WHy did Russian Install missiles in Cuba

On October 14th, 1962, a lone U-2 under Air Force command photographed evidence which corroborated McCone’s theory displaying that the Soviets were in face placing medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Once this discovery was made, the CIA and the entire intelligence community provided the President and his innermost circle of advisors with up-to-date intelligence. President Kennedy’s response to these reports consisted of a series of severe warnings dispatched to Moscow. On September 4th, he declared that the “gravest issues” would surface if the United States obtained evidence of “offensive ground-to ground missiles or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance.” A week later, the Soviet government issued an official statement in response to Kennedy’s warnings. Though refraining from promising to inhibit the introduction of surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba, the intent to do so was communicated within the statement in their

denial of the need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons to Cuba to defend it. The Soviet position, reiterated on October 13, was therefore that their government had no intention of putting such missiles in Cuba. 

Moscow had decided to install these missiles in Cuba sometime in June, their objective being to secure the inaction of the Kennedy administration until the missiles were deployed. Their exact motives however underlying their actions which would provoke a major confrontation with the United States form the foundation for several hypotheses regarding their decision-making.  The traditionalists of the Kennedy Administration provide six of these plausible hypotheses. These hypotheses rationalize that the Soviets sought to test American determination and will, to strengthen their bargaining position on Berlin, Khrushchev and his associates sought to defend  Cuba from an American attack while simultaneously extending the Communist influence in the Western Hemisphere,  to compensate for the missile gap, the Soviets sought to reassert their authority and prestige as the leader in international communism, and Khrushchev sought to divert attention away from a host of Soviet domestic problems.  These hypotheses formed mainly from Western perspectives initiated The Cambridge Conference held at Harvard on October 11-12, 1987 which considered non-Western perspectives. Some of the Soviet views regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis are that the Soviets deeply believed in a repetition of the events following the Bay of Pigs in which Cuba was attacked, the missiles were

emplaced in Cuba for defense of the Castro regime, but simultaneously as an impetus for strategic parity, that the Missile Crisis was the result of adventurism on the part of the Soviets, and that according to Mikoyan 42, 000 troops were in Cuba to defend it against an American invasion. (Word Count: 693)

C. Evaluation of Sources

The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly written by Richard Ned Lebow, a professor of government at Cornell University, in the fall of 1983 is a scholarly providing analytical perspective supported by historical fact explaining why the Soviets emplaced missiles in Cuba. The purpose of the document is to correct the hypotheses of theoreticians about the Crisis decision making and examine the validity of their hypothesis regarding Soviet Policy in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The document’s value is that it evaluates a variety of hypotheses formed by various theoreticians, and is therefore not limited strictly to personal opinion and considers varied viewpoints. The article is limited in that it is geared towards a certain aim as it seeks to correct other theoreticians whom the author deems have misinterpreted the Soviet Policy in the Cuban Missile Crisis, hence the document’s title “Reading the Lessons Correctly”. The author does not side with the analysts but seems rather to condemn them in that they “deny irrationality in decision making and that their interpretations tell them as much about themselves as they do about the historical figures involved”. In addition, the document is limited also because it does not offer as much historical information, devoting a mere three pages to it as it does for the analytical component.

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While The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly provides solely views of scholars with regards to the instalment of missiles in Cuba, The Cuban Missile Crisis: Evolving Historical Perspectives an article by William Medland published in The History Teacher is designed to “present a synthesis of the views of the participants and a synthesis of the counterviews of some scholars.” The article is valuable in that it provides not only a scholarly perspective on the aforementioned issue but also the views of the figures directly involved in the issue, thereby allowing the reader to compare the two so as to determine the validity of the statements presented and also allow the reader to view personal first-hand accounts of the crisis, so as to better understand the logic, reasoning and view the thinking of the figures involved. However, the article is limited in that it is restricted to examining solely “four critical areas of conflicting interpretations” despite the fact that there remain several issues with differing interpretations. In addition, the article does not provide sufficient background on the Crisis so that the reader can understand the foundation of the hypotheses. (Word Count: 405)

D. Analysis

By the time U.S. President Kennedy had become aware in the fall of 1962, that the Soviets were secretly assembling missiles in Cuba, the missiles had already been in place since June. The decision of the Soviets to emplace missiles in Cuba appeared justifiable at the time, but once the ramifications of their actions were fully realized, the rationality of their decision became questionable. Their actions may be justified or further condemned as the reason behind why they installed missiles in Cuba is taken into consideration.

Khrushchev and the inner circle of Soviet policy makers were well aware of the consequences that would ensue if the missiles in Cuba were discovered. Though, it would

certainly stimulate a crisis with the U.S., the Soviets nevertheless ran the risk as they believed that it would produce significant political and strategic gains provided that the missiles remained undiscovered until they were in full operation. The missiles in Cuba could be used as in instrument of negotiation in the Soviet’s favour as their demands could be met in exchange for the removal of the missiles. (Lebow 435) Such demands included the altering of the German Peace Treaty which would prohibit nuclear weapons for Bonn, a nuclear free zone in the Pacific, a pledge from China to cease the production of atomic weapons and the U.S. abandonment of their protection from Formosa. In doing this, the German problem would be resolved, China’s nuclear threat removed, and allow for the possibility of a Soviet-American Disarmament treaty. (Lebow 435).

Khrushchev’s decision to install missiles in Cuba could also be viewed as rational if the possibility of a U.S. invasion on Cuba was taken into consideration. He claimed that his government had information that the U.S. was planning another assault on Cuba, (a repeat of the attack on Cuba after the Bay of Pigs) and that it was necessary that missiles be installed in Cuba to prevent an aggression against her and protect the Castro regime, by forcing the U.S. into a non-aggression pledge. (Lebow 436)  The failure at the Bay of Pigs for which Kennedy assumed complete responsibility had fuelled his inability to deal with Castro and his anger and frustration at Castro’s strength. (Lebow 443). As a result Kennedy made Cuba the central issue of the 1962 campaign, thereby making it reasonable for the Soviets to assume that the U.S. was planning in revenger another attack on Cuba that would hopefully be successful this time.

It can also be said that Khrushchev emplaced missiles in Cuba in order to resolve the disparity between the power and number of Soviet and U.S. weapons. (Medland 434). The Soviets were fully cognizant of the fact that the U.S. had finer and more numerous missiles, thereby meaning that they were losing the arms race. U.S. missiles had the upper hand as they had as they maintained a “first-strike” capability giving them the ability to strike anywhere in Russia. (Lebow 453). The U.S was further strengthened militarily as a result of an agreement they had made with Turkey permitting the establishment of a missile base. (Medland 436). Consequently, these circumstances gave Khrushchev the feeling of being entrapped by American military threat. In order to level the perceived disparity in arms, Soviet missiles were emplaced in Cuba within ninety miles of the U.S. border thereby also equipping them with a first-strike capability.  (Word Count: 546)

E. Conclusion

It is evident that the reasons why the Soviets emplaced missiles in Cuba were founded on rational decision making that was perceived to coincide with the interests of the Soviet nation and their political interests. The Soviets were firm in their belief that though the emplacement of missiles in Cuba would possibly ignite a confrontation with the U.S., the gains far outweighed and justified the risks. The missiles could be used as bargaining tool for which synchronously the German problem, the China problem and the Soviet military inferiority could be solved in exchange for the removal of the missiles. In addition, the missiles would serve as a means of protecting Cuba from a highly anticipated U.S. aggression while simultaneously defending the Castro regime and resolving the apparent disparity in the power and numbers of the arms of the Soviet and the U.S. thereby relieving them of American military threat. Though there exist conflicting ideas about the basis for Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba, these theories offer the best speculations and answers to why the Soviets installed missiles in Cuba.

(Word Count: 180)

F. List of Sources

Works Cited

Lebow, Richard Ned. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly.” Political

        Science Quarterly 98.3 (1983): 431-58. Print.

Medland, William J. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Evolving Historical Perspectives.” The History

        Teacher 23.4 (1990): 433-47. Print.

Miller, Linda K., and Mary McAuliffe. "The Cuban Missile Crisis." OAH Magazine of History 

        8.2 (1994): 24-41. Print.

Works Consulted

Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: A First Cut." Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York ˜[u.a.]œ: Longman, 2010. 80-200. Print.

Garthoff, Raymond L. "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story." Foreign Policy 72 (1988): 61-80. Print.

Gonzalez, Servando. "Khrushchev's Lies." The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Oakland, CA: Spooks, 2002. 29-39. Print.

Pollard, Robert A. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Legacies and Lessons." The Wilson Quarterly 6.4 (1982): 148-58. Print.

Scott, L. V. "Khrushchev's Motives." Macmillan, Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military, and Intelligence Aspects. New York: St. Martin's, 1999. 61-69. Print.

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