Why did the USSR enter into an alliance with Germany in 1939

 The text must have been heavily impacted by the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, which made it apparent that the British policy of appeasement was obsolete. Hitler had finally progressed to imposing his dominion on to a non-Germanic people, which created fear amongst the western countries and would explain why the issue of allying himself with Stalin, was on Chamberlains mind.

It seems probable that Chamberlain, wrote this entry as more then just a mere personal reflection. Evidence that insinuates this is the occurrence of the word “our” in the segment, which proposes that the text is meant for an audience. Another factor implying this theories validity, is that the supposedly personal note is structured in manner similar to that of an argument. Chamberlain's awareness of public access to his writing, may have led him to contemplate a spinned view of actual thoughts, seeing as his previous disdain for communism may have led some to believe his fear was irrational. This text implies that he had genuine fears of the lack of competence and military strength of the soviet government. A supposedly rational notion, which presents a paradox, as his past foreign policy has been consumed by fears of a communist spread in eastern Europe, which would in fact imply grand military competence.

The main brick of knowledge that can be gained from this entry is that it puts a spotlight on the reluctance of the British to enter an alliance with Russia, and it gives some suggestion to why. However this source limits itself, in value, as it was written purposefully with the intent of being public access, using powerful pathos concepts which resemble propaganda such as “our ideas of freedom”.  

The secret protocol of the 23rd of August,1939:

The secret protocol was a part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that wasn't publicized initially and it entailed a plan for dividing up the eastern European territories outside of the USSR, between Stalin and Hitler. The source is a photograph of a copy of the original agreement signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop, the respective Secretaries of Foreign Affairs for the USSR and Germany, and it helps to explain the possible gains of Stalin from entering into an agreement with the Nazis. The Secret clause of the pact, this document exhibits, was not publicized until the Nuremberg trials, where it was submitted as evidence. Russian historians have at later points in time argued that the copy is a fraud, and that such a clause was never agreed upon. They mainly base these accusation on the fact that the original agreements where never found, but this was the case with many Nazi documents, and if it in fact were a fraud, then it was one of the most elaborate in history, because of it's many references in other Nazi documents predating the Nuremberg trials. Another factor implying it's plausibility is that it provided further motivation for Stalin to enter into the agreement with Hitler, in spite of his distrust in der Fúhrer. (526 words)

D)Analysis:

Why the Anglo-Soviet talks failed:

        Stalin's relatively new system of government in the Soviet Union scared many European nations. Their main fears where in regards to the anticipated spread of communism, and whether this would be facilitated by military means. An additional factor was the revelation of the five year plans, whose seeming success caused for fears amongst the capitalist post depression system. Chamberlain was one of the more significant characters in western politics, and he was convinced that the communists had hidden agendas of wanting to achieve world domination, and didn't trust Stalin's dictatorist regime, nor would he ever consciously allow a further spread of communist influence in eastern Europe.

After the Polish-Soviet war around 1920, the polish were militantly opposed to the notion of the red army entering the country, even if their presence was to protect the polish community from Hitler. This factor made Stalin's negotiations with Britain much harder, but he also had his own reluctances against agreeing to defend Poland.

One of his reasons were that if the British were to ask for his aide in defending Poland, in an alliance with France, he would be forced to face Hitler alone, because the time frame meant that British troops would fail to help the red army in time. He feared that the British would double cross him, by forcing him to enter a way with Germany. Stalins distrust can also be traced back to the Munich agreement. Here Chamberlain alienated Stalin and Czechoslovakia, by not inviting them, and it appeared as though the policy of appeasement conflicted with previous promises of collective security. To Stalin it seemed that the British went back on their word, By not protecting the Czechoslovakians and his fear was that they would back down again facing Hitler in Poland.

The British were reluctant to interact with the Soviet government, and the request for an audience with Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, in Moscow was met with a refusal. However eventually the British sent the minor official called Reginald Ranfurly Plunckett-Ernle-Erle-Drax. This sort of “diplomacy of convenience” angered the soviet government, who felt that they where entitled to have a word in regards to when and where, negotiations were to be made. Stalin considered negotiations with this low level official an insult, and sent him back. So in this respect the British effectively pushed Stalin towards Hitler, with their continuous delayed reactions, and their low prioritization of the Soviet Union.  

Why Stalin found the Nazi deal necessary:

        The failure of Stalin's approaches to the British, had effectively led the Soviet Union to face one of two scenarios. They could attempt to fend off, what Stalin assumed was an eminent attack on two fronts by the Germans and the Japanese, or they could align themselves with Germany in a mutual non-aggression pact which Stalin thought would buy the soviets the time to prepare for war with Hitler. In spite of Hitlers impression on Stalin, he earned himself some goodwill on a previous occasion when Soviet spies uncovered information that suggested the Japanese had been discouraged by the Germans from attacking the Soviet Union. This information not only implied that Hitler could be trusted to some extent, but also that he rejected the idea of an immediate war with the Red Army.

The attraction of a deal with Hitler was that the proposal involved a promise of the soviets gaining territory in eastern Europe. The idea of a Non-Aggression pact with Germany was certainly an incentive, but unreliable at best. The agreement although convenient provided no lasting promise, as Hitler had proven several times with the Versailles treaty, how little regard he had for diplomacy. However it bought Stalin the window of time, to increase the military capacity of the USSR, and if Hitler stuck to the treaty then the Soviet Union would gain new territory. The notion of a long war between the great European powers would only benefit the Red Army, since they would be capable of making rapid progress, in claiming more territory in eastern Europe, whilst the major powers were preoccupied elsewhere. (692 words)

E)Conclusion:

         The analyzed material evidence suggests that Stalins decision to ally himself with Hitler was largely motivated by the lack of cooperation by Chamberlain, and the latent responses of the British government to his attempts of reaching an agreement with them. Stalin wanted an agreement with Britain, but was demoralized by having to deal with anti-communist sentiments within their government, and the perspective of having to wage war without support against Hitler, in a Poland who refused the Red Army's entry. Another factor was his own mistrust against Britain. They had made it obvious that they didn't consider the USSR important by not inviting them to participate in the negotiations of the Munich Agreement, and the contents of the agreement suggested that the British were intimidated by Hitler and created precedence suggesting that the British might cave in again in Poland which would leave Stalin facing war against the full strength of the Nazi Army.

 The soviets had very little to gain from a pact with Hitler except time for war-preparation which was Stalin's main priority. The points of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, were all largely invalidated because Stalin severely disbelieved the promise of non-aggression nor did he think that Hitler would share the eastern countries, as he considered Hitler to be a megalomaniac. However a few things made the treaty acceptable, amongst these were that factors implied Hitler initially would limit the war to the western parts of Europe and that Stalin had potential gains to be made in eastern Europe whilst allied efforts where constricted elsewhere. (260 words)

        

                 

         

        

        

F)Bibliography:

Online sources:

Lightbody, Bradley. "Invasion of Poland." BBC. 10 May 2005. BBC. 17 Feb 2008 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/invasion_poland_04.shtml>.

Books:

Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin. 2. oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Sweet, Paul. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 vol 7-9 . D. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1957.

Read, Fisher, Anthony, David. The Deadly Embrace - Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939-1941 (A Dramatic and Detailed Account of Understanding World War II). 2. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988.

Articles:

Estohiya, Sovetskaya. New York Times 17 August(1988)

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Appendix:

Photographed copy of copy of original document.

Secret clause in the Nazi-soviet Non-aggression pact:

Translation of transcript:

Secret Additional Protocol 

On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilnius area is recognized by each party.

2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.

In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in the areas.

4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

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