Impacts of IMF and World Bank to the Development of Vietnam.

Since 1989, the IMF has augmented its regular policy advice with technical assistance in financial and economic management. About one-third of the costs of this assistance have been covered by two successive and extensive UNDP-financed projects executed by the IMF. The areas covered include central banking and monetary policy, fiscal policy, tax reform and budget management, external economic relations, and macroeconomic statistics. Training for officials is provided through the IMF Institute in Washington and the Joint Vienna Institute.

Vietnam will get approximately $1.1 billion in aid from the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank by the end of 2002. The IMF this year will fund the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programme, under which the country expects to get $100 million in loans.

The WB plans to provide $600 million for development projects. The Asian Development Bank will provide some $400 million in loans for infrastructure and banking projects.

In terms of Vietnam's debt repayments, the country will pay an average of $600 million per year, during the 2002-2005 period. Up to $200 million of these annual repayments will be made through commodities exchanges among enterprises, mainly from Algeria, India, Iraq and Russia. The amount of debt repayment through commodities exchanges is based on debt settlement agreements between the Vietnamese government and these governments. Around $1.1 billion of debt was repaid from 1993 to 2001 through commodities exchange arrangements.

Presently, the country's total foreign debt stands at 35% of the GDP, which is around $30 billion.

2.  Vietnam’s Policies

2.1. Economic renovation “Doimoi” policy

"Doi Moi", literally change and newness, is the Vietnamese Communist Party's term for reform and renovation in the economy. This term was coined in 1986 for a transition from the centrally planned Stalinist command economy to a "market economy with socialist direction".  In June 1991, The VII Congress completed the reform policies . Fundamental viewpoints of the renovation:

1. Developing a multi-sectoral economy.
2. Shifting the economy from the bureaucratic planned centralized and State-subsidized mechanism to the socialist-oriented market economy under State's management.
3. Opening the diversified and multilateral economy as well as enhancing foreign economic efficiency on the basis of expanding economic co-operation to the countries in the region and all over the world.
4. Democratizing all fields of the socio-economic life, implementing administration reforms and building a state governed by law. Under the renovation program, trade was gradually liberalized. Whereas in 1981 there were only 12 import-export companies, the number rose to 35 in 1987 and 1250 in 1995.

Although there has been high economic growth rate for the past time, economic scale, due to low starting point, remains modest. Up to now, Vietnam is still one of the poorest countries in the world.  The infrastructure remains backward and antiquated, hardly meet the demand of economic development for the time to come. The vast majority of products that have been rapidly boosted are in form of resource exploitation. Many industrial and consumer goods are of low- quality, failing to compete with foreign- made commodities. In the service sector, operation is still in confusion. The efficiency of investment and production are low, part of the resources has been wasted, and many big businesses have gone bust. Internal saving and investment remain stagnant creating difficulties in mobilizing the people's saving for producing goods and carrying out business .

In contrast to Eastern European reforms Doi Moi favors gradualism and political stability over radical change, with economic restructuring to come before privatization. Vietnam is more like China ( and Pyun, 1995) in its economic structure than the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the role models for successful economic development in East Asia have not promoted political liberalization.

The idea of Doi Moi originated from seeing the negative results of suppressing some spontaneous war-time experiments. Thus it was that the VCP's Sixth National Congress in December of 1986 acknowledged that the economic model followed since 1954 had failed. In 1988 there were major policies initiated which moved the system toward a market economy. Some of these were:

2.2. Poverty alleviation

Poverty has decreased dramatically from an estimated 58 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 2000, a remarkable accomplishment. General Statistical Office (2001).  Most of the traditional social indicators (infant, child, and maternal mortality; life expectancy; literacy) have continued to improve from already high levels, and small gender gaps have narrowed further. In health, one notable shift has been the sharp drop in the proportion of deaths from communicable diseases, due in part to successful public health programmes.

Vietnam experienced GDP growth rates averaging 8% per year between 1990 and 1997.  But the increase in income inequality which marked the years of rapid growth, coupled with the regional financial crisis of 1997, led the Government to re-examine its policies on poverty reduction.  It was clear that growth alone would not solve the problems of the poor.  With the slowdown of foreign direct investment in 1998, the relative importance of foreign assistance rose, which may in part explain the Government’s enhanced interest in strengthening relations with its “development partners”, namely Donors, International NGOs and the growing number of private sector businesses.  Around early 1997, the World Bank was also re-considering its strategy for working in Vietnam, both with Government and with other partner agencies.  

2.3. Paticipatory approach

In recent years, the Government of Vietnam has taken significant steps to improve communication and to encourage more of a two-way flow of information and views. In 1998, a “Grassroots Democracy Decree” was passed, which established the legal framework for the participation of citizens in commune-level local decision making processes and their right to ‘monitor’ local government expenditures.  Although the capacity of citizens to actively participate remains constrained, for example, by their lack of awareness on rights and entitlements, the Decree is viewed as a step towards enhancing the transparency and accountability of local government officials.  Other potential links between the Government and the populace are the various development-oriented actors working at the grassroots level.

In order to learn directly from the poor about the major problems they faced, and how they perceived them, a Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) was conducted in 1999 in four out of seven regions of the country.  As far as possible, the findings of the Integrating quantitative and qualitative data would be integrated in order to develop a fuller picture of the state of poverty in Vietnam. The British Department for International Development (DFID) expressed its strong interest in supporting the PPAs, which it saw as a means to enhance the poverty analysis.  The benefits of the study were pre-defined for different participation levels as follow:

• Local level:  The assessment would help to open up direct lines of communication with poor households with the upper authority levels.

 

•  National level:  A major attraction was the idea that the PPAs would feed into a national poverty assessment which may be used by Government in formulating its next medium-term economic strategies, the 5 Year Plan and the 10 Year Socio-economic Development Strategy.  

 

• Global level:   At a later workshop held in January 1999, it was also agreed that the PPAs could be used as the Vietnam country study for the global “Consultations with the Poor” exercise, which was being conducted as background research to the 2000/01 World Development Report.  

World Bank assistance gains little success in structural reform.  However, efficacy has been more successful in addressing infrastructure and poverty issues. Efficiency is considered average and the overall outcome of Bank assistance is rated as satisfactory ???. Institutional development impact has been modest. Successes include introducing competitive bidding, helping draft new laws and regulations, helping to set the stage for major private investments in energy, and improving the approach to cost recovery in infrastructure. Sustainability of benefits of Bank assistance is mixed. In infrastructure, improvements are needed in operations and maintenance, and sustainability of the new and rehabilitated irrigations systems, highway, and rural roads is uncertain. By contrast, the institutional changes which form the basis for future policy reform seem irreversible. Overall, sustainability is rated as likely. On the whole, the Bank ' s delivery of assistance in Vietnam has been exemplary and has closely followed priorities of the Government as well as corporate mandates. Looking forward, the focus of Bank strategy should continue to be on structural, policy, and institutional reforms at the national level. At the same time, grassroot level was also a concern of the Bank  

Since 1998, the Government had been negotiating with the World Bank and IMF on a joint Economic and Social Restructuring Credit Programme  This programme would be co-funded by the Asian Development Bank, Japan, the Netherlands, U.K., Sweden and Denmark.   The discussions had been held up by dissenting views within the Government, particularly regarding some of the conditions attached to the loan which would require a speeding up of the reform process with a focus on the macroeconomic framework.    Based on the PPA studies and a number of workshops discussing about well-being, Vietnam summieted the Poverty Reduction Strategy (namely “Attacking Poverty”) to the Boards of the IMF and World Bank,

 

 

Enabling factors

 

• ∙        “Vietnamese” process leading strategy formulation:   In the case of Vietnam, the idea of developing a national poverty reduction strategy was part of ongoing preparatory work for the 5 Year Strategy and 10 Year Development Plan.  In fact, the World Bank took pains to play down the “requirement” of a PRSP, emphasizing that it was part of Vietnam’s own planning process.[25]  This was similar to the way in which the Comprehensive Development Framework, officially endorsed by the Government in October 1999, was “introduced” in Vietnam.[26]       

• Longer-term impact on Local Government officials:   In the course of the participatory poverty assessments, there had been some capacity-building through the participation of  local District and Commune staff.  However, these staff were not expected to be able to employ these techniques in their future activities, and furthermore, the Government was unlikely to provide training for its staff in such exercises, given other pressing training needs such as improving the quality of the “regular” statistics.[19]   However, one INGO noted that the experience of going into the poorest communes was new for many Local Government officials, and some had been shocked by the living conditions of the villagers.  In this regard, the impact of the PPAs at the local level should perhaps be assessed by changes in the attitudes of Local Government officials.        

2.3. Demands from WB/IMF/WTO and Vietnam’s resistance

Vietnam is under relentless pressure from the IMF and World Bank to change course, and this is reflected in debates within the party. Following are some of the points on which they are demanding Vietnam intensify "reform", and the differing degrees to which Vietnam is resisting.

•  WB/IMF oppose Vietnam's right to maintain unopposed state ownership in any key areas that Vietnam scrap this state "monopoly", as it is "inconsistent with WTO accession" (WB/IMF/UNDP) It rejected either putting aside certain areas as outside competition from the private sector, or the state investing heavily to strengthen its competitive edge in areas it aims to keep. The Vietnam government, however, is strengthening the key state sectors to face competition.  For all State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) which have capital of $1.33 million or more and contribute at least $200,000 to the state budget over a three year period will stay wholly state owned. SOEs which have capital of between $700,000 and $1.33 million would be equitised, with the state maintaining dominant shares. SOEs which have capital of less than $330,000 (60 per cent of all SOEs) would be equitised, sold, leased or contracted out." (Vietnam Investment Review, July 8-14, 2002).   It is unclear whether such new policy statements, or the congress resolutions, will take precedence in practice.
• They demand that the equitisation process be fast-tracked, promising that the massive job losses—which the WB estimates may be up to 600,000 workers—will be rapidly overcome by employment in the dynamic private sector that would result. At the Third Plenum, party leader Nong Duc Manh expressed the different perspective of the "conservative" wing of the party, that "equitisation" is only one of a number of methods that may be used to "reform" and "strengthen" the state sector, stressing "there are many ways to reform SOEs, and application of foreign experiences without taking into account Vietnam-specific conditions would not be successful. The process must be conducted in a specific and experimental manner to ensure stability and development. As always, accountability must reign supreme in business, but Vietnamese SOEs are driven by a socialist orientation, so the social impacts of economic operations must be taken into account." (Viet Nam News, August 23, 2001)

The dominant role of the state sector in Vietnam’s economy is also what allowed Vietnam to largely withstand the recent Asian economic crisis in 1997. According to Vietnam watcher Adam Forde from the National University of Singapore: “Vietnam delivered by far the best performance in ASEAN during 1998. This has been spectacularly ignored by the world, especially organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF. This is because Vietnam is still protected and 'unreformed' economy was her major source of protection. Not having followed some advisers and opened up her capital markets to foreign investors”

• They insist on stepping up the rate of tariff reductions and other such measures to fast-track WTO entry, leaving Vietnamese industry unprotected in the savage world of global imperialism. Vietnam is taking it all very much at its own pace, while passing new regulations against foreign companies that dump cheap goods onto the Vietnamese market thanks to massive home country subsidies.
• They insist on fewer restrictions on foreign investment. For example, while foreign investors are currently limited to thirty per cent ownership in equitised firms, the US-Vietnam trade agreement states, "Seven years after entry into force of the Agreement, US companies shall be allowed to establish 100 per cent US-owned companies to engage in trading activities in all products".
• They demand the abolition of import and export quotas and the "further liberalisation of the rice trade" (World Bank 1998). At present, the state controls rice exports and decides how much will be exported; rice-producing peasants sell the rest domestically on the free market. This ensures that domestic rice prices are not too high because they do not reflect higher world market prices. According to the WB, this export quota is inequitable because, although it means lower prices for urban dwellers, it means the farmers, who are poorer than urban workers, get less for their rice. It therefore advocates that any private rice farmer or rice trader be allowed to export as much as they like. This is dishonest, because only a fraction of larger farmers, largely in the Mekong delta, produce a surplus for export; the poorest rural areas are rice deficit areas, where peasants would suffer more than urban workers. Moreover, the rice-producing farmers are now suffering from the world collapse of rice prices. So some state rice farms are now setting up contracts with rice farmers to deliver export rice over a period of years, with a price set just above the current market price, to ensure stability for the farmers in the face of world price fluctuations. Many farmers are seeing the advantages and signing on (Vietnam Economic Times, February 2002)

• They demand Vietnam "abandon the push to set up new cooperatives" after the new cooperative law came into effect in 1998. This conflicts with a renewed emphasis, from the "conservative" wing of the party, on the leading role of collective property alongside the state sector. Nong Duc Manh at the party's Fifth Plenum stated that "the collective economy, in which cooperatives play a key role, must expand in diversified forms" because "the state and collective economies should become a mainstay for the national economy" (Manh, 2002).
• The WB opposes the route of cooperatives; rather, it advocates "further liberalisation of land ownership" and a "true land market". (World Bank). Yet what leads to millions living in wood and cardboard shanties surrounding cities is the violence with which this "true land market" has driven millions of peasants off the land. In Thailand, the peasantry has been locked out of some fifty per cent of all cultivable land in recent decades, as giant private plantations growing cash crops enrich a tiny minority. The greater ability of Vietnamese peasants to hold onto land despite the pressures of debt, corruption and the market is, ironically, due to the fact that they don't own the land outright. The Vietnamese constitution declares all land the property of the state; peasants lease agricultural land for twenty years at a time, these leases being instantly renewable and inheritable. While an indebted peasant may sell or mortgage the land, and the "market" has resulted in various degrees of landlessness and land concentration, the process is limited because the sale is limited to the period of the lease, following which the land may revert to the state, which then can re-lease it to peasants. The WB advocates full private ownership of land, which includes the full right to lose land, arguing that the resulting land concentration will result in "economies of scale" that can employ advanced technology in agriculture.

While the miserable state of poverty and corresponding low health and education standards afflicting Vietnam are due to imperialist exploitation through unequal exchange (“free trade”), debt slavery, resource looting and other mechanisms, the difference between Vietnam and capitalist countries is the degree of social control over its economy that the former has established since its socialist revolution. One example is the ruling Communist Party's determination to maintain dominant state ownership over the “key sectors” of the economy, despite a very liberal policy on both domestic and foreign capitalist intervention in many sectors of the economy.

3.  Main impacts

Interviewed by Jared Israel, Emperors-Clothes.com 4/18/2000, Chossudovsky boldly confirmed that “When an IMF mission goes into a country and requires the destruction of social and economic institutions as a condition for lending money - this is very similar to the physical destruction caused by NATO bombing. The IMF will order the closing down of hospitals, schools and factories. That's of course more cost effective than bombing those hospitals, schools and factories, as they did in Yugoslavia, but the ultimate result is very similar: the destruction of the country”.

While the World Bank's mandate consists in "combating poverty" and protecting the environment, its support to large scale hydroelectric and agro-industrial projects has also speeded up the process of deforestation and the destruction of the natural environment, leading to the forced displacement and eviction of several million people.  For instance, the TaBu Dam in Son la province in the Northern Vietnam (2000-2020), hundred thousands of indigenous people have to resettled down in the Central Highland thousand miles away.  It will be hard for then to adjust to the new environment,  the economic conditions is even worse than before.    

3.1. Impact on the national economy

The restructuring of the World economy under the guidance of the Washington based financial institutions increasingly denies individual developing countries the possibility of building a national economy: the internationalization of macro-economic policy transforms countries into open economic territories and national economies into "reserves" of cheap labor and natural resources. The application of the IMF "economic medicine" tends to further depress World commodity prices because it forces individual countries to simultaneously gear their national economies towards a shrinking World market. 

At the heart of global economic system, lies an unequal structure of trade, production and credit which defines the role and position of developing countries in the global economy. What is nature of this unfolding world economic system, on what structure of global poverty and income inequality is it based? By the turn of the century, the World population will be six billion of which five billion will be living in poor countries. While the rich countries with some 15 percent of the World population control close to 80 percent of total World income, some 58 percent of the World population representing the group of "low income countries" (including India and China) with a population of over three billion people, received in 1991 approximately 5 percent of total World income, less than the GDP of France and its overseas territories. With a population of more than 500 million people, the gross product of the entire Sub-Saharan African region is approximately half that of the State of Texas. Together the lower and middle income countries (including the former "socialist" countries and the former Soviet Union) representing some 84.3 percent of World population receive less than 20 percent of total World income.

In many indebted Third World countries, real salaried earnings in the modern sector have declined by more than sixty percent since the beginning of the 1980s. The situation of the informal sector and the unemployed is even more critical. In Nigeria under the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida, for instance, the minimum wage declined by 85 percent in the course of the 1980s. Wages in Vietnam were below $10 a month while the domestic price of rice had risen to the World level as a result of the IMF programme carried out by the Hanoi government: a Hanoi secondary school teacher, for instance, with a University degree received a monthly salary of less than 15 dollars A similar pattern exists in the former Soviet Union: domestic prices are "dollarised" whereas the monthly minimum wage is below 10 dollars a month. In Peru, in the aftermath of the IMF-World Bank sponsored Fujishock implemented by President Alberto Fujimori in August 1990, fuel prices increased by 31 times overnight whereas the price of bread increased by 12 times. The real minimum wage had declined by more than ninety percent (in relation to its level of the mid-seventies). Whereas an agricultural worker in Peru's Northern provinces was (in August 1990) receiving $7.50 a month, the domestic prices of many consumer goods in Lima were higher than in New York.

Structural adjustment is conducive to a form of "economic genocide" which is carried out through the conscious and deliberate manipulation of market forces. When compared to genocide at various periods of colonial history (e.g. forced labor and slavery), its social impact is devastating. Structural adjustment programmes directly affect the livelihood of more than four billion people. The application of the structural adjustment programme in a large number of individual debtor countries favors the "internationalization" of macro-economic policy under the direct control of the IMF and the World Bank acting on behalf of powerful financial and political interests (e.g. the Paris and London Clubs, the G 7). This new form of economic and political domination --a form of "market colonialism"-- subordinates people and governments through the seemingly neutral interplay of market forces. The Washington based international bureaucracy has been entrusted by the international creditors and multinational corporations with the execution of a global economic design which affects the livelihood of more than 80 percent of the world's population. At no time in history, has the "free" market --operating at a World through the instruments of macro-economics-- played such an important role in shaping the destiny of "sovereign" nations.  For VN case:  insert amount of money and how much dependent.  However, the size of loans VN has asked for is much lower than many other countries like Brasil  number?

Reimbursing the “Bad Debts” of the Saigon Regime

Vietnam never received war reparations payments, yet Hanoi was compelled as a condition for the “normalisation” of economic relations and the lifting of the US embargo in February 1994 to settle the debts of US$140 million incurred by the US-backed Saigon regime. At the donor conference held in Paris in November 1993. a total of US$1.86 billion of loans and “aid” money was generously pledged in support of Vietnam’s market reforms, yet immediately after the conference another (separate) meeting was held with the Paris Club of official creditors. On the agenda: the rescheduling of the”bad debts” incurredby the Saigon regime prior to 1975.

The reimbursement of arrears of US$140 million (owed by Sai gon) to the IMF was also demanded as a condition for the resumption of credit. To this effect, Japan and France (Vietnam’s former colonial masters)  formed a so-called “friends of Vietnam” committee to “lend to Hanoi” the money needed “to reimburse the IMF”. By fully recognising the legitimacy of these debts, Hanoi had in effect accepted to repay loans which had been utilised to support the

US war effort.  This is a painful lesson for Vietnam right at the begining of intergrating its communication with the rest of the world since the end of the war.

3.2. Impact on the social system

Since the mid-1980s, the impact of structural adjustment including the derogation of the social rights of women and the detrimental environmental consequences of economic reform have been amply documented. While the Bretton Woods institutions have acknowledged "the social impact of adjustment", no shift in policy direction is in sight. In fact since the late 1980s coinciding with the collapse of the Eastern block, the IMF-World Bank policy prescriptions (now imposed in the name of "poverty alleviation") have become increasingly harsh and tough.  The trend of widening gaps between the rich and the poor seemed to be clearly visible

3.3. Devaluation of Vietnam dong (VND)

The devaluations of 1984-85 under the advice of the IMF were conducive to a tenfold collapse of the Vietnam dong. largely of the same magnitude as that which occurred in South Vietnam in 1973. The dong was worth US$0.10 at the official exchange rate in 1984; one year later it was worth US$0.01. In addition with the galloping rate of inflation, the value of Vietnam dong is now even worst: $US 1 can be exchanged for VND 15,470 (2003). If you are in Vietnam you will be a millionaire if you have a 100-dollar note. Today, Vietnamese people use US dollar notes as “store of value” (Chossudovsky, 1997)  

4.  Lesson leant

Structural Adjustment demanded by the IMF  is best summed up in four words: earn more, spend less  (Smith , 2002).  While such advice might be valid if it were given to only a few countries at once, dozens of debtors are now attempting to earn more by exporting whatever they have at hand; particularly natural resources including minerals, tropical crops, timber, meat and fish. With so many jostling for a share of limited world markets, prices plummet, forcing governments to seek ever-higher levels of exports in a desperate attempt to keep their hard currency revenues stable. The "export-led growth" model on which the fund and the World Bank insist is a purely extractive one involving more the "mining" than the management-much less conservation-of resources.

Accelerating structural reforms and improving the environment for private sector development are key to maintaining the past momentum of growth and poverty reduction. Bank assistance should therefore focus as a priority on structural, policy, and institutional reforms that define appropriate boundaries between public and private roles and enhance a market economy. This focus should be an integral part of investment lending as well as the focus of adjustment lending.30 Structural, policy, and institutional reforms, as difficult as they will be to bring about in Vietnam, are likely to be the area where the Bank can make the largest contribution to the long-term development and growth of the country.

5.3  In rural development, a more strategic approach should be used in partnership with other actors (donors, NGOs), limiting intervention to two or three major areas, including support forkey policy reforms

5.4   For infrastructure investments and rural projects that have a poverty focus, the Bank should seek agreement with the Government on criteria that will be used in selecting the areas for inclusion.

The structural adjustments forced upon the developing countries are exactly opposite the policies under which every wealthy nation developed tells us the power brokers of the developed countries know exactly what they are doing. Their strategy is to impose unequal trades upon the world so as to lay claim to the natural wealth and the labors of weak nations.  However, The official from the agricultural ministry, MARD, agreed with this and outlined two other critical areas in need of support: science and technology, both in development and application, and infrastructure (irrigation, roads,

marketing infrastructure). He also commented that administrative reforms and capacity building should be an important aspect of future Bank assistance.

5.  Conclusion

Contrary to the spirit of the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 which was predicated on "economic reconstruction" and stability of major exchange rates, the structural adjustment programme (SAP) has since the early 1980s largely contributed to destabilizing national currencies and ruining the economies of developing countries.

The restructuring of the World economy under the guidance of the Washington based international financial institutions and the World Trade Organization (WTO) increasingly denies individual developing countries the possibility of building a national economy: the internationalization of macro-economic policy transforms countries into open economic territories and national economies into "reserves" of cheap labor and natural resources. The State apparatus is undermined, industry for the internal market is destroyed, national enterprises are pushed into bankruptcy. These reforms have also been conducive to the elimination of minimum wage legislation, the repeal of social programmes, and a general diminution of the state's role in fighting poverty

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Bibliography

-  Chossudovsky, M. (1997)  ‘The Globalization of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms’, Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press.

-  Clarke, G. & Christie, A. (1998)  ‘Vietnam: Primary Education Teacher Project Stakeholder Analysis’  Report for World Bank Hanoi

-  , B. & Pyun, S. (1995) ‘Doing Business in Vietnam-- an insider's perspective’ PANGAEA.NET's Interactive Global NEWS(tm).

-  Smith, J.W. (2002) Economic Democracy: The Political Struggle of the 21st Century, (Ed.).  First Books. 

-  Prof. Dr. Tang, H.L. &  Prof. Luu H.N., (2002) ’Comparative Research on Economic Renovation in Vietnam and Economic Reforms in China’. National Politics

-  World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme (2002). ‘Vietnam 2010-Entering the 21st Century, Vietnam Development Report 2001’

-  ‘Ground Rules Set for SOE Restructuring Programme’, Vietnam Investment Review, July 8-14, 2002.

-  General Statistical Office (2001). ‘Figures on Social Development in 2000s in Viet Nam’. General Statistical Office Hanoi.

-  Quoted in ‘SOE Reform Vital for Ensuring Socialist Orientation’, Viet Nam News, August 23, 2001.

-  ‘Seeds of Doubt’, Vietnam Economic Times, February 2002

-  World Bank (1998). ‘Advancing Rural Development in Vietnam-A Vision and Strategy for Action’.

-  World Bank and DFID (UK) (1999) in partnership with Action Aid Vietnam, Oxfam (GB), Save the Children (UK) and Vietnam-Sweden MRDP (1999), “Vietnam:  Voices of the Poor”, Synthesis of the Participatory Poverty Assessments.

 

-  Manh, N.D. (2002) opening address, Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee Fifth Plenum.

 

-  Forde, a. National University of Singapore

-  Israel, J. (2000) ‘The IMF and the World Bank -  Two of Several Instruments of National Destruction. An Interview with Michel Chossudovsky’

           

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