- Stalin as the Moderate Force in the Party
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Stalin’s moderate political position gained him support: seen in “Socialism in One Country” versus “Permanent Revolution” debate.
- Trotsky held radical belief of “Permanent Revolution”
- For USSR to survive - needed support from other countries.
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Policy was consequently defeated in debate.
- Stalin - “Socialism in One Country”
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“Lenin’s preferred methodology”.
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Argument was over complicated with quotations taken out of context; but a more moderate approach, with agreeable elements. (Appendices 5).
- PART C: Evaluation of Sources.
Trotsky, L., 1930, My Life; An Attempt at an Autobiography, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York.
Leon Trotsky’s memoirs, written in 1930, have the purpose of providing an explanation for his actions during the power struggle and expressing his point of view. Trotsky’s first hand accounts portray Stalin as a master manipulator in the power struggle and contends that it was no surprise that he became sole leader by 1930.
It is a valuable source because it gives primary evidence about Trotsky’s interpretation of Stalin’s actions during the power struggle. However it has some limitations - for example, Trotsky’s writing is heavily biased against Stalin which may have created elaborations and mistruths in order to sway the reader’s opinion in his favour. There is also the limitation imposed by a lack of supporting evidence for many of the claims made by Trotsky in the text. Dr. Ian Thatcher queries a number of Trotsky’s claims, particularly that he was “the real leader of the revolution in general and of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in particular.”
Source 6: McCauley, M., 1993, Longman History of Russia; The Soviet Union 1917-1991, Longman, London, p75.
Martin McCauley is a leading authority on Russia and Eastern Europe. This source is an extract taken from Martin McCauley’s 1993 revised version of “The Soviet Union 1917-1991” with the purpose of examining the power struggle within the Soviet Union after Lenin’s death. In this extract, McCauley reflects that Stalin took party members by surprise as he seemed an unlikely leadership candidate. However McCauley’s main point is that a combination of Stalin’s circumstances – his methodical moderate position, which reflected party aspirations - and his skill of building tactical alliances as the deciding factors that allowed him to rise to power.
It is valuable as it was written by one of the world’s leading Eastern Europe historians and thus is well researched and from a reputable source. However, it is limited given that McCauley views this era from a western perspective, making the source not completely objective, and like most post-revisionist historians McCauley tries to avoid apportioning blame, instead attempting to unravel complex issues.
PART D - Analysis
Stalin’s Rise to power had an immense effect on world politics and through its analysis the mentality of similar 20th century dictators can be explored.
The evidence collected overwhelmingly suggests, that Stalin’s charisma and tactical talents allowed him to claim absolute power. The first attribute was evident immediately following Lenin’s death with several major steps gaining him favour over his opponents, especially giving the eulogy at Lenin’s funeral in Trotsky’s unexplained absence. Stalin ensured Trotsky’s unpopularity by emphasising Trotsky’s seemingly radical views and disrespectful nature, labelling him a ‘factionalist’ within the party. Additionally, Stalin was able to seem for a while as unassuming – leading the party intelligentsia to discount him as a leadership candidate giving him the element of surprise over his opponents. “[The other party members] were singularly ill-equipped to recognise a party climber (Stalin) when they saw one.”
As a skilful tactician, Stalin isolated his enemies through gaining majority support in the Politburo. This was first demonstrated in the “triumvirate” between Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev - and their followers - which always managed to outvote the so-called “Trotskyists” within the politburo, leading to Trotsky’s subsequent exclusion.
History repeated itself when Stalin gained a majority against the “leftists” – Kamenev and Zinoviev - by forming an alliance with the right. Consequently the left, because of disagreements over the NEP and party politics, was also accused of factionalism and lost all positions of power. Thirdly, Stalin then opposed the right wing of the party. He had gained the majority in the Politburo by replacing his opposition with his avid supporters so that when a disagreement about the continuation of the NEP arose, the right was also denounced as factionalists and excluded - Stalin had won his bid for power.
The mistakes of others also contributed to Stalin’s dramatic rise to power. Stalin was an opportunist, utilising the mistakes of others to gather support. The containment of Stalin’s influence originally rested in Trotsky’s hands, but Trotsky did not accept the gravity of the situation and made some fundamental errors such as not attending Lenin’s funeral or even writing a telegram in his honour, perhaps highlighting his lack of political sensitivity. This was a dangerous omission for Trotsky as a campaign, headed by Stalin, was waged against him within the Politburo based on his disrespect.
Trotsky’s controversial article in “Lessons of October”, which expressed the unpopular and radical view of “permanent Revolution”, was also used against him during the leadership struggle. He implied that Zinoviev was largely responsible for the failure of the German Communist revolt of 1923 and cited Zinoviev's and Kamenev's opposition to Lenin's decision to launch an armed uprising in the fall of 1917 - reopening an extremely ugly wound. From a debate concerning his relatively radical views, Trotsky virtually lost all support within the Party hierarchy.
Additionally, Trotsky could have limited some of Stalin’s influence by using Lenin’s Political testament whilst Lenin’s death was still a fresh memory. However, his late usage of the letter made it ineffective against Stalin’s supporters. Finally, his comments criticising the Politburo as being “a secretarial apparatus from above” only fuelled his unpopularity by insulting most of the influential party members. Leaders of the left and right also made several mistakes which worked in Stalin’s favour including criticisms of the party system – for example the lack of party debate– and completely opposing Stalin on several issues. Had these leaders not portrayed themselves to be so radical, they may have gained support as opposed to enmity.
Finally, Stalin positioned himself so that after Lenin’s death he was the moderate party leader, which allowed him to create the conflict between the left and right wings of the party. His more conservative position echoed popular beliefs within the party, thus gaining him additional support. For example, his campaign for “Socialism in One Country” which aimed for national reconstruction, gathered overwhelming support against Trotsky’s adventurist policy – the “Theory of Permanent Revolution”. When Stalin emerged as a leadership candidate, the general sentiment of the party was more conservative than ever so that in many eyes, Stalin was the obvious choice as the next leader of the USSR.
It can be seen through primary sources of key political figures present during the struggle, including Leon Trotsky, that Stalin was viewed by his enemies to be a masterful manipulator of party opinion – often ignoring the importance of his moderate position in gathering party support. “Stalin has been the chief instrument in carrying out this overturn [of power]. He is gifted with practicality, a strong will, and persistence in carrying out his aims.”
However in light of the facts presented, it seems more realistic to agree with the contrasting interpretation of some historians, most notably Martin McCauley, which perceive Stalin’s rise to power to be a combination of several factors including his circumstances – his moderate position. “Stalin was moderate and methodical... he was the only one skilled at building tactical alliances...he had to reflect the aspirations of the party.”
PART E - Conclusion
Between 1924 and 1930, Stalin’s rise to power can hardly be considered a surprise as he was the key politician in the power struggle. Though his opponents did gather some support against him, Stalin’s iron grip over the party’s majority gave him the power to crush all opposition and stay in control. He played each wing off against the other until only his moderate supporters remained in the party structure. To a small extent circumstances served in his favour as many opportunities arose for him to denounce his opposition and gain additional support. However, overall, through this investigation it is clear that it was truly a combination of qualities such as his charisma, tactical ability, moderate position and opportunistic nature that allowed him to gain power and, therefore, when analysing the events between 1924 and 1930, his rise to power is not at all surprising.
Word count : 1987 words.
- Appendix
Source 1
Evans, D., 2005, Teach Yourself; Stalin’s Russia, Bookpoint Ltd., London, p35-36
Lenin’s Political Testament
“…I suggest that comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from the post and appointing another man who differs from comrade Stalin in being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate of his comrades… From the Standpoint of safeguards against a split between Stalin and Trotsky, it is not a minor detail that can become extremely important.”
Source 2
Trotsky, L., 1930, My Life; An Attempt at an Autobiography, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York.
Trotsky’s account of Lenin’s funeral.
“The news of Lenin's death was spreading in ever-widening rings. ...I was told: "The funeral will be on Saturday, you can't get back in time, and so we advise you to continue your treatment." Accordingly, I had no choice. As a matter of fact, the funeral did not take place until Sunday, and I could easily have reached Moscow by then. Incredible as it may appear, I was even deceived about the date of the funeral.”
Source 3
Quote cited in, McCauley, M., 1979, The STALIN File, B. T. Batsford, London.
Zinoviev comments upon Stalin’s manipulation.
"Lessons of October" merely served as a pretext. Failing that a different motive would have been found and the discussion would have assumed slightly different forms, nothing more. . . . You must understand that it was a struggle for power. The trick was to string together old disagreements with new issues. For this reason "Trotskyism" was born.”
Source 4
Larina, A., 1994, This I Cannot Forget; The Memoirs of Nikolai Bukharin’s Widow, W. W. Norton, New York, p384.
Bukharin’s widow discusses his opinion of Stalin.
“I recall also that Nikolai Ivanovich, from what he told me, admitted to Kamenev and Sokolnikov that they had been absolutely right at the Fourteenth Party Congress, in 1925, when they advised delegates not to reelect Stalin as gensek [general secretary]. Bukharin went on to say that Stalin was an unprincipled intriguer who in his pursuit of power would change his politics at any given moment, depending only on whom he wanted to be free of.”
Source 5
Quote cited in, McCauley, M., 1979, The STALIN File, B. T. Batsford, London, p26.
Trotsky discusses Stalin’s influence.
“He is needed by all of them -- by the tired radicals, by the bureaucrats, by the Nepmen [traders], by the kulaks [rich peasants], by the upstarts, by the sneaks, by all the worms that are crawling out of the upturned soil of the manured revolution. He knows how to meet them on their own ground, he speaks their language and he knows how to lead them...if everything continues to go automatically as it is going now, Stalin will just as automatically become dictator.”
Source 6
McCauley, M., 1993, Longman History of Russia; The Soviet Union 1917-1991, Longman, London, p75.
“Politburo opponents of Stalin had had little practical experience of politics before 1917. They had not mounted the party ladder step by step and had not had to claw their way up; 1917 had made them, at a stroke, key political figures. They were singularly ill-equipped to recognise a party climber when they saw one. They were all superior to Stalin, or so they thought, despite what Lenin had written in his Testament. Their fierce intellectual independence ill prepared them for caucus politics. Stalin was moderate and methodical, not to say pedestrian, but he was the only one skilled at building tactical alliances and this put him head and shoulders above the rest. This did not automatically guarantee success: he had to reflect the aspirations of the party and that party wanted socialism. On the face of it the left should have won between 1925 and 1927 and in any case the distance between the right and the left was narrow in 1927 when Bukharin moved against the kulak. Convergence might have resulted if domestic and foreign peace had been guaranteed. However, Stalin used the imaginary threat of war in 1927 to stifle debate and exaggerate the differences with the left.”
- Bibliography
Borisov, Y., in 20th Century, Vol 8, p1033, cited in: Morcombe, M., Fielding, M., 1998, Spirit of Change: Russia in Revolution, McGraw Hill Australia, Roseville.
Bradley, J., 1988, The Russian Revolution, Bison Books Ltd., London.
Carr, E. H., The Russian Revolution from Lenin to stalin 1917-1929, pp 74-5, cited in: Morcombe, M., Fielding, M., 1998, Spirit of Change: Russia in Revolution, McGraw Hill Australia, Roseville.
Daniels, R. V., 1960, The Conscience of the Revolution; Communist opposition in Soviet Russia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p252
Evans, D., 2005, Teach Yourself; Stalin’s Russia, Bookpoint Ltd., London.
Larina, A., 1994, This I Cannot Forget; The Memoirs of Nikolai Bukharin’s Widow, W. W. Norton, New York, p384.
McCauley, M., 1993, Longman History of Russia; The Soviet Union 1917-1991, Longman, London, p75.
McCauley, M., 1979, The STALIN File, B. T. Batsford, London.
Oxley, P., 2001, Russia; 1855-1991 From Tsar to Commissars, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Prof. Rempel, G., date unknown, Stalin Vs. Trotsky, Western New England College, http://mars.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/stalin/lectures/StalinTrot.html,12/6/2007.
Trotsky, L., 1930, My Life; An Attempt at an Autobiography, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York.
Dr. Thatcher, I., 2002, Trotsky, Routledge, London.
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Dr. Ian Thatcher has conducted research across Eastern Europe into its nineteenth- and twentieth-century history. He is a member of the Study Group of the Russian Revolution and is on the Advisory Board of the PSA journal Studies in Marxism. He has previously taught at Universities in England, Scotland and New Zealand, and has served on the Editorial Boards of Europe-Asia Studies (formerly Soviet Studies) and the Scottish Slavonic Review and thus there is merit in the criticisms he makes of this text.
Dr. Thatcher, I, (1988) p215.
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McCauley, M, 1979, , p24.
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op cit Trotsky, L,...p513.
op cit McCauley, M,...p24.
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op cit McCauley, M, 1993, .p75.
., op cit Carr, E. H...p181
op cit McCauley, M., .. p26
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