Some level of full agreement could however be found in the concession of all parties on matters of the clause regarding Alsace-Lorraine. The resentment that the French had over their loss of Alsace-Lorraine meant that they were to go to all extents to ensure that control over this province was reasserted to them. The reason behind the agreement to the restoration of the province to France was that amongst the British war aims presented in January 1918, one was “the defense of democracy and the righting of injustices done to France in 1817 when she lost Alsace-Lorraine to Germany.” Though France did not achieve all her territorial claims that she had sought to pertain, the concessions made during the conference that opened on January 12, 1919 and closed on January 16, 1920, soon made her sphere of influence much more beneficiary than before 1914.
France, being the region where the most fighting during the First World War occurred, had consequently suffered major physical damage and had lost over 1.3 million soldiers making not only their total casualties reaching nearly 3.2 million, but also leaving in requirement of the most reconstruction of all the warring states. Clemenceau’s hope that the German payments would cover the costs of reparations once again became a cause for disagreement. Though Wilson agreed that Germany should take responsibility, disagreements on which aspects the repayments should cover resulted in the postponement of the Reparations Commission to a later date (by May 1921 the Commission was expected to come up with a final concession).
The Saar dispute, though it may seem to have simply been yet another territorial feud, was also another way for France to ensure that its wish for German economic decline was affirmed. Annexation of the Saar to the French would have resulted in her further empowerment as well as provided a basis for deeper resentment from Germany. Clemenceau therefore had no choice but to compromise on British and American decision that they should only attain control over Saar’s coal mines and allow the League of Nations to mandate it for 15 years.
Though disputes over the articles of the Versailles Treaty were frequent during the conference due to personal or national interests, the Big Three conceded to the fact that the offenders deserved punishment and that world peace should be achieved. The extent to how severely the victors were to punish the Central Powers may have varied though some aspects were mutual to all parties involved in the negotiations. Amongst all the clauses that the Big Three disputed over, articled 231, commonly known as the guilt-clause which kept full responsibility of the war upon Germany and her allies, along with the agreement that none of the Central Powers could attend the conference, attained some of the least fracas. Consequent to the strict terms that Germany had imposed on Russia in the Brest-Litovsk treaty following Russia’s withdrawal from the war in 1917, she could therefore expect no sympathy from the victors. Over the years however, the legitimacy of the Versailles Treaty has been questioned with the growing evidence that Germany did not bare the sole responsibility of the war. Furthermore, the fact that the Allies concurred that the Central Powers could bare no representation during the agreements meant that the Allies were not given an opportunity to defend themselves which made concessions regarding a common world peace less than achievable due to the growing resentment from the Central Powers.
The fact that the Allied powers carried out their peace settlements immediately after the war meant that the atrocities committed were fresh in their minds and this may have possibly had an implication on their varied perception on how severely the defeated nations were to be punished. In order for one to conclude, it is necessary to put into consideration that firstly, Lloyd George had won British elections of 1916 with slogans such as “Hang the Kaiser” which meant that leniency on the Germans would result in stern criticism and that Britain could not afford to lose one of her fundamental traders (Germany) by making her economy too weak. Secondly, Woodrow Wilson was angered at Germany’s ignorance of his 14 Points and imposition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Finally, Clemenceau was under pressure to restore France to its former glory and to insure that no future aggression from Germany would take place. By putting all these considerations in mind, one understands how easy it is to concede that “The peace negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference are often interpreted as a struggle between proponents of reconciliation led by Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George against the ruthless advocates of peace of revenge represented by Gorges Clemenceau.” The extent of the struggle and the frustrations that the leaders had can be accentuated by Clemenceau’s statement that Wilson bores him with his 14 Points. Though this statement is to a great extent true, it is however not entirely true due to the fact that there were some factors on which the Big Three agreed on without much dispute such as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the ‘war guilt’ clause, and the fact that none of the defeated states could have representatives in the peace settlements. In addition, the other disputes came to an accord though in some cases compromises had to be made.
Empire of debt: the rise of an epic financial crisis By William Bonner, Addison Wiggin
Britannica Ency. Page 987 vol. 29
Modern World History; Norman Lowe
