Strategic Management - CARREFOUR CASE ANALYSIS

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Case Study: Carrefour

Running head:                 CASE STUDY: CARREFOUR

Case 7 Analysis: Carrefour

BA 462: Strategic Management

Instructor: Carlos Alsua


EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

  • GENERAL
  • DEMOGRAPHIC
  • Carrefour operates in 29 countries around the world.  World population is rising, geographic distribution of populations is shifting, world population is aging rapidly, ethnic mixes in developed countries are changing rapidly, and average household incomes are increasing.
  • The demographic environment presents both opportunities and threats for Carrefour.  Increases in population size and household incomes help to expand the market in which Carrefour operates.  However, changes in the geographic distribution of populations, due to technological advances in communications,  may cause difficulties for Carrefour in determining profitable locations for new storefronts.
  • ECONOMIC
  • In 2004, there was substantial economic growth due to near-record low interest rates in the United States, resulting in substantial growth in global trade.  This growth was tempered by high oil prices.
  • The economic environment presents both threats and opportunities for Carrefour.  Growth in global trade presents opportunities for Carrefour in identifying new products and services to offer to its customers.  High oil prices, however, threaten Carrefour’s profitability by increasing the costs of transportation for goods destined for Carrefour’s warehouses and storefronts.
  • POLITICAL/LEGAL
  • Later on, it worked with financial or industrial partners only when national regulations made it necessary, as in China, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. (p. C 77)
  • Foreign ownership laws in Thailand allowed foreign companies—except American companies—to hold no more than 49 percent of the shares.  Carrefour argued that this law would favor its rival, Wal-Mart.  When the Central Retail Corp. sold its 40 percent shareholding in 1998, this law made it impossible for Carrefour to purchase the shares. (p. C 79)
  • [A]ll products within its stores were “halhal” in compliance with prevailing food requirements.  (p. C 79)
  • Since 1992, foreign participation in retailing had been permitted through joint ventures with Chinese companies. (p. C 80)
  • In 1999 China’s central government ruled that foreign companies could not own more than 65 percent of any retailing enterprise in China. (p. C 81)
  • Subsequently, the SETC (State Economic and Trade Commission) threatened to shut down all the stores if Carrefour did not comply with central government regulations. (p. C 81)
  • In 2004 China announced that it would honor its pledges to open the booming retail sector to foreign players such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, abolishing joint-venture requirements before the end of the year.  Beijing also promised to end restrictions on the location and number of foreign-owned chain stores. (p. C 81)
  • The company’s aim is to operate 70 hypermarkets in a few years’ time, but political risk remains high in China. (p. C 82)
  • Instead, local distributors launched lawsuits against Carrefour as the company opted to purchase directly rather than conform to the long-established distribution channels. (p. C 82)
  • The political/legal environment presents a threat for Carrefour.  The differences in the political/legal environment across regions makes it difficult, and sometimes costly, for Carrefour to comply with government regulations.  Political risk in some countries remains comparatively high as does the threat of lawsuits from competitors, distributors, and consumers.
  • SOCIO-CULTURAL
  • [N]ew markets […] had seen dramatic changes in consumer buying habits, coupled with high growth in per capita GNP, suburbanization, greater participation of women in the labor force, and a large increase in the ownership of cars and refrigerators. (p. C 74)
  • The continued growth of suburban communities […] abroad is another major sociocultural trend. (p. T 44)
  • Asian customers still tended to shop daily at wet markets or “mom & pop” stores[.] (p. C 77)
  • Moreover, impulse buying was on the rise and replacing necessity purchasing. (p. C 78)
  • Shopping as a form of leisure was an increasing phenomenon[.] (p. C 78)
  • The socio-cultural environment presents opportunities for Carrefour.  Growth of suburban communities, rises in impulse buying, increased leisure shopping, and other major changes in buying habits tie in nicely with Carrefour’s ability to take advantage of such changes when entering new markets.
  • TECHNOLOGICAL
  • Technological advances in data storage, information systems, the internet, and other forms of communication continue at a rapid pace.
  • The centralization of its IT systems and administrative procedures achieves further savings. (p. C 76)
  • The technological environment presents opportunities and threats for Carrefour.  Improvements in technology will allow Carrefour to perform better analysis of data related to existing and future customer bases.  The improvements will also allow Carrefour to continue to improve its supply chain, which is vital in enabling Carrefour to offer low prices.  These technological improvements, however, may also be readily available to competitors.  If competitors can easily mimic Carrefour’s processes through advances in technology, Carrefour will suffer setbacks.
  • GLOBAL
  • Rapid globalization of business markets.
  • Military and political conflicts continued around the globe.
  • Increased importance of environmentally friendly businesses.
  • The global environment presents opportunities and threats for Carrefour.  Military and political conflicts may increase expenses in transportation, among other areas, that make it difficult to maintain low prices.  The rapid globalization of business markets presents opportunities to Carrefour as countries relax regulations that hinder trade and foreign entry into domestic markets.  The increased importance of environmentally friendly business operations may also increase costs of operation.  However, if Carrefour can establish itself as an environmental leader, the result may be increased sales and profitability.
  • INDUSTRY
  • INDUSTRY DEFINITION
  • Carrefour is a member of the retail industry.
  • In 2003 Carrefour was the second-largest mass retailer in the world[.] (p. C 73)
  • Although primarily known as a hypermarket pioneer, Carrefour also operated supermarkets, hard discounts and other formats, such as convenience stores[.] (p. C 73)
  • In Europe and China, Carrefour is the number one retailer in terms of size. (p. C 74)
  • It built a reputation as the retailer that offered the most variety and freshness at low prices. (p. C 74)
  • The retailer operated exclusively in France until the late 1960s before expanding into Spain, where under the name of Pryca, it became the country’s second-largest retailer. (p. C 74)
  • THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS
  • BARRIERS TO ENTRY
  • PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
  • Carrefour developed the hypermarket concept of bringing nearly all types of consumer goods under one roof in 1959[.] (p. C 74)
  • [Carrefour] built a reputation as the retailer that offered the most variety and freshness at low prices. (p. C 74)
  • [Carrefour] has always been significantly more international than most of its competitors[.] (p. C 74)
  • In order to fight back against the hard-discounters, Carrefour expanded its own hard discount chain, ED. (p. C 75)
  • Carrefour focuses on selecting the format best suited to the particular market and adapting that format to local needs. (p. C 75)
  • For Carrefour, price is not simply a competitive advantage but an essential means of survival. (p. C 76)
  • Carrefour has added new services in developing markets, such as free shuttle services for customers and play areas for children, as well as home delivery. (p. C 76)
  • Carrefour also works actively with local governments and nonprofit organizations to protect the environment. (p. C 76)
  • Carrefour, with Makro, was the first foreign retailer to establish the hypermarket concept in Taiwan. (p. C 78)
  • Carrefour introduced a new feature with the creation of cultural centers in two stores in partnership with Korea’s leading newspaper. (p. C 79)
  • In 2002 Carrefour introduced a number of sales innovations that proved successful. (p. C 79)
  • Carrefour organized two “free credit” campaigns in 2002, which were a resounding success[.] (p. C 79)
  • Carrefour also sought to participate in public welfare projects and to contribute to local communities, while cooperating closely with local authorities. (p. C 81)
  • Ito-Yokado did not reduce prices but instead emphasized higher quality. (p. C 82)
  • Japanese supermarkets chains began slashing prices in anticipation of the “foreign threat”. (p. C 82)
  • [T]he company established its first sales space specializing in French household goods at its fully renovated store in Chiba Prefecture. (p. C 82)
  • Barriers to entry are increased by the differentiation of Carrefour’s storefronts, the level of its community interaction, and its reputation.  It would be difficult for new entrants to do something that Carrefour has not already done or is not currently doing.
  • ECONOMIES OF SCALE
  • [Carrefour] operated 10,378 stores in 29 countries and employed more than 410,000 people. (p. C 73)
  • [Carrefour] has always been significantly more international than most of its competitors[.] (p. C 74)
  • Thanks to its massive buying power, Carrefour could guarantee low prices while permanently offering about 50,000 items in stock. (p. C 74)
  • Carrefour tries to establish as many stores as possible in major urban areas in order to achieve economies of scale. (p. C 76)
  • Carrefour has built big global procurement centers coordinated through Shanghai and Hong Kong. (p. C 76)
  • In 2003 Carrefour was present in eight Asian markets, operating 144 hypermarkets and 55 hard discount stores. (p. C 76)
  • Carrefour’s operations are massive and global in scope.  Barriers to entry for new entrants are increased by high economies of scale.
  • SWITCHING COSTS
  • Carrefour has added new services in developing markets, such as free shuttle services for customers and play areas for children, as well as home delivery. (p. C 76)
  • Carrefour organized two “free credit” campaigns in 2002, which were a resounding success[.] (p. C 79)
  • Carrefour developed the hypermarket concept of bringing nearly all types of consumer goods under one roof in 1959[.] (p. C 74)
  • The basics of Carrefour’s concept are (1) one-stop shopping, (2) low prices, (3) self-service, (4) quality products, (5) freshness, (6) free parking. (p. C 75)
  • [Carrefour] advertises new promotions and discounts every day, reminding customers that they will be refunded if they find the same product cheaper elsewhere. (p. C 76)
  • When first moving into Asia, Carrefour opted for joint ventures and partnerships to make up for its lack of knowledge of the Asian market.  Later on it worked with financial and industrial partners only when national regulations made in necessary, as in China, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. (p. C 77)
  • Promotions, discounts, refunds, joint ventures, partnerships, credit programs, free parking, and other offerings serve to increase switching costs for consumers, suppliers, and partners alike.  However, many retailers behave in this fashion and offer similar services.  Because this is so common in the industry, I question how effective these practices may be at increasing switching costs.  Therefore, the switching costs for consumers in this industry are neither high nor low.
  • ACCESS TO DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS
  • Access to distribution channels can be a strong entry barrier for new entrants, particularly in consumer nondurable goods industries[.] (p. T 51)
  • In some markets, such as China, Carrefour has launched its own product line in home appliances and spices. (p. C 76)
  • In China, for instance, more than 95 percent of its merchandise is locally sourced and the remainder is sourced through local importers or the trading office in Hong Kong. (p. C 76)
  • Carrefour has built big global procurement centers coordinated through Shanghai and Hong Kong. (p. C 76)
  • In order to increase its profitability, in 2000 Carrefour created the GNX online supply platform with Oracle and Sears, whereby suppliers and retailers can exchange information via the Internet and optimize the flow of merchandise, thus reducing their administrative costs. (p. C 76)
  • Managing the supply chain was another major challenge. (p. C 78)
  • Taiwanese suppliers lacked rigor, organization, equipment, and aggressiveness, but they were much more flexible than their Western counterparts. (p. C 78)
  • The price slump and suppliers’ concerns over retailers’ insolvency worked in Carrefour’s favor and the company opened four stores by 1998. (p. C 80)
  • As in Taiwan, Carrefour had to deal with a different negotiation culture and at first used Taiwanese negotiators for its suppliers in China. (p. C 80)
  • Even though China is officially a centralized country, local authorities seek to enforce their own sphere of influence. (p. C 80)
  • Since 2002 a new organization within the group has aimed to expand market outlets for its suppliers and enhance its product offering in its European stores. (p. C 81)
  • Japan is a much more advanced market with established consumer trends, local brands, and supplier networks. (p. C 82)
  • One concrete barrier to entry into the Japanese market was the close network of multiple layers of intermediaries. (p. C 82)
  • Barriers to entry due to access to distribution channels are high.  The differing complexities of distribution channel operation and access among countries, the existence of large global procurement centers, regional differences within countries, and the existence of the GNX online supply platform all serve to increase barriers to entry for new firms.
  • COST DISADVANTAGES INDEPENDENT OF SCALE
  • In order to increase its profitability, in 2000 Carrefour created the GNX online supply platform with Oracle and Sears, whereby suppliers and retailers can exchange information via the Internet and optimize the flow of merchandise, thus reducing their administrative costs. (p. C 76)
  • In addition, in urban areas some kind of “protection” from the local street societies had to be negotiated. (p. C 78)
  • In certain cases Carrefour chose industrial and commercial parks to develop the hypermarkets[…] [b]y adopting this strategy Carrefour could capture both big and small accounts and grow much faster than its rival Makro. (p. C 78)
  • Carrefour is pronounced Jia Le Fu in Chinese, which means “luck and happiness for the whole family.”  This fortunate phonetic translation unexpectedly contributed to Carrefour’s success in Taiwan and later in China, where foreign names often remain unpronounceable. (p. C 78)
  • Despite its efforts, Carrefour failed to find large sites suitable for developing its hypermarket concept and to acquire significant market share. (p. C 80)
  • Carrefour also sought to participate in public welfare projects and to contribute to local communities, while cooperating closely with local authorities. (p. C 81)
  • Ito-Yokado, Japan’s largest supermarket chain, had no plans to copy Carrefour or to open hypermarkets because land costs remained too high. (p. C 82)
  • Japanese supermarkets chains began slashing prices in anticipation of the “foreign threat”. (p. C 82)
  • Carrefour was planning to sell its eight stores in Japan due to “difficulties in acquiring real estate for new stores and the lack of touch with Japanese consumers’ tastes”. (p. C 83)
  • High.  Proprietary supply platforms, operations in desirable locations, high costs of real estate, competition, understanding of consumers’ tastes, participation in public projects, language translations, and the need for protection in some areas all raise barriers to entry.
  • EXPECTED RETALIATION
  • Vigorous retaliation can be expected when the existing firm has a major stake in the industry[…], when it has substantial resources, and when industry growth is slow or constrained. (p. T 51)
  • China represents a huge market and now it has acquired its WTO membership.” (p. C 73)
  • [Carrefour] operated 10,378 stores in 29 countries and employed more than 410,000 people. (p. C 73)
  • Thanks to its massive buying power, Carrefour could guarantee low prices while permanently offering about 50,000 items in stock. (p. C 74)
  • In order to fight back against the hard-discounters, Carrefour expanded its own hard discount chain, ED. (p. C 75)
  • Carrefour advertises new promotions and discounts every day, reminding customers that they will be refunded if they find the same product cheaper elsewhere. (p. C 76)
  • Carrefour has built big global procurement centers coordinated through Shanghai and Hong Kong. (p. C 76)
  • Until the year 2000 international competition had been rather timid but was now progressing fast. (p. C 77)
  • International players such as Makro, Metro, Tesco, and Wal-Mart had shown a big appetite for the region. (p. C 77)
  • “It was as if the Huns had arrived in Taiwan,” Gerard Clerc said of the reaction of local retailers in Taiwan to Carrefour’s arrival. (p. C 78)
  • Carrefour continued to reinforce its lead over Makro, sometimes opening new stores near existing Makro stores. (p. C 78)
  • Local conglomerates raised the stakes and invested massively to protect the local industry. (p. C 78)
  • In 2003 Carrefour was the number three food retailer in Malaysia but was facing increasing competition from strong local and foreign retailers, such as Tesco. (p. C 79)
  • However, local competition remained strong and professional (NTUC) and local suppliers resisted Carrefour’s methods. (p. C 79)
  • But in 1999 it experienced fierce competition and had to modify its activity. (p. C 80)
  • Because most retailers concentrate their efforts in this part of China, competition is steadily increasing. (p. C 81)
  • In 2002 and 2003 Carrefour stepped up its expansion in a bid to move faster than its competitors. (p. C 81)
  • In the wake of the Zhongguancun store opening, Carrefour planned to open one or two more stores in Beijing in 2004 as well as a store in Jinan, the capital of east China’s Shandong Province. (p. C 81)
  • In 2004 China announced that it would honor its pledges to open the booming retail sector to foreign players such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, abolishing joint-venture requirements before the end of the year. (p. C 81)
  • In recent years Shanghai-based major retailers have started to defy foreign competition. (p. C 81)
  • Despite the spectacular bankruptcies of local players such as Mycal in 2002, Japan’s retail sector has remained overcrowded and competition quite fierce. (p. C 82)
  • Japanese supermarkets chains began slashing prices in anticipation of the “foreign threat”. (p. C 82)
  • High.  As demonstrated above, this industry is highly competitive, and new entrants can expect swift and decisive retaliation when opening new stores in many different countries.
  • POWER OF SUPPLIERS
  • Thanks to its massive buying power, Carrefour could guarantee low prices while permanently offering about 50,000 items in stock. (p. C 74)
  • In some markets, such as China, Carrefour has launched its own product line in home appliances and spices. (p. C 76)
  • In China, for instance, more than 95 percent of its merchandise is locally sourced and the remainder is sourced through local importers or the trading office in Hong Kong.  Carrefour has built big global procurement centers coordinated through Shanghai and Hong Kong. (p. C 76)
  • In order to increase its profitability, in 2000 Carrefour created the GNX online supply platform with Oracle and Sears, whereby suppliers and retailers can exchange information via the Internet and optimize the flow of merchandise, thus reducing their administrative costs. (p. C 76)
  • Worldwide, Carrefour requested that its stores make less use of plastic in packaging, thereby gaining a reputation as a model in the retailing industry. (p. C 76)
  • Taiwanese suppliers lacked rigor, organization, equipment, and aggressiveness, but they were much more flexible than their Western counterparts.  They sold products, not services, and often lacked information regarding basic data on their sales, inventory level, and even internal accounting. (p. C 78)
  • However, local competition remained strong and professional (NTUC) and local suppliers resisted Carrefour’s methods. (p. C 79)
  • Carrefour is one of the world’s major exporters of Chinese products. (p. C 81)
  • Since 2002 a new organization within the group has aimed to expand market outlets for its suppliers and enhance its product offering in its European stores. (p. C 81)
  • [T]he traditional clout of wholesalers was slowly being reduced to a more logistic function. (p. C 82)
  • [L]ocal distributors launched lawsuits against Carrefour as the company opted to purchase directly rather than conform to the long-established distribution channels.  After the Japanese distributors lost their case, Carrefour resumed its expansion. (p. C 82)
  • Power of suppliers is low.  The supplier groups are less concentrated and not dominated by a few large companies.  There are many substitute products available to firms, retail firms are a significant customer for supplier groups, and there is little threat of forward integration into the retail industry.
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  • POWER OF BUYERS
  • No single buyer purchases a large portion of the industry’s total output.
  • Thanks to its massive buying power, Carrefour could guarantee low prices while permanently offering about 50,000 items in stock. (p. C 74)
  • Carrefour advertises new promotions and discounts every day, reminding customers that they will be refunded if they find the same product cheaper elsewhere. (p. C 76)
  • Taking local constraints into account, Carrefour has added new services in developing markets, such as free shuttle services for customers and play areas for children, as well as home delivery. (p. C 76)
  • [T]he Asian crisis ...

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