Thus the initiative for war at the beginning of the July Crisis lay in Vienna as a consequence of its military ambitions and its Foreign policy. The Habsburg Empire thought that early and decisive action against Serbia with the full consensus of Germany (blank cheque 5th July 1914) would deter any possibility of ‘serious European complications’ (diplomatic euphemism for war). In consequence, Vienna first resolved for war, sought German assurances and then exploited them once received igniting a world war.
Germany, on the other hand, was given the perfect opportunity “to secure and thereafter to enhance its borders of 1871”3 (primary aim of Weltpolitik) through the Austro-Serb conflict of July 1914. Leaders in Berlin also saw war as the only solution to ‘encirclement’ by Russia, France and England (Triple Entente). Nevertheless, Berthmann Hollwegg was determined to control all levers of decision-making. The July Crisis according to Hollwegg was a splendid opportunity to either break the Triple Entente and thus gain a great diplomatic victory or a global European war that would fulfill Germany’s expansionist aims and gain her a ‘a place in the sun’ (Weltpolitik).
In other words, victory was possible either on the field of battle or diplomatically. Furthermore, even though most of the German elite criticized and condemned Hollweg on his pro-Habsburg policy “This fifth of July was horrible day for Germany … a fatal day. How could Bethmann have done this!”4 (Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow in December 1914) Hollweg by July 8 placed war first and diplomacy second. Thus when war was declared on the 23 July Wilhem II’s military encourage were fully aware that the ultimatum rejected by Belgrade ‘pretty well meant war’ in Europe. Hence why Germany can be considered responsible for planning a ‘pre-meditated and cold-blooded’ global European war during the July Crisis.
C: Evaluation of Sources
Source A:
The German ‘blank cheque’ to Austria
Count Szogyney, Austrian Ambassador in Berlin to Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, 5 July 1914 (letter).
The origin of source A, The German ‘blank cheque’ to Austria, is a primary source from Count Szogyney, Austrian Ambassador in Berlin to Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, 5 July 1914 (letter). The purpose of this document is to reassure the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister on the full support of their German ally in their cause and recognize the necessity of a warlike action against Serbia. The value of such source consists of information of the private dealings between Germany and Austria upon the conflict with Serbia “me to inform …rely upon Germany’s full support.”5. Thus reinforcing the thesis that the first move in the July Crisis of 1914 rested in Berlin and Vienna; consequently the origins of World War one. Furthermore, the source gives explicit information on the responses of the other European nations if an armed conflict was started in the Balkans. “But it will certainly set other powers…add fuel to the fire in the Balkans.”6 This establishes that Berlin had full knowledge that a ‘local war’ could potentially degenerate into a ‘global European war’. However, the source does not give us an ensemble of the decisions of Kaiser Franz Joseph “His Apostolic Majesty… would be reluctant to march into Serbia”7. This casts serious doubt of whether or not Austria-Hungary truly desired a European war as it was pressured by Germany. Another limitation consists of the fact that the source is a letter with specific personal opinions and not an official declaration of war by Austria-Hungary upon Serbia. Additionally, it does not give the full picture of events only concentrating on the relationship between Austria-Hungary and Germany and not on the global European diplomatic situation (July Crisis).
Source B:
War Fever in Vienna
Excerpt from the front-page article in the London Times on 27th July 1914. Report from a correspondent in Vienna.
The origin of Source B is Excerpt from an article in the London Times on 27th July 1914. The article was a report from a correspondent in Vienna. The purpose of this newspaper article is to inform the reader of the general situation and mood in Vienna concerning the Austro-Serb conflict after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This is described as “war fever”8 in the article. This document is of great value to historians. It gives clear and concise details on the development of the general mood in Vienna towards an armed conflict with Serbia “A crowd …another crowd demonstrated in front of the Foreign Office (Ministry)…waving black and yellow…“9 Thus having been published just before the declaration of war (28th July 1914 declaration of war), this document offers a first-hand account from a neutral source (England desired peace and remained neutral) outlining that Austria-Hungary desired a war. In addition, the document comes from a respectable source, ‘London Times’, thus account of the events can be found to be credible and realistic. However, there are some limitations. The newspaper article gives no insight on the short and long-term reasons that could have ignited such an enthusiasm for war. Thus the understanding of the situation (July Crisis 1914) could be false, as it does not embody any other information upon the other European states and their reactions. Furthermore, the name of the reporter is not mentioned anywhere, diminishing the credibility of the source as it cannot be verified.
D: Analysis
John Leslie, a British historian makes three crucial points on the relevance of the Austro-Serb quarrel towards the origins of World War One. Austria-Hungary used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as an excuse to settle accounts Serbia and asked Germany to prevent Russian intervention. Secondly, Germany saw the war with Serbia as secondary to the struggle with Russia and thirdly the Kaiser virtually commanded Austria-Hungary to deploy its troops against Russia. This highlights how Germany quite deliberately used the opportunity to launch a European war, which Austria-Hungary never desired. In summary, John Lowe puts the significance of the Austro-Serb quarrel into its proper context by stating: “The crisis in the Balkans was the occasion, rather than cause of the First World War”10. Thus Germany in the traditional orthodox view could be held accountable for World War One.
The preceding point made by John Leslie and John Lowe comes thus in complete accordance with Fritz Fischer’s thesis. On this issue, Fischer makes the following claims:
- “Germany was prepared to launch the First World War in order to become a great power (weltpolitik)
- Germany encouraged Austria-Hungary to start a war with Serbia and continued to do so (through the use of the Blank cheque), even when it seemed clear that such a war could not be localized.
-
Once the war began, Germany developed a clear set of aims, already discussed before the war, to gain large territorial gains in Eastern and Central Europe.”11
This thesis is extensively supported by Source A as Germany is described as using the occasion to urge Austria into a global European conflict by using the Austro-Serb quarrel as an excuse. However, Fischer considered Bethmann Hollweg, German chancellor in 1914, as one of the prime personages that pressed for war. This is contradictory to Source A and John Leslie’s thesis as they mention the Kaiser giving the ‘blank cheque’ and pressuring Austria for a war against Russia. Weltpolitik as described above was used as a “distraction from domestic problems…in the decision for war”12 (Paul Kennedy) Hollweg thus realized and believed that Austria-Hungary required Germany’s full support by 1914 and that Germany had to break free from its diplomatic ‘encirclement’. To this end, the First World War was no preventative war. It was planned and launched by Germany, under the opportunity provided by the Austro-Serb conflict to make Germany a world power.
On the other hand, Joachim Renak, Bernadotte Schmitt and F.R. Bridge all view the Habsburg-Serb quarrel as the major issue, which brought the war. The ‘local conflict’ on the dominance of the Balkan region degenerated dragging the rest of Europe into the “the third Balkan War”13 According to this view, primary responsibility for the war is shared by Austria-Hungary, which wanted to restore its prestige, and Serbia, which stood in a good position to benefit from European rivalry in the region. “The growth of Serbia clearly threatened the future of the Habsburg Empire”14 Thus as stated by Bernadotte Schmitt in the ‘Origins of the First World War (1958)’ “this conflict between existing governments and their unhappy minorities was responsible for the catastrophe of 1914”15 This presents World War One as a ‘war of salvation’. This ‘war-at-any-price’ and ‘settlement of accounts’ was the fully formed idea of Conrad von Hotzendorf, Chief of staff appointed in 1906. He argued that that only the use of armed forces could prevent the forces of nationalism (Serbia) from pulling the multinational empire apart. The same ‘war fever’ mentality can be found in Source B, reinforcing the thesis. The other personage that supported such mentality of expansionism was Count Berschtold, Austria-Hungary’s foreign minister in 1912. The elite, therefore, genuinely believed that the integrity of the multiethnic empire (11 nationalities; 47% Slavs) was seriously threatened by Serbian panslavist’s ambitions.
E: Conclusion
In conclusion, Joachim Renak, Bernadotte Schmitt and F.R. Bridge all view that Austria-Hungary in July 1914 went to war to save itself. Fear dominated the Viennese planners; fear of Pan-Slavic nationalism; fear of loosing the military advantage to Serbia, Russia and France; and fear of forfeiting Berlin’s support. Austria-Hungary had to emerge from the crisis as the dominant political force in the Balkans. Both the pace and the decision-making remained in the hands of Conrad von Hotzendorf, Austrian Chief of staff, and the Foreign Minister Berchtold. In July 1914, nothing short of war even a World War could achieve that purpose.
Nonetheless, there is a general agreement amongst historians that German decision-making was a crucial element in the tense situation after the June assassination. It has been widely asserted by Fritz Fischer, John Leslie, John Lowe and Paul Kennedy that German foreign policy held the key to the situation in the summer of 1914. Bethmann Hollweg, Foreign prime minister, held the pivotal role. It was the German desire to profit diplomatically and militarily from the ‘third Balkan crisis’, which widened the conflict from an Eastern Europe one to a continental and world war. Ultimately, I believe for those reasons that Austria-Hungary and Germany both tried to exploit the July Crisis to their own benefits, engendering the First World War making them responsible for its origins.
F: Bibliography
- Darby, Graham. The Origins of the First World War. Ed. Christopher Culpin. Singapore: Longman, 1998. Print. Pages 76-80
- Henig, Ruth B. Origins of the First World War. London: Routledge, 2002. Print.
- Holger Herwig: The First World War: Germany and Austria 1914-1918”. Arnold. UK.1997. Page 8 to 23
- Joll, James. Origins of the First World War. London: Longman, 1984. Print.
- McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars (Cambridge Perspectives in History). New York: Cambridge UP, 1997. Print
- Pope, Giles. History for International Baccalureate: The Origins of the First World War. New York: IBID, 2002. Print.
1 Holger, Herwig. 1997. The First World War: Germany and Austria 1914-1918, page 10
2 Holger, Herwig. 1997. The First World War: Germany and Austria 1914-1918, page 19
3 Holger, Herwig. 1997. The First World War: Germany and Austria 1914-1918, page 19
4 Holger, Herwig. 1997 The First World War: Germany and Austria 1914-1918, page 21
5 McDonough, Frank. 1997 The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, page 19
6 McDonough, Frank. 1997 The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, page 19
7 McDonough, Frank. 1997 The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, page 19
8 Pope, Giles. 2002. History for International Baccalureate: The Origins of the First World War, page 95
9 Pope, Giles. 2002. History for International Baccalureate: The Origins of the First World War, page 95
10 McDonough, Frank. 1997. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, page 36
11 McDonough, Frank. 1997. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, page 26
12 McDonough, Frank. 1997. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, page 31
14 McDonough, Frank. 1997. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, page 36
15 Henig, Ruth B. 2002. Origins of the First World War, page 42