Britain’s fear of decline was primarily triggered by Wilhelm’s attempt of a ‘world politic’ (Weltpolitik) in 1897 in the midst of colonial affairs. Weltpolitik was a programme of naval expansion which would industrially advantage Germany while supporting her colonial objectives. Under the directions of the chancellor, Kaiser von Bülow, and the naval minister, Admiral von Tirpitz, the German navy was to: match the best in the world (the British navy), help Germany become a major imperial power, and augment support for authoritarian rule. Germany’s decision to build a high seas fleet majorly threatened other European countries, and increased the likeliness of a war. To maintain supremacy, Britain was forced to engage in the Two Power Standard; where Britain’s Royal Navy would have to be larger than any other two fleets combined. This was encouraged by Germany’s competitive nature - trying to outnumber the British dreadnought battleships. In response, Britain sought to the release of the HMS Dreadnought in 1906, introducing her naval arms race. More importantly, Britain was not the only country resolving in serious action against Germany’s disturbing expansion policy. The USA and other European powers also ensured acknowledgeable control against the Weltpolitik. For instance, the USA fought German ambitions in Venezuela (the Venezuela Blockade of 1902-3) and Dominica (1905). Meanwhile all the major European powers were working together to ensure that Germany made no significant economic gains in China in 1900. Otto von Bismarck’s Realpolitik transformed into Wilhelm’s confrontational Weltpolitik, established a major change in German foreign policy. Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister, claimed that the Anglo-German naval race was a major reason why Britain went to war in 1914. This new attention-grabbing policy established Germany as a notable danger to peace in Europe.
In addition to this, Kaiser Wilhelm’s policy diminished certain diplomatic relations with Germany previously formed by Bismarck; further diminishing in her popularity. Bismarck firstly introduced the system of alliances in 1879 with the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, which became the Triple Alliance of 1882 when Italy joined. Yet, after forming the Dual Alliance ensuring Austro-Hungarian support of Germany against Russia in case of attack, Bismarck went on to form the League of the Three Emperors in 1873 informally linking Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia. However, this was not enough for Bismarck, who eventually put an end to the League in 1887 to create the secret Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia. This was a guarantee that neither of the two countries would go to war with one another. In all evidence, Bismarck’s intentions were based on a plan of security for Germany within Europe, possibly through fear of war. On the other hand Wilhelm’s leadership worked against Germany’s reputation. One year later, Wilhelm decided not to renew the Reinsurance Treaty when he came to power in 1888. This demonstrated unreasonable lack of diplomacy on Germany’s behalf and encouraged Russia to turn towards France in 1893 in the Franco-Russian Alliance. This Alliance along with the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 and the Entente Cordiale formed the Triple Entente between the UK, France and Russia.
The immediate cause of the First World War was the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in Sarajevo on June 28th 1914. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the development of the two opposing alliance systems over the years (the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente) was to resort into inevitable conflict within Europe shortly afterwards this attack. In this case, Bismarck can be indirectly held responsible for the Great War, considering he influenced the alliance mechanism among Europe. However, it was Wilhelm’s decisions during the July crisis of 1914 that largely determined Europe’s future.
Austria-Hungary immediately turned to Germany for support against Serbia after assassination at Sarajevo. Wilhelm accepted this request and gave Austria-Hungary the ‘blank cheque’ on July 5th. The so-called, ‘blank-cheque’ entitled Austria-Hungary to freely deal with the situation. An Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was sent to Serbia on July 23rd – giving Serbia a 48-hour time limit to ‘confess’ to conspiring in the assassination of the archduke, and agree to ten commandments designed to put down the terrorist activities of Serb nationalists. Of course, Serbia would refuse this ultimatum in order to preserve her honour. On the 29th of July, the Tsar of Russia, Nicholas the second, sent a telegram to the Kaiser appealing for help, “... An ignoble war has been declared on a weak country [Serbia]. ... To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship [Reinsurance Treaty] to do what you can to stop your allies going too far.” Aware of Russia’s support of Serbia, Germany did nothing to restrain neither the ultimatum, nor Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war on Serbia five days later. Quite contrarily, when Russia ordered general mobilisation against Austria-Hungary on July 30th; Germany declared war on Russia the next day. At this stage, it is argued that Germany’s intentions were to protect Austria-Hungary, as Bethmann Hollweg, German chancellor quotes to German ambassadors in Paris, London and St Petersburg on the 21st of July, “It has become unmistakeably evident that it would no longer comport, either with the dignity or the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to regard inactively any longer the mischief-making on the other side of the border.” However, Germany’s actions clearly suggest that she favoured to resolve matters through aggression rather than seeking peaceful negotiation; thus fulfilling her former reputation in the eyes of the major European powers. Furthermore, Germany’s war plans involved confronting France. The Schlieffen Plan (named after the supreme German military commander, Count Alfred von Schlieffen) by Von Moltke, the German military chief of staff, consisted of a rapid attack on France in the west, via Belgium, followed by a move eastwards to battle Russia. The Germans declared war on France on August 3rd with intentions to attain France passing through Belgium. Systematically, Britain, cautious of undesired consequences, came into conflict. As quoted by Sir Edward Grey in a telegram to Sir Edward Goschen, British ambassador in Berlin on the 30th of July, “France could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy without further territory in Europe being taken from her.” Grey warned that the British would declare war on Germany should she breach Belgian neutrality to in-danger France. In spite of this warning, German troops invaded Belgium that very day. This reckless behaviour was to lead Britain into war with Germany on the 4th of August, and submit Europe to three traumatising years of war.
Fischer, a German historian, develops a thesis accusing Germany of being concious of her par-taking in Europe’s decent into the First World War; therefore associating with the idea of German responsibility. I agree with Fischer’s thesis in the sense that Germany should hold a good deal of responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War. Germany’s annexations of territory dating back since 1870, as well as her motivations for creating a Weltpolitik prove that Germany’s desire to become a great power considerably outweighed her consideration of other countries. The same argument stands when considering Wilhelm’s careless decisions during the 1914 July crisis – declaring war on two countries in the space of three days in spite of the pleas of peace from Russia and Britain. At this point, it is fair to assume that Wilhelm was aware of the weight of his actions.
Words: 1’763
Works cited: Causes and consequences of World War I, by Stewart Ross (1998) Raintree Steck-Vaughn
Publishers
Origins of the First and Second World Wars, by Frank McDonough (1997)
The Causes of World War I, by Tony Allan (2002) Heinemann Library
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p6-8)
Tony Allan “The Causes of World War I” (p25)
Stewart Ross “Causes and Consequences of World War I” (p16)
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p8)
Stewart Ross “Causes and Consequences of World War I” (p21-22)
Tony Allan “The Causes of World War I” (p26)
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p10)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1996.tb00622.x
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p8)
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p10) & Tony Allan “The Causes of World War I” (p12)
Stewart Ross “Causes and Consequences of World War I” (p15)
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p16)
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p20)
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p19)
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p20)
Frank McDonough “Origins of the First and Second World Wars” (p38)
