4 Foreign ministers' meeting, July 27, 1945, p. 475, 481, 489, 932.
5 Gaddis, p. 24.
6 Foreign ministers' meeting, July 30, 1945, p. 485, 487, 488, 491: Clayton to Byrne; Byrnes-Molotov meeting, July 27, 1945, p. 901.
7 Mee, Jr., Charles L. p.219. “Truman extended this notion of two spheres, projecting the division of Germany onto Europe as a whole, asking whether Stalin meant to establish “a line running from the Baltic to the Adriatic.” Stalin replied he did.”
8 Trachtenberg, 1999, p. 72.
Germany is exercised…jointly…uniformity of treatment of the German population…Germany shall be treated
as a single economic unit”.9
II. It was agreed if the Allied Control Council failed to agree on provisions calling for foreign trade arrangements on all-German basis, the control and financing of foreign trade would “revert to the zonal commander”. This accepted principal enabled Byrnes Plan to override the Potsdam Protocol, rendering German‟s common-import export impossible, as Eastern and Western Germany “would have to relate to each other economically as though they were foreign countries”, causing deadlock in the Allied Control Council. 10
III. By producing a common export-import program for western Germany as a whole among the three western powers, this contradiction would be covered up, as “the all-German language of the Potsdam agreement would change nothing of substance.”11
Potsdam was not directly responsible
Sphere of Influence before and after Potsdam (Ideological Incompatibility)
i. In 1944, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill made an alleged agreement on dividing southeastern Europe into spheres of influence during the Fourth Moscow Conference. 12
ii. At Yalta, Soviet assimilation of Poland into its own sphere of influence was implied with “her complete liberation by the Red Army”13, the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland, and western allies “withdrawal of their recognition 14from the former Polish Government in London15” at Potsdam. A zone in Germany would be allocated to France based on geographic proximity rather than military involvement16, roughly two-thirds of Germany.
iii. Exclusion of USSR from Italy‟s capitulation and an insignificant role in Japan's occupation caused Stalin's resentment. 17 Thus he denied the western allies any significant share of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary by allocating the Red Army densely across Eastern Europe. 18
C Evaluation of the Sources
The first source is a work of scholarship analyzing the nature of the agreements at Potsdam, called “The Myth of the Potsdam”, a history text written by an American political science historian, Marc Trachtenberg, Due to the time of its publication on the 30th of July 1996, Trachtenberg has both the advantage of hindsight regarding Potsdam and access to previously classified archives as seen in, “this is one of the big surprises to emerge from recent archival research”19, where he obtained a document from French archives. Unlike diplomatic historians where the emphasis of their analysis is placed on ideological and political implication of Potsdam, Trachtenberg puts great depth on the economic implications of Potsdam agreements, stating “reparations…were the most basic questions about Germany as a whole.”20 The source was written with the purpose of proving “the Potsdam Conference was not an agreement to treat Germany as an economic unit” but to “accept the division of Germany” into “east and west”.21 Although a secondary source, this source is invaluable as it bases its argument on the use of primary sources regarding the Potsdam conference, e.g. official documents- James Byrnes‟ Plan, which provides a more objective view on the role of US policy at Potsdam. This differs from conventional interpretation that Potsdam agreement had agreed on maintaining a unified Germany 22 , where Germany‟s division was cause predominately by Soviets violation of
9 "Avalon Project - A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949 - Potsdam Conference."
10 Mee, Jr., p.210.
11 Trachtenberg, 1996, p.14
12 Wikipedia, “Percentages Agreement."
13 BL Tsybulevsky., 1969.
14 "Avalon Project – The Yalta Conference”
15 Grenville, J. A. S, p. 235.
16 Gaddis, p. 22
17 Gaddis, p. 22
18 Gaddis, p. 20
19 Trachtenberg, p.15
20 Trachtenberg, p.4
21 Trachtenberg, p.3
unitary agreements.23 However, the source‟s usefulness is limited as its argument has not been completely endorsed by the majority of Cold War historian e.g. “pre-eminent and internationally celebrated24” US diplomatic historian John Gaddis, who Trachtenberg claims to have “not been privy to what had really gone on at Potsdam”.25 Thus this source only represents view of a minority of Cold War historians, and may contain an element of subjective bias.
The second source is a compendium called “Tehran-Yalta-Potsdam, Collection of Documents” containing”, a collection of papers produced at the Potsdam conference on 1st of August, 1945, which is compiled by a Soviet historian SH.P Sanakoev, BL Tsybulevsky. As the source was published in 1967 by the “Moscow Publishing House
„International Relations‟”, the views it presents regarding Soviet responsibility at the Potsdam conference regarding the division of Germany is undoubted heavily influenced by Soviet authorities and censors. The purpose of this source is to present evidence that Western allies were directly responsible for the creation of East and West Germany, arguing Soviet policy at Potsdam was motivated by purely benign intentions. As opposed to the first source where it represents a US perspective regarding Potsdam, this source is valuable as it presents a Soviet perspective motivated by the political context of the “cold war”, which is crucial to our understanding on how both sides had agreed on “unitary” policies at Potsdam, which lead to East and West Germany‟s creation. Yet, the reliability of this source is limited by its patriotic subtext and anti-western connotations about the role of Soviet and American responsibilities at Potsdam. As seen in terms like, “…brilliant victories of Soviet troops…The greatest hater of Soviet Russia (Churchill)…Nazi hordes…bourgeois scientist…heroic defense of Moscow”.
D Analysis
The Potsdam Conference is commonly believed to be a “difficult and divisive” conference between the western allies and the Soviet, where the failure to establish substantial and firm agreements were due to their fundamental ideological incompatibility. John Lewis Gaddis, US historian, believes though it was agreed Germany would be run as an economic unit, Soviet subsequent refusal to comply to the agreements, forced US policy makers to abandon cooperation, thus leading to division of Germany. While this is interpretation valid to an extent, Marc Trachtenberg, US political science historian, argues this was “simply a myth” to disguise actual agreements at Potsdam, and to justify western allies‟ actions in creating West Germany. In fact, the actual agreements laid no groundwork for inter- allied cooperating in administrating Germany and encouraged unilateralism. James Byrne, US secretary of state,
who had proposed plans for German reparations and administration, stated "pull together in running Germany” was
impossible, thus there was "general scrapping" of a policy which originally proposed a united German economy. This argument is not unfounded as the majority of primary sources produced at Potsdam by western allies and the soviets are in agreement with this claim. However, all these views seemed to suggest Potsdam‟s “unitary policies”, myth or not, had great significance on the creation of East and West Germany.
Trachtenberg states Byrnes‟ plan reflected “a basic orientation for a sphere of influence”, highlighting the basis for feasible relations among the allies could only be maintained with a clean separation of Germany, which will put an end to “squabbling”. Mee supports this argument describing Stalin had enthusiastically supported a sphere of influence solution for Germany, and implicitly for Europe as a whole. Both historians suggest open recognition of sphere of influence between the western allies and the Soviets began with the division of Germany. In addition, although BL Tsybulevsky presents a rather biased interpretation of western policy at Potsdam, his analysis nonetheless confirms the western allies were the first to propose the “dismemberment of Germany”. Thus, we can clearly see the actual agreements at Potsdam were fully intent on establishing spheres of influence post war order in Europe, which began with Germany.
While the majority of Cold war historians agree that spheres of influence had existed before Potsdam, few could agree the implications of the Potsdam were direct causes of Germany division as the Potsdam Protocol had clearly stated there would be unified administration of Germany. However, Trachtenberg shows the Potsdam protocol weren‟t the actual agreements on Germany; it was in fact Byrnes‟ plan. The fact this contradiction was never pointed out was driven by political reasons, because it provided grounds for mutual recrimination in future conflicts over Germany. As a British official said, “We have to make the Russian appear to the German public a s the saboteurs of German unity”. Both the Soviets and Western allies claimed the other violated the agreements of the Potsdam Protocol. While Western historian Gaddis claims the Soviet were “blocking a common import-export program” in
23 Gaddis, p. 24
24 KAPLAN, FRED, 2011.
Germany, the Soviets historian BL Tsybulevsky argues violation of the Potsdam agreement began with the “creation of a separate state Bizonia” which failed in its “claim to the represent the entire German people”. Thus, it can be
seen that these arguments provided both sides a rationale for dividing Germany and the extent to whom was
responsible for violating the Potsdam agreement can be argued based on historiography.
Yet, despite these opposing views, they weren‟t necessarily contradicting as Germany was indeed “simultaneously divided and unified”. According to Mee, it was divided on “specific economic grounds, united on vague political grounds.” While Byrnes‟ reparation plan had split Germany in two spheres of influence “definitively”, political
unity was a mere “facade” for the public to see, as described by Trachtenberg. Therefore, the agreement on a unified Germany, ironically, helped divide Germany “more surely”, enabling both sides to “wield its divided halves more securely”.
Before Potsdam, ideological tensions had already existed between the Western and Eastern European States due to ideological and economic incompatibility, thus a spheres of influence post-war order in Europe was likely. Gaddis believes when the German army began to downfall, Stalin and the western powers were already considering spheres
of influence in post-war Europe. The percentages agreement implied “a division of Europe into spheres of influence” and left “little room for the Europeans to determine their future.” At Yalta, the Red Army occupation was densely spread across Eastern Europe. Poland in particular, had been seized by the Red Army, imposing a new government with the help of Lublin Poles. This suggests though the war had forced cooperation between the western allies and
the Soviets, this “unnatural alliance” was only driven by a common goal of defeating the axis powers, and had not reconcile their ideological differences. Thus, the cause of East and West Germany creation may lie in the roots of ideological incompatibility, where Potsdam merely catalyzed Germany‟s inevitable division.
E Conclusion
In conclusion, Potsdam was directly responsible for the creation of East and West Germany, through laying a hidden framework of economic division of Germany on the basis of incompatibility of post-war economic interest.
Although Potsdam had achieved many fundamental agreements, the nature of these agreements on Germany were on foundations of unilateralism and a silent confirmation their ideological could never allow for any real economic
or political cooperation, and in the long run, would only lead to severe disagreements. In simplistic terms, the agreements of Potsdam “had agreed to separate Germany”. Ultimately, Potsdam was essential and indispensible in
causing the creation of Germany into East and West since it created the permanent conditions for Germany‟s
separation precluding the possibility of unified Germany in a future post-war Europe.
F Bibliography
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<>.
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