A man who contributed substantially to the monarchists’ retention of sovereignty and power during as well as after the 1848 revolution was Otto Von Bismarck, a man whose actions and policies throughout the 19th century are considered by many as contributory to the ascension of Nazi ideology in the 1920’s and 30’s. Known as a man who was determined in his cause, and willing to resort to ruthless, even revolutionary means to satisfy his thoroughly conservative ambitions, Bismarck founded the German Empire after a series of delicately engineered wars with France and Austria in 1871.
In the years following the declaration of what became known as “the Second German Reich”, Bismarck, in his role as Reich Chancellor, pursued policies specifically aimed at maintaining the order of the state and the sovereignty of the monarchy, setting an ominous precedent for the following three decades. His tendency to declare any faction critical of the monarchy as “enemies of the Reich”, as well as his subsequent persecution of these targeted groupings of specific political or ethnic character, familiarized the German people with the fact that particular groups in society could simply be eradicated or promulgated as unpatriotic and hazardous to society under the direction of an authoritarian power. Resistance in any form was intolerable for Bismarck, whose adherence to the principles of monarchy remained unshaken throughout his reign. An illustrative example of this dogmatism that existed in Germany even sixty years before the ascent of Nazism is the policy implemented by Bismarck in an attempt to mitigate the increasing influence of the Catholic Church. He feared the emergent Papal influence over the Catholic community and regarded it as a direct threat to his own power and sovereignty in Germany, specifically the effect these developments could have on the electorate that played an increasingly substantial role in a state that to an extent depended upon elected representative institutions to govern. After the implementation of the Syllabus of Errors (1864) and Declaration of Papal Infallibility (1871), explicit expressions of Rome’s determination to expand its sphere of influence, Bismarck responded swiftly with the promulgation of a series of laws and policies that required the Catholic clergy to subject themselves to training at state institutions and concede clerical appointments to the authority of the state, with the aim of achieving the subjugation of the Catholic clergy under the German state. This confrontation resulted in what was called the “struggle for culture”, as Catholic clergies refused to abide by the new laws imposed upon them. Bismarck utilized the extensive police system to arrest and detain all those who proved uncooperative, resulting in the imprisonment of 225 priests by the mid 1870’s. The action was supported by the liberals, who regarded Catholicism as the antagonist of modernity and progression, and ultimately had two main impacts upon the future course of German history. Firstly the Catholics were deeply embittered by the fact that they were regarded by Bismarck as unpatriotic, and thus founded their own political party, the Centre Party, that retained deep religious roots and an ostensibly nationalistic nature in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the state. It would maintain a formidable presence throughout German politics, and due to its strong adherence to the Bismarckian Reich it remained, even during the years of Weimar, a party whose true allegiance lay with old order, thus actively contributing to the lack of legitimacy that so characterized the Weimar Republic. Ultimately the policies of Bismarck in the 1870’s pressured the Catholic community into politicization, creating a party that stood in diametric opposition to modernization and liberalism, and would contribute to an insufficient political foundation for the Weimar Republic from which the Nazis profited immensely.
An additional aspect of Bismarcks political agenda that when regarded in retrospect contributed to the climate of political fragmentation and incoherence present in the 1920’s was his active hindrance of the emerging labor movement. As in many European states at the time, namely Britain, the effects of the momentous industrial revolution resulted in an exponential increase of the working class in Germany, as manual labor became essential to utilize the novel production techniques and concepts. Through the influence of the revolutionary theories of Marx and Engels this significant portion of Germany’s population rapidly underwent a process of intense politicization as they developed what Marxist thought regards as “class consciousness”. Soon Germany was home to one of Europe’s largest labor movements, advocating the rights of workers and criticizing the capitalist, bourgeois establishments. Naturally Bismarck regarded this emerging movement as a direct threat to his conservatively inclined monarchy, and thus tacitly exploited two assassination attempts upon Kaiser Wilhelm I to proclaim the socialists as “enemies of the Reich”. He introduced the Anti-Socialist law, banning socialist meetings, newspapers and public events, resulting in mass arrests and imprisonments.
Although the law was allowed to lapse in 1890, the consequences of this radical policy were of even greater magnitude than the earlier persecution of the Catholic community. The Anti-Socialist law pushed the labor movement to the left, as it adopted an obdurate Marxist course, prophesizing a revolution that would result in a dictatorship of the proletariat. This radical leftist ideology was compounded by a deep resentment for the bourgeoisie and liberalism, since, as before, the liberals had supported Bismarcks actions, regarding the Social Democrats as an impediment to their own electoral success. This mutual antagonism produced a deep cleft between the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties of the liberals, an unabridged gap that contributed to the political disintegration of Weimar. Additionally, the Social Democrats adopted a strict adherence to the law even into the years of Weimar in order to avoid further restriction or persecution. This paralyzed the movement when it was faced by the violence and blatant illegality of the radical parties such as the Nazis and KPD, and hindered them from employing their immense political weight; after all they were the largest political party until 1932, to mitigate the advance of the Nazi party.
Overall Bismarcks influence upon German history is immense, as the founder of the German Reich he achieved the unification of the various separate states into one coherent monarchist empire. Therefore it is undeniable that he also contributed to the political and socioeconomic climate of later decades, namely the time of the Weimar Republic. His persecution of various groupings in German society, primarily the Catholic community and growing working class, produced two political parties whose ideology was incompatible, firstly with one another, and secondly with the larger context of the Weimar era. The policies of Bismarck can be seen as the origin of political fragmentation in Weimar, and therefore must be considered as factor in the ascent of Nazism. Yet it is certainly insufficient in providing the full picture, for although political fragmentation was of benefit to the Nazis, it was not this aspect that permitted them to emerge from the myriad of political factions. Other factors of greater magnitude allowed the Nazis to excel from a fringe party to the largest, most dominant movement in the country. This view is supported by historian Richard J. Evans who regards the policies of Bismarck as a contributory factor, but considers other aspects to be of far more decisive nature.
The factors previously deliberated were of historic kind, as they considered the impact of particular aspects of German history on the times of Weimar and the subsequent rise of Nazism. Yet as aforementioned these considerations, though important and valid, were of contributory sort, and second in rank to aspects of greater significance. The ascent of Nazism is frequently linked to the inadequacies of the Weimar Republic, namely its lack of legitimacy and failed policies. In regard to this, harsh criticism is often directed toward the constitution employed by the new Weimar government, yet in consideration of the historic context, the Weimar constitution was no outlier by any means, and although the reputed Article 48 is seen as a fatal flaw, it would not have been so under different circumstances. The lethal lack of legitimacy that accompanied this constitution was indeed what made the flaws of this document so problematic, and it was this that provided the radicals of the left and right with an ideal point of demagogic criticism in order to win support.
The three parties identified with new system were the SPD (Social Democrats), the Centre Party, and the liberal German Democratic Party, members of the so called “Weimar Coalition”. In combination these political organization constituted the bulwark of the Weimar Republic in 1919, as the only parties explicitly committing themselves to democracy, and were thus instrumental in the outlining of its structure. Unfortunately however the parties proved incompetent in maintaining their initial electoral support of 76.2 percent. The source of the coalition’s ostensible decline after 1919 varied between the organizations, as some experienced radical undercurrents in their own ranks thus rebuking their earlier democratic stance, and others simply succumbed to circumstances beyond their control. Yet overall the effect proved fatal as the very political foundation of the Republic lacked genuine commitment to democracy, consequently benefiting radical extremists, especially those operating from the right wing of the political spectrum advocating a return to authoritarian leadership and ardent nationalism.
The Social Democrats frequently propagated themselves as the true founders of the Weimar Republic, acting as the country’s largest party and delivering the nation’s first Reich President in the figure of Friedrich Ebert. Yet the SPD proved inapt in stemming the consternating increase of electoral votes for radically inclined parties such as the Nazis. This paralysis was due to several reasons yet one predominant cause may be discerned in rapport with the profundity of the SPD’s ideology. The Social Democrats remained obdurate in their adherence to the Marxist creed, retaining absolute believe in the inevitability of a proletariat revolution conjuring the collapse of the capitalist system. A party with these political principles and beliefs at its core, stood in diametrical opposition to the German socioeconomic reality of the 1920’s.Weimar Germany was most certainly infused by capitalist, free market orientated philosophy, and a clear bourgeois lifestyle, thus breeding a constantly prevalent dissatisfaction within the SPD, that regarded itself as the sole guardian of a system that stood in complete contradiction to its own ideological orientation. The result of this was that the SPD was reluctant to participate in the various coalitions of the Weimar years, entering a mere 8 out of 20 cabinets over the course of the years, despite representing the largest faction of deputies in parliament. This may be viewed as the Republics greatest indicator of illegitimacy. The fact that the nation’s largest political party is reluctant to fulfill a leading role, and deep at its core in fact resents democracy in its entirety speaks volumes about the impossibility of success that loomed ominously over the Republic even at its birth. Indeed some historians, such as William L. Shirer, argue that the sole reason why the SPD maintained a commitment to the Republic even until its demise in 1933 was to avert the possibility of permitting the rise of communism. They feared that if they overtly refuted democracy and employed their immense political weight against the Republic, they would be swept away in a storm of radical leftist revolution. Additionally, the SPD remained traumatized by the ruthless persecution of their ideology in the 1870’s and were thus committed to adhering to the legitimate governing institution of the time, which the Weimar Republic persisted to be until the 1930’s. As a result they were completely immobilized when they were faced by the success of parties that employed violence and illegality as means to fulfill their political ambitions. The SPD’s inability to act as the solid foundation for democracy illegitimated the Weimar Republic from its outset, and in turn provided a legitimate point of criticism for the radical right, that tacitly utilized the blatantly dysfunctional Republic, and its primary supported the SPD, as an embodiment of the flaws of democracy, underlining their appeal for an authoritarian, nationalistic leadership.
The second party of the founding political allegiance of 1919 was the catholically constituted Centre Party. Despite persisting as one of the Republics largest and most consistent parties, mainly due to the adherence of the Catholic community to this political institution, the Centre Party materialized as an unreliable supporter of Weimar. Naturally inclined toward conservatism due to its profound religious roots, the Centre Party succumbed to a perilous undercurrent of radical nationalism emanating from the papal authority in Rome, which drove a deep cleft between itself and the democracy of the Republic. The presence of socialistic and even communistic inclined sentiment in Weimar Germany worried the Pope, who feared that an ascent of the atheist adherent left would spell the demise of Catholicism in Germany. Therefore Rome increased its degree of interference in the political orientation of the Centre Party, directing it onto a radical course of nationalism, believing that only a strong, authoritarian government could mitigate the rise of a leftist revolution. Thus the Centre Party, though as aforementioned one of the largest parties, employed its political weight for an antidemocratic course, tolerating the Republic out of necessity rather than conviction, and thus actively contributing to its dysfunctional nature, its subsequent demise and the consequent rise of Nazism. In fact Richard J. Evans regards the Centre Party as a prime example of the key, underlying problem of Weimar. The Republic was led by parties who themselves discarded the concept of democracy and desired authoritarianism in its stead, thus essentially justifying and confirming the ideology of the Nazis.
The final arm of the “Weimar Coalition” was the German Democratic Party, whose ideology revolved around the concept of liberalism, advocating civil rights and freedoms as well as free enterprise economy. Naturally therefore the party catered primarily to the middle class bourgeoisie. A member of virtually every cabinet of the Republic, the party may be seen as a solid, and more importantly genuine, supporter of the Republic. Yet as a result of the rightward shift of middle class voters after 1924, the party substantially declined in its support and consequent representation in parliament. In response to this concerning development, the party decided to merge with a splinter group of the youth movement that had developed in the post war years and consisted mainly of young men who fanatically pursued the nostalgic myth of frontline comradeship and nationalistic sacrifice. The notion behind the merger was to construct a strong centrist block to counter the flow of middle class votes to the Nazis, yet it failed utterly as it was undermined by right wing radicalism that failed to differentiate itself in a beneficiary manner from the Nazis, and thus led to it being forced to the fringes of politics. As a result a party that had valiantly upheld the principles of democracy was equivalent in its inability to stem the flow of extremism in the form of the Nazis, as it was forced to adopt radical policies itself that inevitably distanced it from democracy and aided the ascent of the Nazis.
The incompetence of the political parties described in stemming the flow of radicalism and upholding the notion of democracy and freedom lay primarily in their own ideological ambiguity. These three central parties of the Weimar Republic that constituted the fortification of democracy and acted as its headlight were themselves ingenuous in their commitment to the Republic, some due to instilled ideological constraints, others out of necessity when faced with the possibility of political extinction. The radical extremists, most effectively the Nazis, identified this innate contradiction and were able to expose it to the electorate in the most explicit and demagogic fashion. The populate of Germany increasingly flocked to the Nazi party not least due to the fact that the Nazis were honest and frank in their proclamations. Why vote for a party that desires the very same thing, the end of democracy, as these Nazis do only indirectly and covertly? The political factors in the ascent of Nazism are momentous, and the most significant is certainly the illegitimacy of the democracy of Weimar, epitomized its main political factions, whose contradictory and equivocal approach to the Republic only accelerated and intensified the support for a party overtly hostile to the concept of democracy.
Despite the extensive deliberation lent to the analysis of political factors in regard to the ascent of Nazism, it is a factually established reality across human history that the specific economic situation of a state dictates the gradation of approval it receives from its population. The Weimar Republic was by no degree an exception to this historically proven fact that the economy is the foundation for political power and legitimacy. All previously considered factors would have been tolerable for the Weimar system if it had maintained a solid economic condition. The combined effects of hyperinflation and subsequent stabilization in the 1920’s, as well as the disastrous stock market crash of 1929 and ensuing depression rendered the German economy dysfunctional in its entirety, and permitted the Nazi Party to attain electoral successes that would otherwise have been inaccessible.
Throughout the course of the First World War, the German government relied upon borrowing to sustain its momentous war effort, and as a result state expenditure exceeded revenues through taxation or other means by 1916. Naturally the German nation foresaw a grand victory rewarded with rich annexations in both the East and West that would more than compensate the borrowed sums, a vision that appeared very likely indeed during the early years of the conflict. Yet these hopes were diminished by the military’s crushing defeat in 1918 and the German government was faced with the consequences of having printed money without the sufficient economic resources to support it. The product was rapid inflation, which was compounded by the fact that vast proportions of revenue were transferred abroad in the form of reparations as obligated by the Treaty of Versailles. Yet massive expenditure was required to adjust the economy to peacetime, and the government was thus forced to continue the process of printing money.
It is contended by some historians that the scale of inflation experienced by Germany in the early post war years was of benefit to the industrial recovery of the country. William L. Shirer argues that the ability to borrow money to purchase goods, equipment and more, and having to pay it back when it was worth a fraction of its original value aided the stimulation of the economy, as businesses were able to recover at a rapid rate. Indeed economic growth was high until 1922, with unemployment and taxation rates low, permitting Germany to succeed in its transition to peacetime more effectively than other European nations. However this point is heavily contested by historian Richard J. Evans, who argues that although the process of inflation in its early stages may have benefited business, the extent to which it developed over the next few years proved unbearable, and indeed this apparent recovery was unfounded, and was eventually reversed by the effects of hyperinflation. By December 1923 one US dollar was equivalent to 4,200,000,000,000 marks as the depreciation of the value of the German currency adopted astronomical proportions.
The consequences of the hyperinflation were momentous, and it is therefore regarded as a principal factor in the ascent of Nazism by many historians especially due its effect on the middle class. It is said that the process of hyperinflation ruined the economic prosperity of the middle class, who had largely invested in war bonds or other loans to the state and thus burdening huge losses. This subsequently catalyzed a rightward shift in the middle class, as they lost faith in the traditional bourgeois parties that had failed to avert the devastation of inflation in favor of their electorate. This point is strongly advocated by German historian Joachim Fest, who proclaims that the hyperinflation disillusioned the middle class with its conventional conservative approach, and transformed it into the prime target for Nazi propaganda. Indeed many middle class businessmen viewed the prewar era with immense nostalgia, desiring a return to the times where a strong authoritarian government maintained order by containing the labor movement, and generally pursuing a protectionist agenda for business. They perceived the occurrence of hyperinflation as a direct product of the Weimar Republic, honestly believing that such a calamitous economic state would be impossible under an authoritarian government. Evans does not entirely negate this view, conceding that several middle class families experienced financial ruin and corroborating the observation that investments in war bonds produced ruinous losses, yet he rightly underlines the fact that it is inaccurate to generalize the impact of inflation upon such a large and diverse group of society. It was primarily those who relied on a fixed income that were most severely affected, since the money they received as payment became essentially worthless, Evans argues. He goes on to outline that several middle class individuals benefited from the inflation, for instance through acquiring a property for virtually nothing after having borrowed a large sum of capital as a mortgage.
Through considering the notion presented by Evans the consequence of inflation most significant for the Nazis becomes evident. The coherence and harmony of the middle class was entirely disintegrated as winners and losers confronted each other across a deep chasm carved by the force of hyperinflation. The deep new social divides of the middle class led to the fragmentation of the parties that had represented this portion of society, rendering them immobile against visceral demagogy from the right. The Nazis tacitly exploited the middle class’s frustration and disillusionment with their conventional political roots and the Republic to their benefit, proclaiming that the policies of democracy had turned the world upside down, procuring first the war defeat, and then the economic turmoil. In addition, the hyperinflation permitted the Nazis to proliferate their harsh anti-Semitism, identifying those few who had marginally profited from the inflationary period as evil, manipulative Jews instigating the chaos as way of attaining personal wealth. An additional aspect of hyperinflation that was of immense significance to the Nazis in their attempt to proliferate their callous ideology, perhaps even more so than the fragmentation of the middle class, was the impact of the combined effects of inflation and stabilization upon Germany’s farming community.
As a natural consequence to the introduction of the new Reichsmark currency in 1924, deflation dictated the German economy in the mid 1920’s, as prices began to decline rapidly, forcing businesses to rationalize through cost cutting policies primarily in the form of wage cuts and labor force reductions. This resulted in wide spread discontent as unemployment figures rose rapidly and business became reluctant to bargain with unions to improve labor conditions and payment. The Nazi party employed their intuition to identify this as an opportunity to expand its electoral support into the working class milieu. Hitler consigned Goebbels to initiate a massive propaganda campaign in the industrial Northwest in an attempt to rally the working class away from their conventional, social democratic roots, by emphasizing the “socialist” aspect of the Nazi’s ideology. However by 1927 the party remained stagnant at approximately 75,000 members and a mere 7 deputies in parliament, clear evidence corroborating the fact that Hitler and Goebbels’s new drive into the industrial working class had been illusionary. The profundity of the social democratic and communist tradition amongst the urban working classes was simply too strong to allow the establishment of a new and rash ideology. Recognizing these difficulties, the party redirected its attention upon the rural society of the Protestant North where dissatisfaction amongst the peasantry was overtly present. The contradictory effects of inflation and stabilization had combined into an overreaching crisis of agriculture by the late 1920’s. While on the one hand large landowners and farmer had acquired machinery on hire purchase and thus modernized their production at relatively low cost, the peasants were inclined to save money and so lost it, or spent it on domestic goods, and so attained no benefit for their business. In addition the measures introduced by the government after the inflation to ease credit restrictions worsened the situation as peasants borrowed heavily in order to redeem their losses, expecting a return to inflation, and thus found themselves in a situation where they could not pay back their loans due to prices declining rather than rising as an effect of stabilization. Mass bankruptcies and foreclosures drove the peasantry to the right, as the Nazis promised to restore order, and initiate the redistribution of land from manipulative Jewish landowners to the farmers that were to constitute the strong base of the new Nazi state. Yet larger famers as well as the landowners were equally inclined to turn to the Nazis for support, as they were suffering heavily from the downturn in agricultural prices, and found themselves devoid of the capital required to pay what they perceived as excessive taxation to support the welfare state of the Republic. The Weimar government had attempted alleviate the situation through extensive subsidies, tariffs and import controls, yet their effect was insufficient, and soon the farmers and landowners were appealing for a higher import tariffs on foodstuffs as the only means of protecting their income. Not surprisingly therefore the policies propagated by the Nazi’s about introducing a nationalist, self-sufficient state wherein food imports would essentially be banned appeared highly attractive to the farming community as a whole. The support of the rural class regenerated the Nazi party and aided it in the continuance of its electoral success, substantially contributing to its overall success as the nation’s largest party with the rural community persisting as one of the parties most solid foundations. Indeed it was the first large portion of society that essentially committed itself to the Nazi cause, increasing its influence and reputation from beyond the confines of the South and into the rest of the country. Yet it was another economic factor that permitted the party to excel beyond its own expectations and to the pinnacle of German politics, fulfilling the ambitions of Hitler to unify the nation into an authoritarian, nationalist state.
Unemployment had already been at a relatively high level throughout the period of inflation and ensuing period of thorough stabilization, yet by the 1930’s these figures increased dramatically. The recovery of the German economy, in the form of extensive rationalization, from the devastating hyperinflation was financed to a large extent by heavy foreign investment, primarily from the USA. Crucially these investments were provided predominantly in the form of short term loans, and the German industry became heavily dependent upon such funds in its determination to modernize through mechanization. In addition German banks themselves relied upon foreign loans to substantiate their investments in German business, contributing to an economic situation that although experiencing high growth was highly geared and dependent upon factors beyond their direct control. Throughout the course of 1928 all industrialized nations began to impose monetary restrictions, anticipating a coming recession, and the USA proceeded by reducing its foreign lending, a necessity in the preservation of gold reserves, the basis of financial stability at the time of the Gold Standard. As a result there was effectively no industrial growth in Germany during the year of 1928-29, as foreign investment dropped dramatically, and the government confronted immense difficulties in attempting to raise capital through the issuance of bonds, due to a lack of faith in the independence of the German state by investors. It was evident that the Germany economy was at the brink, and in a situation of truly precarious nature. Disaster struck in the same year when on October 24th 1929 the business crisis overwhelmed the US stock exchange and swiftly spilled over it other nations across the world. American investors rapidly began withdrawing their funds from Germany, at a time when a sharp stimulus was of the utmost necessity, and the Weimar government had no choice but to take out more short term loans, destabilizing the economy and merely accelerating the process of capital drain from the country. Industrial output collapsed, dropping by 40% from its 1929 level by 1932. Businesses cut back in dramatic fashion, laying off workers and reducing wages to a pittance, while refusing to pay the taxes imposed to finance the welfare state.
The result of the Great Depression was unemployment on a superlative scale. By 1932 1 in every 3 workers was unemployed, and those who had managed to retain an occupation had their income slashed by up to 70%. Misery and discontent characterized the German populace of the early 1930’s, with millions of workers desperately searching for an alternative to the prevalent destitution. It is common view of many historians, including William Shirer, that the Great Depression boosted the Nazi party so immensely because it enabled the party to finally enter the vast urban worker milieu that had previously been unattainable. Though certainly Nazi support in the urban community rose throughout the great depression, it was not significant enough to justify the Nazis incredible advance during the period. Statistically the unemployed flocked into the ranks of the communists, shifting from the moderate socialist conception of the Social Democrats to the more radical ideology of the ardent Marxists. It was in fact the disillusionment of the middle class that enabled the Nazis to attain such an increase in support. Although the Nazis had courted members of the middle class bourgeoisie during the period of hyperinflation, these generally tended to be lower middle class families, which suffered severely under the effects of inflation. The more wealthy middle class, bordering and to an extent overlapping with the upper class, largely benefited from the inflation since they were primarily business and land owners who had cost effectively modernized their businesses or farms with the help of inflation and the rapid devaluation of capital, thus maintaining their allegiance to the conventional liberal bourgeois parties. Yet during the Great Depression this section of the middle class failed to elude the economic hardship as it had before, since white collar workers lost their jobs as banks and finance institutions confronted immense difficulties, and the retail, hospitality, and tourism industries of the service sector struggled due to the decline in customer purchase power.
Once more the Nazis party employed its intuitive quality to capitalize upon the demise of the Great Depression, and proselytize those portions of society that were most severely affected to adhere to their ideology. Hitler focused his energy upon business, and employed his propaganda apparatus to preach of a vision wherein business would be freed of the constraints placed upon it by the Republic in the form of welfare concessions and other taxes, a point that infuriated many businessmen who regarded the imposition of taxes to finance welfare by the Republic at a time of economic desperation as utterly incomprehensible. Thus the Nazi party managed to diversify its electorate so as to include wealthy businessmen and to an extent business elites who after the devastating consequences of the Great Depression regarded the root of devoted nationalism and totalitarianism as the only alternative. The economic situation of Weimar Germany, as deliberated, contributed immensely to the immense success of the Nazi party. The punishing consequences of the hyperinflationary and stabilization period combined with the traumatic collapse during the Great Depression alienated the higher middle class from the Republic and converted it to embrace Nazism. With the increased electoral support and crucial financial backing of business in Germany, the Nazi party excelled in its march to dominance, and attained its ambition of an authoritarian state with the help of the arbitrary economic circumstances of the time.
The study of the Nazi movement has produced myriad conclusions, perspectives and explanations, and perhaps there is no one approach that succeeds in combining all the relevant aspects and associated ramifications into one coherent synthesis. Yet from the considerations outlined above, ranging from historic to political and socioeconomic factors, it appears evident that though several aspects were significant and to an extent paved the way for later developments, it was the economic circumstances of the Weimar Republic that constituted its demise and subsequently enables the rise of Nazism. Without the combined destitution of inflation and depression, the political institutions of the time may have been able to stem the extremist sentiment procured by historic consequences. Yet the Weimar Republic was impotent in this respect, as it was confronted by insurmountable economic realities, and so permitted the eclectic ideology of Nazism to be forged from various in current elements of extremism, into one conformed conception that was able to effectively translate ideas into violent action, eventually toppling the nation of Germany into oblivion.
Works Used
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Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich. New York: Penguin, 2004. Print.
Fest, Joachim C. Hitler. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974. Print.
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Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. Print.
Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich; a History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Print.
Taylor, A. J. P. The Origins of the Second World War. New York: Atheneum, 1962. Print.
Winkler, Heinrich August. Weimar, 1918-1933: Die Geschichte Der Ersten Deutschen Demokratie. München: Beck, 1993. Print.
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lpaul1994 (student)
