A truly loving God would never allow the suffering of innocents and an omnipotent God would be able to prevent such suffering. Can the God of Christian theism be defended against such a charge?
“A truly loving God would never allow the suffering of innocents and an omnipotent God would be able to prevent such suffering”. Can the God of Christian theism be defended against such a charge?
The problem of evil involves the problem that if God is omnipotent and omni-benevolent, how is it possible that evil exists? If one is able and willing to give up one of these apparent characteristics of God, His omnipotence or omni-benevolence, one can then argue that God is either not able to prevent evil or He does not wish to do so. Therefore He is capricious. However, none of these answers are in line with the traditional Christian view of God, for He is said to possess both of the above characteristics. In answer to the question, I would say it is possible to defend the God of Christian theism against such a charge in the case of moral evil, but instances of natural evil are more difficult to account for. I shall refer to the Augustinian theodicy and the Free Will defence in order to come to my conclusion on this charge.
The Augustinian theodicy, derived from , suggests that since God is the creator and He is wholly good, he cannot be responsible for the existence of evil in the world. Evil, in fact, does not exist as a separate substance: it is rather an absence of good – just as blindness is the absence of sight. This absence arises through the actions of humans who possess free will. The God of Christian theism can be defended against the above charge because humans must possess free will in order to be human. For this freedom to exist there must also exist the possibility of evil. To expect God to create free beings and simultaneously prevent them from making immoral choices is a logical impossibility. It may be the case that God’s omnipotence does not allow him to do the logically impossible. He cannot make 1+1=3; he cannot create a rock that He is not able to lift; similarly, he cannot give a person free will and make decisions for them at the same time. Therefore, the greater good of human freedom is a product of God's benevolence and the evil that exists is a consequence of humans making poor use of that freedom. This defence resolves the logical problem of evil by allowing God to be both omnipotent and omni-benevolent. This defence also places the blame of evil and suffering at the hands of humans. However, the question still remains as to whether God was able to create the universe without the possibility of suffering. God could have created free beings that freely choose never to cause suffering – if this were to be the case, evil would not exist and the defence does not stand up. Also, God’s omniscience can be questioned, as people may suggest that God should have known that such freedom would lead to evil taking place in His creation. The Free Will Defence also fails to give a satisfactory account of natural evils. Alvin Plantinga has claimed that natural evils are a result of moral evils carried out by humans, referring to the biblical account of the Fall. However, it seems perfectly reasonable to some that God could act to prevent natural disasters without reducing the importance of human free will. Moreover, it is hardly plausible to suggest that an earthquake could be explained in terms of human actions. For this reason, the Free Will Defence has no real answer to natural evil.