Universal Grammar In Second Language Acquisition: The nature of interlanguage representation.

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UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR IN SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION:

THE NATURE OF INTERLANGUAGE REPRESENTATION*

Lydia White

McGill University

Constraints on representation

In this paper, I provide an overview of differing perspectives on the role of Universal Grammar (UG) in second language acquisition (SLA). I will suggest that we must not lose sight of the fact that UG is a theory which provides constraints on linguistic representation. At issue, then, is whether inter-language (IL) representation is constrained

by UG.

UG is part of an innate biologically endowed language faculty. It places

limitations on grammars, constraining their form (the inventory of possible grammatical

categories, in the broadest sense, i.e., syntactic, semantic, phonological), as well as how

they operate (the computational system, principles that the grammar is subject to). UG

includes invariant principles, as well as parameters. While theories like Government-

Binding (GB), Minimalism, or Optimality Theory differ as to how precisely they handle

concepts like principles and parameters, there is a consensus that certain properties of

language are too abstract, subtle and complex to be learned without postulating innate

and specifically linguistic constraints.

Much of the work on UG in SLA has been conducted within the GB framework.

Since then, there have been changes in linguistic theory; some properties that were

determined by principles in GB are handled differently under the Minimalist approach.

Parameters have gradually become more constrained, being largely associated with

variation in the lexicon. In the Minimalist framework, the computational system is

‘given’ by UG and is invariant. What varies is properties of the items that enter into the

computation (for example, their feature composition and feature strength).

Such changes in linguistic theory (hence in the definition of UG) should not be

seen as a matter of major concern. What we are interested in (in part) is whether certain

abstract and complex properties which are underdetermined by the L2 input manifest

themselves in inter-language grammars (ILGs). The fact that there are constant revisions

to theoretical analyses of these properties is tangential. (It is a reflection of normal

development and growth within linguistic theory.) What does not change (much) is

theoreticians’ view of what the problematic data are that require postulation of innate

principles and parameters in the first place.

* Different versions of this paper (with different titles) were presented at GASLA , Pittsburgh, Sept. 1998

and at SLRF, Hawaii, Oct. 1998. This research was conducted with the generous support of research grants

from FCAR and SSHRCC.

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UG is a theory relevant to the issue of linguistic competence, i.e., a theory as to

the nature of grammatical representation. Although UG provides constraints on possible

grammars in the course of acquisition, it is not, of itself, a theory of acquisition. This

point is often misunderstood, perhaps because of terms like Language Acquisition Device

(LAD), which many people in the past equated with UG. But it would be more accurate

to think of UG as just part of an LAD (Hilles 1991) or part of a language faculty (Radford

1997). The LAD will also have to contain learning principles, processing principles,

triggering algorithms, etc. In other words, in addition to a theory of constraints on IL

representation, we need a theory of how that representation is acquired, a theory of

development (whether we are talking about L1 or L2 acquisition). (See Carroll 1996;

Felix 1987; Gregg 1996; Klein and Martohardjono, in press).

The logical problem of language acquisition

Although UG contributes to an explanation of how languages are acquired, this is

in the sense of how it is that learners come to know properties that go far beyond the

input, how they know that certain things are not possible, why grammars are of one sort

rather than another, etc. These properties do not have to be learned; that is the claim.

What is the motivation for UG in the first place? It is the claim that, at least in the case of

first languages, there is a logical problem of language acquisition, a mismatch between

what goes in (namely, the primary linguistic data) and what comes out (a grammar). In

other words, the input underdetermines the output. Assuming a logical problem of L1

acquisition, people have asked whether the same holds true of L2 (White 1985a; Bley-

Vroman 1990).

This question remains central - is it the case that L2 learners attain unconscious

knowledge (a mental representation) that goes beyond the L2 input? And if they do, can

we eliminate alternative sources of this knowledge, such as the L1? The strongest case

for the operation of UG in SLA is if the L2 properties could not have been learned from

input alone or from input plus non domain-specific learning principles or from the L1

grammar alone.

Let us review what kinds of situation have been used to demonstrate an L2 logical

problem, hence likelihood of involvement of UG. Researchers have sought out genuine

‘poverty of the stimulus’ cases. In other words, both of the following must hold (White

1990):

i. The phenomenon in question must be underdetermined by the L2 input. That

is, it must not be something that could have been acquired without recourse to

universal principles, by simple observation of the L2 input, by frequency effects,

or on the basis of instruction, analogical reasoning, etc.

ii. The phenomenon in question should work differently in the L1 and the L2. If

L2 learners show evidence of subtle and abstract knowledge, we want to exclude,

as much as possible, the possibility that such knowledge is obtained via the L1

grammar alone.

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Indeed, this double requirement (not obvious in L2 input; not present in L1) has

been applied as a kind of formula to much UG-SLA research (see Schwartz 1997 for

related observations). However, the requirement that L1 and L2 differ in the relevant

respects becomes harder and harder to achieve, in that many properties of UG will of

necessity manifest themselves in the L1 in some form (see Hale 1996). Nevertheless, if

the L1 and L2 differ in terms of surface properties, then we can at least rule out transfer

at this level as the sole explanation of what is going on.

It is important to distinguish between the logical problem question and the UG

question. The logical problem question is: Is it the case that L2 learners attain

unconscious knowledge (a mental representation) that goes beyond the L2 input? The

UG question is: is this achieved by means of UG? (These are NOT the same question,

although they often get collapsed, since the way to determine whether UG principles and

parameters operate is similar to the way to assess whether there is a logical problem.)

UG ‘access’ and terminological confusions

Assuming that there is indeed a logical problem of L2 acquisition, researchers

asked more UG-specific questions. In the 1980s, the UG question seemed relatively

straight forward (and relatively global): Is UG available (or accessible) to L2 learners? In

other words: do ILGs show evidence of being constrained by principles of UG? A

number of principles were investigated, such as Subjacency, the ECP and Binding

Principle A. The assumption was that if you can show that a particular UG principle

operates/does not operate then this generalizes to other principles, hence to UG

availability/non-availability in general.

The first issue to be taken up in our field was, I believe, the issue of UG

parameters rather than invariant UG principles, e.g. head position (Flynn 1984) and prodrop

(White 1985b), Ritchie (1978) being an early exception. A lot of early work looked

at whether there is evidence of parameter (re)setting in ILGs (i.e., early stage L1 value,

later stage L2 value of some parameter, with relevant clustering of properties). If ILGs

are UG constrained, then we expect parametric properties to show up, either in the form

of L1 settings or L2 settings or settings found in other languages, with an associated

cluster of properties.

A number of people proposed a ‘no parameter resetting’ hypothesis, whereby L2

learners are subject to UG principles but cannot reset parameters (e.g. Clahsen and

Muysken 1989; Liceras et al. 1997; Tsimpli and Roussou). Others argue that L1 settings

prevail initially, with subsequent acquisition of other values (e.g. Schwartz and Sprouse

1996; White 1985b). Some have proposed that L2 settings are attainable without prior

adoption of L1 settings (Epstein, Flynn and Martohardjono 1996; Flynn 1987).

Considerable terminological confusions and disagreements arose fairly early on,

relating to the involvement of the L1 and implications for UG operation. For example,

consider terms like direct access and full access to UG. Direct access for some meant

that L2 learners arrive at UG properties independently of their L1 (e.g. Cook 1988). For

others (e.g. Thomas 1991b) it meant the instantiation of any legitimate parameter settings

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(L1, L2, Ln). Indirect access to UG was used to refer to access via the L1, some

researchers using it to mean access ONLY via the L1 (e.g. Cook 1988), while others took

this to mean access via L1 initially followed by parameter resetting. Similar problems

have arisen with the terms full access and partial access which at some point replaced

direct/indirect access. Full access for some (Epstein, Flynn and Martohardjono 1996) is

restricted to the position that UG operates independently of the L1 representation,

whereas for others (e.g. Schwartz and Sprouse 1996; White 1985b) it means access via

L1 but not restricted to L1.

Part of the problem is that these terms are too global. In addition, some

researchers have assumed a fairly simplistic and misleading dichotomy: UG or L1 in the

IL representation. As Hale (1996) has recently pointed out, in many cases it is

impossible to tease UG and the L1 apart. UG is necessarily manifested in the L1.

But another part of the problem, to me at least, is that these terms reflect too much

concentration on the source(s) of IL knowledge (UG versus L1). I believe that it is time

to focus more on the nature of the representations that L2 learners achieve. Not that we

ignored this in the past, but it always seems to be secondary. Is UG available? - let’s

take a look at the grammar ...... I think we should be prepared to reverse this focus and

concentrate more on the nature of the IL representation. We must recognize that it may

not always be appropriate to dwell on the UG question. For example, much current work

on functional categories in IL representation presupposes the operation of UG and

concentrates on details of how functional categories and features are represented (see

below for further discussion).

The comparative fallacy

If we are going to take the issue of representation seriously, we need to consider

Bley-Vroman’s (1983) comparative fallacy. Recently, Schwartz and Sprouse (1994),

Schwartz (1997) and Cook (1997) have reminded us of the dangers of comparing L2

learners to native speakers of the L2 with respect to UG properties. In his 1983 paper on

the comparative fallacy, Bley-Vroman warned that “work on the linguistic description of

learners’ languages can be seriously hindered or sidetracked by a concern with the target

language” (p. 2) and pointed out that “the learner’s system is worthy of study in its own

right, not just as a degenerate form of the target system” (p. 4).1

Ironically, I believe that the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis (FDH) itself

constitutes a case of the comparative fallacy. Bley-Vroman argues that L2 learning is

fundamentally different from L1 acquisition in part on the basis of differences in the

outcomes (i.e., properties of the grammars of L2 learners versus the grammars of native

speakers). Certainly, other proponents of the FDH are quite explicit in their assumption

that one should compare L2 learners and native speakers with respect to UG properties,

the native speaker of the L2 providing a reference point for assessing UG availability.

Research was often somewhat formulaic (see also Schwartz 1997): take Principle X or

1 See White (1982) for similar observations re L1 grammars.

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Parameter Y, investigate whether or not L2 learners observe properties relating to the

principle or parameter in question. If L2 learners rendered judgments (or otherwise

behaved) like native speakers, then they were deemed to have access to Principle X or

Parameter Y; on the other hand, if they differed in their judgments from native speakers,

then their grammars were assumed not constrained by UG; hence, UG is not

available/accessible. (For arguments against this position, see Schwartz (1997) and White

(1996b).) For example, in Schachter’s (1989, 1990) investigations of Subjacency, this

was the underlying rationale for assuming non-operation of UG (or UG only via L1).

L2ers of certain L1 backgrounds were very inaccurate in their judgments on Subjacency

violations when compared to native speakers of English; hence, Schachter argued, L2

learners do not have access to UG principles independently of the L1.

A number of UG/SLA researchers pointed out quite early on the need to consider

ILGs in their own right with respect to principles and parameters of UG, i.e. not to

compare L2 learners to native speakers of the L2 but to consider whether ILGs are

natural language systems (e.g. duPlessis et al. 1987; Finer and Broselow 1986;

Martohardjono and Gair 1993; Schwartz and Sprouse 1994; White 1992). These authors

have shown that if one concentrates on properties of the ILG in its own right, one sees

that L2 learners may arrive at grammars which indeed account for the L2 input (though

not in the same way as the grammar of a native speaker). The issue, then, is whether the

ILG is a ‘possible’ grammar, not whether it is equivalent to the L2 grammar. For

example, with respect to Subjacency, Martohardjono and Gair (1993), White (1992) and

more recently Hawkins and Chan (1997) argue that L2 learners have a different analysis

for the phenomenon in question, i.e., wh-questions are derived without movement, using

pro as the empty category, hence explaining lack of Subjacency effects.

Another form of the comparative fallacy is to expect L2 speakers not to differ

significantly from native speakers with respect to performance on some property.

Suppose that on a grammaticality judgment task native speakers accept some UG

violation at less than 10% and accept corresponding grammatical sentences at over 90%.

In order to demonstrate ‘access’ to this principle, is it necessary for L2 speakers to

perform at the same sort of level? In fact, this is not the issue. Rather, the issue is

whether the ILG shows evidence of certain distinctions: does learner performance on

grammatical sentences differ significantly from their performance on ungrammatical

sentences (c.f. Grimshaw and Rosen (1990), for related comments on L1 acquisition)?

Do L2 learners distinguish between different kinds of ungrammatical sentences (see

Martohardjono 1993)? If certain sentence types are treated significantly differently from

other sentence types, this suggests that the ILG represents the relevant distinction

(whatever it may be), even if the degree to which they observe it may differ from native

speakers.

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Should one, then, never compare L2 speakers to native speakers of the L2?2 This,

I think, would be overdoing it, since there are legitimate reasons for asking whether the

L2 learner has in fact acquired properties of the L2. After all, the L2 is a natural

language, the learner is exposed to L2 input (though this may in fact be deficient input).

What is problematic is when certain conclusions are drawn based on failure to achieve

the L2 grammar. Failure to acquire L2 properties may nevertheless involve acquiring

properties different from the L1, properties of other natural languages, properties that are

underdetermined by the L2 input. Such failure does not necessarily entail lack of UG.

Comparing ILGs to the L1 grammar potentially constitutes a case of the

comparative fallacy as well, since such a comparison may result in failure to observe the

ILG in its own right, i.e., precisely the same problem that arises with constant comparison

to the target language grammar. (See Schwartz (1997) for a contrary view.)

The nature of interlanguage representation

Much current research concentrates on the nature of IL representation. Specific

grammatical properties are investigated and claims are made about how they are

represented in the ILG. In a number of cases, the “does this come from UG/L1?”

question and “does this mean access to UG?” question is not explicitly addressed (rightly

in my view). The focus on IL representation manifests itself particularly clearly in

current research on the L2 initial state. There have been a variety of initial state claims:

the L1 grammar is the initial state (Schwartz and Sprouse 1996); UG is the initial state

(Epstein, Flynn and Martohardjono 1996); a grammar with lexical but not functional

categories is the initial state (Vainikka and Young-Scholten 1994); a grammar lacking

specified features is the initial state (Eubank 1994). Theories about the initial state are

theories about the representation that L2 learners start out with, the representation that

they use to make sense of the L2 input. These are not theories about UG availability

(contra Epstein, Flynn and Martohardjono (1996) who mistakenly equate claims about

representations lacking functional categories with claims about partial access to UG).

The nature of representation during development is also an issue. Indeed, earlier

claims about parameter resetting were claims about the nature of representation at

different stages, although they were not always seen that way. The growth in papers

investigating detailed aspects of IL knowledge in various domains reflects the current

concern with representational issues, as well as increasingly sophisticated analyses within

the field.

Finally, interest in ultimate attainment is also a representational matter, addressing

the issue of what endstate representions like. Some researchers have investigated the

nature of the endstate grammar in considerable detail, for example Sorace’s (1993a, b)

work on how unaccusativity is represented in the grammars of near native speakers and

2 Of course control groups should be included in order to make sure that one’s test instruments are OK,

etc. This is a different matter.

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Lardiere’s research on divergence between endstate syntactic knowledge and

morphological properties (Lardiere 1998a, b).

In other words, researchers have been exploring the nature of various properties

in the ILG, in order to understand the ‘theory’ or grammar that the learner creates to

accommodate the L2 input. With this shift, we are no longer asking the UG question

directly; instead of worrying about the source of grammatical properties (UG, the L1,

something else), we are looking at the nature of those properties. This is not to say that

we have abandoned the UG question but we are coming at it from a different angle.

Impaired representation

With the issue shifting to the nature of ILGs considered in their own right, the

question arose as to whether they are always natural language systems, or whether are

they ‘wild’ or ‘rogue’ (i.e. failing to observe UG constraints) (see Dekydtspotter et al.

1998; Hamilton 1998; Klein 1995; Thomas 1991a, 1995). In these cases, ILGs are

argued to show (or not show) properties not found elsewhere in natural languages, hence

indirectly casting doubt on involvement of UG. (The response takes the form of offering

an alternative analysis of the same data, and/or showing that such cases do arise in natural

languages.)

Recently, there have been explicit claims that IL representation is impaired, either

globally (Meisel 1997) or locally (Beck 1998; Eubank and Grace 1998; Hawkins and

Chan 1997; Liceras et al. 1997), impairment mostly located in properties of the IL

functional feature system. One can broadly distinguish two classes of claims. The first

(the unimpaired camp) assumes that the ILG will include L2 functional categories and

features (Epstein, Flynn and Martohardjono, 1996; Grondin and White 1996;

Lakshmanan 1993; Schwartz and Sprouse 1994; Vainikka and Young-Scholten 1994;

White 1996a). Although these researchers differ as to the presumed nature of early ILs,

i.e., whether they lack functional categories altogether (Vainikka and Young-Scholten

1994) or whether the L1 representation is initially involved (Schwartz and Sprouse 1994)

or not (Epstein, Flynn and Martohardjono 1996), they agree that L2 functional properties

will in principle be present in the IL grammar.

The second approach assumes impairment which affects functional properties in

the ILG. This camp can be divided into two, with only the second group making claims

for truly impaired representation. In the first sub-camp, Hawkins (1998) and Hawkins

and Chan (1997) argue for the ‘failed features hypothesis’ whereby the IL representation

is restricted to those features and feature values available in the L1 (also Liceras et al.

1997; Tsimpli and Roussou 1991). However, (i) the ILG has considerable flexibility to

accommodate new data; (ii) this is not an impairment that involves a grammar different in

nature from other grammars, since L1 featural properties are present. In contrast, Beck

(1998) and Eubank et al. (1997) propose that interlanguage feature strength is

permanently ‘inert’ or unspecified (the ‘local impairment hypothesis’ of Beck). These

proposals argue impaired representation - inert feature values (at least for finiteness) or

no features - with consequences for a number of grammatical properties (verb raising,

etc.). (It should be noted that such impairment implies that the ILG is not UG8

constrained in all domains.) Meisel (1997) goes further still, proposing more global

impairment to functional (and other) properties, with L2 grammars being of an essentially

different nature from those found in L1 acquisition.

Without going into the details of this debate, it seems clear that we have left the

global question (is there access to UG?) and are now probing quite intricate properties of

the IL representation. This in turn raises interesting conceptual questions: does it make

sense to think of an IL representation as being impaired in one domain (morphology) but

not another (syntax); does it make sense to think of some features (say, finiteness) being

impaired but not others? If the ILG indeed draws on a variety of knowledge sources,

how do these come together?

Beyond representation

A number of researchers have pointed out that theories of L2 acquisition must

explain both the representational problem (what L2 learners come to know) and the

developmental problem (how they attain this knowledge) (e.g. Carroll 1996; Felix 1987;

Gregg 1996; Klein and Martohardjono, in press). Much UG/SLA research has focused

on the nature of the L2 learner’s grammar, looking for evidence for or against the

involvement of principles and parameters of UG, and has explored the nature of the

initial state, the developing grammar, etc. These are representational issues, as we have

seen.

Even if one looks for UG properties in learner grammars at various points in time,

this is a question of representation, not development. It answers the question of what

learner grammars are like (grammars at time X conform to properties X and at time Y to

Y) but not how they develop in that way. In other words, showing that L2 learners can

reset parameters is not a theory of interlanguage development. We should bear in mind

that UG itself cannot be a learning theory; it can only interact with other theories that try

to explain development. A representational theory is not the same as a developmental

one; there is clearly a need for both and room for both.

Nevertheless, researchers working on UG and SLA have considered the issue of

how grammar change is brought about. To account for grammar change, one needs a

theory of how the L2 input interacts with the existing grammar, what properties of the

input act as triggers change, etc. Some L2 learnability work has looked into these kinds

of questions (the role of positive and negative evidence, learning principles, proposals

that grammar change is failure driven, possible triggers in the input, etc.) (e.g. Trahey and

White 1993; White 1991).

Another issue is relevant in this context. In the SLA field, there is often a

confusion between competence and performance. That is, people look at L2

performance, note that it differs from native speakers, and argue that this means essential

differences in competence, lack of UG, etc. (the comparative fallacy again). But it is in

fact possible that L2 learners’ underlying competence is to some extent hidden by

performance factors, such as the demands of processing or parsing. Recently, there has

been increasing work looking at how the IL mental representation interacts with other

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‘modules’ such as processing (i.e. how the representation is used on-line and off-line)

(Juffs and Harrington 1995; Schachter and Yip 1990). Knowledge and use of knowledge

do not always coincide.

Conclusion

The UG question is part of a bigger question: what are natural language grammars

like? Or rather, UG is proposed as an answer to that question. By focusing more on what

ILGs are like (their nature rather than their source) we are arriving at a more fruitful way

of investigating the involvement of UG in SLA. It is important to bear in mind that

claims for UG operation in L2 acquisition are simply claims that interlanguage grammars

will fall within a limited range, that the ‘hypothesis space’ is specified by UG. As

Dekydtspotter, Sprouse and Anderson (1998) point out: “Given that the sole role of UG is

to restrict the hypothesis space available to the language acquirer, Full Restriction might

be a more perspicuous name than the standard Full Access”. If we have to use such terms

at all, this one has many advantages, since it focuses our attention on properties of the

ILG (the learner’s representation), while at the same time reminding us that the

restrictions come from UG.

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