Theorists have simplified the theory of Evolutionary Psychology into five main principles. One of these principles states that ‘different neural circuits are specialized for solving different adaptive problems’. This completely separates the theory from any notion that the human mind has a multi-functional area that deals with all types of reasoning, learning and decision-making (Tooby & Cosmides 1997). When we look at the way our organs are specified to fulfil different purposes i.e. the heart pumps blood and cannot help us digest food, similarly the lungs are useless for circulating blood, (Hagen. E, 2004) we can begin to understand what Evolutionary Psychologists mean when they say different neural circuits in the brain are purpose specified mechanisms.
It also brings across the idea that the brain is like a computer, where different circuit structures and software allows the computer to perform different functions. It would be impossible to create a computer program that performs all tasks or a single circuit structure that is independent from others. (Hagen.E, 2004) It would also be detrimental for the machine and cause fatal problems when the software or circuit malfunctions due to the way everything is affected as a whole. Hagen (2004) also uses the example of lung tissue being perfectly adapted to extract large amounts of oxygen from the air, while the dense muscles of the heart are adapted to pump and circulate blood around the body. He highlights that the specified domains in physiology indicate specified domains in psychology.
Bereczkei et al (2000) explored this idea further by giving examples of these psychological domains; where a fear of strangers solves the adaptive problem of avoiding a possible dangerous person it is useless in solving the adaptive problem of which member of our group should be preferred as a mating partner (just as the specified function of our bodily organs render them useless in other fields outside their designed capabilities). Furthermore, those who believe in a domain-general approach also believe in learning through trial and error. If we take this into account and compare it to a domain-specific approach, it seems that trial and error learning would be at the disadvantage of mankind. For example, an innate fear of snakes and rapidly moving objects would act as a defence mechanism to protect an individual, rather than a possible fatal experience of learning. Thus, according to basic evolutionary theory, domain-general learning mechanisms should have been selected out.
Criticizing the theory, Steven Rose argues that this principle does not take into account the emotion that people experience, because emotions are what differentiate us from computers.
“Modules or no, it is not adequate to reduce the mind
to nothing more than a cognitive architectural infor-
mation processing machine. Brains/Minds do not
just deal with information. They are concerned with
living meaning.” (Rose. S, 2000 pp260-262)
This comment, as well as the comments of other critics on psychological domain specification, seems to be based on weak evidence. There is a lack of basic EP understanding, where it should be taken into account that EP is founded on emotion and behaviour being a result of specific input triggering innate mechanisms. ‘Living meaning’ does not even oppose the theories of EP, meaning can be derived from input and specific behaviour can occur due to this meaning. The theory suggests that the way we think and interpret specific meanings is a result of our different neural circuits dealing with these ‘meanings’ in ways that solve particular adaptive problems.
Apart from the way different neural circuits are specialized in solving different adaptive problems another core principle of EP is that ‘our modern skulls house a stone-age mind’. This means that the current environment of the world is always too advanced for our minds due to the rate of evolution. Our minds have just been adapted to solve the problems of the Stone Age and not the new problems that this modern era, our new environment poses.
In addition, studies have shown that the current exposure to media images may be leading to people becoming dissatisfied with their partners and reductions in self-esteem. Conclusions have indicated that conditions of modern living seem designed to interfere with human happiness. (Kenrick and Luce, 2004)
Further examples include a common sense of powerlessness (Wengrat, 1990) and increased opportunities of casual sex, lacking in deep intimacy leaving people feeling emotionally empty (Buss, 1994). Additionally, Nesse and Williams’ 1994 study looks at social networks and the way mass communication leads to more distant relationships. They claim that our ‘stone age’ minds require a closely-knit social network. Combined, these factors can be seen to explain such worldwide problems as suicide, depression and mental illness, especially in more economically developed societies (with advancements in technology) where these experiences are most prevalent.
Bereczkei et al (2000) take this a step further with a suggestion of certain phobias being a result of different ancestral environments posing different adaptive problems. For example a fear towards unfamiliar persons in adult life (Xenophobia) could be seen as the mind adapting to a past hostile environment where humans lived in a small tightly enclosed group and strangers were regarded as potential enemies. Similarly, other phobias such as claustrophobia may seem irrational in the modern age, but once we step back into our past, we can see how this could be acting as a defence mechanism for some previous issue of fatality.
Moreover, the fundamental importance of both principles to the theory of Evolutionary Psychology can be explained through their intertwining relationship. Domain specification is central to psychological adaptations and helps us to outline particular areas in which we have an instinctive way of solving problems. It also helps us to outline areas that present a lack of these instincts and essentially lead us to the concept of an imperfect mind. Reasons for this imperfection could be a number of philosophical theories. However, in relation to Evolutionary Theory it seems that an out of date mind is the established belief.
Although, some theorists argue that this idea is farfetched, describing it as a claim that an imagined past explains the present (Rose.S, 2000). Others look at estimations and history, noting that the rate of adaptation in measured ‘Darwins’ (each unit consisting of 1 million years). With 100,000 Darwins estimated for the evolution of sparrows’ legs and only 6000 generations of humans, the figures do not seem sensible. “Could adaptation not take place at a faster rate?” (Rose. S, 2000)
Additionally, the idea of modern skulls housing Stone Age minds has a major weakness; there is no possible means of testing for evidence. It is a theory that cannot be proved physically or psychologically and therefore there will always be room for debate. Bluntly put, “we don’t have a time machine” (Gowaty, 2000).
Evolutionary psychology’s alternative approach to studies on human behaviour opens a new world of exploration. The principles discussed are just touching the surface of the vast density. However, some issues present us with blotches in the very fabric of the theory. For example Charles Jencks highlights the philosophical debate:
“nature determines us to want to know about causation and nurture,
while the spirit of the age, postmodernism, predetermines us to be dubious of all meta-narratives.” (Jencks. C, 2000)
Asking, of what benefit is the need to know about the purpose of mankind? This not only attacks the idea of a ‘Stone Age mind’ but also throws most of the theory off balance. Are our inborn mechanisms trying to waste our time with other issues and does our environment play a more productive role in evolution?
Another fairly strong criticism of EP theory asks could this not just be Darwinian fundamentalism (Gould. S.J, 2000, pp85). As it was Darwin himself who said, “I am convinced that natural selection has been the main but not the exclusive means of modification” (The Origin of Species, 1872 edition). Yet, some EP theorists would argue that it is ‘well balanced’, taking into account environmental input and it simply uses natural selection to explain the primitive instincts in humans.
Other critics are so disgusted by the theory of EP they even see claim that EP theorists have political agendas. However, EP still remains a theory; it does not claim to be a fact, but a different and possible beneficial approach to psychology.
Evolutionary Psychology’s principles of domain specification in the mind and modern skulls housing Stone Age minds are at the core of the theory. They work together in EP research to identify adaptive problems and form predictions. The strength of what they infer is just as weak as Evolutionary Psychology theory. Yet, this begins to become a matter of philosophy and the nature of evolution rather than psychology. Their bearing on modern psychology is still unclear; however, they potentially show a fascinating route of study, which if one day can be proved may provide new, more effective solutions to Psychological issues.
List of References
Bereczkei et al, 2000, ‘Evolutionary psychology: A new perspective in the behavioral sciences’, European Psychologist, Vol 5(3), pp175-190
Buss, 1994 cited in: Kenrick. D & Luce. C, 2004, “The Functional Mind”, Pearson Education, Inc., United States of America
Gould S.J, 2000, ‘More Things in Heaven and Earth’ in: “Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology”, Jonathan Cape, London, 2000
Gowaty. P.A, cited in: Goode. E, 2000, ‘Human Nature: Born or Made?’, retrieved October 14 2007, from
Hagen. E (2004) The Evolutionary Psychology FAQ, retrieved October 27 2007, from http://www.anth.ucsb.edu/projects/human/evpsychfaq.html
Hart J.K, 1938, ‘Mind in Transition’, pp413 in: Page. J.D, “The Journal of Educational Psychology”, Vol 29(7), pp.556-557
Jencks. C, 2000, ‘EP, Phone Home’ in: “Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology”, Jonathan Cape, London, 2000
Malik. K, “Stone Age Men in a Space Age World?” retrieved November 29 2007 from
Nesse and Williams, 1994 cited in: Kenrick. D & Luce. C, 2004, “The Functional Mind”, Pearson Education, Inc., United States of America
Rose. H, 2000, ‘Colonising the Social Sciences?’ in: “Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology”, Jonathan Cape, London, 2000
Rose. S, 2000, ‘Escaping Evolutionary Psychology’ in: “Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology”, Jonathan Cape, London, 2000
Tooby and Cosmides 1996 cited in: Kenrick. D & Luce. C, 2004, “The Functional Mind”, Pearson Education, Inc., United States of America
Tooby and Cosmides, 1997, Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer, retrieved October 14 2007 from
Wenegrat, 1990 cited in: Kenrick. D & Luce. C, 2004, “The Functional Mind”, Pearson Education, Inc., United States of America