Thus, most of the opposition that came from the population was passive. Research has demonstrated that a significant degree of dissatisfaction and discontent survived in Germany against Nazi rule, especially after the outbreak of war. Martin Broszat, exposed a number of everyday defiance arising from irritation and anger at the regime such as the refusal to give the “Heil Hitler” greeting. This non-Nazi behaviour shows the lack of enthusiasm from some groups of the population towards the Nazi regime. As well, several thousand Jews managed to survive Hitler’s rule with assistance from Aryan Germans who, even in the city of Berlin, were able to help them. Priests, trying to defend the power and identity of the church that was being threatened by Hitler, also followed passive opposition by publicly displaying their discontent and criticizing the Nazi’s extreme policies. The Church also served as the youth’s escape from having to enter Hitler’s Youth as parents sent their children to church in order to stop them from being part of this group. Furthermore, several Germans went against the regime’s control by listening to foreign radio, which was forbidden by Nazi norms. Others had anti-Nazi ideas and questioned the regime’s extreme policy but because of the fear imposed by the Gestapo they were unable to organize a strong opposition.
Opposition to Hitler was thus, more passive than active. This was because, as previously mentioned, not many members of the population were prepared to rise against the Nazi regime and face the terror of being brutally punished or sent to a Concentration Camp. By 1939 for example, 100,000 Germans had seen the interior of a Concentration Camp and were not prepared to face the risk of going back. Consequently, because they were not able to an organized active opposition prepared to challenge the Nazi regime, the achievements of those who bravely stood up were insignificant when compared to the strength of the Nazis. In short, opposition of this kind could only have little impact upon the policies and the overall control of the Nazi regime. For instance, the rising of leading generals following the Stauffenberg Plot was immediately stopped with the arrest and execution of many leading generals and high-ranking civilians, shows that even in 1944, at the verge of defeat, the Nazi rule still maintained a strong grip over domestic opponents. A popular rising was therefore impossible, not only because of fear of the Gestapo, but also because of the establishment of a One Party State following a law that stated that anyone who tried to set up another party would be punished. To make sure the law was followed Hitler had already taken care of all opposing political parties by forcing the small parties out of existence, arresting the communists and making the SPD and KPD illegal parties. Also, he instigated fear by arresting 150000 supporters of these two last parties, forcing 40000 into exile and convicting 12,000 of high treason. By taking these violent measures, Hitler made sure that no German would dare form another political party. Therefore, Hitler destroyed all organized opposition starting by dissolving political parties and afterwards he smashed trade unions and local government. Historians Burleigh and Bullock emphasize the repressive nature of the regime and how there was so little opposition, or at least active opposition, due to fear. However, the support during the first years of the Nazi regime, as Gellately stresses, was based on consensus and not coercion. 90% of the population was in favour of the Nazis showing the strong support for the regime. Kershaw, thus, describes the resistance as a “Resistance without people”. Support for the regime came from the domestic successes the Nazis had achieved such as the fall in unemployment and economic growth; the “economic miracle”; and the foreign successes such as the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss and the conquering of Czechoslovakia that helped to undo the Treaty of Versailles; a matter of great disturbance within the German population. The majority of Germans supported Nazi policies and were willing to accuse their neighbours to the Gestapo. In fact, the Gestapo system relied on denunciations to operate as there were not enough agents to control the whole of the population. Germans truly believed “the Führer Myth” and regarded Hitler as the new messiah and the only hope for Germany. He was seen as a superhuman and was even regarded as the one responsible for good weather at the Nüremberg rally; “Führer weather”. His strong gaze inspired awe amongst his listeners who were convinced the Führer was looking directly into their eyes. Devotion for Hitler was such that in 1944 the telephone girls cried over rumours of Hitler’s murder. Goebbel’s slogan “Hitler is victory itself” was believed by millions of ordinary Germans and not just Nazi fanatics. Even after the display of violence and racism during the “Night of Broken Glass”, were the windows of stores of many Jews were broken, synagogues were destroyed and 800 Jews died, Germans who believed this had been a wrong action still supported Hitler as there was a large consensus in his favour. Furthermore, a rising amongst Hitler’s leading circle also seemed unlikely as Hitler was the undisputed leader and they were all loyal to him. The only one who could challenge Hitler’s power was Röhm, the leader of the thousands of S.A agents but after his murder in 1934 during the “Night of Long Knives” any possibility of opposition disappeared. Organized opposition from the army could have been conceivable but after Hitler’s indisputable foreign successes and Chamberlain’s surrender at Munich, Hitler’s position as Führer was guaranteed and it was impossible for the army to go against a national hero. Thus, his foreign triumphs secured a strong hold over the generals. Even in 1944, during the last stages of war, when any rational person could have realised that the war was lost, faith in Hitler remained. In fact, when the evils of the Nazi regime were exposed faith in Hitler continued for many and one German even maintained: “In him I still believe”.
However, although faith in the Führer remained for many, groups of the German population started questioning the Nazi regime once Nazi policies became more radical and as military defeat became increasingly likely. At this stage, active opposition from generals, such as the attempt to assassinate Hitler at Rastenburg in July 1944, started to occur. Nonetheless, Nazi measures became more aggressive and, as Gellately stresses, the policy of consensus was changed to a policy of repression and coercion managing to hold any attempt of opposition. There were mass arrests, summary executions of civilians who opposed the regime and after the Stauffenberg Plot 5000 were killed and 7000 were arrested. Furthermore, as defeat came nearer Germans who still had some faith in the Führer held stronger to their leader as they feared what would happen if they were defeated. Goebbels had persuaded the people that if the Russians won they would summit the people to their regime. Thus, people believed in their Führer to get them out of the war victorious. He was responsible for getting them in the war and now he was the only who one who could get them out. Kershaw blames the failure of German resistance to Nazism on the “strife-torn political climate of the Weimar Republic” and the “massive popular readiness to embrace authoritarianism”. While the resistance lacked support, the dictatorship’s strength relied on consensus.
In conclusion, because the nature of opposition to Hitler was basically passive, with a few exceptions of personal bravery, it provided no threat to the policies of the Third Reich in any significant way. This was also due to their failure of creating an organized opposition as well as to Hitler’s magnetism and successes which provided him with the strength his regime needed. The policy of coercion followed by the Gestapo was also a main contributor to the failure of the opposition as any attempt of resistance was subsequently followed by a strong action of the Gestapo agents who executed and arrested any possible revolutionary. Nonetheless, what the resistance mainly lacked was popular support to operate and strength to succeed; two factors Hitler’s dictatorship controlled.
