To what extent can Berlin or Vienna can be held accountable for the start of WW1?

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IB History Internal Assessment

Candidate Name: Vladimir Nardin

Candidate Number:

History HL

History Internal Assessment

To what extent can Berlin or Vienna can be held accountable for the start of WW1?

Candidate Name: Vladimir Nardin

Candidate Number:

Center Number:

May 2010 Session

Word Count: 2000 words


Contents Page

Section A: Plan of Investigation                        page 3

Section B: Summary of Evidence                         page 3

Section C: Evaluation of Sources                         page 5

Section D: Analysis                                        page 6

Section E: Conclusion                                        page 8

Section F: Bibliography                                        page 9        


  • A: Plan of Investigation
  • To what extent can Berlin or Vienna can be held accountable for the start of WW1?
  • Subject: This investigation seeks to examine the origins of World War One in relation to Austria-Hungary and Germany. Furthermore, this investigation seeks to establish from which personages the pressure for war came and to assess to what extent each country can be held accountable for its outbreak. The debate revolves around the Orthodox viewpoint where Germany is held accountable and Nationalism in Austria-Hungary’s case.

Method

  1. Research for bibliography about the origins of WW1. Instrument: Books. The main criteria used for this selection were: reliability of the source, how recently they were written/updated.
  2. Examination of two primary sources to support main thesis: Count Szogyney, Austrian Ambassador in Berlin to Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, 5 July 1914 (letter) and Excerpt from the front-page article in the London Times on 27th July 1914.
  3. Analysis and evaluation of the different historiographical views (orthodox and other views) on the subject with reference to sources.
  4. Conclusion.

  • B: Summary of Evidence

Even though, Austria-Hungary’s foreign policy before 1914 can be depicted as primarily defensive and preventing any change in the balance of power in the Balkans. A sudden change occurred in 1912 after the collapse of the Turkish Empire. Since this date, Austria faced a desperate struggle for her own survival as a great power. Without the Turkish Empire ruling the Balkans, nationalism and a desire of self-determination grew among the minorities, especially for Serbia to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina (controlled by Austria-Hungary)

An armed struggle seemed to be the only appropriate response against the panslavic ambitions of Serbia even before the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Austrian Chief of staff, Conrad von Hotzendorf, who on no fewer than twenty-five occasions between 1913 and 1914 urged war against Serbia “The Monarchy still suffered from the effects of the humiliation of 1866, and that a military victory alone could restore its prestige”1 Senior Habsburg military commanders seconded Conrad’s aggressive stance. These include the War Minister Alexander von Krobatin , Otto Gellinek, Vienna’s military attaché at Belgrade and General Oskar Potiorek, the military commander in Bosnia-Herzegovnia. However, the Foreign Minister Berchtold held the pivotal role. Ultimately most of the claims for war were rejected, as the empire was unwilling and unable to solve their internal problems. It was not after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand that he came to the conclusion that the Austro-German alliance was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Russia -and by extension France. This statement emphasized the need for a “final reckoning between Slavs and Teutons”2 occupying the central place in Austria-Hungary’s foreign policy.

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Thus the initiative for war at the beginning of the July Crisis lay in Vienna as a consequence of its military ambitions and its Foreign policy. The Habsburg Empire thought that early and decisive action against Serbia with the full consensus of Germany (blank cheque 5th July 1914) would deter any possibility of ‘serious European complications’ (diplomatic euphemism for war).  In consequence, Vienna first resolved for war, sought German assurances and then exploited them once received igniting a world war.

Germany, on the other hand, was given the perfect opportunity “to secure and thereafter to enhance its borders of ...

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