What is it about theories in the human sciences and natural sciences that makes them convincing?

In contrast to the natural sciences, it is claimed that human sciences cannot rely on consistency and repeatability to render its theories ‘convincing’. As evident in my economics’ internal assessments, I was unable to use an adequate experiment to prove and to justify an economic hypothesis on how a population might react in a financial crisis. For example, I would react differently compared to my Indian friend because the Chinese culture has shaped my beliefs and distorted "intellectual default settings" (Van de Lagemaat, 2005, 92). Hence, experiments of social sciences are largely based on assumptions and predictions rather than laws; the evasion of certain variables means that the complexity of reality is generalized in inductive reasoning, this is best seen in the economic term, Ceteris Paribus, which is defined to be “all other factors remaining constant” (Ziogas, 2008, 135). The claim that human sciences lack controllability is supported by the fact that the subject is “plagued by many variables that cannot be independently controlled by experiment and the environment they are trying to describe is continually changing”, which claims experiments unfeasible and unconvincing.

Consciousness and emotions in the social sciences are claimed to cause great obstacles in establishing convincing theories because perception can be coloured by strong emotions and make us ‘blinded’ by belief. The very difference in the involvement of object and subject in the natural sciences and the social sciences respectively, defies the kind of predictability that we can expect of molecules, atoms and larger inanimate objects. While qualitative data can be gathered in the natural sciences, it is claimed that human sciences are more difficult to measure because there exist no discrete units for measuring emotions and thoughts e.g. a continuous stream of consciousness. The incredibly unpredictable nature of the social sciences prevents laws and theories to accurately support the claims in the social sciences. Therefore, while consistency creates sustainable theories in the natural sciences, the human sciences are more focused on observations and the general behavioral patterns of the society in rendering its theories ‘convincing’.

As a knower, I like to challenge and evaluate whether a theory is true (it can be assumed that the theories closest to truth, are most likely to be the most convincing theories). Investigations of agreements, correspondence, and to a certain extent, pragmatism and rationale, is true in both the theories of the natural sciences and the human sciences. Because most theories in the human sciences attempts to explain and to foretell human behaviors, people would be more ready to accept theories that correlate with what one, as individuals, subconsciously discern to be right. I am not discarding the fact that reason as a way of knowing in the social sciences, rather we simply accept that the ambitions of social science need to be less totalising and/or universal than those of natural sciences. This is cognitive relativism which holds that “there are no universal truths about the world” (Alchin, 2006, 348).  Although I have a very limited knowledge as I do not study of psychology, I already intuitively convinced with the theory of cognitive dissonance and the example of the ‘buyer’s remorse’ due to its easily relatable idea. It is claimed that our knowledge on the human sciences “cannot be conjured out of logic, but is based on experience." Yet, from a counter-perspective of a financially-backward country, Zimbabwe, the unavailability of ‘alternatives’ mean that people do not have personal acquaintance, i.e. cannot be intuitively ‘convinced’, with the idea of “buyer’s remorse”. In the natural sciences, intuitive judgments cannot render theories in ‘convincing’ because personal experiences do not occur with the object. It is impossible for me to ‘feel’ that the cell theory is true because intuition is limited as I am incapable of experiencing the microscopic world; thus, I cannot use experiences or ‘common sense’ to understand and be ‘convinced’ by the cell theory i.e. theories in the natural sciences.

These conclusions assume that personal experiences can be related to the theories in the human sciences; to counterclaim, we ought to ask: to what extent can we rely on intuition for ‘convincing’ knowledge? With more extensive economic theories e.g. Fed Model, it is counterclaimed that most people will not have the adequate knowledge to judge, to make a critical analysis nor to question the theory using their own coherence tests. Although we might believe that we are wholly logical in our judgments, the fact remains that most people do not have the sufficient knowledge to reach their own fair judgments. Although we might believe that we are persuaded merely on a rational level, the truth is we are blinded and are solely trusting the scientific leaders to make, what we believe to be, wise conclusions for humans.

Yet, confirmation bias counterclaims and argues that strong emotions may cloud scientists’ judgments and tempt them to reject data that may falsify their theory as scientists “tend to remember only evidence that supports their beliefs” (Van de Lagemaat, 2005, 122). We may think that scientists are purely motivated by truth, but the fact remains that their yearn for ambition, vanity, envy, fortune and fame renders “interpretation of evidence [in scientific theories to be] guided as much by emotion as by reason” (Alchin, 2006, 22). The investigation by Weisberg proved the extent of vulnerability in humans; it discovered that adding a line of “neurobabble” to a scientific theory effectively adds to the convincing nature of the theory. Our partiality for believing that we can fully understand a topic without a fundamental knowledge of it, leads us to consent all scientific theories, which may very well be not ‘true’, solely because a “respectable” scientist proposed these theories. ‘Knowledge-by-authority’ effectively convinces us because we tend to believe and trust the leading scientific figures to put forward, what we believe to be, the right judgments.

It is most evident that theories in both the natural sciences and the human sciences are convincing depends on multiple factors; the repeatable, consistent and predictable nature of results in the natural sciences proves to be the core strength of the scientific method in deducing ‘convincing’ theories. However, for the normal knower with insufficient knowledge in the fields of science, we also believe in and are thoroughly convinced by the theories of the sciences due to our tendency to place all our trust in leading figures for informing us ‘convincing’ theories.

Word Count: 1599

References

Alchin, Nicholas. Theory of Knowledge. London: Hodder Murray, 2006. Print.

Lagemaat, Richard Van De. Theory of Knowledge for the IB Diploma. Cambridge, 2008. Print.