Freud’s concept of ego-defence mechanisms offers an explanation of the way in which the ego ‘makes decisions’ when faced with conflicts between the id and superego. Tactics such as denial, displacement, repression, regression, and projection, are some of many used by the ego as coping mechanisms for painful memories, emotions, thoughts and drives (Gross, 2000). Breakwell and Rose (2000) suggest a flaw in the validity of this aspect of Freud’s work, claiming that the relationship is tautologically problematic as the cause of a behaviour is often reliant on exactly that behaviour. Despite this, the notion of defence mechanisms has held the test of time, as “today, no mental status or clinical formulation should be considered complete without an effort to identify the patient’s dominant defense mechanism” (Valliant, 1992 p. 3).
Psychoanalysis takes a deterministic tack on human behaviour, ascertaining that no aspect of behaviour is accidental; “that all psychological events are caused” (Smith, 2003, p. 110). As such, any aspect of behaviour from forgetting a person’s name to inconsistencies between words and actions is an outcome of a causal relationship with parts of the unconscious. Gavin (1992) calls attention to a problem in psychoanalytic thought that despite its many insights, it does not allow for an individual’s rational choice of behaviour. This particular point is a part of a larger philosophical debate of free-will versus determinism, and ultimately remains a matter of opinion. Specifically to psychoanalysis, however, these definitions mean that psychoanalysis places its focus on the persons past when attempting to explain their behaviour and accordingly provide therapy. The theory has been heavily criticised for this. Spinelli (1994, cited in Smith 2003) rejected the Psychoanalytic dependency on the linear structure of the past, claiming incongruity between the complex nature of behaviour and the proposed ‘linear causality’ of the past. Smith (2003), however, sees an inference in Spinelli’s claims that Psychoanalysis places a single cause to a single effect every time, which Smith deems an erroneous misunderstanding. He cites Freud’s ‘principle of the complication of causes’ from 1901 in which Freud asserts that “mental events are brought about by a complex concentration of causes” (Freud, 1901 cited in Smith, 2003, pp. 110-111).
The determinism that Freud employed was consistent with his strong view that “free will” is an illusion (Meissner, 2003). For this reason Freud received critical attention when he seemingly disregarded his deterministic approach with regards to certain behaviours, when putting his theories into practice. For instance, Freud (1920b, cited in Meissner, 2003) contradicted his deterministic point by stating that successful psychoanalytic therapy would bring a person’s conflicts to the conscious mind, thus allowing the ego to choose a change in and ways in which to change behaviour. Although this sort of debate is arguably a result of misinterpretations of Freud’s ideas and language, but this sort of discrepancy was not uncommon for Freud. Glassman and Hadad (2004) outline Freud’s tendency of reconstructing his theories with little regard to the contradictions made with his previous work by doing so.
Perhaps the most frequent theme in criticisms of psychoanalysis is the lack of empirical evidence. The concept of ‘unfalsifiability’ is consistently present in criticisms of Freud’s work, and has recurred historically in any attempt to prove or disprove his theories. ‘Falsifiability’ is a key element to any valid scientific theory, which stipulates that it is essential that there be a logical scenario in which the theory could be proven wrong (Gross, 2005). Many of the behaviours that Freud seeks to explain are implicit rather that clearly observable, and therefore cannot be empirically tested; this is a trigger for countless objections to the entire theory’s validity. Despite this, some see this as a point to clarify and build on rather than a catalyst for complete dismissal. Chabot (1982, p.50), for example, recognizes the “implicit logic of interpretation in psychoanalysis” and seeks to provide a more abstract but applicable explanation of its logic and validity.
Glassman and Hadad (2004) explain that psychoanalysis is not precise enough to be able to validly predict specific causes for particular behaviours, for example - being able to predict whether people will react to a defined situation with repression, denial, sublimation or any other defence mechanism that Freud lists, or a combination of these. Instead, psychoanalysis merely hypothesises that the reaction to the given situation will be indicative of a ‘defence mechanism’ occurring, without committing to which one/ones in particular. In addition, much of the terminology that Freud makes use of is often interrelated and vague, and often creates a ‘catch-22’ in which “the evidence used to support the theory is also dependent on the theory for its validity” (Glassman and Hadad, 2004, p.234) (italics in cited text). A related challenge of Freud’s methods comes from Grunbaum (1986, cited in Rubovits-Seitz, 1998) who identifies that any documented case-study of Freud’s had taken place in a clinical setting. This oversight, he claims, undermines the empirical validity of his findings, as, it is out of the therapist’s office where neuroses can be objectively observed, and the effectiveness of therapy tested.
In addition, Horney (1950, cited in Glassman and Hadad 2004) criticises the validity of Freud’s findings due to the narrow demographic of his subject groups, who were mostly white, middle class, Viennese women. This is not a varied enough test group, and cannot therefore be representative of the entire population, and not even just of women, however accurate its findings with regards to that narrow group. She had argued that there was not, therefore, an element of ‘generality’ to psychoanalytic ideas - another key element to a successful theory. Barlow and Hersen (1984 cited in Wilson 2000, p. 62), however, retorts that a more homogenised theory would determine a norm from an inappropriate average, which is so general that it will neglect the exceptions, because “the adverse findings could be masked in the population mean […]”.
Along with heavy criticisms of his work, certain accusations were also cast at Freud himself with the purpose of invalidating his methods. For example, Grunbaum (1986, cited in Rubovits-Seitz, 1998) suggests that Freud, whether intentionally or not, was often guilty of manipulating his patients to respond in ways that would produce findings to suit his own theories.
Freud sought to explain all of human behaviour, so it was natural, then, for him to develop ideas regarding children’s development, as it can be seen as the basis for personality development in adolescence and adulthood. With this theme, his theory suggested that all behaviour is a result of events in a person’s childhood. He structured his ideas on early development into five consecutive stages: oral, anal, phallic, latency and genital. Each of these stages involves satisfying sexual impulses and desires which will have an impact on later adult personality and behaviour (Gross, 2005). Among many criticisms, the application of the theory to women’s development was highly contentious. Received predominantly from feminists, the general argument held that Freud was a sexist misogynist whose theories on women’s development, such as castration theory, Oedipus complex and many others were skewed as a direct result of his bias (Purvis, 2006). It is now a fairly common agreement that Freud’s theories regarding the development of women were, indeed, wrong. However, the bias and prejudices employed by Freud can be justified as a product of his time and cultural environment. Most contemporary theories, including those that are psychodynamic, tend to be far more gender-equal (Glassman and Hadad, 2004).Purvis (2006) acknowledges that despite the validity of many of these feminist criticisms, Freud’s impact on the study of sexuality was detrimental to the general study of behaviour. Sexuality is considered to be a central theme in contemporary psychology.
Regardless of criticisms, many of Freud’s ideas were starting points from which followers and critics could build and develop. The study of human psychology, by its definition, will always automatically be applied to all aspects of human life. Religion, art, politics, literature to mention a few are all topics that Freud was interested in and studied with a psychoanalytic viewpoint. Religion, for example, remains a prevalent part of human life, as even in merely choosing to disregard religion or any deity implies an interaction had to have taken place with the concepts. Freud wrote extensively on the topic of religion, and his psychoanalytic perspective of the origin of religion and faith are highly influential (Torney, 1994, cited in Ekins, 1994). “…the psychoanalytic exploration of the origins of religion, far from disenchanting religion, issues a challenge to theologians to be more adventurous in their thinking” (Torney 1994, cited in Ekins, 1994).
These criticisms, despite many of them having a logical and valid basis, are still not enough to have made psychoanalysis obsolete. Psychoanalysis as a general discipline, although commonly varied now from its origins, is still practiced. The evolution of Freud’s psychoanalysis led to a split in psychoanalytical thought, predominantly Ego psychology and Object Relations psychology, and the creation of other psychodynamic schools of thought. The details and terminology change, but the basic psychoanalytical premises of explaining behaviour and motivation by examining internal processes and interactions of personality parts remain the same. Typical of science, it can be argued, psychoanalytic theories have developed, changed and have been revised, with previous versions or lines of thought within often acknowledged as wrong and disregarded (though Freud himself neglected the practice). Equally, certain concepts and aspects introduced in psychoanalysis have since, after many studies, become widely used in psychology. Therefore, although it can be argued that psychoanalysis has had its day, its impact on contemporary psychology is vast, rendering the field impossible to dismiss or disregard as irrelevant.
Word count: 2153 (including citations).
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