Germany played a role in the Abyssinian war as “watchers in the wings,” meaning that at any time they might make a decisive and malicious intervention. Since coming to power, Hitler’s re-armament of Germany grew larger and larger. This German re-armament became the “catalyst of European politics.” After March 1935, Hitler tried to be on his best diplomatic behavior. His attitude was one of “neutrality on the surface.”[7] Hitler felt in 1936 that the situation in Ethiopia was very bad, possibly to become tragic soon, for Italy.[8] Hitler was now poised to succeed, and Europe was to prepare for the worst.[9]
Evaluation of Sources
Documents on German Foreign Policy have been compiled by the United States Government, and have been edited by the U.S. Department of State, the British Foreign Office, and the French government. These documents include communications of the German Foreign Ministry, and their several archives. The purpose of these documents was to keep record of the actions of Germany during this time period, as well as give insight into what Germany sought to do. It is of tremendous value to historians because it comes directly from Germany’s archives, so they are able to see what Germany planned for and what time they planned to do something. The resource of having actual transcripts of what German officials communicated about can give us tremendous insight into the thought of German officials, and what they were thinking during this critical time period. Limitations are that lower ranking officials may have exaggerated their statements, in order to please their superiors. Certain statements made by these officials need to be constantly checked against other known statements and policies to ensure their validity.
Ethiopia at Bay was written by John H. Spencer, who was a long time foreign policy adviser to Emperor Haile Selassie, and was present when the capital of Addis Ababa fell to Italian forces. He was involved in the Ethiopian government for several years, becoming and adviser to the Emperor in 1936, and he can provide an excellent perspective of the Ethiopian government. Spencer wrote the book to provide a first-hand account of the events that transpired, and to document history in the making. He felt that the situation was important, as part of the Ethiopian government, and someone had to tell the story from a somewhat Ethiopian perspective. This book is valuable because it gives that Ethiopian perspective of the war with Italy, as well as provides a first-hand account of the situation, rather than a narrative. There are few documents that tell the Ethiopian side of the story, and this source can enhance the understanding of the situation. Being in the Ethiopian government, Spencer may have had limited information on countries other than Italy, such as Germany.
Analysis
Germany became aware that its re-armament was worrying the European continent, and that it would become a target. When Pierre Laval signed the treaty with Italy, Germany became increasingly aware of the resistance presented by many European powers. In an internal document, a German representative in Ethiopia discussed with Emperor Haile Selassie the supply of modern arms and material for chemical warfare. If the Germans’ offer of arms was favorable, Ethiopia was to send a representative to Berlin to discuss the situation.[10] Germany later said internally that it and Ethiopia had the same interests, and that a conflict with Italy over the Austrian question would be inevitable.[11] Germany was aware that Mussolini, along with Britain and France, did not favor his involvement with Austria. Hitler felt that the only way to be able to take over Austria was to arm the Ethiopians as much as possible so that they would offer the greatest resistance toward the Italians. With the Italians distracted, Hitler would go into Austria. Hitler kept this plan secret, because he was aware of the complicated European political situation.[12]
German firms saw an interest in Ethiopia like the Italians did, but not for the same reasons. Companies such as Rheinmetall and Krupp Steel were aware that Ethiopia desperately needed supplies, and they could provide them.[13] They helped supply the weapons to Ethiopia that were agreed to by Selassie and Hitler. The fact that Ethiopia was on the verge of entering war meant that they need to buy as many supplies as possible to prepare. German firms were prepared to offer Ethiopians what they needed in order to profit. Italy also saw an economic interest in Ethiopia because Mussolini was aware that Ethiopia had a large amount of natural resources, and Italy could improve its struggling economy. With an already struggling economy, Italy was desperate to look for solutions for this problem, and Ethiopia became a possible solution.
Emperor Haile Selassie would of course try and take the offer made by the Germans, and Ethiopia would receive some weapons from German firms.[14] Emperor Selassie knew that Italy was a large military power, and it needed to arm immediately. Both Germany and Ethiopia felt they would win through this arms deal. With Mussolini sending troops into British Somaliland to prepare for the imminent invasion, Ethiopia had to speed up the process of the deal.[15] Germany began to play a large role in the imminent war by causing panic in Europe while making deals with Ethiopia to stop Italy from conquest.
When the main invasion began in October of 1935, German officials discussed the situation. Communications showed that Germany wished to remain a “non-participant,” and with Italy diverted away from Europe and the League of Nations weakened, Germany focused on the Austrian question.[16] It watched the Italian conflict, but Emperor Haile Selassie was aware that he was outnumbered, and Germany felt that Italy would likely succeed. Germany now knew that this was the time to take advantage of the European political situation, and it hoped that the Italo-Abyssinian conflict would continue for a long period of time so that it could begin its expansion plans.
Conclusion
Ethiopia would struggle to deal with the Italian invasion, but not before Germany would try to influence the outcome of the war. Mussolini’s Italy had struggled through economic problems, and needed to distract from this by invading Ethiopia. Mussolini had also feared that Germany might go into Austria and consequently made a pact with France that would build opposition toward Germany. German firms knew that they could take advantage of the situation in Ethiopia, and did so by providing materials to the African nation. Hitler was aware of the opposition, and needed a distraction, so he provided arms to Ethiopia in hopes of building resistance toward Italy. Germany played a large role in the period prior to the war, because concern over the Austrian question and the Rhineland put Germany in the spotlight, and Hitler was desperate to find a way to avoid the attention. Germany shifted its policy because it had gotten most of it wanted from the conflict, including diverting Italy’s attention, the weakening of the League of Nations, and a strain on Franco-Italian relations. The strain on European relations allowed Hitler to focus on his expansion plans. This Italo-Abyssinian War has been argued by historians as the precursor to World War II, because of the moves made by many European nations. In the end, however, Germany would be the one to make the move, and spark the beginning of a new era.
Word Count: 1,815
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Documents on German Foreign Policy: Series C, Volume III. United States:
Government Printing Office, 1959.
Documents on German Foreign Policy: Series C, Volume IV. United States:
Government Printing Office, 1962.
Spencer, John H. Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Selassie Years. Michigan:
Reference Publications, 1984.
Secondary Sources
Baer, George W. Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations. Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1976.
Del Boca, Angelo. The Ethiopian War 1935-1941. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
Erlich, Haggai. Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence. Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1986.
Hardie, Frank. The Abyssinian Crisis. Great Britain: Archon Books, 1974.
Sbacchi, Alberto. Ethiopia Under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience. Great
Britain: Zed Books Ltd., 1985.
Work, Ernest. Ethiopia, A Pawn in European Diplomacy. New York: MacMillan Company,
1935.
[1] Alberto Sbacchi, Ethiopia Under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience. (Great Britain: Zed Books Ltd., 1985) 7.
[2] Haggai Erlich, Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence. (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986) 149.
[3] Angelo Del Boca, The Ethiopian War 1935-1941. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969) 22-23.
[4] Ernest Work, Ethiopia, A Pawn in European Diplomacy. (New York: MacMillan Company, 1935) 339.
[5] Frank Hardie, The Abyssinian Crisis. (Great Britain: Archon Books, 1974) 85.
[6] Work, 339.
[7] Hardie, 64-65.
[8] George W. Baer, Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976) 171.
[9] John H. Spencer, Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Selassie Years. (Michigan: Reference Publications, 1984) 34.
[10] Documents on German Foreign Policy: Series C, Volume III. (United States: Government Printing Office, 1959) 759-760.
[11] Documents on German Foreign Policy: Series C, Volume IV. (United States: Government Printing Office, 1962) 454.
[12] Ibid, 455.
[13] Ibid, 455.
[14] Ibid, 146.
[15] Hardie, 247.
[16] DGFP: Series C, Volume IV, 744-745.