Part C: Evaluation of Sources
Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002.
Diana Preston, who studied modern history at Oxford University, is a historian and the author of several books. She has written articles and reviewed books for numerous newspapers and magazines, including The Wall Street Journal, and is a broadcaster for the BBC. Preston’s purpose for writing this book was to reach a conclusion, after analyzing recently released German documents and other materials, about the motivations behind the sinking of the Lusitania and its worldwide ramifications. This source is valuable because it provides a very balanced, objective account of the events surrounding the attack on the Lusitania based on many primary sources, including interviews with survivors and previously-classified American, British, and German documents. Also, Preston uses extensive endnotes, making it simple to trace the basis for her claims back to the evidence. Additionally, one of the appendices focuses on the technical aspects of the sinking, which includes diagrams of the ship’s configuration and which refutes Britain’s initial claims that the Lusitania was not carrying any munitions. The only limitation is that only about one-fourth of the book focuses on the reasons behind the attack on the Lusitania, while the rest discusses the passengers on the ship, the attack itself, and its consequences.
Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972.
Colin Simpson was a British journalist and historian who became famous for his theory that the British were part of a conspiracy to sink the Lusitania. After extensive searches on the Internet, no other information on Simpson could be found, though many other prestigious historians refer to him in their works. Simpson’s purpose for writing this book was to advance his assertion that Churchill purposely instigated and enabled Germany to sink the Lusitania in order to bring America into the war on the Allied side. This source is valuable because, not only does it express a unique viewpoint, but it bases its conclusions on evidence taken from primary sources. For example, Simpson quotes from one of Richard Webb’s (head of the Trade Division of the Admiralty) memos in which he claimed that Captain William Turner (of the Lusitania) had been “inviting disaster” in order to illustrate Webb’s blatant lies and attempts to place the blame away from the Admiralty. Simpson also includes many maps, illustrations, and diagrams in order to clarify his points, such as the map of St. George’s Channel, which shows how the U-20 had approached the Lusitania. However, this book has many limitations, primarily because of Simpson’s blatant bias in favor of his conspiracy theory. In some cases, Simpson tends to interpret ambiguous sources in ways that support his thesis but that may not be accurate. For example, Churchill states in his autobiography that “the maneuver which gains an important strategic point may be less valuable than that which placates or overawes a dangerous neutral,” a statement which Simpson interprets as a clear indication of Churchill’s desires to do anything in order to bring America into the war as a British ally. Another limitation is that the book was written in 1972, so the materials may be outdated, and many historians have since then attempted to discredit Simpson’s thesis.
Part D: Analysis
While one can conclude that Germany sank the Lusitania in an attempt to enforce the unrestricted submarine warfare policy, it would be difficult to assert that the British had played as large a role in the conspiracy to sink the ship as Colin Simpson would claim. In response to Simpson’s conspiracy theory, Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan published a book that attempted to discredit Simpson’s argument. Bailey and Ryan asserted that the Lusitania was attacked because of Captain Turner’s negligence and because of excessive German aggression, not because of a plot by the British. However, some of Bailey’s other arguments are founded on more flimsy evidence. For example, Bailey asserted that the Lusitania “was not being used as a warship,” but he never provided any source as to where he obtained this information. Much more evidence supports the theory that the British were involved in some way with the sinking of the Lusitania, though their degree of involvement is probably not as extreme as Simpson asserted. For example, Churchill’s order for a report predicting the effect on other nations of an attack on a passenger ship is irrefutable, and as was his deliberately antagonistic arming of British merchant ships; Churchill was certainly desperate for any advantage that could be brought to the Allied side.
Nevertheless, the British cannot be fully blamed for the sinking of the Lusitania since a great deal of evidence indicates that Germany was already planning on sinking ships carrying munitions into Britain. Germany needed to deter neutral countries from sending military aid to the Allies, to demonstrate their naval power, and to impose a blockade around Britain that would prevent her from receiving illegal aid. Establishing a war zone around the British Isles, with unrestricted submarine warfare, could achieve these goals, and sinking the Lusitania would demonstrate their ability and willingness to enforce it. Even without Churchill’s questionable actions (i.e. telling passenger ships to arm themselves and ram submarines), the Germans clearly intended to sink the Lusitania, as demonstrated by their warning published in newspapers, stating that “travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk”. Furthermore, the Germans directly responsible for the sinking, Captain Schwieger and Hermann Bauer (commander of the U-20 and two other submarines), both believed that attacking passenger ships, even unmarked and potentially neutral ones, was acceptable in the war zone. Therefore, the British played only a minor role in the sinking of the Lusitania; German political and military motivations were the primary factors.
Part E: Conclusion
Like in most military and government decisions, a multitude of factors combined to cause the Germans to sink the Lusitania. However, the British were not primarily responsible for the attack; their actions simply enabled the attack to occur. Britain may have played a part in instigating Germany, but ultimately German motivations would cause the sinking. Churchill’s actions ensured the attack’s success by making the Lusitania an easy target; he did not directly cause her to be attacked in the first place. Ultimately, the sinking of the Lusitania brought the Americans one step closer to war; the United States’ declaration of war on Germany on April 6, 1917 would change the outcome of the war and affect international relations dramatically.
Preston’s book was more valuable to this investigation than Simpson’s book because her book showed a more balanced, objective viewpoint and was based on more reliable sources. Simpson tended to be biased and made some of his claims based on questionable evidence.
Part F: Source List
Primary Sources
Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis. Revised Edition. London, 1931, as cited in Simpson.
Fisher, Lord John A. Memories and Records. Volume 2. New York, 1920, as cited in Simpson.
Gerard, J.W. My Four Years in Germany. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1927, as cited in Preston.
Webb memorandum in Lord Mersey’s papers, duplicated in P.R.O., ADM / 137 / 1058, as cited in Simpson.
Secondary Sources
Bailey, Thomas A., and Ryan, Paul B. The Lusitania Disaster: The Real Answer Behind the World’s Most Controversial Sea Tragedy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975.
Ballard, Robert D. Exploring the Lusitania: Probing the Mysteries of the Sinking that Changed History. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1995.
Coffey, Michael. Days of Infamy: Military Blunders of the 20th Century. New York: Nugus/Martin Productions Limited, 1999.
Gibson, R.H. The German Submarine War, 1914-1918. London: Constable, 1931
Pickford, Nigel. Lost Treasure Ships of the Twentieth Century. London: Pavilion Books Limited, 1999.
Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002.
Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972.
Ballard, Robert D. Exploring the Lusitania: Probing the Mysteries of the Sinking that Changed History. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1995, Page 20.
Ballard, Robert D. Exploring the Lusitania: Probing the Mysteries of the Sinking that Changed History. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1995, Page 13.
Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Pages 32-33.
Pickford, Nigel. Lost Treasure Ships of the Twentieth Century. London: Pavilion Books Limited, 1999, Page 65.
Many German submariners believed that “as England completely disregards international law, there is not the least reason why we should exercise restraint.” Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 67; Gibson, R.H. The German Submarine War, 1914-1918. London: Constable, 1931, Page 26.
Coffey, Michael. Days of Infamy: Military Blunders of the 20th Century. New York: Nugus/Martin Productions Limited, 1999, Page 23.
Official German communications mentioned “heavy artillery fire in certain sections of the Western front, mostly with American ammunition” and that “captured French artillery officers say that they have great stores of American ammunition.” Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 81; Gerard, J.W. My Four Years in Germany. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1927, Page 159, as cited in Preston.
Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Pages 87-88.
Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 170.
Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 91.
Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 160-162.
The Cruiser Rules stated that unarmed ships could be stopped and the crew could be allowed to disembark before the ship was captured or destroyed. However, armed ships could be attacked without warning. Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Pages 32-33.
On May 20, 1915, Vice Admiral Oliver (Chief of the Naval War Staff) stated, “It also frequently happens that the ship has sailed before it is known [at the Admiralty] that troops or valuable government warlike stores are on board.” Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 69; Fisher, Lord John A. Memories and Records. Volume 2. New York, 1920, Page 215, as cited in Simpson.
Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 36.
Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 35; Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis. Revised Edition. London, 1931, Page 298, as cited in Simpson.
Preston states that she wanted to “provide a fresh perspective on why some acted as they did and how their actions and decisions influenced not only the fate of the Lusitania but, as a consequence, the outcome of the First World War and the conduct of warfare in general.” Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 5.
Preston includes many direct quotes from survivors, particularly in Chapter 14 (entitled “My God, We Are Lost”) in which she recounts the actual attack on the Lusitania. For example, many survivors commented on seeing the torpedo speeding towards the ship underwater. Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Pages 189-200.
Appendix B, entitled “A Technical Account of the Sinking.” Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Pages 441-454.
Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Pages 35-36.
Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 185; The Webb memorandum in Lord Mersey’s papers, duplicated in P.R.O., ADM / 137 / 1058, as cited in Simpson.
Another example is the diagram showing what cargo the ship was carrying on its last voyage and where the cargo was placed in the ship’s interior. Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Pages 135 and 104.
For example, the Admiralty War Diary documents Lord Fisher (Admiral of the Fleet) and Churchill’s discussion of the Lusitania’s arranged escort ship. The diary stops abruptly after the escort ship’s futility against submarine attack was discussed, which Simpson claims clearly indicates Churchill and Fisher’s desires to mask their decision of withdrawing the Lusitania’s escort. Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 130.
Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 35.
Bailey claimed that “Captain Turner had deliberately violated five of his top-secret instructions,” quoting one of Captain Webb’s memorandums to show that the Admiralty was blameless; Webb believed that “not only had [the Lusitania’s] course leaked out but that ‘misleading directions’ had been sent to the liner while en route ‘in [the British] code.” The five instructions were “high speed, zigzagging, a mid-channel course, avoiding headlands, and shunning approaches to harbors.” Bailey, Thomas A., and Ryan, Paul B. The Lusitania Disaster: The Real Answer Behind the World’s Most Controversial Sea Tragedy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, Page 179.
Bailey, Thomas A., and Ryan, Paul B. The Lusitania Disaster: The Real Answer Behind the World’s Most Controversial Sea Tragedy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, Page 178.
In his autobiography, Churchill stated, “The first British countermove, made on my responsibility … was to deter the Germans from surface attack. The submerged U-boat had to rely increasingly on underwater attack and thus ran the greater risk of mistaking neutral for British ships and of drowning neutral crews and thus embroiling Germany with other Great Powers.” Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 36; Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis. Revised Edition. London, 1931, Pages 724-725, as cited in Simpson.
Bailey, Thomas A., and Ryan, Paul B. The Lusitania Disaster: The Real Answer Behind the World’s Most Controversial Sea Tragedy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, Page 30.
Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 67.
Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 73.
Ballard, Robert D. Exploring the Lusitania: Probing the Mysteries of the Sinking that Changed History. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1995, Page 31.
When U-boat captains were told not to sink neutral ships, Bauer angrily expressed that “his U-boats should not be put at risk because of political wavering and that his captains must have some freedom to act.” Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 149.
