Does language determine the way we think?

Some of the earliest proponents of the idea that language shapes thought were Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (see Whorf, 1956) embodies two concepts: the view that the characteristics of language determine cognitive processes such as thought, perception and memory (known as linguistic determinism), and the idea that each language maps onto the world in a unique way (known as linguistic relativity) (Harley, 1995). The anthropological evidence for linguistic relativity and determinism cited by Whorf (1956) will be critically reviewed. Furthermore, recent psychological evidence for a causal link between language and thought will be evaluated with the view that although language cannot be the sole determinant of thought, it may still subtly shape certain cognitive processes.

The strongest version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis asserts that language exclusively determines thought (Takano, 1989). However, this position is generally considered untenable, as although a language may not posses single word translation of ‘mokita’ (meaning, “truth that everyone knows but nobody speaks” in Kiriwinan) it does not mean that the concept cannot be understood by speakers of that language (Hunt & Agnoli, 1991). Furthermore, if thought does not occur outside linguistic restrictions, a word such as ‘bank’ could not have multiple meanings it possesses in the English language (Takano, 1989). However, although there is a lack of evidence for the strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, a weaker version of linguistic relativity can not be ruled out (Hunt and Agnoli, 1991). This weaker version incorporates the idea that although language may not determine thought, it may influence perception and cognitive processing to an extent (Harley, 1995). Although this concept has often been dismissed as being “too vague too be useful” (Harley, 1995, p. 346), Hunt and Agnoli (1991) state that it can be quantified and evaluated using cognitive models which were unavailable to Whorf.

Early evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis came from Whorf’s (1956) many anthropological observations. However, the work of Whorf has faced considerable criticism. Notably, Whorf (1956) claimed that Hopi language had no words or syntactical devices to convey the concept of time and subsequently Hopi speakers did not perceive the passage of time as a continuum. However, in contradiction to this, the anthropologist Malotki (1983) found that the Hopi language contained words such as ‘taawanasave’, meaning ‘at noon’ and other words for days, weeks, months and seasons. Many of Whorf’s other arguments for the linguistic relativity hypothesis have been criticised as they display circular reasoning and do not justify the direction of causality championed by Whorf (Bloom & Keil, 2001).

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Laboratory studies have provided more concrete evidence both for and against the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Specifically, consequences for thought due to the vocabularies of different languages has been examined. One particular area of research has highlighted the effects on perception, categorisation and memory resulting from differing numbers of lexical entries for colours in different languages. Heider (1972, as cited in Harley, 1995) presented evidence that language has no affect on colour perception, as although the language of the Dani of New Guinea contains only two basic colour terms (those for dark and light), they can remember and label colour focal exemplars better than non-focal exemplars (e.g. red is remembered and labeled more readily than rusty). Nevertheless, some effects of language have been noted on the categorisation of colour, as speakers of Setswana, who have a single term for the green/blue region of the spectrum, tend not to draw a distinction between these two colours in the way that English speakers do during categorisation tasks (Davies, 1998). However, this may be due to the employment of a language strategy to direct grouping (Davies, 1998). Further support for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is provided by Kay and Kempton’s (1994, as cited in Bloom & Keil, 2001) study that showed an improved memory for colours which could be described by a basic label in the participant’s language. However, this result only occurred when the task predisposed the subjects to describe the colours internally (Pinker, 1994).

Lexical differences between languages have also been shown to affect the conception of numbers. Saxton and Towse (1998) found that Japanese children grasped the base-ten rule of place value more readily than their English counterparts due to the fact that the Japanese language has a more regular system for denoting numbers above ten. However, subtle alterations to task instructions equalised performance on numeracy tasks (Saxton & Towse, 1998). Equally, Ellis and Hennelly (1980, as cited in Bloom & Keil, 2001) found that children who are bilingual in Welsh and English showed a greatly enhanced ability to perform calculations in English. This may be due to the longer number words used in Welsh, suggesting that number concepts are understood centrally yet shaped within the linguistic structure they are operationalised in (Bloom & Keil, 2001).

Hoffman, Lau and Johnson (1986) provided evidence for a lexical influence on person cognition. They found that particular schematically based stereotypes were employed by Chinese-English bilinguals only if they were processing character descriptions in the language which had an available word label for the stereotype. Subsequently, having a word that denoted a stereotype in the processing language affected impression formation and memory (Hoffman, Lau and Johnson, 1986).

Recent research into the affects of lexical items on thought has shown that language can shape abstract concepts such as time. Boroditsky (2001) noted that mandarin speakers talk about time using vertical metaphors (e.g. earlier events in the weeks are described as shang or “up” and later events are xia or “down”). Subsequently, Mandarin speakers answered temporally phrased questions faster after vertical primes compared to horizontal primes. This finding was reversed in English speakers who used horizontal metaphors (e.g. “before” and “after”) to describe time (Borodisky, 2001).

However, other contemporary research has shown that differences in vocabularies between languages may not have a universal affect on thought and affect. Frank, Harvey and Verdun (2000) showed that although Chinese has five different words for shame, speakers of English showed affective distinctions in the experience of shame which equaled that of Chinese speakers. This suggests that contrary to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, people are capable of forming differentiations that are not supported by their linguistic categories (Frank, Harvey and Verdun, 2000).

In addition to the studies that support a weak form of linguistic relativity by showing an effect of words on thought, some research has also found evidence for an effect of the grammatical structures of different languages on thought. Bloom (1984) compared the counterfactual reasoning of Chinese and English speakers, due to the fact that the Chinese language contains no subjunctive to indicate a sentence is dealing with a hypothetical instance. Bloom (1984) found that English speakers (whose language possesses the subjunctive) showed better comprehension of a counterfactual passage than Chinese speakers, possibly due to the added processing and memory burden of counterfactual reasoning in Chinese. However, Au (1984) questioned the reliability of these results as the Chinese translation of the counterfactual passage was written in unidiomatic Chinese, and at times the Chinese version was genuinely ambiguous rather than counterfactual.

So far the ways in which different languages have contrasting effects on thought have been reviewed. However, Vygotsky (1962) proposed that thought is shaped by the common cognitive properties that all languages share and thus thought is enhanced by learning any language. A strong interpretation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis would suggests that if language determines thought, there can be no thought without language (Pinker, 1984). However, Vervet monkeys, who have no language, show comprehension of family relations (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1992, as cited in Pinker, 1994). Equally, Wynn (1992) showed that babies can perform basic arithmetic prior to language acquisition, as they become interested in numerical changes to displays they had previously habituated to (although these results should be interpreted with caution as infants can comprehend language forms before they can produce them (Levorato & Cacciari, 1995)).

If thought is not represented within the brain by our native language, what other form does it take? Fodor (1975) suggested that we think in a simple, non-verbal symbolic form (commonly know as mentalese (Pinker, 1994)) that exists prior to language acquisition. The concept of a rudimentary language of thought is supported by Shepard and Cooper’s (1982) study into mental rotation of the letter F. They found that subjects were quicker to identify a correct representation of F (compared to a mirror image) if it had not been rotated far from its standard, upright position. If subjects were describing the rotated F to themselves using standard language the upside-down image should be one of the quickest to identify as the verbal labels for the upright image would simply be reversed (Pinker, 1994). However, this is the slowest image to be correctly identified, in line with the fact that it requires the largest rotation of the mental image (Shepard & Cooper, 1982).

Despite the evidence for a sub-linguistic language of thought, some research indicates that internal speech and other universal language elements (such as labeling) do have an affect on thought. Fivush and Schwarzmueller (1998, as cited in Bloom & Keil, 2001) suggest that the common human inability to remember biographical events before the age of two (infant amnesia) may be due to the fact that young children are unable to establish their history within a narrative, linguistic structure. Furthermore, the concept of mentalese does not account for the effects of labeling. Dunker (1945, as cited in Harley, 1995) found that changes in the labeling of items in a problem solving task could alter participant’s conception of an object as being employed in a single way (know as functional fixedness). Equally, Carmicheal, Hogan and Walter (1932) found that providing verbal labels for nonsense pictures improved memory for the stimuli.

The evidence both for and against the influence of language on thought is compelling. The strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can easily be disproved not only for differences between languages, but also for the distinction between not possessing a natural language and having one. Evidently thought can exist without language. However, there is much support for a weak version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which suggests that many aspects of perception, memory and cognitive processing are mediated by linguistic features. Nonetheless, this evidence must be interpreted with care. Firstly, the direction of the association between language and thought must be substantiated as proponents of Cognitive Determinism (cf. Piaget, 1955 as cited in Harley, 1995) suggest that cognitive precursors to language, such as object permanence, determine linguistic development, and not the other way round. Furthermore, in testing the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis many studies use measures of linguistic performance. In doing this, the results may not demonstrate the effect of language on thought, but instead show the influence of language on language. Notably, recent studies have provided support for linguistic relativity whilst controlling for this confound in studying the effect of language on spatial awareness as evaluated by non-linguistic hand gestures (Levinson, 1996, as cited in Bloom & Keil, 2001). In implementing particular controls, future research may define the domains in which a non-determinative, yet influential effect of language can be seen on thought.

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