The first activist move from the Israeli government was the Lavon affair in July 1954, where Lavon the defense minister in Israel behind Prime Minister Moshe Sharett’s back organized a covert action in Egypt. The idea was to bomb the British and American embassies in Egypt, and blame the Egyptians for the attack. This would then prevent the British forces in the Canal Zone from withdrawing. The plot was detected, Lavon dismissed and the Egyptian Jews involved brought to trial. Because of the fact that Israel engage in covert actions without having a concrete reason to justify their actions the Israel foreign policy changes from being reactive to active.
After the 1949 armistice Israel wanted to get more secure borders and to expand their territory so they could get even more power in the region. The new regime in Egypt lead by Nasser wanted to redeem the Palestinians and because of the total defeat of the Arab troops in 1948/9 Nasser and the rest of the Arab countries wanted to defeat the powerful IDF. Because of these 2nd round thoughts a 2nd war was inevitable in the coming years. After the Gaza raid Nasser turned first to the US to get weapons but as they could not agree Egypt turned to the soviet block and the Czech arms deal was made; USSR would aid weapons through Czech Republic. This increased the Israeli threat perception and they made a deal with France to get weapons. The Czech arms deal lead to a very active form of Ben Gurionism in Israel “If they really get MiGs – I will be for bombing them!” (Shulze, page 25) And Nasser did get MiGs.
Nasser also decided to nationalize the Suez Canal and to close the strait of Tiran which left Israel with no connection to the red sea. So instead of negotiating the closure of the strait and because of Gurion being outraged about the Czech arms deal Israel decides to engage in the Sevres protocol with France and Britain. France who thought that Egypt was aiding the rebels in the French occupied Algeria wanted to remove Nasser from his powerful position in Egypt. Britain and Anthony Eden wanted Nasser removed because of the nationalization of the Suez Canal and because of Eden’s interpretation of Nasser being the new Hitler. Ben Gurion with his aggressive approach had won over the diplomatic Sharett and he agreed to participate in the Sevres protocol. Therefore Israel attacked Egypt October 29th 1956. This action could be seen as a reaction to the Czech arms deal and the closure of Tiran but it was a preemptive attack, and it was Israel who took military in use. Britain and France used Israel as a piece in their puzzle of getting Nasser removed and Israel went with it because they wanted to gain territory and to get better borders, they did not go to war as a reaction to any Egyptian military actions.
After the ceasefire on November 2nd 1956, there still was no solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and there was no peace treaties signed. From 1956 to the six day war in 1967 tensions in the region was built up, and even though no one claims to have wanted a war, the war came.
The change of government in Syria to the more aggressive military Ba’thist regime increased the already bad Syria-Israeli border relations. This resulted in fierce battles in the area of the Sea of Galilee. This lead to a mutual defense pact between Egypt and Syria; Israel was now very vulnerable.
The establishment of PLO in Egypt unified all the rebel groups resulting in the fedayeen attacks increasing, being better planned, and more effective. On November 13th 1966 this lead to the most extensive operation since the Sinai campaign (Schulze, page 34) IDF raided the West bank and killed 72 people and destroyed 140 houses. This raid was not an active action it was a reaction to Nasser’s establishment of the PLO, an example of the still reactive foreign policy in Israel.
When the Soviet intelligence report in May 1967 came to Egypt, saying that Israel would attack Syria, Egypt were forced to mobilize because of the mutual defense pact. Egypt now asked the UNEF to partial withdraw their troops which had been used as a buffer zone between the Israeli-Egyptian border. This was not a move Nasser did as an act of war but just to ensure Syria that Egypt would be ready. The fact that Nasser only asked for partial withdrawal confirms this. Israel chose to interpret this as an act of war and they launched their preemptive attack June 5th1967. This was a very active move and it confirms that Israeli Foreign policy was not reactive. Israel attached so they would not be the ones attacked, so they were not the ones who had to react.
Israel’s foreign policy started out being reactive with the Quibya and Gaza raid, but as she realized how powerful a military she had the foreign policy became more active with the Lavon affair and the Sevres Protocol. The foreign policy was more reactive than the Egyptian with all the fedayeen raids, but it is wrong to describe it as only reactive. The Sevres Protocol is a really good example of how active the foreign policy was – Israel engaged in covert operations and preemptive attacks. Also during the Six Day War Israel had a very active foreign policy. She attacked first and showed off her military superiority and in this way developed her foreign policy to a more active than reactive one.
