Indirect realists use illusions as a way of arguing against direct realism. For example, the bent stick illusion: when we see a straight stick in water we perceive it to be bent, yet we know that it is straight. In this situation, one is directly aware of the stick being bent yet no relevant physical thing is actually bent. Thus, in this situation, one is directly aware of something non-physical and this causes a problem for naive realism because if we see objects in an unmediated way, we should not see the straight stick as bent. However, direct realists can counteract this argument, saying that naive realism does in fact account for illusions. In this situation, what we see is actually there – the image of the stick bending is due to refraction. We cannot focus solely on the stick, but must take into account the whole situation of the stick in the water as well as the concept of refraction and if we do this, as critics of naive realism do not, when we see the stick as bent we do in fact see it directly.
Representative realists also argue that perceptual variation proves against direct realism. An example of this is viewing a table; as we move further away from the table, it appears smaller, yet we know that the size of the table has not changed. The table we are directly aware of is changing in size, yet the real, external object is not changing at all. Therefore, it can be said the thing we are directly aware of is not the real object as what we see varies while the actual objects do not, so we do not perceive the actual objects. Direct realists have a response to their critics, saying again that they are not taking into account the full situation. With perceptual variation, we should focus on the geographical location of the person looking at the table as part of the situation, rather than just the table itself. Location is also part of the situation and by walking around the table we change the situation, therefore the situation we perceive will be different. What we see varies, but so has the overall situation as we move around.
The strongest argument used against direct realism is that of hallucinations. For example, upon consuming vast amounts of alcohol I see an elephant, indistinguishable from one I have seen the previous week. However, there is no physical elephant in front of me now so therefore in this situation one is seeing something non-physical. What one sees in this situation is the same type of thing one sees in normal, non-illusory, veridical perception. It can therefore be said that in normal perception, one sees non-physical, mediated things, disagreeing with the concept of direct realism. However, the representative realist argument from hallucinations takes what is happening when the brain is malfunctioning and uses it as a model to explain what is happening for all our perceptions. Direct realists say we cannot accept this as hallucinations are caused by chemical disturbances in our brain etc, and can therefore not be used to determine how all of our perceptions take place. As hallucinations are so rare, it is unfair to criticise direct realism on the basis of a few freak occurrences, when perception under normal conditions is not affected. Hallucinations, therefore, do not prove against direct realism as they do not prove all perception is mediated and indirect.
Some direct realists adopt a ‘disjunctivist’ approach to perception, rejecting the existence of sense data in certain situations. The disjunction is between appearance and the reality behind appearance i.e. the non-hallucinating mind sees the material world directly, whereas the hallucinating mind sees non-material images. Disjunctivists claim that in a veridical perception, a person’s experience actually contains the external, mind-independent object of that perception. However, in a hallucination there is no real external object to be related to, neither is there sense data to be part of the perception. Therefore when I hallucinate an elephant, there is no actual sense data involved in the perception, so it does not prove that any sense data is being mediated and thus does not rule out direct realism.
In conclusion, direct realism faces many arguments from indirect realism which seem to threaten the definitude of the theory, yet direct realists always have a counter argument to prove they are correct. Most of the arguments against direct realism have the same flaw – they say that our perception has been mediated, yet they do not take into account the whole situation. The argument of hallucinations, which indirect realists deem the most important argument against direct realism can also be opposed, as they do not prove our perception is always mediated and indirect, when in fact hallucinations are very rare occurrences. Overall, the argument for direct realism is very strong and manages to counteract and disprove any arguments against it, suggesting we do in fact perceive the world directly.