the Israelis to talk by withholding funds and persuade them by rejecting the idea of a Palestinian state
- The Likud government of the time was strongly opposed to the idea of a separate Palestinian delegation at the peace talks.
- The growth of Islamic fundamentalism worked against this increasing cooperation and reconciliation. The main force behind this movement was Iran, who assisted the US-led alliance during the Gulf War by remaining neutral but has continued to support anti-Western terrorism abroad. Jordan and Syria have also supported similar causes.
The Madrid Conference, 1991
- Bush invited Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and PLO and Israel to attend a peace conference.
- Initially, Syria refused, Israel would not negotiate with the PLO and the PLO thought it would be pointless to meet while other Palestinians thought otherwise.
- Secretary Baker eventually convinced Syria to attend by telling Assad that if Syria came and Israel didn’t then the world would blame Israel. Shamir responded by announcing new settlements in the OTs, a move which the US condemned. Arafat then agreed that a few Palestinian leaders could act as representative of the PLO so that Israel would negotiation.
- A conference opened in Madrid in 1991, sponsored jointly by the USA and the SU. It then moved to Washington. These talks progressed very slowly and other events soon threatened their continuation such as the Israeli killing of the Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Abbas Musavi. The atmosphere was one of accusation and counter accusation.
- It achieved very little
The Oslo Agreements, 1993
- In 1991, Rabin’s Labour Party took power in Israel but did not have a majority in Knesset. Rabin had achieved victory in the elections by promising to accelerate peace talks with Arabs – with the aim of making a peace agreement within a year. At this time, both Rabin and Arafat were in a weakened position:
- Arafat had lost much credibility during the Gulf War through supporting Saddam Hussein and the Intifada had arisen with no prompting of the PLO leadership.
- Rabin’s position was shaky and the Americans were pressuring him to converse with the PLO. Rabin still hoped to embarrass the PLO leadership by finding more moderate Palestinian leaders to converse with. However, it became clear that the only alternative to Arafat and the PLO was the far more extreme and violent Hamas. Rabin was for more conciliatory towards the Palestinians than his predecessor, Shamir had been.
- In 1993 secret meeting were help in Oslo between Israeli and PLO officials under the auspices of the Norwegians. This secrecy was the key of Oslo’s success, as the negotiations were free from external pressures and interference.
- Rabin had no knowledge of the Oslo talked occurring initially. When he found out he gave support, hoping that this would forced the Palestinian delegation back to the negotiating table in Washington. It worked.
- Rabin initially dismissed the Oslo draft because Washington was going ahead so he saw no need for it. He was suspicious that the PLO was using the Oslo agreement to trick the Israelis. He therefore hired a lawyer who was sent to Oslo to seek clarification about some aspects of the document – the Palestinians were outraged.
- Arafat then asked for a kissing point between GS and WB, which was not part of the agreement. He decides he also wants Jerusalem back on the agenda and more land around Jericho.
- In order to keep the peace negotiations alive, Israel suggested mutual recognition if the PLO renounced terrorism and violence, and changed the charter to reflect the agreement.
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Negotiations continued over the phone for hours and hours. An agreement was made that left the issues Israeli military govt in WB, Jerusalem and crossing points undecided. Edward Said: “The declaration of principles itself, once described as brilliant, has further been revealed as an interpreters nightmare.”
- Dec 13 1993 Israel and PLO signed the ‘Declaration of Principles’ in Washington DC. It included mutual recognition, phased redeployment of Israeli troops and terms whereby a Palestinian Council would govern the WB and GS for 5 years while a permanent treaty and final status of OTs would be worked out.
- The declaration was ratified by the Knesset and PNC
- More than 40 countries pledged $2bn over 5 years to support the Palestinian government.
- The ‘Oslo Accords’ envisaged a three-stage agreement between Israel and the PLO:
- Stage 1 would see Israel withdraw from Gaza and Jericho (on the WB) and power there transferred to the PLO
- Stage 2 would see elections there after three months
- Stage 3 would involve negotiations over the Israeli settlements in the WB and the issue of Jerusalem
- As a sign of good faith, Rabin and Arafat shook hands in front Of President Clinton in Washington in 1993
Following the Oslo I
- On May 4 1994 Israel withdrew from GS and Jericho and transferred powers to the Palestinian authority. The first stage occurred with no trouble but Hamas tried to discredit Arafat at every opportunity by attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians, hoping to cause brutal Israeli retaliation and thus derail the talks. WB settlers also tried to embarrass the Israeli government by refusing to move out and trying to set up even more settlements.
- On July 1 1994 Arafat entered Gaza in triumph.
- In late July Rabin and Hussein signed a peace treaty officially ending the state of war that had existed between the two countries for 46 years.
- Other Arab countries moved cautiously towards recognition of Israel and began to ease the economic sanctions they had placed upon it.
- Sept 24 1995 an overall agreement was finally reached.
- Signed on Sept 28 in Washington.
- Towards the end of 1995, a year after it was due, six cities and several hundred WB villages were handed over to Palestinian administration but not the city of Hebron. This transfer gave the Palestinians very limited control:
- The areas they controlled were separated
- Water supplies in some areas were under Israeli control
- Israeli troops retained the right to enter these areas if necessary
- Palestinian police could not arrest Israelis
- A Palestinian executive was to be elected in 1996
- In February 1996, Arafat was sworn in as the first elected President of Palestine. However, despite these moves, the peace process was seriously compromised by an upsurge in violence:
- On 3 March, a Hizbollah suicide bomber killed 20 people on a West Jerusalem.
- In late March, Israeli forces destroyed the houses of those related to suspected terrorists
- In April Hizbollah attacks resumed attacks on northern Israel and Peres launched an overwhelming respose, the reasons for both remain unclear.
- Arafat convened the PNC in Gaza on April 24 and the PNC voted to cancel the clauses in the PLO covenant calling for the destruction of Israel. In return, Israel’s Labour party abandoned the long-standing opposition to the formation of a Palestinian state. It also abandoned its claim that the Golan Heights were essential to Israel’s security.
The ‘final status’ talks
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Started in Taba on the 5th May 1996.
- The Palestinian negotiator called for a Palestinian state next to Israel, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
- Israel’s negotiator described Israel’s goals as the separation of the two people, while seeking cooperation, security and the retention of Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel.
- The most difficult issues were:
- The question of Palestinian statehood
- The status of Jerusalem
- The future of the 3 milliong Palestinian refugees living abroad
- The fate of Jewish settlements in Palestinian areas
- The final borders
- Security arrangements
- Vital economic questions such as trade and the sharing of water
- Negotiations were interrupted by elections in Israel – Peres called them in May rather than in October thinking that he would easily win. The Likud leader Netanyahu narrowly defeated Peres by 29,000 votes, a victory margin of less than 1%. His campaign had played on Israeli fears.
- Netanyahu’s victory placed the peace process in danger. He insisted he wanted peace and would honour Israel’s commitments so far. However in reality he asserted very different things, including the fact that Israel would never accept a Palestinian state on its doorstep.
- In August 1996 Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met for the first time since the Israeli elections. Both sides immediately accused each other of violating the accords.
- In September 4, yielding to both internal and external pressure, Netanyahu finally met with Arafat at a checkpoint near Gaza and the two shook hands, but the act was largely meaningless.
- Fighting broke out over the issue of the building of a secret tunnel along the Western perimeter of the Temple Mount compound in East Jerusalem.
- The riots only halted when Arafat and Netanyahu hastily agreed to meet at a ‘summit’, along with King Hussein, called by President Clinton.
- The meetings did seem to bring about a closer relationship and understanding between the two men. Arafat pledged to try and control Palestinian violence, and Netanyahu agreed to resume discussions about Hebron (their promise to deploy from it)
- October 6 1996 Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams began discussions in Hebron. Israel was reluctant to evacuate Hebron because of the presence there of around 500 settlers. The issue soon became linked with the issue of further Israeli withdrawals from the rest of the WB, as stipulated by the Oslo Accords.
- After weeks of futile negotiations, a breakthrough was secured by King Hussein, who extracted concessions from both sides in Jan 1997. Arafat existsed a mid-1998 target rate of withdrawal instead of the existing September 1997 one, and Netanyahu agreed to the timetable for withdrawal.
- Agreement signed Jan 15 1997, ratified by PLO, the Israeli cabinet and Knesset.
Support and opposition for the peace process among Israelis and Palestinians
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Schlaim: “On both sides, the Rabin-Arafat deal provoked strong and vociferous opposition on the part of the hardliners. Both leaders were accused of betrayal and sell out.”
- Palestinians and Arabs reacted to the 1993 Oslo accords as if it was the first, not the last step taken, unlike in America.
Israelis:
- There was widespread support within Israel for the ongoing peace process.
- Younger elements of the population in particular were tired of the constant, ongoing violence and supported the peace process.
- During the first half of the 1990s, there were frequent mass demonstrations calling for peace.
- However, there were also pockets of dissenting groups which opposed any moves towards peace if it meant what they believed was Israel’s pre-ordained right to the land of Palestine. Such groups included extremist religious groups, new settlers in OTs (particularly Russian migrants) and right wing politicians and the small, radical Jewish religious parties
- These groups still could not let go of their desire for Eretz Yisrael and thus were very reluctant to pursue peaceful solutions – all of which involved trading land. They were very opposed to the idea of Israel withdrawing from any territories or dismantling any Jewish settlements and the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state.
- Right wing and nationalist extremists were particularly concerned because the Oslo II provisions had made the possibility of giving up Eretz Israel a reality.
- Following Oslo, 1000 Israeli’s were polled. The results found that 65% supported the agreement, and only 13% were very much against.
- Many ordinary Israelis were:
- Suspicious about entrusting security to Arafat who seemed incapable or unwilling to deal with extremist groups
- Fearful on continued terrorist attacks
- Anxious this was the first step towards the eventual destruction of Israel
- Dismayed at the prospect of abandoning settlers and settlements.
- The constantly changing leadership of the Israelis has always been a big obstacle to peace.
Palestinians:
- The Palestinian community was equally divided
- Palestinian leaders had greater difficulty in trying to reach peace with Israel, as any peace was bound to involve the loss of Palestinian land and to agree to this would mean political suicide
- Many groups existed within Palestinian that aimed to sabotage the peace process: Hizbollah guerrilla groups, Hamas and a host of other, radical Islamic groups
- Rabin and Arafat were still miles apart on whether the Palestinian state was to be the end result of this process. Many Palestinians became disillusioned by the slow process of peace, a factor that helped the rise of groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad
- Palestinian negotiators and much of the population were:
- Suspicious of the step by step transfer of land and power
- Dismayed that Israel would retain much of the WB
- Surprised that the Palestinian authority would only gradually assume administration and security functions.
- Fearful that Israel intended to provide long term protection for Jewish settlers and never fully withdraw.
- Anxious because under the accord Israel would maintain control over 73% of land, 80% of water, 97% of security arrangements in the OTs.
- Islamic militants were violently opposed to any accommodation with Israel. They were very unhappy about the recognition of Israel and the fact that the Palestinian state would be restricted only to the WB and GS. The terrorist attacks that resulted completely undermined Arafat’s credibility.
Significance of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the election of Netanyahu in 1996
Rabin:
- Rabin faced an election in 1996, an election in which for the first time Israelis would choose their PM directly
- Rabin’s opponent was Benyamin Netanyahu, who had won the leadership of Likud in March 1995.
- Netanyahu was known to favour a more hardline approach to the Palestinians than Rabin
- Some questioned Rabin’s seriousness in seeking an accommodation with the Ps. However, greater progress towards peace had been made under his leadership than at any time since Camp David:
- Rabin’s peace efforts alienated many in Israel who totally opposed handing over any of the ancient Israeli land to Palestinians. Israeli extremists became even angrier as Israel handed over some West Bank towns and villages to the Palestinian Authority in October 1995.
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One such opponent was a young law student called Yigal Amin, who assassinated PM Rabin at a peace rally in Tel Aviv on the 4th November 1995.
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Rabin’s Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres was formally approved as his successor on the 22nd November
- The death of Rabin was a shattering blow to the peace process. Rabin’s reputation as a no-nonsense, tough leader had given the Israeli people a great deal of confidence in the peace process. For most Israelis, even those that disagreed with the course he had embarked upon, Rabin had brought a credibility to the peace process that no other Israeli leader possessed. He had always been extremely concerned with the defence of the state, and it was widely believed that he would never jeopardise Israel’s security in any kind of territorial compromise. Peres, although admired and loved by many, was perceived as a weaker leader than Rabin. He committed himself to whatever Rabin was but Palestinian terrorist attacks change the political scene – many voters cared more about security than peace.
Netanyahu:
- Negotiations in the ‘final status’ talks were interrupted by elections in Israel – Peres called them in May rather than in October thinking that he would easily win.
- The Likud leader Netanyahu narrowly defeated the Labour leader Peres by 29,000 votes, a victory margin of less than 1%. His campaign had played on Israeli fears.
- Netanyahu’s victory placed the peace process in danger. Through contacts between the Israelis and the Ps continued throughout 1996, Netanyahu made it clear that concessions to the Ps had ended.
- His narrow election victory meant that he was weak within his own party and dependent on right-wing member of the Knesset to hold onto poer.
- He was seen as an ‘obstructionist to the peace process, and he persisted with the controversial construction of Jewish settlements in Arab East Jerusalem.
- He was not an experienced politician, and his leadership capabilities were unknown and untested.
- He insisted he wanted peace and would honour Israel’s commitments so far. However in reality he asserted very different things, including the fact that Israel would never accept a Palestinian state on its doorstep.
- In August 1996 he announced that the four year freeze on the expansion of settlements would be lifted, as well as approving 500kms of new roads to link settlements, requiring the confiscation of more Palestinian land.
- Netanyahu signalled to Syria that he would be willing to resume negotiations without preconditions but Syria rejected the offer.
- He also worked on a ‘Lebanon first’ approach, which involved withdrawing from Southern Lebanon in return for the cessation of Hizbollah attacks and the integration of the South Lebanon Army into the regular Lebanese army.
- Arab leaders met but refused to endorse a Syrian proposal to downgrade relations with Israel.
- Netanyahu visited Jordan and Egypt but he refused to meet Arafat.
- The autonomous Palestinian area was in serious economic trouble, causing problems for Arafat with the Islamists as well as the Palestinian Legislative Council and the PNC.
- In August 1996 Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met for the first time since the Israeli elections… what happened is all above.