As mentioned before, central vigilance weakened towards the last years of Qianlong’s reign and one of the biggest problems as a consequence of that was increase in corruption. Corruption was in control during Yongzheng’s reign because of Yongzheng’s tight control over his officials. Yongzheng granted ‘anti-corruption funds’ and severely punished those who charged surtax or practiced irregularities. However, in senile Qianlong’s empire, corruption in forms of graft, extortion and irregular levies was to be expected and even systematic. Heshen, for example, was very openly corrupt, his property confiscated by Jiaqing after Qianlong’s death was worth 800,000,000 taels, and yet he was not properly punished by Qianlong_. According to Hsu, “[Heshen’s] satellites in the government followed the suit and his associates in the military service unnecessarily prolonged campaigns as to have the benefits of additional funds.” This shows that Heshen was only one of the many other officials all over China that were corrupt and even granting ‘anti-corruption fees’ could not stop them. Corruption took a large toll on the poorer citizens of China because they were the ones being exploited. General discontent at the unfairness of the society fueled rebellions such as the White Lotus. The White Lotus rebellion that started in the 1796, a year after Qianlong had abdicated and was ruling behind the scenes, was a protest against the extortion of tax collectors _.
Another consequence of the Qianlong’s lack of asserted authority was the decline of the Bannermen and the Chinese Green Standard Army. After Qianlong’s impressive military conquests, his reign was peaceful and his rule became relaxed. In peaceful times, instead of studying military arts, soldiers gambled, went to theatres, watched cock fights and ran businesses, in general, leading debauched lives. The command structure of the armies became weak_ and as J.K. Fairbank says “They lacked supplies, morale and incentive as well as vigorous leadership.”_ Emperor Qianlong did not continue supervising the armies after his military campaigns and this was a critical problem for the country because in certain areas, the Eight Banners were responsible for administration such as registration, taxation, conscription and mobilisation of people_. Hence, as a consequence of the decline of the Bannermen and the infantry, not only was military defence of borders neglected but general administration, especially in the newly conquered areas such as Xinjiang, suffered as well.
Of course, the beginning of the decline of the Qing dynasty cannot be blamed solely on Qianlong because there were other ungovernable factors that played important roles such as the sudden increase in the population of China. As Jones and Kuhn said, “The extended peace of the Qianlong reign had produced and nurtured an expanding population, without developing the new kins of economic and political growth whereby the population might be absorbed.” Between 1660 and 1800, the population of China doubled from 150 million to 300 million people. Though the amount of cultivable land increased as well, it was only by less 50 percent, from 549 million mou to 791 million mou. There was a large pressure of population upon land, many were landless and people were living saturated in close quarters_. However, as Jones and Kuhn mentioned, the lifestyle of many of the Chinese was still traditional and agricultural and economic systems were not adapted to people living closely together. This added to the deteriorating administration, again, caused internal discontent that provoked protests such as the Miao Revolt in 1795, which started in western Hunan as violent conflicts over land.
The Han Chinese’s long term resentment at being ruled by the foreigners was also a factor for internal rebellions that was uncontrollable on Qianlong’s part. From the beginning of the Qing dynasty and throughout, there were revolts because many Han Chinese considered the Qing as outsiders. The Manchu government tried to mitigate the discontent by keeping the system of rule of the Ming government, promoting Neo Confucianism which was the popular religion in China at the time and allowing Han Chinese into its bureaucracy. However, the Qing also did much to show that the Manchus were separate and superior, for example, they established the Imperial Clan Court to supervise births, education and marriages for the Manchus and Manchu and Chinese intermarriages were prohibited as well as Chinese immigration to Manchuria. As Hsu puts it, in the end, “the very fact that the Qing was an alien dynasty continuously evoked Chinese protest in the form of secret society activites and nationalistic racial revolt and revolution.” _ In this sense, because the Han Chinese would never have been content with being ruled by foreigners, internal discontent and rebellion was guaranteed and the Qing dynasty was ‘doomed from the very beginning’.
In conclusion, Qianlong’s reign did mark the beginning of the decline of the Qing dynasty because many of the problems that arose was due to Qianlong and Qianlong’s senility was a principle reason because it caused him to become incompetent as a leader, allowing corruption to increase and the Bannermen to decline. However, there were other factors such as the sudden and rapid population increase of China and rebellions because the long term resentment of the Han Chinese at being ruled by foreigners, both unfortunately also happened during Qianlong’s reign, that contributed to the perhaps inevitable decline and downfall of the Qing dynasty.
Bibliography:
Elleman, Bruce A. "The Secret Societies and Qing Decline." Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989. London: Routledge, 2001. Print.
Jones and Kuhn. “Chapter 3.” The Cambridge History of China Volume 10: Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I. Cambridge [Eng.: Cambridge UP, 1978. Print.
Fairbank, John King, and Merle Goldman. "Late Imperial China, 1600 - 1911." China: a New History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 1998. Print.
Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. "A Conceptual Framework of Modern China, The Rise and Splendor of the Ch'ing Empire, The Turn of Dynastic Fortune." The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. Print.
Roberts, J., Modern China: an Illustrated History. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Pub., 1998. Print.
Theobald, Ulrich. "Chinese History - Qing Dynasty ().". Web. 12 Sept. 2010. <>.
1 Ulrich Theobald. Chinese History - Qing Dynasty. n.d._2 Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. Print._3 Roberts, J., Modern China: an Illustrated History. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Pub., 1998. Print. p.19._4 Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. Print._5 Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. Print._6 Fairbank, John King, and Merle Goldman. China: a New History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 1998. Print. p 189._7 Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. Print._8 Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989. London: Routledge, 2001. Print p 5._9 Fairbank, John King, and Merle Goldman. China: a New History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 1998. Print. p 190._10 Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. Print._11 Jones and Kuhn. The Cambridge History of China Volume 10: Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I. Cambridge [Eng.: Cambridge UP, 1978. Print. p.109_12 Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. Print._
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