To what extent, if any, did the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster contribute to the fall of the Soviet Union?

        Two plant workers died on the night of the accident, and a further 28 people died in the following weeks as a result of acute radiation poisoning. However, with a dramatic increase in the number of thyroid cancer cases, a precise estimate of the total  number of civilian cancer deaths by the contamination is still difficult to reach.

        European countries noticed the spike in radiation levels and tried to monitor the disaster through satellite surveillance. Through its public broadcasts, the Soviet Union tried to downplay the accident in order to prevent outside countries from raising concern over the matter and refused offers of assistance. Even the central authorities took a while to grasp the full scope of the situation, and as a result, the evacuation from the immediate areas was delayed by two days after the accident. 

        In the immediate aftermath of the incident, the notable feature of both central authorities and personnel at the station was confusion, and no public warnings were issued. Later on throughout the day of the explosion, the people of Pripyat resumed their normal activities: children went to school, men went fishing, special occasions were held, and all were ignorant to the fact that they were exposed to high levels of radiation. Finally, nearly three weeks after the accident, Gorbachev made a statement on May 14, 1986 addressing Chernobyl. 

        According to his explanation, the accident was the result of an unauthorized experiment at the reactor, but later when inspected by exiled Soviet biochemist and historian Zhores Medvedev, it was the product of flawed Soviet reactor design that was unable to withstand a massive power surge. The reactor cooling system's emergency shutdown failed, resulting in the reactor's explosion. Even a Soviet news agency investigation reported that the disaster was the result of human error, equipment failure, and a number of inexperienced workers who disregarded the proper safety procedures and were unable to monitor radiation levels. The plant operators found responsible for the explosion were sentenced to ten years of hard labor. However, Gorbachev also attacked the motives of Western critics, mentioning their own nuclear catastrophes in his speech in order to divert the attention from only Soviet nuclear mistakes, and felt that his country’s “misfortune was being used as a propaganda point.”

        Approximately 300-600 million people were contaminated (estimates vary). Soviet officials confirmed that the general public was kept in the dark during the incident; one even stated, “If we are treating a patient for cancer, we never tell them they have it; we don’t want to give them hope. In this regard, we treat the population as children.” Western leaders called for a international convention requiring information exchanges on nuclear accidents and emergencies with the Soviet Union under condemnation for not initially revealing the accident and withholding information on the mishap. 

C. Evaluation of Sources

        According to a Moscow broadcast report, the Soviet Union hid the incident from the general public. Translated by Yurii Bohatiuk in The Ukrainian Quarterly of 1986, this broadcast that originated from the Soviet government, stated that “there [was] no destruction that some Western agencies [were] writing about.”  Its purpose was to provide a counterstory to the outside news media's reports, attempting to prevent any public panic that could occur. It also accused Western mass media of spreading rumors. In light of the opening of the Soviet archives after 1991, this source is valuable since it supported the fact that the Soviet government was secretive about its operations, which contributed to the responsive ideals of “public-openness.” This source is limited because it serves as a public broadcast to downplay the incident and not as a government memorandum.

Gorbachev’s Glasnost: Red Star Rising is a compilation of editorials originating from newspapers across the United States. All those addressing the Chernobyl incident were published in May 1986, a few weeks after the nuclear disaster. This source, or sources, is valuable in giving insight into the United States’ reaction toward the actions of the Soviet Union after the nuclear crisis and their secrecy about the situation. It gives an opposing perspective as well as a response to the Soviet’s counter-operations such as the Soviet broadcast. The purpose of the editorials in general was to inform the U.S. public of Soviet operations and to criticize the Soviet government and its nuclear industry and make them appear inadequate. However, the editorials are limited as a source since they are in fact coming from the Soviet’s opposing side during the Cold War, which makes them biased and perhaps leaning toward propaganda against the Soviet Union. Both sources were very close to the time of the catastrophe and thus does not capture the broader perspective of historical context and impact of the disaster but rather foreshadows the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

D. Analysis

        According to Soviet press releases, the country’s nuclear industry was accident-free, suggesting that an accident could not possibly occur. Hence, accident preparation was minimal, and these construction defects were a signs of how the Soviet nuclear industry generally operated, revealing that even buildings with military significance were not immune to problems. The Chernobyl nuclear plant, like its counterparts elsewhere in the Soviet Union, lacked protective machinery, and engineers did not have enough knowledge in reactor physics in order to carry out the proper safety procedures and monitor radiation levels. With the nomenklatura system benefiting patron-client relations and stifling the will of “ordinary people,” authoritative control in the Soviet Union was becoming more detached and unorganized. A catastrophe seemed inevitable, and the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster became a prime example of spontaneous and disorganized response to a major crisis.

        A reported 135,000 people were evacuated, though some not immediately to safety, and the evacuations included only a fraction of the population in contamination zones. As opposed to its initial response to the explosion, the Soviet government was much more decisive in addressing outside concern. Its response was mainly public reassurance, deflection of criticism, and selective cooperation with external agencies. Gorbachev was still trying to reform the corrupt government system and thus, he kept pressing for the concept of glasnost, although his May 14, 1986 address about the accident contradicted his commitment.

        Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the policy of glasnost to reduce the amount of corruption within the Soviet government, which was meant to include the general public in the political process. Secrecy has been a trait carved into Russian culture by the Soviet regime, and its citizens have long been suffering from truth deprivation. Nothing was ever reported in the newspapers, but investigations from outside media pressed for full openness and stimulated a response from the Soviet Union, leading to the eventual leak of government operations. 

        Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost led to a decrease in Soviet censorship, allowing journals and media to expose news of government corruption, which was an unparalleled openness and exploitation for the general public. This outbreak of information about government crimes included the secrecy of the Soviet counter-operations for the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, causing panic in the people and led to an increase in social protests and going against Gorbachev’s goals for reform.

        Contradictions arose between the Soviet government's public broadcasts and the media's investigative reports, such as attempts to downplay the disaster by stating the death toll as thirty-one instead of millions due to radiation exposure. The exploitation of the Soviet government caused many citizens to view the regime as illegitimate, especially since so many of their lives were at stake. The disaster opened a “Pandora's Box” of negativity toward the central government. Once the government was longer seen as infallible, its people began to lose confidence. Eventually, in 1991, with so much opposition from its people and within its own government, the Soviet Union collapsed. However, the contamination from the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster still lingers, and many lives, including military personnel that tried to clean up the mess, were lost.

E. Conclusion

         The Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster still carries a great impact and shook the Soviet Union into a harsh reality, a crisis of leadership. However, historians such as James Oberg argue that it was the policy of glasnost that was the greatest contributing factor toward the fall of the Soviet Union. This policy was already taking its course, but the disaster led to international involvement. With the availability of mass media, both Western and Soviet, this disaster sped up the eventual victory of openness over reflexive secrecy. The Soviet people were already experiencing a deteriorating economy, but then they fell victim to the deathly consequences of a corrupt society, leading to the unveiling of other government crimes such as the use of a black market system that mainly benefited corrupt Communists officials. The Chernobyl Disaster helped determine whether the government was adequate and successful in its response to a time of trouble, but glasnost revealed to the Soviet people that the government was not.

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F. Bibliography                                                                    Word count: 1,945

Bohatiuk, Yurii. “The Chernobyl Disaster.” Ukrainian Quarterly. Spring-Summer 1986. Web.

Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Vienna: The Chernobyl Forum, 2003–2005. Second revised version. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Print.

"Fukushima, Chernobyl and the Nuclear Event Scale." Nuclear Energy Institute - Clean-Air Energy. Nuclear Energy Institute, Summer 2011. Web.

Medvedev, Zhores A. The Legacy of Chernobyl. New York: W. W. Norton &, 1992. Print.

Oberg, James E. Uncovering Soviet Disasters: Exploring the Limits of Glasnost. New York: Random House, Inc., 1988. Print.

Trager, Oliver, ed. Gorbachev’s Glasnost: Red Star Rising. New York: Facts on File Inc., 1989. Print.

Winters, Paul A. The Collapse of the Soviet Union. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven, 1999. Print.

Yablokov, Alexey V., Vassily B. Nesterenko, and Alexey V. Nesterenko. Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment. Meeting Report. Ed. Janette D. Sherman-Nevinger. Vol. 1181. Boston: Blackwell, 2009. Print. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences.

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