In reality, the serfs were little more than slaves; workers tied to the land, comprising of 45% of the population. Along with the remaining peasants (an additional 40%) [Vucinich, Curtiss], they paid a huge proportion of the taxes, produced food for the entire nation and supplied Russia’s most profitable export: Grain. The outdated system, however, floundered in its every aspect; the primitive means of production gave off too small a yield to fully support the needs of the entire population; each bad harvest, resulting from crude reliance upon the vacillating weather, was often fatal for millions and Russia’s speedy population increase, doubling between 1800 and 1858 (and again by 1900) [Sherman, p54] only impaired the situation further. The resulting shortage of surplus reduced the landlords’ income, causing the rise of both individual and national debt. By 1860, three in five private serfs and 50% [Curtis] of all land values were mortgaged to a state already rubbed bare by war. Economic chaos was imminent as the intricate system of serfdom deterred innovation in industry and development of agriculture; the country’s two greatest revenues. Serfdom, as a basis for Russia’s economic backwardness and instability, was of central importance to its future prosperity.
Though he may have been a caring and humanitarian man, Alexander II’s fundamental direction was as an autocratic ruler and Romanov. The emancipation of the serfs was a means to an end, for the peasants were key to domestic production, army recruitment and industrialization, or rather, the lack of it. Russia’s entire economy had to be put on its feet, along with the revival of its international standing. These were the main reasons for the edict; the humanitarian question was clearly neglected given, among other effects, the unfair redistribution of the land and 49 years of debt through redemption payments that were to accompany the “freedom” which the edict promised the peasants.
Though peasant unrest is generally considered a major factor toward the creation of the edict, the slightly rising numbers of peasant disturbances, classified as “refusal to fulfill obligations”, were far from out of the ordinary. Considering the vastness of the Russian Empire and her stereotypical tendency toward alcohol abuse, 108 [Curtis, data for 1860, p50] instances of disobedience in a year are next to none, especially given the fast circulation of rumors about the serfs’ proposed autonomy from their landlords [Curtiss p51]. Even half a century later, during the 1905 revolution, the people were not ready to overthrow their “Little Father” for there was a severe lack of political awareness among peasants. The Decembrist conspiracy of 1825 is an ideal example in which the crowds calling for “Constantine and Constitution” believed that the latter was the wife of Grand Duke Constantine. Each peasant lived his life in his own limited world, few venturing beyond the next village in their entire lifetime. Kavelin, a Russian university professor, writing in 1856, called serfdom, Russia’s very foundation, the “stumbling block to all successes and development”; he claimed that “All significant internal changes in Russia are without exception so closely linked to the abolition of serfdom that one is impossible without the other.” Hence condemning Russia to “fossilization”.
For a more productive and powerful state, Alexander II adjusted the social system that had stood since 1649 and set about introducing various modifications. To allow for Military Reform (1874), the emancipation of serfs, who had previously been tied to the land, was used as a fresh source of conscripts. Such a supply of available men would allowed for the reduction of service years from 25 (generally a death sentence) to 6, enabling the survival of soldiers and workers. Yet for serfdom to be appropriately abolished, local governments, Zemstvos, were introduced to maintain the autocratic rule and manage local affairs in the countryside (containing 96% of the population); a task previously subsidized by landlords. The power of these Zemstvos extended to vitalities such as the maintenance of roads, schools, healthcare, welfare and streetlamps, contributing to the goal of a more developed Russia through an uncorrupt and elected local leadership. Nevertheless, this remained limited through reduced founding, careful regulations and government officials who were the extended eye of the Tsar.
Successful Zemstvos and the new judiciary system according to the legal reforms of 1864 required a higher level of education to produce able officials. Consequently, a rise in the number of university students, a position he had opened to all citizens, was allowed for and soon, even lectures on European government and philosophy were introduced; aiming at bringing Russia’s social position somewhat closer to that of the western world. This was fatal move for the immutable Romanov rule; Zemstvos became powerful breeding grounds of new ideas and ideals. Western society and public policy in Russia could not be accomplished in compliance with such autocratic visions and the introduction of such policies inevitably led to clashes between the two polar legislative and social ends.
The origins of the emancipation of the serfs lay in humiliation and defeat; as Joseph Stalin would later say, “up until now, not a single class has voluntarily made way for another”. Alexander II was no exception. His reforms were limited, appointed to heal fundamental social weakness and a mistake in regard to his ambitions. By 1874, he had banned trade unions and maintained a great army and police force due to the consequentially rising instabilities. His reforms had awoken a hunger for further liberty among the people, a liberty that was never planned, and a liberty that formed the grounds for many attempts on his life. Where he was prepared to acquiesce to his people, it was not enough, or not in the correct manner. On March 1, 1881, he was assassinated by revolutionary terrorists.
Despite their many consequences (be they negative or positive depend entirely on the viewpoint), Alexander’s reforms caused the empire to step forward in terms of the formulation of ideas and ideologies and paved a rickety but hard-wearing path toward future development. They allowed for much of the thought that caused later revolt and revolution. The Emancipation had changed the legal status of the serfs but little else, for the same agricultural practices were kept. Industry, with a small influx of “freed” serf workers, improved but failed to keep up with the West. The army grew seemingly stronger and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 was won. The war with Japan in 1904 and the First World War were not. As Marx wrote, war is the midwife of progress. Following the Crimean war, Alexander II instituted “liberalization” processes, attempting to please all, yet Russia’s diversity ensured this to be impossible. Instead, all remained dissatisfied. Despite his later reactionary policies, radicalism grew steadily as the steam had been let out of the pot. Overall, his failure to create sufficient political change became the basis for future uprisings.
Word count: 1,521 with references.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cowie, Leonard W. Wolfson, Robert. Years of Nationalism: European History, 1815-90. London: Hodder&Stoughton. 1985.
Sherman, Russell. Russia, 1815-81 (Access to History). London: Hodder&Stoughton. 1991.
Vucinich, Wayne S. Curtiss, John Shelton. The Peasant in nineteenth-century Russia. California: Stanford University Press. 1968.
Curtis, Glenn E. Russia: A Country Study (online). Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1996. [Cited: 09/12/2009] Available at:
From the diary of a German merchant travelling to Moscow in the 1830s.
These figures are approximate and vary according to source
Though this prematurelywas cancelled in 1907
