The results were replicated in Tall Sharot’s 9/11 (2007) experiment. They separated the participants into a downtown (near to WTC) and midtown groups. DT participants recalled for more detail of 9/11 than participants in midtown, vice versa for memory of summer vacation. The DT group often mentioned direct threat and the sensory experience they had during the witnessing of the 9/11 incident. They found that not only is personal involvement is important in the formation of flashbulb memory, but that the amygdala is more activated given a experiences with higher emotional impact; in other words, the proximity of people to the incident positively correlated with stronger memory and activity in the amygdala. The factor of surprise and consequential importance to one’s life enhances memory of the event, and therefore recall was much more vivid and concrete than compared to witnesses who were farther in distance from the event and had less of an emotional impact; instead they performed better when recalling for summer holiday memories.
These findings, however, were not consistent in the results of flashbulb memory’s need of a specialized neural mechanism that evokes emotional influence. The attack on WTC was also used as an opportunistic chance for experimentation in Talarico and Rubin (2003)’s study. The researchers asked a random sample of people to recall what had happened 1, 7, 42, and 224 day(s) after the attack and after a day-to-day event. Though the claimed flashbulb memory does contain vivid details, uttered with confidence, they were as inaccurate as recall for everyday memories. Such findings demonstrate that flashbulb memory may just be as persistent and perpetual as regular memory, which for the most part, constantly evolves. Ultimately, this debunks the original theory as even an emotionally influential, surprising, and high consequential event changes with time.
Neisser and Harsch (1992) also question the existence of flashbulb memory, suggesting that it is merely the product of repetitive maintenance and recall. They asked 106 students to fill in a questionnaire and write a description of their emotional and surrounding experience upon hearing the Challenger disaster 24 hours prior. Forty-four of the same students returned after two years and completed the same event, in addition to rating their confidence of memory accuracy and whether if they had taken a quiz similar to this before. Though their confidence was 4.17, their accuracy was poor, 22 scoring 2 or less correct points. Also, the initial 21% who reported to have been informed via television increased to 45%. The results challenge the flashbulb theory because though they were confident of their answers and exposed to a “traumatic” event, the accuracy in recall was low and lacking. The researchers deduced that memory was deteriorating in detail, regardless of shock aspects of the event. It challenges flashbulb theory because the memory of participants did not remain the same. Therefore the hyped phenomena of flashbulb memory could simply be normal memories; its susceptibility to distortion, also deems it unreliable. However, it must be addressed that the experimenters did not distinguish a control condition, thereby making results are unfit to compare between flashbulb and normal memory. They believe its preserved state in memory is due to the conscious and unconscious retelling of aspects in the event. This outward retelling is open to distortions, as with each recount transforms and slowly deviates from the original. Moreover, Neisser suggest that if flashbulb memory were true then the encoding theory—an inflexible account of features surrounding the event is made—is wrong since erroneous memory occurs in recall. According to various research, the strong emotional relevance and consequences to self are important to constitute flashbulb memory. Surprise, on the other hand was not well supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, the research to support or to refute flashbulb memory show that memory can be unreliable because emotion affects recall and retrieval of the event. One of the weaknesses of this claim however is the fact that the studies aimed to challenge flashbulb memory failed to distinctively show the immediacy between the individual and event. The two studies--contrary to propositional claims--show that flashbulb memory, despite its relative rich in detail and confidence in recall, does not hold permanent residence in memory nor is it any more accurate than normal memories.
An explanation to the errors in flashbulb memory can be explained by reconstructive memory, by which suggests memory is flexible to changes and is constantly changing, anew with every recall. Memory is not a passive process but an active one so recollection is not merely a recitation of readied information. It implies that memory recall is affected by external influences. Like flashbulb memory, this also includes eyewitness theory. The factor of anxiety has been correlated to performance of memory. Chrisitanison and Hubinette (1993) asked a total of 110 witnesses (victims or onlookers) on 22 different bank robberies and found that victims involved in the crime scene had better recall, which was still present 15 months later. They concluded that fear does impact the clarity of memory recall. The heightened or diminished arousal/emotion can lead to more inaccurate recall, whereas as moderate stress or anxiety improves recall. This concludes that too much fear can divert attention away from the essential aspects of the situation much like with too little arousal, as people would less likely process all information from lack of attention. Moderate levels of stirred emotion, however, general improve recall accuracy. The eyewitness theory (EWT) demonstrates that memory recall is improved by heightened physiological reactions. As explained, flashbulb memory states that the emotional impact of the event is so strong that it imprints a long-lasting memory. Similarly, EWT can explain this phenomena in that a person’s arousal to the situation broadens their attention, thereby processes more surrounding circumstances.
Flashbulb memory is accepted as a viable phenomenon to explain why emotional memories are highly vivid. Some aspects such as emotional relevance and high importance consequences are deemed plausible in the formation of FBM, which was concluded from research sprouted by Brown and Kulik’s theory. Such that emotion-triggered hormonal changes causes people to remember events longer. However, many skeptics have reason to doubt some claims made by Brown and Kulik. Flashbulb memory is a reconstructive memory whereby emotion is a major determinant to the accuracy of the memory. Neisser has speculated that perhaps flashbulb memory is vivid because of the constant internal or external retelling of the event, which is altered through retrieval and social sharing. The elaborative recall of flashbulb memory, however, is not correlated with its accuracy. Research has also shown that regardless of confidence, the recall is no more accurate than recall on an everyday event. This suggests that the factor of vividness and accuracy are independent of one another. The inclination to errors in flashbulb memory questions the appropriateness of the term “flashbulb” used, which implies a remarkable photographic image is inscribed in memory, though contrary to evidence presented. Flashbulb memory has been challenged by many researches on its existence. Nonetheless, it does provide a valid explanation as to why emotional impressions increases memory of the event.