In what sense should we be egalitarian ? What should we try to equalise ?

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In what sense should we be egalitarian ? What should we try to equalise ?

Egalitarianism has been rightly identified as an "essentially contested concept", that is, there is not, and it is doubtful whether there ever can be, any agreement as to its meaning (HURLEY, 1993, p179). The value of equality is disputed by different thinkers. Some believe that equality is only to be valued as a means of attaining some broader aim, for example the maximisation of utility. By contrast, others believe that equality has an intrinsic value and should be pursued as an end in itself (BARRY, 1995, p186). The view taken on this question has important implications for debates concerning value conflicts, for example between equality and liberty. Moreover, even amongst those who accept equality as a primary goal, there is little agreement over what should be equalised. For example, should we try to equalise opportunity or resources or welfare - each of which may result in different outcomes, some more 'equal' than others? It is these issues with which this essay is concerned. Firstly, I shall examine the concept of egalitarianism in order to clarify the point that most thinkers advocate not absolute equality of all people but, what Rees terms, 'conditional' equality (1971, pp107-116). Next, I shall consider various accounts of what constitutes equality as offered by Utilitarianism, Rawls and Sen's conception of basic capability equality. Finally, I shall look at the different positions on what we should try to equalise.

`However, before examining the question of in what sense we should be egalitarians, it is important to examine the basis for any form of egalitarianism. Williams identifies two principle uses of the notion of equality (1967, p110). Firstly, it is used as a statement of fact, that is that 'all men are equal', and, secondly, as a statement of political principle, that is that 'all men should be equal (and at present they are not). Clearly human beings are not identical, they do not have the same desires, needs, wants, requirements, etc. Given the obvious diversity within the human race, what argument can be offered to justify equal treatment of different people? Williams suggests an answer to this problem (1967, pp232-9). He points out that all men possess a common humanity, for example they all possess the capacity to feel pain and affection, they all desire self-respect, etc. It is argued that common moral claims arise form these common characteristics. In short, the equality of men in simply being men gives credence to the assertion that men should be equal and treated as such.

`The most extreme version of egalitarianism advocates the equal treatment of all in every respect, whatever their condition. As Watkins notes this would require that "everybody should be treated alike, irrespective of whether they are competent, married, old lags, youths, alcoholics, or whatever" and this is "palpably absurd" (quoted by REES, 1971, p97). No writer of any note has adopted this position for, given the diversity of human society, the degree of social engineering that would be required to pursue it and the nature of the society that would be created, this concept of egalitarianism is both unattainable and undesirable. Moreover, an acceptance of the principle of absolute equality would lead to a situation in which all in society had nothing (but were equal in this!) being preferable to a situation in which any inequalities existed. This is clearly an untenable position.

`If the principle of absolute equality is rejected then we must look for some other, more appropriate, conception of egalitarianism. This can be described as 'conditional equality' which "prescribes that all persons should be treated equally (in the same way) save when there are reasons for treating them differently" (REES, 1971, p108). This is similar to Aristotle's notion of proportional equality which requires that if two people are equal they should have equal shares and if they are unequal they should have unequal shares in proportion to their inequality (REES, 1971, pp92-3). Whilst this conception has the advantage of successfully avoiding the injustices of treating persons with different needs in the same way, it is still a relatively weak conception. As Rees notes, this bare form of conditional equality represents no more than the assertion that there should be "no discrimination without a reason" (1971, p109). Thus, upon this conception, inequalities on the grounds of race, sex and religion would be justified so long as those discriminating were able to provide reasons for the inequalities. The question then becomes not whether there are reasons for unequal treatment but whether these reasons are morally relevant or appropriate. Given that there is no consensus on what constitutes morality or appropriateness, this criterion would appear to be inherently problematic. As Aristotle recognised: "Equals are entitled to equal things, but the important question is: equals and unequals in what?"

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`Now that a few of the problems of egalitarianism have been highlighted, we will move on to consider the particular ways in which various political theories have sought to embody their differing conceptions of what it means pursue the principle of equality. Firstly, we shall examine the notion of utilitarian equality. The objective of the utilitarian is to maximise the sum total of utility. The achievement of this goal requires that the distribution of goods ensures that the marginal utility of everyone be equal. Thus, it is argued that this theory can be characterised as egalitarian by virtue firstly of its allowing each person's interests to contribute in the same way to determining what would, in sum, maximise utility and secondly by the equalising of everyone's marginal rate of utility (NAGEL, 1979, p113). However, this theory can be used to justify vast inequalities of resources and welfare as everybody does not have the same function for utility. As it pays no attention to the actual level of utility of each person but only to the marginal rate of utility, the smallest gain in the total utility sum would be sufficient to outweigh blatent distributional inequalities. Thus, if we accept that the equal distribution of total utilities is to be valued, then this conception of equality must be condemned (SEN, 1982, pp354-7). The deficiency of utilitarian equality are clearly illustrated by an example given by Sen (1982, p358). Suppose person A gets half the utility from the same income as person B. This theory would require us to give B more income and A less until the marginal rates of utility are equalised. Consequently, A would become doubly worse off. Not only would he get less utility from the same income as B, he would also get less income!

`A different conception of egalitarianism can be labelled 'total utility equality' (SEN, 1982, pp359-63). This view requires that the total utilities of all individuals be maximised and thus the correct distribution is found by employing the 'leximin' (a combination of the maximin rule and the Suppes principle). This conception can be criticised on several counts. Given its adherence to the maximin principle, it does not take into account the number of people whose interests must be overidden in pursuit of the interests of the worst off. Furthermore, due to the ordinal characteristic of ranking, it is insensitive to magnitudes of potential losses and gains. Thus, a (3,2) distribution is preferred over both a (10,1) and (4,1) distribution.

`However, possibly the most significant attack that can be made on both of these utilitarian theories is that they consider only the intensity of pleasures and resulting utility, not their source. As Rawls argues, "In calculating the greatest balance of satisfaction it does not matter...what the desires are for....we ask no questions about their source or quality but only how their satisfaction would affect the total of well-being" (quoted by SEN, 1982, p362). Thus, utilitarian arguments can be used to justify constraints on liberty, discrimination, vastly unequal outcomes, etc. As such, Sen argues that utilitarianism, and other welfarist theories of equality, are undesirable because utility is not an adequate basis upon which to make moral judgements about a state of affairs (SEN, 1982, p363).

`An alternative is offered by Rawls. Rawls creates a hypothetical 'original position' in which people are placed behind a 'veil of ignorance' and, through their deliberations, arrive at two principles of justice. These principles, it can be argues support an egalitarian viewpoint (HURLEY, 1993). It can be argued that egalitarianism seeks to neutralise bias and that the radical ignorance Rawls' original position places people in effectively does this. Whilst I do not have the time to discuss Rawls' two principles in detail, it is the case, I would suggest, that they are egalitarian in a sense. Firstly, it is held that everyone would be equal on in terms of 'primary social goods', that is things that every rational man is presumed to want such as rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, self-respect, etc (SEN, 1982, pp364-7). Moreover, the Difference Principle condemns any inequality unless it works to further the position, in terms of primary goods, of the worst off. Thus, this theory does have the advantage, in contrast to welfarist theories, of embodying some objective criteria of well-being, namely the index of primary goods. However, Rawls' principles of justice take little account of the diversity of humans. As already discussed, people are not identical and they have different needs based on numerous factors such as helath, location, body size, etc.

`After rejecting the needs-based utilitarian and Rawlsian theories, Sen argues for a notion of equality based on 'basic capabilities' (1982, pp367-8). By this he means all people should be able to do certain basic things. For example, everyone should be able to move, should have adequate nutrition, be clothed, have sufficient shelter etc. It is argues by Sen that this approach of 'basic capability equality' allies Rawls' concern with primary goods with the more utilitarian concern of the relationship between goods and humans, i.e. moves away from view of goods as mere embodiment of advantage to what goods actually do for humans. Moreover, by taking into consideration the differences between people, it allows the differential allocation of resources in order to bring everybody up to an equal position of basic capability.

`I would agree with Sen that our aim as egalitarians should be to equalise basic capabilities. This position does not represent equality in the absurd sense of absolute equality as it does not recomment equal treatment and equality of all in every respect, regardless of their condition. However, this conception is still problematic. What constitutes 'basic capablity' and what is needed for particular individuals to achieve it is debatable. For example, sight might be regarded as a basic capability. However, no possible distribution would bring a blind person up to the same level as a seeing person with respect to this. Despite the obvious difficulties though, I believe that Sen's conception of egalitarianism is problably the best availiable. It takes account of differing needs and its emphasis on basic capability equality provides an objective standard as to what can be construed as relevant grounds for inequalities and what cannot. Furthermore, it is not as narrow as Rawls' theory in that it does not give priority to the worst off to the exclusion of everyone else.

`So, to the question of what we should try to equalise. The answer to this depends on the sense in which we are egalitarians. A basic division exists between those who wish to equalise welfare (or utility) - that is those who focus on equality of outcome - and those who wish to equalise resources - a position which may not yield equal outcomes. However, before examining these in more detail, I would first like to say something about the notion of equality of opportunity, if only in order to dismiss it as inappropriate to a serious egalitarian.

`Williams defines the notion of equality of opportunity as the "notion that a limited good shall in fact be allocated on grounds which do not a priori exclude any section of those that desire it" (1967, p243). Thus, there should be no exclusion other that on appropriate or rational grounds for the good in question and no condition should be set that people from one section of society have no chance of achieving. Williams goes on to argue that it is the task of the egalitarian to cure reform a social environment which handicaps someone. Oppenheim characterises the principle of equality of opportunity as a "fair race, where people are even at the starting line" (1981, p116). Thus, on these definition, equality of opportunity would combine equal access with measures to ensure that all start the 'race' from the same point with the 'winner' being the person with the most ability. Those with lower abilities have a smaller chance of success than the more gifted. Regardless of the impracticalities of equalising the conditions under which the 'competition' would take place, the notion of equality of opportunity clearly does not conform to a strict egalitarian ethic. Any egalitarian who desires some overall equality of results would be disappointed by this formulation. This is a strictly meritocratic doctrine which, although it goes further than mere formal equality of access, could produce huge social and economic inequalities (BARRY, 1995, pp189-92). As Baker points out, by helping to make systems of inequality seems reasonable and justifiable, principles of equal opportunity shift the issue away from whether the inequalities themselves are justified to the question of how to distribute inequalities. The notion of equal opportunity neither conforms to the utilitarian desire to maximise either the marginal rate or total utility nor the particular form of equality advocated by Rawls in which all are guaranteed an equal allocation of primary goods and then the welfare of the worst off is prioritised. Moreover, this position is also somewhat removed form that of Sen's basic capability equality for it makes explicitly rejects taking capability as a factor that should be equalised.

`So, let us look instead at alternatives. Many egalitarians believe that we should try to equalise 'welfare'. This view holds that an objective standard exists, be it happiness, utility or whatever, which we can measure and equalise. In short, those who believe we should try to equalise welfare believe in equality of outcome. It should be noted here that a long-term perspective, usually over a whole lifetime, is taken when assessing how much utility/happiness a person has enjoyed. This proviso prevents a descent into the more extreme position of constant absolute equality. However, there are many difficulties in equalising welfare. The problem of expensive tastes is an important one. Suppose one person gets as much utility out of eating kippers as another gets out of eating caviar. In this case, those wishing to equalise welfare would wish to distribute more resources in favour of the caviar-eater. Thus, those with expensive tastes are rewarded, perhaps unfairly, on this formula. Furthermore, because equality of outcome ensures that you will have at least as much or even only as much success in your project as anyone else, any incentive to work hard and utilise any special talents you may have is removed. Thus, the notion of equality of welfare can be criticised on the grounds of efficiency. Redistribution to equalise equality reduces incentives which reduces the total amount of wealth in society and consequently everyone is made worse off.

`It is this question of efficiency which those advocating equality of resources seek to address. This notion seeks to raise the general level of resources whilst benefiting the worst off. It seeks to give everyone the equal capacity to pursue their desires but, crucially, provides no guarantee of success. Dworkin notes, "Equality of resources supposes that the resources devoted to each person's life should be equal" (1981, p289). He proposes that the best way of achieving this is to imagine an initial 'auction' in which everyone has equal means to bid for bundles of goods. When the 'envy test' is satisfied, that is when no one desires another's bundle of resources more than their own, then the distribution of resources is equal. Significantly, Dworkin does not suppose that there will be a continuously equal division of resources. If, for example, someone works hard and acquires more material goods such that his bundle becomes one which others envy, this is not a problem for occupation must be taken into account when applying the envy test: "it requires that no one envy the bundle of occupation and resources at the disposal of anyone else over time" (Dworkin, 1981, p306). It is important too that Dworkin does not allow an individual's talents to be included in an assessment of his bundle of resources. Thus, on Dworkin's theory, it is neither necessary nor desirable that resources remain equal after the initial auction. If, by more talent or hard work, someone uses their equal share to create more, he is entitled to keep the profit (because his gain is not made at the expense of someone else who does less with his share). However, despite his view that some inequality of resources resulting from talent or hard work should be allowed, Dworkin does advocate some redistribution through a tax system to partially neutralise the effects of differential talents and thus blunt the inequalities that may result. Thus, Dworkin's theory incorporates an initially equal starting position allowing people with talents to profit but also recognising the role of genetic luck in possessing such talents and thus catering for some late redistribution (1981, pp312-4). In contrast to conceptions of equality of welfare and Rawls' Difference Principle which would both appear to be inefficient, Dworkin's theory both incorporates incentives to enhance efficiency whilst starting from a basis of initial equality. This theory then would appear to be compatible with Sen's conception of basic capability equality.

`In conclusion, I would argue that egalitarianism has a sound basis and justification in its recognition of men's common humanity. Whilst utilitarian accounts of equality, particularly that which seeks to equalise individuals' total utility, initially look appealing, they are subject to many shortcomings. Not least of these is the practical difficulty in achieving their objectives without undermining incentives and efficiency. Sen's conception of basic capability equality is far more appealing and, combined with Dworkin's approach of equalising resources together with some notion of equality of opportunity in remedying adverse social conditions, would go a long way towards achieving a more egalitarian society without incurring the cost of a reduction in overall resources due to inefficiency.