The period 1929-1934 saw a rotation in Stalinist foreign policy; this was due to Soviet aims of reviving trade relations and securing some much needed foreign capital. During these five years, the economic mutual cooperation that was Stalin’s main objective developed between the two states of Russia and Germany, with the latter providing her neighbour with the loans and heavy industrial goods she sorely needed. In return, Russia provided Germany with payment for imports and realised German military aims by supplying both manufacturing facilities and the opportunity for the German army to train and experiment with weapons that was forbidden by the treaty of Versailles. Another important motivation for this mutual cooperation was the diplomatic advantages it would bring to both countries; for Germany, a strengthened bargaining position with Britain and France, and for Russia a subsidence of Stalin’s fears of isolated Russia facing a combined Capitalist front. During this period, Stalin both achieved his 1929 aims, with 47% of total Russian imports coming from Germany by 1932, and even a trade agreement with fledgling Nazi Germany in 1934, and yet undermined their success through his lack of foresight. Stalin destroyed the hope for further cooperation between the two countries into and beyond the late 1930s through his failure to see the danger to Russia posed by Hitler. His dangerously naive outlook can be seen from the Leader’s assumption that ‘they’ll be so preoccupied with the west that we’ll be able to build up socialism in peace’, despite Hitler previously publishing in Mein Kampf his opinion on his neighbour’s politics; ‘Bolshevism is the arch enemy of Civilisation’. The fact that Stalin’s instruction of the German Communists through the Comintern prevented them from forming a coalition with the ‘social fascists’ despite the Social Democrats being one of the biggest parties in Weimar, and instead focusing its efforts on desecrating their name, paved the way for Hitler to rise to power. ‘Stalin and his associates had a pragmatic interest in ending their international isolation’ according to Service; yet crucially what they lacked was the logical insight to see Nazi Germany as a threat to the mutual cooperation between Russia and Germany, which reached its peak in 1932 but was abruptly ended by Hitler in 1934. Once again facing political isolation and now the threat of animosity from two fronts thanks to the increasing strength and military aggression from Japan, Stalin once again plunged headfirst into a wholly dissimilar foreign policy in pursuit of alliances with Allied powers.
Stalin, although with the same foreign policy aims of gaining security and trade relations to further industrial development, dramatically changed the way in which he went about achieving them with the formation of a Popular Front from 1934-37. From previously flaunting the conditions of Versailles by making available land and resources for the German army to train and experiment, ‘the USSR switched from being a Revisionist state to one committed to upholding the Versailles treaty’ according to Chris Ward. This type of about-turn movement characterised Stalin’s ability to ‘bend like a reed’ according to Stephen Lee in order to secure what he thought necessary for Soviet Russia; in order to please his new prospective allies, the ever-flexible Stalin even ordered a reversal in the formerly stringent policies of the Comintern in August 1935. By 1937, it seemed to Stalin that the pro-Allied attitude of his foreign minister Litvinov was having a positive effect as 1934 saw USSR’s entry into the League of Nations and pacts in 1935 with France and Czechoslovakia effectively achieved the aims of Russian foreign policy, on paper. With the formation of an Anti-Comintern pact involving Germany, Japan and Italy also by 1937, a potential war on two fronts loomed before Russia. Their treaty obligations with France and Czechoslovakia therefore assumed significant importance for their national security, because, as Litvinov orated, ‘what other guarantees of security are there?’ This period marked the change in Russian international attitude as it became more and more dependent on the success of collective security whilst simultaneously becoming acutely aware of its vulnerability from attacks on both borders through the strengthened relationship between Germany and Japan. Furthermore, Russia’s unfaltering attitude towards upholding the popular front was not shared by Britain and France, who demonstrated a worrying lack of commitment to collective security through their continued appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini. As the impending threat of WWII cast a shadow over Russia, the possibility that once again Stalin’s supposed Allies had little interest in supporting him threatened in practice to undermine his documentary allegiance.
By 1938, Stalin’s foreign policy still had the same paradox at its heart; a seemingly simple wish for security that in practice was almost impossible to obtain. Through pursuit of the popular front, Stalin appeared to be a step closer to securing allies and protecting Russia, yet the Czechoslovakian crisis highlighted the lack of commitment to the policy of collective security on the part of Britain and France. As Russia was prevented by Poland from fulfilling its treaty obligations to the invaded country, ‘the west shed all pretence of supporting collective security,’ according to Ward. After Russia was excluded from the Munich Conference despite her allegiance with Czechoslovakia, Stalin began to view collective security as ‘a capitalist plot to push Russia into conflict with Germany and Japan’ in the words of Ward. This was largely due to the attitude of Britain preventing Russian foreign policy from advancing; according to Ward, Britain was ‘profoundly anti-Communist, deeply suspicious of Moscow’s intentions and sympathetic to Germany’s plight’. The Soviet State was also poorly regarded in parts of western thinking, in some cases making Hitler preferential to Stalin, seeing ‘the Third Reich as a barrier against Communism’. This thinking was accepted as truth by the British government as multiple attempts for alliance were proposed by Litvinov to Allied Powers, each rejected, and after the proposed Triple Alliance, based around the victorious Triple Entente of WWI, was rejected by Britain and France, Stalin judged Litvinov’s policy of securing western allies to have failed and the foreign minister became increasingly isolated from the Politburo. Russia found herself in the dawn of 1939 desperate to avoid bearing the brunt of fighting in the now inevitable European war, and, facing increasing intimidation from German and Japanese actions; this prompted Stalin to declare that ‘we do not by any means think it necessary to renounce business dealings with…Germany and Italy’ before sending new foreign minister Molotov to negotiate a treaty that defined Russian foreign policy as completely unpredictable.
A month before WWII broke out, Russia’s foreign policy once again swung back in favour of German cooperation in order to secure their elusive dream ‘to keep out of a European war’ according to PMH Bell. However, the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was a very different settlement to previous Russo-German agreements. According to Service, ‘if there was ever proof that Stalin was willing to take risks, the Nazi-Soviet Pact provided it’; however, it was more the fact that Stalin had no other alliance to pursue after a decade of negotiations with all progress made being quickly reversed. According to Ward, ‘by summer 1939 Stalin’s options had virtually disappeared’; Nazi Germany was his last option, and Russia needed an ally. The secret protocol included in the Pact was especially favourable to Russia who stood to gain territory as well as her fears of a war on two fronts to subside. However, because the Pact was instigated by Hitler, who had previously wanted nothing to do with Bolshevism, it was clear the Fuhrer had an agenda beyond simply the accumulation of Poland. Stalin’s attitude regarding the negotiations did not reflect this fact however, and another example of his naïve outlook was the assumption that ‘it is I who have outsmarted he!’ in 1939. Therefore although the Nazi-Soviet Pact was initially viewed by Russia as the biggest achievement in Soviet foreign policy, it was in reality what lured Russia into a false sense of security, possibly the most dangerous of all situations to be in at the outbreak of World War.
Stalin declared at the sixteenth party congress early in his governance that ‘USSR would never be swayed by foreign power…but would always base her foreign policy on self interest’. By 1941 it was apparent that although all foreign policy aims had been pursued purely in the interests of Soviet Russia, it had not been independent of the influence of foreign power but rather wholly decided by it, and the elasticity of Stalin with ‘the power to divide and subdivide himself…depending on circumstances’ according to Service which facilitated this. An alliance was needed by Russia in order to sustain Socialism In One Country, yet to whom and on what conditions was determined by stronger countries, namely Britain and Germany. Stalin himself was too naïve in international politics, in which he only ‘took a sporadic interest’ according to Haslam, to pay close attention to the possible ramifications of the rapidly vacillating foreign policy decisions, decisions that highlighted his indifference as to whom Russia’s ally was as long as there was one, which in turn discouraged countries from negotiating with such an unscrupulous state. Instead, Stalin met his match in Hitler; the European alliance that should have secured Russia instead left it exposed and without anticipation of attack. What should have been the greatest achievement of foreign policy was without a doubt its greatest failure, and Stalin, in the words of Churchill, was ‘the most completely outwitted bungler of the Second World War’.
Ciara Lally
09.05.2010
by
peterealdoc2 (student)
