"Generals win battles, resources win wars."To what extent is this true of the period 1792- 1918?

Effective planning is a further skill of Generalship, because ‘Mistakes in preliminary deployment are difficult to correct.’ There may be a steady supply of resources, for example, but poor planning could still ensure defeat. The greatest responsibility of the commander was to decide how, when, where and if, the battle would be fought. Whereas Wellington planned for the need to feed troops, Napoleon often did not. This led to his defeat in 1812 in Russia. Planning was also essential for Frederick William III’s victories. A co-ordinated General Staff and the use of corps and divisions, prompted by the defeat at Jena- Auerstadt, enabled to them to become a strong and successful army. The use of railways enabled the planning of warfare to become easier. Before the Crimean War, for example, Britain was able to transport weapons, supplies and troops to the Crimea in less than three weeks, which enabled them to be at an immediate advantage. Poor planning, conversely, leads to almost certain defeat. General Custer underestimated the number of Native Americans in 1876, for example. Though he intended to encircle the braves, he ended up being encircled and overwhelmed. This was also evident in the Charge of the Light Brigade, when Lord Lucan’s poor planning and Nolan’s lack of insight led to defeat. A further example is the Schleiffen Plan. Although Kesselschlacht worked during the Franco- Prussian war when planned for appropriately, the Germans underestimated the enemy and the plan failed, despite adequate resources. A General’s plans, therefore, can significantly influence the outcome of a war.

A General must have appropriate insight as well as effective planning and tactical manoeuvres. Carnot made a virtue out of necessity by adopting ‘shock tactics’ to make up for the lack of trained troops. He urged, ‘No more manoeuvres, no more military art but fire, steel and patriotism…. We must exterminate, eliminate to the bitter end.’ Carnot also used his skills of Generalship to support the risk- taking, combining it with effective planning to create columns that presented less of a target to the opposing infantry. Similar methods were used by Frederick the Great who attacked even against superior numbers. Despite sustaining greater casualties in all but the battles of Rossbach and Leuthen, because he supported the method with the ‘oblique tactic’ he brought mobility and decisiveness back to the battlefield. Grant applied similar tactics. Following Von Klauschwitz’s ideas, luck and imagination, for example during the Vicsburg Campaign, enabled victory by force and determination. This was seen during the Battle of the Wilderness when he made the best use of the resources he had; proving Generalship can win a battle or a war even with poor resources.

A General’s command of the troops can also be decisive in a battle. ‘Victory to the big battalions’ can be true, but it is often the effective organisation of those battalions which secures victory. Von Moltke provides evidence that ‘Battles are won not by numbers but by the manner of forming your troops together and their order and discipline,’ as he combined conscription with detailed contingency plans which, with the Dreyse rifle, enabled success against Austria in 1866. This can also be seen in the Franco- Austrian War, when the French arrived on the battlefield in superior numbers, peak condition and fully supplied after using the railway, whereas the Austrian army marched at less than three miles a day, and lost the battle. Beckett notes in “Warfare in the Twentieth Century,” industrialization “ensured that ever larger armies could be mobilized theoretically more quickly …. And sustained in the field far longer.” This implies that the role of those in command was vitally important; that industrialization alone would not have ensured a country’s victory without the General’s effective use of it. This can be seen in the Franco- Prussian War, for example. Von Moltke’s planning ensured that their artillery was modernised and the railway effectively expanded, enabling rapid mobilisation. The French, on the other hand, found the chassepot expensive so faltered in their modernisation. When mobilising they were slow and fragmented, resulting in the Prussians mobilising twice the amount of men in seventeen days. Therefore it was whether the General took advantage of the industrialization that influenced the outcome of the war.

It has been argued that the results of wars are determined by nature. Keegan, for example, states that, “War is always limited…. Because nature determines that it shall be.” He continues in “A History of Warfare” to cite the wind, terrain, and gender as influencing war. Though Keegan’s views are well respected, it seems more likely that nature more often influences a General’s decisions, rather than actually directly influencing the war. During the American War of Independence, for example, the Generals’ poor planning meant that they struggled to ship supplies three thousand miles across sea. A further example is Wellington who used the surrounding terrain to his advantage during the Battle of Waterloo; the decision to occupier the higher ground ultimately leading to success, as it did during the 1757 Battle of Leuthen when Frederick the Great used a similar to deceive the Austrians. Classic examples of Generals being forced to base their tactics on the surrounding landscape is through guerrilla warfare. During the American War of Independence Greene demoralised a British Army who, as with the Americans in Vietnam, were ill- prepared for guerrilla warfare. Though both Generals had the opportunity to make advantage of the terrain, Greene’s superior preparation and tactics lead the Americans to success. Napoleon also provides an example of this. Spain, described by Napoleon as “an ulcer,” was his first major setback because the Spanish people fought a guerrilla war. This was successful despite poor resources due to not being funded by their government, who had previously surrendered to the French. Therefore whatever the environment or available resources, a General’s effective planning can still lead to success.

Though of vital importance, though it is often the General’s effective organisation of resources which enables success; resources alone would not win a war. Von Kluck’s army, advancing from the Mons to the Marne, were too slow to find untouched stores due to the General’s poor planning. Conversely, the Russians in Central Asia in 1874 employed 8,800 camels to feed 5,500 men; superior preparation leading to victory. Marlborough’s victory at Blenheim in 1704 was secured as much by ensuring supplies as the events on the battlefield. ‘It is I who commands the army by flour and forage are the masters’ was also true of Napoleon. Whereas his effective adaptation for resources led to success at Ulm, when his resources became weak his tactics suffered and became predictable, leading to defeat at Waterloo because, ‘They came on in the same old way and we stopped them in the same old way.’ A typical example is General Roberts. During the Boer War he realised that he needed “to massively increase the number of mounted troops and to remodel the supply and transport system” to beat the mobile and efficient Boers. This resulted in a successful series of battles, leading to the entering of Bloemfontein and Pretoria. Roberts’ effective Generalship made the best of poor resources resulting in battle success. The opposite can be seen during the Franco- Prussian War. Though the resources were available to the French troops who had an advantage with the Chassepot and the mitrailleuse, it was kept so secret that very few French troops knew how to use it. This led to decisive defeats at Metz and Sedan; ultimately, the General’s poor use of resources led to downfall.

Resources are of obvious importance during a war; without men, artillery or food a General would be powerful. It can likewise be said, however, that original tactics are of equal importance, especially during short conflicts where problems with the supply of resources are unlikely to occur. Without leadership and direction, an army is powerless. Perhaps the ultimate decider is the fact that though wars have been won without certain resources such as superior artillery or man- power, there has never been success without effective leadership. During the Crimean War, for example, the British had sufficient resources during the Charge of the Light Brigade but lost the battle due to poor Generalship. A war is never won on the utilisation of resources alone. Their organisation is only one of the skills that a General must combine with others such as the effective command of men and advance planning if the battle, and ultimately the war, is to be won.